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The purpose of this thesis is to find the most plausible answers to the 
following three central questions of p rudential value (or well-being): (I) 
What does a person's well-being consist in: what has final value for a 
person? (II) How do we determine just how valuable a certain situation 
(or fact) is for a certain person? And (III) how do we determine how 
well off a person is on the whole (at a certain time)? 
In order to achieve this purpose, I conduct a critical examination of 
three common types of answers which have been given to these 
questions, viz. hedonistic theories, desire theories, and "objective list 
theories". For each of these theories of prudential value, I first try to 
offer a formulation of the theory which is as precise as possible (and 
which makes the theory as plausible as possible). I then try to find out 
whether the theory in question is a plausible theory, by looking at a 
number of arguments that can be given for and against the theory. 
My conclusions can be formulated as follows: On the negative side, all 
three theories examined suffer from certain defects; especially the pure 
forms of these theories. On the positive side, I think it is possible to 
construct a theory that can avoid the objections which hit the other 
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of modified actual desire theory, a mixture which also contains certain 
"objectivist" elements. 
Key words 
Well-being, welfare, good life, quality of life, human good, prudential 
value, value-for, theory of value, subjectivism, objectivism, value and 
time, hedonism, desire theories, preferentialism, objective list theory, 
pleasure, preference, rational desire 
The Human Good 

ACTA PHILOSOPHICA GOTHOBURGENSIA 
6 
The Human Good 
Bengt Brülde 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS GOTHOBURGENSIS 
© Bengt Brülde, 1998 
Distribution: 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS GOTHOBURGENSIS 
Box 222 
SE-405 30 Göteborg 
Sweden 
ISBN 91-7346-324-8 
ISSN 0283-2380 
Printed in Sweden by 
Kompendiet, Göteborg 1998 
Acknowledgements 
My first acknowledgement is to Björn Haglund, my supervisor, for his 
support and for our stimulating conversations. 
Next, I want to thank all those who have read and commented on 
various parts of the manuscript. In particular my gratitude goes to 
Krister Bykvist, Mats Furberg, Anders Tolland, Torbjörn Tännsjö, and 
Jan Österberg. 
I am also grateful to the practical philosophers at Uppsala University, 
for their helpful comments and encouragement. In particular I want to 
thank Krister Bykvist (again), Erik Carlson, and Jan Österberg (again), 
for our inspiring discussions on the desire theory. 
Finally, I would also like to my gratitude to the Fulbright Commission, 
who made it possible for me to spend the year 1992/93 in New York. 
A générai note to the reader 
As John Rawls once said (in A Theory of Jus tice), "[t]his is a long book, 
not only in pages". Earlier drafts (which also included a number of sec­
tions on the issue of measurability) were even longer, though. The 
reason why the book is so long is that it is problem-oriented in a very 
strict sense: I have been doing what I consider necessary in order to 
come up with satisfactory answers to the questions asked. 
Now, I realize that there are a number of possible readers who will 
regard the present book as too long (and "not only in pages"). To 
make things easier for those people, I want to give "a few remarks by 
way of guidance". The central questions of this book are formulated on 
pp 22-24. The most fundamental passages besides this one are section 
1.2, where the traditional theories of prudential value (viz. hedonism, 
the desire theories, and the objective list theory) are formulated, and 
chapter 8, where my own mixed theory of prudential value is pre­
sented. Those who want more precise formulations of the traditional 
theories can turn to chapters 2 (hedonism), chapter 4 (the unrestricted 
desire theory), section 5.2 (the modified desire theories), and chapter 6 
(the objective list theory). Those who are interested in the arguments 
that can be given for and against these theories can turn to chapter 3 
(hedonism), section 5.1 (the unrestricted desire theory), sections 5.2 
and 5.3 (the modified desire theories), and chapter 7 (the objective list 
theory). 
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Chapter One 
The questions, the traditional answers, 
and some notes on "method" 
This is an essay about "the good human life" (or well-being), primarily 
about what it is and what it is not, but I will also touch upon some 
related issues, e.g., on whether there are such things as universal pru­
dential values, and to what extent (if any) a person's well-being can be 
measured. The issues that will be discussed are all of a theoretical 
nature, i.e. there will be no discussion of more "practical issues", like 
how we should act and think in order to make our lives better. 
The main purpose of the book is to find the most plausible answers to 
the following three substantive questions of prudential value: (I) What 
kinds of situations (facts) have final value (positive or negative) for a 
person?; (II) How do we determine just how good (or bad) a certain 
situation is for a certain person?; and (III) How do we determine how 
well off a person is (on the whole)?1 
The way in which I will try to achieve this end is not very original: I 
will first take a look at how these questions have (in fact) been answe­
red by various thinkers, and when a certain answer is too vague or 
ambiguous, I will suggest a more precise formulation of it. I will then try 
to determine how plausible these "theories of prudential value" (or 
"conceptions of well-being") are, viz. by looking at the reasons that 
have (or can) be given for and against these theories. This critical dis­
cussion of a number of existing theories constitutes the major part of 
the book, and in the course of this discussion, my own theory will 
slowly take shape. 
But this discussion cannot (and should not) begin until we have a firm 
grasp on the three questions. It is important that the questions of pru-
1 Whenever I refer to (I), (II), or (III) in the text, I will have these central questions 
in mind. (There is one exception to the rule, however, viz. on p 282 ff.). 
1 
dentia! value are formulated in a clear and precise way, and one of the 
main purposes of chapter 1 is to provide such formulations, mainly by 
offering a general account of prudential value (or "value-for"). I think 
there are good reasons for adopting such a "question-oriented" appro­
ach: it is, after all, rather obvious that if a question is given a clear 
enough formulation, if one can get a firm grasp on it, then it is also 
easier to find (or recognize) a plausible answer. 
It is worth pointing out that my three central questions are not the 
only questions which have figured in the philosophical discussion on 
well-being. There are many questions of prudential value besides the 
substantive evaluative questions, e.g., metaethical or methodological 
questions like "What is the nature of well-being?", "Is it possible to jus­
tify (or refute) a substantive conception of prudential value, and if s o, 
how?", and "To what degree (if any ) is the prudential value that a cer­
tain situation (or life) has for a certain person measurable?". Now, even 
though most of these questions will be either ignored or discussed only 
"in passing" (e.g., in appendix D), I think it is important that they are 
not excluded altogether; partly because they will constitute a fruitful 
contrast to the three central questions. 
Chapter 1 consists of three main sections. In section 1.1, my main pur­
pose is to formulate the central questions of prudential value as clearly 
and precisely as possible, but there will also be some discussion of why 
they are important questions, why (and how) they are of normative 
relevance, how they are related to other questions, and so on. In sec­
tion 1.2, I offer a survey of the traditional answers that have been 
given to the central questions. It should be noted that the purpose of 
this section is solely to give a rough characterization the major theories 
of prudential value, e.g., there will (at this point) be no discussion of 
how plausible these theories are. There will then (in section 1.3) be a 
brief and very general "epistemological" discussion of what general re­
quirements a substantive theory of prudential value must satisfy in or­
der to count as plausible, or more specifically, of how general value-for-
claims can be justified or refuted. The main reason for including this dis­
cussion is this: In order to determine whether a general substantive 
value-for-claim is plausible or not, we will (of course) have to assess the 
arguments which can be given for and against the claim. But how do 
we do this: how do we determine whether a certain argument is good 
or bad? What constitutes (in this context) a good argument? Here, I 
2 
will simply state my position on this issue: there will be little or no argu­
ment for the "general methodological convictions" expressed. 
1.1. The questions of prudential value 
The main purpose of this section is to formulate the central questions of 
prudential value as clearly and precisely as possible. In order to achieve 
this goal, I will (roughly speaking) proceed as follows: I will first offer a 
general account of prudential value (or "value-for-people"2) - of what 
kind of value it is, to what it can meaningfully be attributed, and so on3  
- and I will then offer some kind of "analysis" (in a broad sense of the 
term) of the notion of well-being. So, let us first take a closer look at 
what kind of value value-for-people is, and what implications this has 
for the understanding and interpretation of our central questions. 
Goodness-for-people: What it essentially consists in 
Let us start by pointing out that goodness-for-sentences normally take 
the form "X is (was, will be, or would be) good for Y", or "It is (was, 
etc.) good for Y that X holds", where Y ("the subject") can be a carpet, 
a plant, an engine, a company, a person, or the like, and where X ("the 
object") is "ultimately" an event or a state of affairs. This suggests that 
goodness-for is really a r elation between an object and a s ubject, and if we 
want to determine whether a certain object is good for a certain 
subject, we must therefore take into account both what the object is like 
and what the subject is like. 
The only kind of subject that is of interest in this context is people (or 
human beings), i.e. the only kind of goodness-for that is of any rele­
vance here is goodness-for-people. And again, it is important to notice 
that goodness-for-people is (like all kinds of goodness-for) ultimately 
"possessed by" events or states of affairs, and only derivatively posses­
sed by other things (cf. Thomson (1992), p 97). That is, I will restrict my 
attention to goodness-for-statements of the form "X is (was, will be, or 
2As far as I can tell, this term was coined by Thomson. Cf. Thomson (1992). 
3This account will be further developed (more than what is necessary to get a firm 
grasp on the central questions) in appendix A - which deals with how value-for 
differs from (and is related to) other kinds of values - and in appendix B - where 
value-for is further characterized. 
3 
would be) good for P", where X (the object) is a "situation"4, and 
where P (the subject) is a person5. 
Now, to say that "X" refers to a situation, and "P" to a person, is far 
too ambiguous. If w e look at how goodness-for-people-statements are 
actually used, we see that the terms "X" and "P" may refer to a number 
of different things. If w e look at the term "X", we see that, first, it may 
either refer to a particular situation or to all particular situations of a 
certain type; second, the situation X may either be actual (e.g., concrete) 
or merely possible; and, third, it should also be noted that situations 
differ "in size", some situations are (so to speak) "larger" (more global) 
and other situations are "smaller" (more local). In a similar way, the 
term "P" may refer to different things. First, it is likely that it refers to 
one or several particular persons (actual or possible), but it may also 
refer to "generic man"6; second, it may either refer to a certain parti­
cular (actual) person, or to all (actual) persons, or to all (actual) persons 
of a certain type; and third, it seems that it may not just refer to one or 
several actual persons, but also to hypothetical people. 
This implies that goodness-for-people-statements may be of many dif­
ferent kinds, depending on what the terms "X" and "P" refer to. In this 
context, the most interesting kinds of statements are the following ones: 
(1) "The particular situation X is good for the particular person P", e.g., 
"it is good for John that he has this particular pleasant experience right 
now"; (2) "All particular situations of type X (actual or hypothetical) are 
good for the particular person P", e.g., "it is good for John to have 
pleasant experiences"; and (3) "All particular situations of type X (actual 
4In this book, I will use the terms "situations" and "facts" as substitutes for the 
phrase "events and states of a ffairs". In this terminology, a particular situation (or 
fact) is (roughly) a concrete part of reality that corresponds to a true statement 
(sentence, or proposition), and which "makes" this statement true. 
5At this point, it is worth mentioning that the type of person which I have in mind 
is a "reasonably healthy", "minimally autonomous", and (on top of this) adult 
human being (this is something I have in common with most other philosophers 
of well-being). That is, when I ask what is good for a person, I assume that the 
person in question is (roughly) a biological organism who is also a conscious, self-
conscious, social, and language-using agent. (That is, the terms "persons", "people", 
and "human beings" can, in this context, be regarded as more or less 
synonymous). However, this does not mean that a conception of well-being does 
not have anything to say about what is good for squirrels, infants or gravely 
handicapped people; it is just that these cases are (with the possible exception of 
hedonism!) not the central cases in this context. 
6Or "the generic person"; but cf. note 10 below. 
4 
or hypothetical) are good for all persons P" (where hypothetical people 
may also be included), e.g., "it is good for anyone to have friends"7. 
Even though statements of t ype (1) are (most probably) most funda­
mental in the epistemic sense, it seems that the most general type of 
goodness-for-people-statement, i.e. (3), is most "fundamental" in anot­
her sense, viz. because statements of the other two types can be dedu­
ced from statements of t ype (3). This explains why the question "What 
types of situations are good for everyone?" is often regarded as the 
central (or fundamental) question of prudential value. But it is worth 
noticing that this is not generally accepted, and the reason for this is 
that the question is based on the assumption that there are valid state­
ments of type (3), but this assumption may not be true. If this is the 
case, i.e. if "goodness-for-relativism" is true, then we have to replace 
this question with a more "neutral" question, viz. "How (according to 
what criterion) do we ("in principle", that is) determine what situations 
are good for a particular person?". This is a perfectly neutral question 
that everyone can accept, whether they are "generalists" or "particula-
rists", "universalists" or "relativists", "substantivists" or "formalists". 
So, what do we mean when we say that a certain situation is good for 
someone? How should good-for-people-statements (as they are used in 
ordinary language) be analysed? Well, it seems that sentences of the 
form "X is good for P" must be analysed in terms of P 's interest, or P's 
well-being, or P's welfare, or P's good, or the good of P, or P's health, 
or P's being in a good condition. Here are some examples of how the 
phrase "X is good for Y" can be analysed: According to von Wright 
(1963), something is good for a being (or beneficial to this being) when 
the doing or having or happening of th is thing affects the good of th at 
being favourably (cf. p 45). He also suggests that when the being in 
question is a human being, the phrase "the good of a being" (or "the 
being's good") can be understood in two different ways: in terms of 
welfare, and in terms of health, where the welfare of a being is the good 
of the being "as a whole", bodily health is the good (or welfare) of the 
body, and mental health is the good of the mind. This analysis is almost 
identical with the one that Thomson (1996) offers: "What is it for a 
thing X t o be good for a thing Y? X 's being good for Y presumably 
7If some kind of cultural relativism is adopted, statements of the type (4) "All 
particular situations of type X (actual or hypothetical) are good for all persons of 
type P (e.g., for men, or for traditional people)" may also be of interest. 
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consists in X's being conducive to Y's welfare, or to Y's being in good 
condition, or anyway to Y's being in better condition than it would 
otherwise be" (p 140). If we assume that being healthy and being in a 
good condition is the same thing8, we see that goodness-for-people is 
(again) analysed both in terms of welfare and in terms of health. Two 
years earlier, Thomson "defined" goodness-for in terms of " interest" 
and "well-being": "What is good for a creature is what is on balance in 
its interest, or constitutes or contributes to its well-being" (Thomson 
(1994), p 13). This suggests that when we say (in everyday talk, that is) 
that something is good for someone, we either mean that it is in some 
way conducive to his welfare (or well-being), or that it is conducive to 
his (bodily or mental) health, or both. 
This analysis makes it "natural" to make the following two distinctions 
between different kinds of goodness-for. The first distinction is the one 
between "health-goodness-for" and "welfare-goodness-for", where 
something is good for a person in the former way if i t conducive to his 
health, and where something is good for a person in the latter way if i t 
conducive to his welfare (or well-being). In the present context, it is 
"welfare-goodness-for" that is of interest. 
The second distinction (which crosses the first) has to do with how, in 
what way, the object to which goodness-for is attributed is conducive 
to a person's health or welfare. The idea is that situations can be con­
ducive to a person's health or welfare in two major ways; by being a 
constitutive part of it, or by contributing to it in some other way, e.g., 
by making it possible, or by making it more likely. 
If we restrict our attention to welfare, the relevant distinction is the 
distinction between being conducive to a person's welfare by being a 
constitutive part of it, and being conducive to a person's welfare by 
contributing to it in some other way. This distinction is (I think) identical 
with the distinction that Thomson (1992) made between derivative and 
nonderivative goodness-for. In Thomson's terminology, "the derivatively 
good inherits its goodness, and the nonderivatively good does not" (p 
99). She also points out that a thing can inherit its goodness from anot­
her good thing in several different ways, e.g., by causing it, by making 
8It should be noticed, however, that in Thomson's own terminology, being 
healthy and being in good condition is not the same thing. For Thomson (1996), 
being in good condition seems to be more or less identical with welfare (or being 
well off, or having a good life). 
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it possible, or the like9. And this seems to imply that to be nonderivati-
vely good for a person is the same thing as to be a constitutive part of 
his10 welfare. There is a problem with this view, however: It seems rea­
sonable to assume that if a situation X is part of another situation Y, and 
if the value of Y is a function of the values of its parts (including X), 
then the value of Y can (and should) be regarded as derived from the 
value of X. Bu t this allows for the possibility that there are constitutive 
parts of a person's welfare (viz. certain larger wholes) that do not have 
nonderivative value for this person. This means that we will (in this 
book) not restrict our attention solely to nonderivative value-for. The 
focus will be on nonderivative value-for, however (it is, after all, the 
fundamental thing); it is just that we will also (at times) have the wider 
category of final value-for in mind (viz. in the cases where the distinction 
between derivative and nonderivative value do not coincide with the 
more well-known distinction between instrumental value (value as a 
means) and final value (value as an end)11, e.g., when we are concerned 
with the value-for of additive wholes). 
All this suggests that the most fundamental question of v alue-for (or 
prudential value) can be formulated as follows: How (according to 
9The fact that X inherits its goodness-for-P from Y by making it possible can (I 
think) be expressed as follows: The statement "X is g ood for P" can be derived 
(inferred) from the statements "Y is good for P" and "X m akes Y possible", or 
alternatively put: X is good for P because [X makes Y possible and Y is good for P], 
But notice that this "inference" is not of a deductive kind. 
10His or her, that is. As Jonathan Lear writes in his Love and its Place in Nat ure (in 
note 1, p 4): "Unless I am specifically referring to a male, "he" should be 
understood as meaning "he or she", etc. The following observation about the 
problem of gender pronouns made by David Velleman in Practical Reflection 
strikes me as apt: 
"Some readers make take offense at my use of 'he' to denote the arbitrary 
person. Let me assure these readers that I share their goal of inclusiveness in 
language and differ with them only about the means to that goal. My view is that 
traditional usage in this case makes English more inclusive, not less. 
"The rule governing traditional usage is that when 'he' denotes the arbitrary 
person, its gender is purely grammatical, not semantic, and hence carries no 
implications as to the referent's sex. So understood, 'he' no more denotes a man, 
because being masculine, than the German 'die Person' or the French la 
personne' denotes a woman, because of being feminine. 
"The alternative practices that are currently recommended as inclusive - such as 
saying 'he or she' or altering 'he' with 'she' - actually threaten to rob the language 
of i ts capacity for gender-neutral reference to persons." 
11 The distinction between final and instrumental value is further elaborated in 
appendix A. 
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what criteria) do we determine what situations (facts) that are non-
derivatively good (and bad) for a particular person? This question may 
also be formulated in terms of interests, or welfare, or the like. If we do 
this, we will get: How do we determine what is (ultimately) in a certain 
person's interest? How do we determine what a person's welfare (or 
good, or well-being) ultimately consists in?12 These are perfectly neutral 
formulations of the question of prudential goodness, formulations that 
everyone can accept. But how (if at all) could this question be 
answered? 
Well, it is often assumed that there are certain (central, or important) 
types of situations that are nonderivatively good for everyone, e.g., to 
feel pleasure, to have one's desires fulfilled, or to have friends. Now, if 
this assumption is true, the question is really what kinds of s ituations 
that are nonderivatively good for everyone, since if w e know this, it is 
easy to determine what situations that are nonderivatively good for a 
particular person; we simply apply this general knowledge in the parti­
cular case. On this "generalist" view, the most fundamental question of 
prudential goodness can (and should) be formulated as follows: What 
kinds of situations are nonderivatively good (and bad) for a person? 
(where "a person" should be interpreted as "all persons" or "any 
person"). If we formulate this question in terms of interests, or welfare, 
or the like, we may get: What is ultimately in a person's interest?13 
What has (universal) prudential value? 
The reason why I have chosen to regard this substantive evaluative 
question as the fundamental question of p rudential value (cf. (I) on p 1) 
is simple: I believe that the most central and important prudential values 
are universal. The only possible threat to this idea comes (as I see it) 
from a certain kind of subjectivism (or desire theory), but when it is 
recognized that this view can also be plausibly interpreted as a substan­
tive universalist theory, there is really no need to deny that there are 
12Notice that in this book, I use the term "welfare" is in a somewhat technical 
sense, a sense which differs from some of its ordinary senses. Cf. the section on 
the notion of well-being below. 
13An example of an "analysis" of the question of the good life that seems to 
identify this question with the question of what is in a person's interest can be 
found in Parfit (1984). He writes: "What would be best for someone, or would be 
most in this person's interests, or would make this person's life go, for him, as 
well as possible? Answers to this question I call theories about self-interest" (p 493, 
Parfit's own italics). 
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universal prudential values (we will return to the desire theory and its 
different interpretations below, in section 1.2)14. 
This is (I think) all the background that is needed in order to get a 
sufficient grasp on our first central question. But before we turn to how 
the second and the third central questions should be understood, we 
need to say something about how (I) should not be understood; in par­
ticular, we need to say something about how value-for differs from 
"value-period", and how final value-for differs from final "value-
period"15. 
Value-for vs. value-period 
"Goodness-period" (or absolute goodness, or ethical goodness, or 
whatever one may like to call it) is the kind of goodness that moral phi­
losophers have paid most attention to, e.g., it is the kind of goodness 
that is considered most normatively relevant (it is, supposedly, the kind 
of goodness that utilitarians think we ought to maximize). Moreover, 
the traditional theories of prudential value, e.g., hedonism or the 
desire-fulfilment theory, are normally conceived of as theories of 
"value-period" (or rather: as theories of intrinsic, or final, "value 
period"). 
So, what kind of v alue is value-period, and (most importantly) how 
does it differ from value-for? This is a very rough answer to this ques­
tion (a more detailed answer will be given in appendix A): (1) To be 
good-period is to be good "absolutely", or "to make the world (as a 
14An example of a philosopher who do not agree with me is Sumner (1996). On 
his view, the fundamental question is not the substantive "What are the (direct, 
intrinsic) "sources of w elfare"?" (i.e. "What is intrinsically good for us?"), but the 
formal "What is it for something (anything) to be a source of welfare?". This is 
intimately connected to the idea that a theory of welfare must be formal, i.e. that 
it must offer us not merely a list of "sources of welfare", but also an account of 
what qualifies something (anything) to appear on that list (cf. p 16). We will return 
to this idea several times, but suffice it to say here that Sumner does not give us 
any reason to believe that the satisfaction interpretation of the desire theory 
should be rejected. 
15Goodness-for also has to be kept distinct from goodness-from-a-point-of-view 
(or subjective value) as well as agent-relative value. These distinctions are 
discussed in appendix A, which also contains a more detailed discussion of the 
distinction between final goodness-for and final value-period. In the same 
appendix, there is also a discussion of how value-for (in general) is related to 
"value-period" (in general; both agent-relative and agent-neutral value-period), 
and, in particular, how final value-for is related to final value-period. 
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whole) a better place" (a better-period place, that is). (2) It is likely that 
the notion of v alue-period must somehow be understood in normative 
terms, e.g., in terms of what we have a reason to promote (aim at), 
want, or like. And even if value-period-sentences might not (strictly-
speaking) be reducible to normative sentences (in a broad sense), it still 
seems that we have to regard sentences like "if two situations X and Y 
can both be realized: X is better-period than Y if and only if we have a 
prima facie reason to aim at (promote, etc.) X ra ther than Y" or "X is 
better-period than Y if and only if it is the case that if some agent could 
realize X instead of Y, he should do so" as platitudes. In short, it can 
hardly be denied that there is a strong conceptual connection between 
"X is better-period than Y", on the one hand, and claims like "If there is 
a choice between X and Y, we have a prima facie reason to choose X" 
or "We have a reason to prefer X to Y (on the whole)", on the other. 
This strongly suggests that the notion of v alue-for and the notion of 
value-period are two entirely different notions. To see this more clearly, 
consider the following circumstances: (a) It is not impossible that there 
exist situations which have final value for people, but which lacks final 
value-period. For example, the alleged fact that it has final value for a 
person that a certain desire of h is is fulfilled does not necessarily make 
the world better-period, and it does not "imply" that there is an "ulti­
mate" reason to promote that the desire is fulfilled16, (b) It is also possi­
ble that there are situations that have final value-period without being 
(finally) valuable for anyone. First, it is (obviously) the case that a situa­
tion can have final value-period without also having final value for some 
existing person: That a certain situation has final value-period (or that a 
certain situation is finally better-period than another) does not imply 
that there is any particular (existing) person for whom it is good. To see 
this, consider the following statements: "It is better that 100 babies are 
born than that 50 babies are born" and "it is better if 300 people die 
than if 700 people die". Here, it is quite clear that there need not exist 
any person (or sentient being) P such that "better" can be replaced by 
16Or alternatively put, it is not necessarily irrational to accept preferentialism qua 
conception of prudential goodness and (at the same time) reject preferentialism 
qua conception of final (agent-neutral) value-period altogether. (It is worth 
noticing that this idea is closely related to, but not identical with, the idea that 
preferentialism is plausible qua axiological component of egoism, but that it is 
implausible qua axiological component of utilitarianism). 
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"better-for-P". Second, and more importantly, the final value-period of 
a certain situation need not be a function of t he final values-for that it 
"contains". Or alternatively put, all final values-period need not be 
"personal values", there may also exist "impersonal final values", like 
distributive equality or ecological diversity. 
The fact that the theories of the good life that will be discussed in this 
book (e.g., hedonism or the desire theory) are often conceived of as 
theories of final value-period rather than as theories of prudential value 
makes it important to distinguish carefully between the two types of 
theories. For example, viewed as a conception of prudential goodness, 
the hedonistic theory claims (roughly) that the only thing that is ultima­
tely in our interest is to have pleasant experiences. Viewed as a concep­
tion of final value-period, on the other hand, hedonism claims (roughly) 
that the only thing we (ultimately) have a reason to promote is that 
people's lives (or the lives of sentient beings) are as pleasant as possible. 
These are two very different claims, and they have to be justified (or 
refuted) in somewhat different ways. 
A note on Betterness-for 
In order to make the central questions (II) and (III) more precise, it is 
necessary to dwell on two rather trivial "claims" about value. The first 
one is that evaluations are often comparative, i.e. they are often of the form 
"X is better (or worse) than Y"17. In the case of v alue-for-people, com­
parative sentences either take the form "It is better for P that X holds 
than it is that Y holds", or they take the form "X is better for P than 
what Y is for another person Q". The former case is the intrapersonal 
case, and here "every human being" may well be substituted for "P". 
The latter case is the interpersonal case, and here "P" and "Q" either refer 
to particular persons or to all persons of certain types. In a similar way, 
we can also distinguish between intratemporal and intertemporal com­
parisons, where an intratemporal comparison has (in the intrapersonal 
case) the form "it is (at a certain time t) better for P at t if the possible 
situation X ho lds at t than if the possible situation Y holds at t", and 
where an intertemporal comparison has (again, in the intrapersonal case) 
17Comparative evaluations may (of course) also take the ("superlative") form "X (a 
particular K) is the best (or worst) of all Ks", but evaluations of this type are of 
little or no interest in this context. 
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the form "X's occurrence at tj is (or was) better for P at ij than Y's 
occurrence at £2 is (was) for P at £2" (e.g., as in "my present job is better 
for me now than the job I had two years ago was for me back then")18. 
The second (trivial) claim is that value is always a matter of degre e. All 
good things have (it seems) positive value to some degree or other, and 
all bad things have negative value to some degree. So, in the case of 
value-for, we can say that if something is good (or bad) for a person P, 
then it is always good-for-P (or bad-for-P) to a certain degree. This no­
tion of "value to a certain degree" is (I think) intimately connected to 
the notion of comparative evaluation, or more precisely, it is likely that 
"specifications of degrees of value cannot be obtained without recourse 
to comparative evaluations" (cf. Wetterström (1986), p 85). 
Now, these claims are both relevant in this context. The second claim 
is an assumption that has to made if t he central questions (II) and (III) 
are to make any sense at all, and the fact that there are several diffe­
rent kinds of comparative evaluations implies that there are several 
ways in which the two questions can be interpreted. 
Let us look at (II), which has been formulated as follows: "How do 
we determine just how good (or bad) a certain situation is for a certain 
person? For example, how do we compare different possible situations 
with respect to their final value for a certain person?". This is a question 
about intrapersonal measurement: what we want to find out is how we 
should (on the assumption that this is possible) measure to what degree 
a certain good (bad) situation is good (bad) for a certain person. So, 
what type of intrapersonal measurement (e.g., comparisons) do I have 
in mind, intratemporal or intertemporal? Well, the answer is really 
"both" (it is hard to see how one could suggest different standards of 
measurement in the two cases19), but for reasons that will be given 
below (e.g., in appendix C), the focus will be on the intratemporal case. 
That is, (II) will (primarily) be understood as follows: To the extent that 
it is possible, how (according to what criteria) do we determine just 
what final value a certain possible situation has for a certain person-at-
18These formulations are all "based" on the view that all value-for-P is value-for-P-
at-some-time-f. This view is formulated in more detail in appendix C. 
19In a similar spirit, we can add that the standard of measurement that is most 
plausible in the intrapersonal case is probably most plausible in the in t erpersonal 
case too. But it is far from certain that the two standards coincide fully (e.g., if 
some desire theory is accepted; cf. note 47 below), and to the extent that they 
differ, I will ignore the interpersonal question. 
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a-certain-time? For example, how do we determine whether a certain 
(possible) situation is nonderivatively better or worse for a certain 
person-at-a-certain-time than another situation (or whether the two 
situations are equal in value)?20 21 
The notion of well-being 
Let us now try to get a better grasp on the third central question, viz. 
"How do we determine how well off a person is (on the whole)?". In 
order to understand this question, we need to know what we mean 
when we say that someone is well off22, or that his level of well-being is 
high (or low), or that there has been an increase (or decrease) in well-
being. How should such attributions of well-being be interpreted? Well, 
to say that someone is well off is (obviously) to make an evaluative 
claim, and the question can therefore be rephrased as follows: When 
we say about a certain person that he is well off, what kind of value is 
being attributed, and to what is this value being attributed? 
My answer to this question is that when we say about a person P that 
he is well off, we attribute final (but not nonderivative) value-for to his 
existence as a whole. Or alternatively put, to be well off is (roughly) the 
same thing as living a good life (in a broad sense of the term; cf. e.g., 
20This suggests that (III) is (primarily) a question about how we should (in 
principle) determine (measure) how well off a certain person-at-a-certain-time is 
at that time. We will soon return to how (III) should be understood. 
21The fact that these questions are (in a way) based on the assumption that final 
value-for is (at least to some degree) intrapersonally measurable gives rise to a 
number of co rresponding questions concerning measnrability (e.g., comparability). 
Examples of such questions are: Is the final value that a certain (possible) situation 
has for a certain person intratemporally measurable, and if s o, in how strong a 
sense? For example, is it possible to compare (rank) all possible situations with 
respect to their, final value for a certain person-at-a-certain-time? And in how 
strong a sense (if any) is well-being (intrapersonally) measurable, e.g., is it 
possible to rank all possible lives for P at t with respect to value for P at t? 
Now, it is worth noting that even though it might be of great normative 
importance to find plausible answers to these questions, they are not questions 
that a conception of prudential value is supposed to answer. Every theory of well-
being has certain methodological implications, however, and to find out what 
these implications are, all we have to do is to assume that the theory is true, and 
then ask in how strong a sense (if a ny) that well-being is measurable (given this 
assumption). These methodological questions will fall outside the scope of this 
investigation, however. 
22What we mean in this context, that is, and not in ordinary speech. I will, for 
example, ignore the fact that "being well off" sometimes means "being financially 
well provided for". 
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note 49 on pp 224-22S)23. But what is a person's existence (or "life"), 
and what is it to attribute value-for to such a thing? 
The situations (facts) that have final value for a person differ in "size" 
as well as in complexity. That is, the situations to which final value-for is 
attributed can be more or less local (more or less global), and they can 
be more or less simple (more or less complex). The smallest (most local) 
situations to which final value (for a person P) can be meaningfully 
attributed is (I think) situations like "P has such-and-such an experience 
(e.g., a pleasant experience) right now", "P is engaged in such-and-such 
an activity (or performs such-and-such an action)", or "P interacts with 
Q in such-and-such a way (e.g., he has sex with Q)". Examples of pos­
sible prudential values with a higher degree of globality are accom­
plishment, intimate relationships (where a relationship should be regar­
ded as a much more global and complex thing than an interaction), per­
sonal development, and autonomous living. Now, my idea is (roughly) 
that the most global (and the most complex) situations to which final 
value-for-P can be meaningfully (and plausibly) attributed are situations 
of the type "P has such-and-such an existence"24, where a P's existence 
(or "life" in the broad sense) includes such things as what kind of 
person P is, and what kind of life (in the narrow sense) he has25. 
The idea that "P is well off" can be understood as "P's existence (as a 
whole) has positive final value for P" suggests that the central question 
(III) may also be formulated as follows: How do we determine just how 
23That is, the fact that well-being is attributed to persons (we do not say about a 
person's existence that it is well off) does not in any way imply that we attribute 
value to a person when we say about him that he is well off. And once this is clear, 
we will hardly assume (with Kagan (1992)) that "it might be one thing for a person 
to be well off and quite another for that person's life to go well" (note 7, p 182), or 
that the quality of a person's life may be distinct from his level of well-being (cf. 
ibid., note 10, p 188). 
24It is worth noticing that this idea is inconsistent with the unrestricted version of 
the desire theory. The reason for this is that this theory attributes final value-for-P 
to the most global situations which can be imagined, viz. situations of the type 
"the world (as a whole) is constituted in such-and-such a way". As far as I can see, 
the idea is consistent with all the other theories, however, e.g., the fact that the 
hedonist attributes final value to our experiential lives only does not seem to 
prevent him from attributing final value-for-P to a P's existence as a whole (it is 
just that this value is believed to "reside" solely in the experiential dimension). 
25We could also say that a full description of a person P's existence would take the 
form of a list of factual claims about P and his life. But what types of f acts should 
be included in such a description, and what facts should be excluded? We will 
return to this issue in section 5.2.1. 
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finally valuable a person's existence is for this person? Or in terms of in­
formation: What do we need to know about a person's existence in or­
der to be able to determine its final value for this person? For example, 
how do we determine whether a certain possible life is better or worse 
for a person than another possible life, or whether the two lives are of 
equal value? 
Now, it seems that "P's life (existence) is good for P" is better formu­
lated as "P's life is a good life for P" (or as "P's existence is a good 
existence for P"). Here, the term "good" is affixed to the noun "life", 
i.e. it is used adjunctively. This suggests that when we say that a certain 
life is good for the person who lives it, we attribute goodness-for to a 
certain kind of entity, viz. a life (or an existence). It also suggests that 
"good-for" is (in this context) an attributive adjective in Geach's techni­
cal sense, i.e. that statements of the form "X is a good life for P" never 
split up logically into "X is a life" and "X is good for P" (cf. appendix A). 
Or alternatively put: The goodness-for that we attribute to existences 
belongs to the category "goodness-of-a-kind"26. This explains why the 
non-comparative question of well-being (which is really a part of (I), 
and which should be kept separate from the comparative (III)), viz. 
"What does a person's well-being consist in?" can also be formulated as 
"What kind of life is a good life for the person who lives it"? 
Let us now connect this to the idea of supervenience. In the case of 
attributive goodness, the idea of supervenience can (I think) be formu­
lated as follows (cf. appendix B): For each kind K, there is a standard of 
goodness that is of the form "a good K is a K that has the natural fea­
tures Fi...Fn, and if X is a good K, it is because it has these features". 
That is, as far as attributive goodness is concerned, a standard of 
goodness is always a standard of goodness for some kind K, and for 
each K, this standard is common to all Ks. This suggests that the non-
comparative question of well -being can also be formulated as "What is it 
that makes an existence (a life) good for the person who has (lives) it?", 
or "What are the "good-for-making characteristics" for human existen­
ces (lives)?". 
Now, in order to get a better grasp on how the questions of well-
being (especially (III)) should be understood, there are at least two 
26That is, value-for is sometimes attributive, and value-for-statements are 
sometimes of the form "X is a good-K-for-P". "K" need not refer to existences, 
however; it can also refer to experiences, activities, relationships, or the like. 
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more things we have to know. First, phrases like "P's existence" and 
"P's life" can either refer to P's existence (life) at a certain time, or to P's 
existence (life) over time, i.e. to something temporally extended. So the 
question arises: How should the phrases be understood in the present 
context of well-being? Second, regardless of whether we have existen­
ces at certain times or temporally extended lives in mind; existences 
(lives) are wholes, and this has certain implications for how the ques­
tions of well-being should be understood and answered, implications 
which need to be spelled out. Let us now take a closer look at these 
issues. 
Well-being and time: the temporal aspect of (III) 
So, depending on whether we have existences at certain times or tem­
porally extended lives in mind, there are two possible interpretations of 
the questions of well-being. The non-comparative question of well-being 
(i.e. "What makes a life have final value for the person who lives it?") 
can either be interpreted as (i) "What makes a person's life good (for 
this person) at a certain given time27?", or as (ii) "What makes a 
person's life good (for this person) over a (longer) period of time?" (a 
special case of which is (iii) "What makes a life as a whole (from birth to 
death) good for the person who lives it?"). The comparative question 
of well-being (i.e. (Ill) "How do we determine just how valuable a 
person's existence is for this person?") can, in a similar way, either be 
interpreted as (i) "How do we determine just how well off a certain 
person is at a certain time?", or as (ii) "How do we determine just how 
valuable a person's existence (life) over a certain period of time is for 
this person?" (a special case of which is (iii) "How do we determine just 
how valuable a certain life as a whole (from birth to death) is for the 
27So, how should the phrase "at a certain given time" be understood here, how 
extended is the time span that it refers to? Examples of "certain given times" are 
"now" and "then", as in "my life is good now, but it was not good then (a year 
ago)". So, when someone says that his life is good now, what time span does he 
have in mind? Well, "now" does most probably not mean "this very moment", but 
rather something like "nowadays". So, what does one mean when one says that 
one's life is good nowadays? Presumably that it has been good for some time (at 
least for a couple of d ays), but also that it is likely to stay that way (at least for 
some time). If i t is true that judgements of the form "P's life is good right now" 
involve an implicit reference to the near future (or at least to beliefs about the 
future) in this way, then every plausible answer to (i) must take this into account, 
but I have never really seen this done (in a philosophical context, that is). 
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person who lives it?")28. 
Suffice it to say that in this book, the two questions of well-being will 
be understood in the first (synchronic) sense, rather than in any of the 
diachronic senses. That is, the non-comparative "What makes a life 
good for the person who is living it?" will be understood as "What 
makes a person P's life at a certain given time have final value for P at 
that time?", and the comparative (III) wi ll be understood as "How do 
we determine just how well off a certain person is (on the whole) at a 
certain time?"29. 
Lives are wholes 
Let us now turn to the idea that existences are wholes, and see how 
this idea might affect our understanding of the questions of w ell-being. 
It is (especially in this context) natural to regard lives as wholes: when 
we attribute value-for-P to P's life, we attribute value-for to a certain 
type of whole. There are two ways in which lives can be regarded as 
wholes, viz. "in the diachronic" and "in the synchronic". To say that 
lives are wholes "in the diachronic" is to say that they are (can be regar­
ded as) temporal wholes which consist of a sequence (or succession) of 
parts (e.g., actions and events), and to say that lives are wholes "in the 
synchronic" is to say that they can (and should) be regarded as "simul­
taneous wholes" that consist of a number of parallel (simultaneously 
occurring) states, actions, or events. This means that a life-over-time 
(e.g., a life-as-a-whole) is a whole in both senses, i.e. in the diachronic as 
well as in the synchronic, while a iife-at-a-certain-time-r is (roughly 
28Xt is important to distinguish the idea that the questions of the good life (or 
existence) has "temporal content" (that one can, so to speak, have different "time 
spans" in mind when one asks them) from the observation that lives (or periods 
of lives) are always evaluated from temporal perspective or other, e.g., while they 
are going on, afterwards, and so on. 
29My main reason for adopting this "synchronic interpretation" is that I tend to 
regard it as the only intelligible (and plausible) interpretation. Or more specifically, 
I think it makes perfectly good sense to talk about (i) the final value-of-a-life-at-a-
certain-time-for-the-person-who-is-living-it, but I don't think it makes any sense 
to talk about (ii) the final value-of-a-life-over-time-for-the-person-who-is-living-it, 
and/or (iii) the final value-of-a-life-as-a-whole-for-the-person-who-is-living-it. 
However, the "fact" that it makes little or no sense to attribute final value-for to 
lives as temporally extended wholes does not (in any way) suggest that it is 
unintelligible to attribute aesthetic value or value-period to whole lives. These 
(somewhat controversial) ideas are developed more in detail in appendix C. 
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speaking) a synchronic whole, but not a diachronic whoie. And since 
we have restricted our attention to what it is that makes a person's life 
good (for him) at a certain given time, this means that we will (from now 
on) conceive of lives as synchronic wholes. 
Now, suppose we ask what kinds of features of lives-at-certain-times 
that make them good for the persons who live these lives. If we think 
of lives as synchronic wholes which consist of parts, two kinds of pos­
sible answers present themselves. First, a life can (of course) be good 
because its constituent parts (or "contents") are good, e.g., because 
there is a lot of pleasure "in" it, or because it "contains" a lot of friend­
ship. But second, it is also possible that the goodness of a life super­
venes on certain "holistic" features, i.e. properties that are (roughly 
speaking) "possessed" by the whole but not by its parts. The holistic 
features of a life-at-a-certain-time that are most likely to be good-
making are its "formal features", i.e. features which concern how its con­
tents are structured (synchronically), e.g., organic unity30. 
An example of a philosopher who thinks that organic unity matters, 
or more specifically, that a more organically unified life is ceteris paribus 
better than a less organically unified life31, is Nozick (1989). He writes: 
In wanting ourselves to be of value and our lives and activities to 
30A life-over-time has more global features, however, e.g., features which concern 
how the contents of a life are distributed over time (its "narrative direction"), and a 
life-as-a-whole has (on top of this) also a duration. Of all the features of lives, this is 
the quantitative feature par excellence, and this is why a question like "what is the 
most optimal life span?" can be regarded as a question of "the quantity of life". 
But observe that since the first "t" in "X-at-f is good for P-at-f" can refer to a 
(short) period of time (cf. note 27), it may well be possible to attribute properties 
like rhythm and continuity to lives-at-certain-times as well. 
31 Where organic unity (or "unity in variety") is a combination of the features unity 
and variety (or diversity). This means that the degree to which something is 
organically unified is a function of two things, viz. "the degree of [the] diversity 
[that gets unified] and the degree of unity to which that diversity is brought" 
(Nozick (1989), p 164). That a life is organically unified in the synchronic means that 
it is both varied and unified at a certain given time, i.e. that it has many parts (or 
"dimensions"), and that these parts "hang together", or form a coherent and 
harmonious whole (e.g., the life in question can not be characterized as a "double 
life", or as a set of "multiple lives"). (Cf. the idea that the good life is a balanced or 
harmonious life, e.g., by displaying "hierarchy"). That a life is organically unified in 
the diachronic sense, on the other hand, means (roughly) that it is both varied and 
unified over time, e.g., that there is a rhythm of alternation between things like 
novelty and adventure, on the one hand, and continuity and tradition, on the 
other. 
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have value, we want these to exhibit a high degree of organic unity. 
I... I We want to encompass a diversity of traits and phenomena, 
uniting these through many cross-connections in a tightly integrated 
way, feeding these productively into our activities (p 165)32. 
Now, I am far from certain that this idea is a plausible idea about what 
is good for a person, but I do think it is worth taking seriously. In other 
words, we can not automatically assume that all the situations which 
have nonderivative value for a person are "local"; we also have to con­
sider the possibility that it has final (and nonderivative) value for P-at-f 
that his life has certain formal features at f, e.g., that it is organically 
unified at t. That is, we should not ignore the question of whether the 
value (or "quality") of a life-at-a-certain-time is dependent on what 
"form" it has33. 
Evaluative atomism vs. evaluative holism 
Another thing that becomes clear if we think of lives-at-certain-times as 
synchronic wholes is the following problem: We attribute final value to 
lives, but also to their features (e.g., parts). But what connection (if 
any) is there between the value of the whole and the values of its fea­
tures (parts)? Well, I don't think anyone would deny that there is some 
kind of correlation between the value of a life-at-a-certain-time (as a 
whole) and the values of its features (parts), but there are different 
views as to the nature of th is connection. As a general evaluative view, 
evaluative atomism claims that the value of a whole is a function (e.g., a 
sum) of the values of its parts. The evaluative holist rejects this idea, and 
if h e is an extreme holist, he might even claim that a certain feature can 
32This is but a special case of a more general view, viz. the idea that "[sjsomething 
has intrinsic value /.../ to the degree that it is organically unified". (He even 
claims that a thing's organic unity is its intrinsic value, or "at any rate", that "it is a 
structure of organic unity that constitutes value's structure" (p 164)). It is not 
entirely clear what kind of value he has in mind here, though. 
33And if it is the value of a life-over-time, or the value of a life-as-a-whole that we 
happen to be interested in (a value that cannot, on my view, be value-for), we also 
have to ask: (1) Is the value of a life-as-a-whole dependent on how long it is?, and 
(2) Is the value of a life-over-time dependent on what "diachronic form" it has, 
e.g., (a) on how organically unified it is over time, or (b) on how its contents are 
distributed over time? (Where the answer to (1) is obviously "yes" if one has 
value-period or "perfectionist value" in mind, but not necessarily if one has 
aesthetic value in mind, where the answer to (2a) is obviously "yes" if one has 
aesthetic value in mind, and so on). 
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be a merit in some lives and a defect in other lives. If w e apply this to 
the case at hand, we can say that someone is a "synchronic atomist" if he 
claims that the value of a life-at-a-certain-time is a function of the values 
of i ts "simultaneous" (or "parallel") features/parts34, and that someone 
is a "synchronic holist" if he rejects this view35. 
So the question arises: Which view about the connection between the 
final value-for of a life-at-a-certain-time (as a whole) and the final 
values-for of its features (parts) is correct, synchronic atomism or 
synchronic holism? Well, personally, I think that it is quite clear that 
"synchronic atomism" is false (at least as long as we do not conceive of 
holistic features as parts), i.e. I agree with Moore's (1903) idea that we 
are sometimes "justified in asserting that it is far more desirable that a 
certain thing should exist under some circumstances than under others; 
namely when other things will exist in such relations to it as to form a 
more valuable whole" (p 30)36. The holism I accept is not very extreme, 
however. For example, I tend to agree with Russell (1930) when he 
claims that "[tjhere can be no value in the whole unless there is value in 
the parts" (p 25), and I do not agree with Moore (1903) when he claims 
"that a good thing may exist in such a relation to another good thing 
that the value of the whole thus formed is immensely greater than the 
sum of the values of the two good things", or when he says that "it 
seems as if indifferent things may I... I be the sole constituents of a 
whole which has great value, either positive or negative" (pp 27-28, my 
italics)37. On my view, the value-for of a life-at-a-certain-time is 
34That someone is a "diachronic atomist" would then mean that he believes that the 
value of a life over time is a function of the values of its temporal parts (or its 
"periods"). However, the value referred to here can (on my view) not be value-for 
(cf. appendix C). 
35As it stands, it is not entirely clear how this should be understood, however. In 
particular, it is not clear whether we should think of the holistic features which 
were discussed above as "parts". If there are such things as holistic good-making 
features of lives, does this imply that holism is true and atomism false? Well, I 
think this is the common view, but I don't think that it is necessarily the most 
plausible view. There are two separate questions here, and there are good reasons 
for formulating them in such a way so as to make this circumstance as clear as 
possible. 
36At this point, someone might think that we could make things clearer by 
introducing a notion of contributory value. It is doubtful, however, whether we 
gain anything by doing this. If atomism is true, we don't need it, and if h olism is 
true, it seems that the notion in question does not really help us to clarify 
anything. 
37As far as the value-for of a life-at-a-certain-time is concerned, that is. It is worth 
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"roughly" a function of th e values-for of its parts, and this means that I 
also reject the extreme idea that the same feature can be a merit in one 
life and a defect in another (under all descriptions, that is)38. The form 
of holism I accept is compatible with "generalism" in this area, i.e. it does 
not force me to become a particularism9. 
The problem of (synchronic) aggregation 
The last problem that is generated by the idea that lives-at-certain-times 
are wholes is the problem of aggregation. Suppose that synchronic ato­
mism is correct, and that the value-for of the whole is a function of the 
values-for of its parts40. This gives rise to the following problem: What 
is the function that takes us from the values-for of t he ("simultaneous") 
parts to the value-for of the (synchronic) whole? How do we calculate 
the final value-for of a life-at-a-certain-given-time from the final 
(nonderivative) values-for that it contains at that time? This is the 
problem of aggregation at a certain time, or "the problem of aggregation in 
the synchronic"41. 
Now, it is (I think) rather obvious that there is at least "some truth" 
in synchronic atomism: it can hardly be denied that the final value-for of 
a life at a certain given time is at least partly dependent on the values-
noting that both Moore and Russell had value-period (rather than value-for) in 
mind. There are exceptions to the rule, however: First, the complex fact that P 
wants X and X obtains may well have value even if the fact that P wants X and the 
fact that X obtains are both (in themselves) "indifferent", and second, the rule does 
not seem plausible if one has very local (e.g., "microscopic") parts in mind: there is 
hardly any value in such parts. 
38But only on the assumption that the satisfaction interpretation (rather than the 
object interpretation) of the desire theory is adopted. See section 1.2. 
39But it is worth noting that the idea that the occurrence of a certain situation may 
be better for a person under some circumstances than under others means that 
the following questions can not really be avoided (in connection with (II) and (III), 
that is): "For every type of good situation, under what circumstances is it best for 
a person that it occurs? What combinations of good-for situations tend to form 
synchronic wholes that are more valuable for a person than the sum of the 
values-for of their constituent parts?" These are extremely difficult questions, 
however, and they will therefore be put aside. 
40Most answers to (III), the comparative question of well-being, e.g., the 
hedonistic answer, seem to be based on this assumption. 
41There is (of course) also a problem of aggregation over time, or "a problem of 
aggregation in the diachronic", viz. how to calculate the value of a life over a 
certain period of t ime (e.g., the value of a life as a whole) from the nonderivative 
values that it contains during that period. This is not a problem that needs to 
concern us here, however. 
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for of it s constituent parts at that time. This suggests that no answer to 
the comparative question of wel l-being (i.e. (Ill)) can be complete unless 
it includes a theory of a ggregation in the synchronic, and that no ana­
lysis of this question can be complete unless it includes a reference to 
the problem of aggregation. 
This ends the section on how the conception of life-at-a-certain-time 
as a synchronic whole influences (or ought to influence) our under­
standing of the questions of prudential value, especially the questions of 
well-being. 
The questions of prudential value revisited 
We now have the background we need in order to get a good enough 
grasp on our three central questions (or sets of questions). To sum 
things up, this is how these questions can be formulated more in detail: 
(I) On the assumption that the central and important prudential 
values are universal: What kinds of situations (facts) have final value 
(positive or negative) for a person? What does a person's well-being 
(or welfare) consist in? Or more specifically, what is it that makes a 
person P's "existence" at a certain given time have final value for P at 
that time? What features of a life-at-a-certain-time make (if p resent) 
this life better (for the person who is living it) than it would other­
wise have been? 
In particular, we want to know what kinds of local situations that 
are nonderivatively good (bad) for a person, but we also have to 
consider the possibility that it has final (and nonderivative) value for 
P-at-f that his life has certain formal features at t, e.g., that it is orga­
nically unified at tiZ. 
The most general comparative question can be formulated as follows: 
To the extent that it is possible, how do we measure (intrapersonally as 
well as interpersonally, and intratemporally as well as intertemporally) 
the final value that a certain possible situation (local or global) has for a 
42It might also be argued that a person's well-being at a certain time is (in part) a 
function of what his future prospects are at that time (which would include how 
long it is expected to be). I don't think that the value that it has for me-now to 
have certain future prospects (e.g., future possibilities) is final, however, and I 
therefore exclude the question of good future prospects from the investigation (in 
spite of the fact that good prospects may well have "contributive" value). 
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certain person-at-a-certain-time? For example, how do we (in the intra­
personal case) compare different possible situations (local or global) 
with respect to their final value for a certain person? Can we assume 
that the more there is of a good thing, the better, and can we assume 
that the value of a certain good is proportional to the amount of this 
good? 
If we restrict our attention to the intrapersonal case, and if we make a 
distinction between the global case and the more local cases, we get: 
(II) In the case of more local situations: To the extent that prudential 
value is (to some extent) intrapersonally measurable, how do we 
determine just how (nonderivatively) valuable a certain local situation 
is for a certain person at a certain time? For example, how do we (in 
the intratemporal case) compare different (possible) local situations 
with respect to their nonderivative value for a certain person at a 
certain time? 
(III) In the global case, i.e. in the case of whole existences-at-certain-
times: To the extent that well-being is intrapersonally measurable, 
how do we determine just how well off a certain person is (on the 
whole) at a certain time, and how do we determine how valuable a 
certain possible existence-at-a-certain-time would be for the person 
for whom it is possible? For example, according to what criteria do 
we (in the intratemporal case) compare different possible "lives-at-
certain-times" with respect to their final value for a certain person?43 
If w e realize that there is some truth in "synchronic atomism", we 
can see that an answer to this question cannot be complete unless it 
includes an answer to the problem of synchronic aggregation, viz.: To 
the extent that it is possible, how do we calculate the final value-for 
of a life at a certain given time from the nonderivative values that it 
"contains" at that time? Or alternatively, if we assume that the value 
43If we switch to the intertemporal case, we can see how the question how we 
should determine changes of well-being enters the picture. The reason why this 
question is (so to speak) identical with the question of how to make intertemporal 
intrapersonal comparisons of well-being is simple: A certain change in a person's 
circumstances constitutes an increase (or decrease) in well-being if and only if h is 
is better (or worse) off after the change than he was before the change. We do not 
have to determine a person's level of well-being in order to determine whether a 
certain change is for the better or for the worse, however, nor in order to 
determine how big a certain increment (or decrement) in well-being is. 
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it has for P that he has a certain kind of existence is (to some extent) a 
function of the prudential values of a number of smaller-scale facts 
about P: How do we calculate the final value that P's existence at t 
has for P from the nonderivative values of the facts that hold of P (at 
t ) l  
These are the central questions of this essay44. But before we look at 
the traditional answers that have been given to these questions, there is 
one more issue which needs to be addressed, viz. the following one: It 
can hardly be doubted that the notion of value-for is a normatively 
relevant notion, and it seems (moreover) plausible to assume that there 
are several different ways in which a conception of value-for can be 
normatively relevant45. So the question arises: Does this have any impli­
cations for how the three central questions should be understood (and 
answered)? For example, is it necessary to regard the questions of well-
being as relative to some normative context or other, or as asked from 
some normative point of view or other? And if this is so: is the meaning 
of such a question something which varies with the normative point of 
view from which the question is being asked? 
44It is, however, worth noting that these are not the only questions to which a 
complete conception of well-being must provide answers. In order to see this, we 
just have to take a look at the recent philosophical discussion of well-being: at 
what this discussion has been about, and what questions it has centred on. If we 
do this, we can see that there is (of course) a considerable overlap between the 
questions that have been discussed in the literature and the central questions of 
this book, but we can also see that the two sets of questions do not fully coincide. 
First, some of the questions listed above are often ignored in the literature 
(especially the questions that are actualized by the idea that lives are wholes, e.g., 
the question of good synchronic form), and second, some of the central questions 
in the literature are not included in the central questions of this book (they will be 
of some importance in this book too, however, but only indirectly). The most 
important of these questions is the question (or questions) on which "subjectivists" 
and "objectivists" disagree; questions which will be made explicit (or 
"reconstructed") in appendix D. 
45This does not mean that the notion of value-for is a normative (or quasi-
normative) notion, however, or that it can (or should) be understood in 
normative terms. Value-for-statements are "evaluatives" rather than "directives", 
and qua evaluatives, they do not in themselves tell us what we have reason to 
promote: to do this, they must be combined with some directive or other. This 
idea is further elaborated in appendix B. 
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A note on Normative relevance 
There are several ways in which the questions of p rudential value (and 
their respective answers) are of normative relevance. Or alternatively 
put, there are several plausible norms (prima facie or not) which involve 
a reference to people's welfare. The most important examples of such 
norms (or "objective reasons for acting") are (i) self-interested norms, 
like "everyone has a prima facie reason to promote his or her own wel­
fare", and (ii) benevolent norms, e.g., "we ought to promote other 
people's welfare, especially the welfare of our own children"46. 
Now, this gives rise to the possibility that there is no such thing as the 
most plausible conception of prudential value, i.e. that the most plausible 
answer to the questions of prudential value may (instead) vary with the 
different ways in which a conception of well-being may be normatively 
relevant. 
So, is there such a thing as the most plausible answer to the questions 
of prudential value? For example, is the welfare that we have a reason 
to promote qua self-interested the same human welfare that we have a 
reason to promote qua benevolent third parties? And are these "wel­
fares" the same human welfare that the interest-utilitarian thinks we 
ought to maximize? 
Well, on my view, the answer is "yes" (but cf. note 47), and this im­
plies that the question (I) " What has final value for a person?" need 
(roughly speaking) not be understood in relation to any normative 
theory (or prima facie norm) N, i.e. it need not be interpreted as "What 
conception of p rudential value makes (if embedded in N) N most plau­
sible?". This also means that it is (as a rule) not really necessary to bring 
in any normative intuitions in order to determine whether a certain con­
ception of well-being is plausible: straight-forwardly evaluative intu-
46These are not the only ways in which conceptions of well-being can be of 
normative relevance, however. For example, such conceptions also supply certain 
normative theories with the axiology they need, viz. theories that are (in a wide 
sense of the word) "teleological", i.e. theories that claim that moral Tightness or 
practical rationality consist solely in the maximization of (and/or some 
distribution of) nonderivative (or final) goodness-for, e.g., like the self-interest 
theory or "interest-utilitarianism". Moreover, it is also possible that there are valid 
norms of the malevolent type, e.g., the retributivist idea that we sometimes have 
a good moral reason to harm other people. And so on. There is a more detailed 
discussion of all this in appendix B. 
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itions will do, i.e. we can safely remain in the evaluative sphere47. 
This is all I have to say on the three central questions of this book, 
and on how they should (and should not) be understood. It is now 
time to take a brief look at how the questions have been answered. 
1.2. A brief overview of the main answers to (l)-(lll) 
Substantive vs. formal theories of prudential value 
The central questions of this essay are all substantive evaluative ques­
tions, and the answers to these questions will (therefore) take the form 
of substantive evaluative claims, e.g., (in the case of (I)) straight­
forward claims about what is nonderivatively good and bad for us. 
Now, even though the focus will (in this essay) be on substantive 
theories of prudential value (or what Scanlon calls "substantive good 
theories"), it is important to point out that a theory of p rudential value 
need not be substantive: it may also be formal. A formal account of p ru­
dential value does not make any substantive claims about what is good 
and bad for us; it specifies (instead) some formal criterion according to 
which it can be determined what is good and bad for a person. For 
example, rather than telling us what a life must "contain" (or "consist 
of") in order to be good, it may tell us that the good life is the kind of 
life that a well-functioning (e.g., rational, autonomous, or authentic) 
person would live under acceptable circumstances, i.e. that a life L is a 
good life for a person P if and only if it is the kind of lif e that P would 
lead if he were a well-functioning person living under acceptable 
circumstances48. 
47Or more specifically, I agree with Sumner (1996) that a theory of welfare must 
be both "descriptively" and "normatively adequate", and I also tend to believe that 
the normative adequacy of a certain theory does not vary from one normative 
context to another. There is one possible exception to the latter idea, however; the 
version of the actual desire theory (cf. section 1.2) that is most plausible in an 
intrapersonal normative context may not fully coincide with the version that is 
most plausible in an interpersonal context (cf. section 5.1.2). Personally, I don't 
regard this as problematic, however, since I have already made it clear that I will 
(in this book) focus solely on the intrapersonal case. 
48This idea should be carefully distinguished from another formal idea, viz. the 
idea that a life L is a good life for P if and only if P would prefer to lead L if h e were 
a well-functioning person. 
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In Griffin's (1986) terminology, a formal account of the good life is an 
"account of the modes of approach that will fix on the [good] life" (p 
63). This seems to mean that an account of prudential value is formal 
only if it specifies some "procedure" or "method" that (if followed) will 
generate correct substantive views on what is nonderivatively good 
and bad for different persons. This suggests that an account that is 
formal in my sense is not necessarily formal in Griffin's sense (an exam­
ple of this would be the object interpretation of the desire theory, i.e. 
the idea that X is good for P if and only if P has an intrinsic desire that 
X holds). But it is (of course) possible that an account that is formal in 
my sense is also formal in Griffin's sense (an example of t his would be 
the idea that X is good for P if and only if P believes that X is good for 
him and if his belief has been generated by a certain procedure)49. 
To get a better grasp on the distinction between substantive and 
formal theories, let us now consider the distinction between two possi­
ble interpretations of the desire theory, viz. the satisfaction interpretation 
(which is a substantive theory) and the object interpretation (which is a 
formal theory). 
The desire theory claims (roughly) that the only thing that has non-
derivative value for a person P is that his intrinsic desires are fulfilled, 
where P's desire that a situation X obtains is fulfilled if and only if X 
holds. But even though there is (on condition that P desires that X, that 
is) a very intimate connection between the fact that X holds and the 
(relational) fact that P's desire is fulfilled, these are still different facts. 
That is, it seems that we have to distinguish between the circumstance 
that P's desire is satisfied and the object of the desire (cf. Rabinowicz 
and Österberg (1996), p 2). 
This makes it possible that one of the facts is nonderivatively good for 
49Here are some examples of fo rmal theories in other parts of ethics: (i) Nozick's 
idea that a distribution is just if and only if (and because) it has a "fair history"; (ii) 
the Kantian idea that an action is morally right if a nd only if it is in accordance 
with some valid norm, where a norm is valid if and only if we can consistently will 
that it should become a universal law; (iii) discourse ethics (on one possible 
interpretation), viz. the idea that norm is valid if an d only if (an d because?) there 
would be rational consensus about its validity, i.e. if people would agree about its 
validity after having been engaged in a certain kind of (rational) discourse; (iv) 
Elster's idea that a desire (or belief) is rational if and only if (and because) it has 
been generated in the right way (and so on); and (v) Brandt's idea that a desire is 
rational if and only if (and because?) it would survive (or be generated by) a 
process of ideal deliberation. 
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P but not the other: it may be nonderivatively good for P that his desire 
that X is fulfilled, but not that X holds, and vice versa. So the question 
arises: When a desire theorist claims that it is nonderivatively good for 
a person to have his desires fulfilled, to what (exactly) does he assign 
nonderivative value-for? "Is it (i) the circumstance that our (intrinsic) 
desires and preferences be satisfied, or is it rather (ii) those states that 
are the objects of our (intrinsic) preferences and desires?" (ibid., p 2). To 
believe that (i) is the right interpretation of the desire theory is to adopt 
what Rabinowicz «fe Österberg calls the satisfaction interpretation of t he 
theory (this is what Österberg argues for), and to believe that (ii) is the 
case is to adopt what they call the object interpretation (this is what 
Rabinowicz argues for)(cf. ibid., pp 2-3). 
That is, the satisfaction interpretation of the theory makes a straight­
forward claim about what has nonderivative value for a person, and it 
must (therefore) be regarded as a substantive theory. The object inter­
pretation of the desire theory, on the other hand, claims that a situation 
X is nonderivatively good for a person P if and only if ( and because) P 
has an intrinsic desire that X holds. This is a formal criterion of value-for 
rather than a substantive claim about what has value for a person, and 
the object interpretation of the theory must (therefore) be regarded as 
a formal theory50. 
Now, even though there will be some discussion of different formal 
theories in this book (e.g., the object interpretation of t he desire theory 
50Does this mean that the object interpretation must be regarded as a subjectivist 
(or "projectivist") theory about the nature of value-for-P, i.e. must it be 
understood as claiming that the fact that something (X) is good for P consists in (is 
constituted by, or identical with) the fact that P desires that X? Or does the object 
interpretation merely presuppose such a theory of the nature of value (as 
Rabinowicz seems to suggest; cf. ibid., p 19)? In any case, it is rather obvious that 
some formal theories (in my sense) are not merely answers to "how do we 
determine what is nonderivatively good for a person?": they can also be (at least 
in part) regarded as theories about the nature of value, as conceptions of 
justification, or the like. This is (typically) another feature that distinguishes them 
from substantive theories (cf. appendix D). 
It is worth pointing out that the two interpretations of the desire theory are 
equally informative (they give the same answer to questions like "what do we 
need to know in order to tell how well off a person is?"). This shows that 
substantive theories are not necessarily more informative (or more specific) than 
formal theories. As a rule, substantive theories are more informative than formal 
theories, however, e.g., the substantive claim that it is good for all human beings 
to have friends is (somehow) "more specific" (and more informative) than the 
formal idea that it is good for every human being to realize his or her potential. 
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and the basic need account), it is (as we have seen) the substantive 
questions (I)-(III) which are most central. So let us therefore give a 
short characterization of the most important substantive theories of 
prudential value. 
The perhaps most common classification of (general) theories of pru­
dential value is the one constructed by Parfit (1984), viz. the distinction 
between hedonistic theories, desire-fulfilment theories, and objective list 
theories. Of these three theories, it is only hedonism that is clearly sub­
stantive, i.e. it is doubtful whether the last two theories should really be 
understood as substantive (cf. appendix D). It is possible, however, to 
interpret both of t hem as substantive theories (or as having substantive 
evaluative content), viz. if we accept the satisfaction interpretation of 
the desire theory, and if we conceive of the objective list theory as a 
theory that is both "non-internalist" and pluralist51. 
Let us now look at how the three types of substantive theories can be 
characterized. We will start with the most simple theory, viz. hedonism. 
The Hedonistic Theory 
The hedonistic theory of p rudential value (or "pure hedonism") can be 
characterized as follows. First, this is how the theory answers (I) 
"What kinds of local situations have nonderivative value for a person?": 
(HI) Nothing but a person's own experiences (concrete conscious men­
tal states and events, like sensations, emotions, perceptions, moods, 
fantasies, and thoughts) can be nonderivatively good or bad for this 
person. Or more precisely, the only local situations (or "atomic facts") 
that can have nonderivative value for a person P are situations of t he 
type "P has a certain experience E". This feature of the hedonistic 
theory is sometimes called the Experience Requirement. If this require-
51What this means will be explained later, but it should be pointed out that the 
objective list theory is {qua substantive theory) not merely a theory that is neither 
a hedonist theory nor a desire theory. This means that the present classification is 
not really complete: there are possible views which "fall outside" the classification, 
e.g., certain monistic theories (like the idea that nothing but love has 
nonderivative value-for). But if w e restrict our attention to theories which have 
actually been held by various philosophers, the classification is (I think) complete, 
i.e. it seems that the only serious alternatives to hedonism and the desire theory 
are both "non-internalist" and pluralist. 
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ment is included in a theory of well-being, we get the idea that a 
person's level of well-being at a certain time is a function of one thing 
only, viz. what his "experiential life" (or total mental state) is like at 
that time. 
(H2) More specifically, the only thing that is nonderivatively good for 
a person is to feel pleasure (to have pleasant experiences), and the 
only thing that is nonderivatively bad for a person is to suffer (to 
have unpleasant experiences). This implies that every experience 
which is nonderivatively good for a person is also pleasant, and that 
every experience which is nonderivatively bad for a person is also 
unpleasant. 
(H3) All pleasant experiences are nonderivatively good for the expe­
riencing subject, and all unpleasant experiences are nonderivatively 
bad, regardless of what other properties these experiences have. 
That is, the class of pleasant experiences which it is good for a person 
to have, and the class of unpleasant experiences which it is bad for a 
person to have, these classes are, on the theory, not restricted. Let 
us call this idea the Thesis of Unrestrictedness. If we include this thesis in 
a theory of well-being, we get the idea that we cannot really deter­
mine what value a person's existence has for this person unless we 
take all her pleasures and sufferings into account. 
(H3) is naturally explained by another essentially hedonistic idea, viz. (if 
we ignore the issue of duration) the idea that 
(H4) All nonderivatively good experiences are good in virtue of their 
pleasantness only, and all nonderivatively bad experiences are bad in 
virtue of their unpleasantness only. That is, there are no other good-
or bad-making features of experiences besides their pleasantness and 
unpleasantness: As far as the nonderivative value-for of our experi­
ences is concerned, it is totally irrelevant how these experiences have 
originated, what their objects are, what beliefs they are based on, 
and the like. 
If we combine this idea with (H2) and (H3), we get: An experience is 
nonderivatively good for a person if and only if (and because) it is plea­
sant, and an experience is nonderivatively bad for a person if and only 
if (and because) it is unpleasant. 
This is how the pure hedonist answers (II) "To the extent that it is 
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possible: How do we determine just how (nonderivatively) valuable a 
certain pleasant (or unpleasant) experience is for a certain person?": 
(H5) If we (again) ignore the issue of duration: The (positive or ne­
gative) value of a n experience for the person who has it is a function 
of one thing only, viz. how pleasant or unpleasant it is. That is, the 
degree to which a pleasant experience is nonderivatively good for the 
experiencing subject is a function of its degree of pleasantness, and 
the degree to which an unpleasant experience is nonderivatively bad 
for the subject is a function of its degree of unpleasantness52. The 
function in question can be characterized as follows: The more plea­
sant an experience is, the (nonderivatively) better it is for an experi­
encing subject to have it: the higher is its prudential value. Or more 
specifically, it is always (nonderivatively) better for a person to feel 
pleasure than to suffer, it is always better for a person to have a 
more pleasant experience than to have a less pleasant experience, and 
it is always worse for a person to have a more unpleasant suffering 
than to have a less unpleasant suffering. This is the "intensity-orienta­
tion" of the hedonistic theory, and it follows naturally from the idea 
that the more there is of a good thing, the better. We can also assume 
that the degree to which a certain experience is good or bad for the 
experiencing subject is, on the hedonistic theory, proportional t o how 
pleasant or unpleasant the experience is, i.e. that the marginal positive 
value-for of pleasure is not diminishing (and that the marginal nega­
tive value-for of suffering is neither diminishing nor increasing)53. 
52If we would not ignore the issue of duration, we would (instead) get the 
following idea: (H51) " The (positive or negative) value of an experience for the 
person who has it is a function of two things only, viz. (i) how pleasant or 
unpleasant it is, and (ii) how long it lasts (or how long it appears to last). That is, 
the degree to which a pleasant experience is nonderivatively good for the 
experiencing subject is a function of its degree of pleasantness and its duration, 
and the degree to which an unpleasant experience is nonderivatively bad for the 
subject is a function of its degree of unpleasantness and its duration". There will be 
a detailed discussion of this idea in appendix E, where I argue (in a somewhat 
"speculative" way) for the following two theses: (a) If duration matters, it is a 
certain kind of s ubjective duration that matters, and (b) it may well be the case 
that duration does not matter at all, and that we can (therefore) continue to ignore 
it. 
53As I see it, it is (on the face of it) not implausible to assume that the positive 
value of a certain amount of pleasure is proportional to this amount, but is the 
assumption really well-founded? That is, does the "idea of proportionality" have 
any support; are there really any good reasons for assuming that the marginal 
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This is (roughly) how the pure hedonist thinks we should (to the extent 
that it is possible) determine how well off a certain person is (on the 
whole) at a certain time, i.e. this is the answer that he gives to (III): 
(H6) The value that a certain life-at-a-certain-time has for the person 
who is living it is a function of how pleasant (unpleasant) its "experi­
ential content" is at that time, i.e. of how much pleasure and suffering 
that it contains at the time. The more pleasure and the less suffering a 
life contains, the better this life is for the person who is living it. For 
example, if two possible lives-at-certain-times contain the same 
"amount" of suffering, but different "amounts" of p leasure, then it is 
better for a person to have the life that contains more pleasure. 
It is important to point out that all hedonists are not pure hedonists, 
however: there are also hedonists who do not accept all the claims 
(H1)-(H6) above. Or alternatively put, there are also "modified" versions 
of the hedonistic theory. On my view, these modified theories are basi­
cally of two kinds: First, there is the type of hedonist who (like Mill) 
accepts (H1)-(H3) but rejects (H4)-(H6), and second, there is the 
"restricted hedonist", who accepts (HI) and (H2) but rejects (H3)-(H6). 
That is, all modified hedonists accept (HI), the Experience 
Requirement, and (H2), the idea that the only thing that can be non-
derivatively good for a person is to have pleasant experiences (etc.). On 
my view, this is what makes the modified hedonist a hedonist. It is (HI) 
and (H2) that constitute "the essence of hedonism", and there is no 
way one can reject any of these claims and still consider oneself a 
hedonist. 
Moreover, all modified hedonists reject (H4)-(H6). If we restrict our 
attention to the case of good experience and ignore the issue of dura­
tion: The modified hedonist denies that every nonderivatively good ex­
perience is good in virtue of its pleasantness only; he denies (for this 
reason) that the positive value of an experience for the person who has 
it is always proportional to how pleasant it is; he even denies that it is 
always the case that the more pleasant an experience is, the better it is 
for the experiencing subject to have it. 
The modified hedonist replaces (H4)-(H5) with the following claim: 
value of p leasure is not diminishing? 
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(MH4) If w e ignore the issue of duration: There are other "value-for-
affecting features" of experiences besides pleasantness and unplea­
santness. The value of an experience for the person who has it is 
does not just depend on how pleasant or unpleasant it is, it also de­
pends on what other (relevant) features the experience has; and if 
any of the relevant features comes in degrees, the value of the expe­
rience might also depend on to what degree it possesses the feature 
in question. For example, the value-for of a pleasant experience might 
(in part) depend on whether the belief on which it is based is true or 
false, or on whether it is associated with the employment of our 
"characteristically human capacities" or not. 
But how exactly does the modified hedonist think the value-for of an 
experience depends on its "value-affecting features"? How should we 
(on this theory) calculate the value-for of an experience from informa­
tion about its relevant descriptive features, i.e. how should the value 
function be characterized? Suppose that our modified hedonist claims 
that the nonderivative value-for of a pleasant experience is a function of 
two things only, viz. how pleasant it is, and whether it can be classified 
as "higher" or "lower" (or more specifically, that it is somehow non-
derivatively better for a person to have pleasant experiences of the 
higher type). How exactly should this claim be interpreted? Well, this is 
(most probably) what our modified hedonist would say: 
(a) First of all, it should be noted that (H2) tells us that an experience 
cannot be good unless it is pleasant. This puts certain restrictions on the 
function. 
(b) If our modified hedonist is not a restricted hedonist (cf. below), 
he also accepts (H3), the idea that every pleasure is nonderivatively 
good for the experiencing subject, regardless of whether it is classified 
as higher or lower. This also puts certain restrictions on the function. 
(c) If two pleasant experiences are equally pleasant, and if one of 
them is higher while the other is lower, then it is better for a person to 
have the higher pleasure (assuming that the two pleasures are compa­
rable with respect to pleasantness). 
(d) If t wo pleasant experiences are of the same type (e.g., if they are 
both of the higher type), then it is better for a person to have the 
experience that is more pleasant. 
(e) Our modified hedonist would (most probably) not claim that every 
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pleasure of the higher type is better than every pleasure of the lower 
type, e.g., that a very pleasant pleasure of the lower type is less good 
than a much less pleasant pleasure of t he higher type (again, assuming 
that the two pleasures are comparable with respect to pleasantness). 
Instead, he would make a weaker claim, viz. he would say that even 
though it is ceteris paribus better for a person to have higher pleasures 
than to have lower pleasures: If a lower pleasure is sufficiently pleasant 
it can outweigh a higher pleasure54. 
In short, our modified hedonist would make the following (imprecise) 
claim concerning relative weights: "If the pleasant experience El is of the 
higher type, and if th e pleasant experience E2 is of t he lower type, then 
it might be nonderivatively better for the experiencing subject to have 
El, even if E2 is more pleasant than El. And if El and E2 are equally 
pleasant, then it is better to have El than to have E2 (because El is 
higher while E2 is lower)". I don't think he can get any more precise 
than this. 
So, would our modified hedonist make similar claims about sufferings 
and unpleasantness? That is, would he claim that it might be less bad to 
have a more unpleasant suffering because it is of a higher type? I think 
not. I haven't come across any explicit statements on this issue, but it is 
my guess that as far as suffering and unpleasantness is concerned, 
modified hedonists tend to be pure hedonists. 
A modified hedonist might also reject (H3), however, i.e. he might be 
a Restricted Hedonist. The restricted hedonist replaces (H3) with the 
following claim: 
(RH3) There are pleasant experiences that are not nonderivatively 
good for the experiencing subject (there might even be pleasures that 
54As far as I can see, (MH4) can also be formulated in terms of organic wholes, 
viz. in the following way: A complex whole cannot have positive nonderivative 
value-for-P in isolation (i.e. positive intrinsic value in the proper sense of the term) 
unless it is of the type "P has a pleasant experience", and it cannot have negative 
intrinsic value unless it is of the type "P has an unpleasant experience". However, 
the intrinsic value of such a whole is not always a function of how pleasant or 
unpleasant its experiential content is. There are also other features, the presence 
or absence of which might affect the value of a whole. For example, it might be 
intrinsically better for a person to have an emotion that is both pleasant and based 
on a true belief than it is to have an emotion that is both pleasant (to the same 
degree) and based on a false belief, even though it not intrinsically valuable to 
have true beliefs. (If anyone is tempted to use the notion of contributory value 
here, cf. note 36). 
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are bad for the subject). It is also possible (but not likely) that there 
are sufferings which are not bad for the suffering subject. Or alter­
natively put, every restricted hedonist makes some kind of restriction 
claim, i.e. a claim of the following form: "If a pleasant experience has a 
certain "non-hedonic" feature F (e.g., if it is sadistic or based on a 
delusion), then it does not have nonderivative value for the subject to 
have it, in spite of its pleasantness"55. 
The fact that the modified hedonist accepts (MH4) (and maybe also 
(RH3)) means that he has to reject (H6). He would (instead) accept the 
following claim: 
(MH5) The value that a certain life-at-a-certain-time has for the 
person who is living it is (roughly) a function of how much good 
pleasure and how much bad suffering that it contains (and so on). 
The satisfaction interpretation of the Desire-Fulfilment 
Theory 
There are a number of d ifferent versions of the desire theory. The only 
thing which these versions have (on the satisfaction interpretation) in 
common is that they all accept the following claim: 
(Dl) Nothing but (actual) desire-fulfilment can be nonderivatively 
good for a person: the only thing that is nonderivatively good for a 
person is the circumstance that his actual intrinsic desires are satis­
fied56. However, this does not allow us to assume that non-fulfilment 
(or frustration) of desire is nonderivatively bad for a person: from 
the fact that it is good for a certain person to have a certain desire 
satisfied, we can not conclude that it is bad for this person if the 
desire is not satisfied. As far as badness is concerned, we should 
55A restriction claim for sufferings would take the form "If an unpleasant 
experience is of the kind K, then it is not nonderivatively bad for people to have 
it", but I doubt whether any such claims are plausible. I also doubt that there are 
pleasures that have negative value for the experiencing subject; it might have 
negative (nonderivative) value-period that a certain person feels sadistic joy, 
however. 
56So, does this mean that so-called idealized versions of the desire theory are not 
really desire theories? Not really. All it means is that idealized theories are 
inconsistent with the satisfaction interpretation of the theory: all such theories 
presuppose the object interpretation, and they can (therefore) not be regarded as 
substantive good theories. 
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adopt the following view: Nothing but "aversion-fulfilment" can be 
nonderivatively bad for a person, i.e. the only thing that is non-
derivatively bad for a person is (roughly) that some situation to 
which he has an aversion obtains. 
This is all that the different versions of the (actual) desire theory agree 
on. This means that from now on, we have to treat different versions 
of the theory separately. Let start with the simplest version, viz. the 
unrestricted (actual) desire theory. Besides (Dl), this theory makes the 
following claims: 
(UD2) Every fulfilment of an intrinsic desire is nonderivatively good 
for the desiring subject, and every "fulfilment" of an intrinsic aversion 
is nonderivatively bad for the averse subject. That is, the class of 
intrinsic desires that it is nonderivatively good for a person to have 
fulfilled, and the class of intrinsic aversions that it is nonderivatively 
bad to have fulfilled, these classes are, on this version of the theory, 
not restricted. Let us call this idea the Thesis of Unrestrictedness. 
It is (again) important to note that the theory makes no claims about 
what value it has for a person not to have his desires or aversions fulfil­
led. For example, the theory does not claim that it is bad for a person 
not to get what he wants, or that it is good for a person not to get 
what he does not want. Suppose that it is good for P to have his desire 
that X satisfied, and that it is bad for P to have his aversion to Y satis­
fied. This does not automatically imply that it is bad for P that not-X 
obtains, or that it is good for P that not-Y obtains. The only thing that 
determines what value not-X and not-Y have for P is (roughly) where 
on P's preference ordering these negatively specified facts can be 
found. Here, it should be observed that in real life, a person's desire 
that X is often accompanied by an aversion to not-X, and in such a case 
it is obviously bad for this person that X does not obtain. But again: the 
reason why not-X is bad for him is that he has an aversion to not-X, 
and not that he has a desire that X. What is bad for a person is "to get 
what he wants not to have", rather than not to get what he wants. 
(Dl) and (UD2) constitute the unrestricted desire theorist's answer to 
(I) "What kinds of local situations have nonderivative value for a 
person?". This is how he answers (II), i.e. (in the present case) "How 
do we determine just how (nonderivatively) valuable a certain desire-
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fulfilment or aversion-fulfilment is for a certain person?": 
(UD3) The degree to which a certain desire-fulfilment is non-
derivatively good for the desiring subject is a function of one thing 
only, viz. of how strong the desire is, and the degree to which an 
aversion-fulfilment is nonderivatively bad for the averse subject is (in 
a similar way) a function of how strong the aversion is. No other 
properties of our desires and aversions besides their strength are of 
any relevance in this context, e.g., it does not matter at all how they 
have originated, what their objects are, and so forth. The function in 
question can be characterized as follows: The "stronger" (the more 
"intense") an intrinsic desire is, the (nonderivatively) better it is for 
the desiring subject to have it fulfilled, and the stronger an intrinsic 
aversion is, the worse it is for the averse subject to have it "fulfilled". 
This is the "intensity-orientation" of the desire theory. We can also 
assume that the value it has for a desiring subject to have a certain 
desire or aversion fulfilled is (on the theory) proportional to how 
strong it is, i.e. that the marginal values of desire-fulfilment and 
aversion-fulfilment are not diminishing. 
This is the answer that the unrestricted desire theorist gives to (III), i.e. 
this is how he thinks we should (to the extent that it is possible) deter­
mine how well off a certain person is at a certain time: 
(UD4) A person's level of w ell-being is dependent on what his intrin­
sic desires and aversions are, and whether these desires and aver­
sions are fulfilled or not. Or more specifically, the more desire-fulfil-
ment and the less aversion-fulfilment a life contains, the better this life 
is for the person who lives it, e.g., if two possible lives contain the 
same "amount" of aversion-fulfilment, but different "amounts" of 
desire-fulfilment, then it is better for a person to live the life that 
contains more desire-fulfilment. 
This ends our characterization of the unrestricted desire theory. There 
are also a number of restricted versions of the desire theory, however. 
The central feature of these theories (besides the fact that they accept 
(Dl)) is that they reject (UD2), i.e. the thesis of U nrestrictedness. 
(RD2) Even though it is true that nothing but desire-fulfilment can be 
nonderivatively good for a person, and that nothing but aversion-
fulfilment can be nonderivatively bad for a person (as (Dl) claims): It 
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is not the case that every fulfilment of e very intrinsic desire is non-
derivatively good for the desiring subject, nor that every "fulfilment" 
of every intrinsic aversion is nonderivatively bad for the averse sub­
ject. Or alternatively, the class of intrinsic desires that it is non­
derivatively good for a person to have fulfilled, and the class of 
intrinsic aversions that it is nonderivatively bad to have fulfilled, these 
classes are (according to these versions of the theory) both restricted. 
Let us now introduce the distinction between relevant and irrelevant 
(intrinsic) desires and aversions. Let us say that an intrinsic desire is rele­
vant if and only if it is nonderivatively good for the desiring subject to 
have it fulfilled (if its fulfilment makes him better off); that an intrinsic 
aversion is relevant if and only if it is nonderivatively bad for the averse 
subject to have it fulfilled (if its fulfilment makes his life worse); and that 
an intrinsic desire or aversion is irrelevant if a nd only if i t is not rele­
vant. If we adopt this terminology, we can see that (UD2) (the thesis of 
Unrestrictedness) states that all intrinsic desires and aversions are rele­
vant, while (RD2), on the other hand, states that only some kinds of 
intrinsic desires and aversions should count as relevant. Or alternati­
vely, every restricted desire theory makes restriction claims of the 
following form: "Only desires and aversions of a certain type should 
count as relevant. If an intrinsic desire (or aversion) is not of t his type, 
it can never be nonderivatively good (or bad) for the subject to have it 
fulfilled". 
There are many different versions of th e restricted desire theory, and 
what makes these versions different is (of c ourse) that they have diffe­
rent ideas about exactly how the class of (all) intrinsic desires (and 
aversions) should be restricted. Some restricted theories are "object-
oriented": they make restriction claims of the form "only desires and 
aversions with certain kinds of objects (e.g., only desires that are about 
one's own life) should count as relevant; if a desire (aversion) has the 
wrong kind of object, it can never be good (bad) for the subject to 
have it ful filled". Other restricted theories are "rationality-oriented"; 
these theories make restriction claims of a different form, viz. "only 
rational (e.g., informed) desires and aversions should count as relevant; 
it can never be good (or bad) for a person to have an irrational desire 
(or aversion) fulfilled". There are also restricted theories that are 
neither "object-oriented" nor "rationality-oriented". 
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This was the restricted desire theorist's answer to the non-
comparative (I). So, how does he answer the comparative questions (II) 
and (III)? On the assumption that we restrict our attention to the rele­
vant desires and aversions: How do we determine just how valuable a 
certain desire-fulfilment or aversion-fulfilment is for a certain person, 
and how do we determine just how well of a certain person is at a 
certain time? 
As I see it, there is nothing that prevents a restricted desire theorist 
from being "intensity-oriented", i.e. he may well accept (UD3) above. 
Or more precisely, he can (so to speak) be intensity-oriented after the 
restriction has been made, e.g., he can think of a restriction as nothing 
but an elimination of certain items from our intrinsic preference 
orderings, and he can claim that this is all we should do: once we have 
eliminated all irrelevant items from these orderings, we should let the 
remaining (relevant) items maintain their relative positions in the 
orderings. That is, as far as the relative importance of the relevant 
desires and aversions is concerned, strength is all that should count. 
(UD3') How good (or how bad) it is for a desiring subject to have a 
certain relevant desire (or aversion) fulfilled depends on one thing 
only, viz. how strong the desire (or aversion) is. That is, once we 
have eliminated certain desires and aversions as irrelevant, strength is 
the only property of our desires and aversions that counts. For 
example, it is always (nonderivatively) better for a desiring subject to 
have the stronger of two relevant intrinsic desires fulfilled. 
An intensity-oriented restricted desire theorist would also replace 
(UD4) with 
(UD4') A person's overall level of well-being is a function of how 
much good desire-fulfilment and how much bad aversion-fulfilment 
there is in his life, i.e. it is a function of how many relevant desires and 
aversions that are fulfilled, and of how strong these desires and 
aversions are. 
However, a desire theorist need not accept (UD3') or (UD4'): it is also 
possible to reject the intensity-orientation (and notice that even though 
such a move is "restrictive" in spirit, it does not presuppose that (RD2) 
is accepted). This is what such a "non-intensity-oriented" desire theory 
would claim: 
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(NIDS) How good (or bad) it is for a desiring subject to have a 
certain relevant desire (or aversion) fulfilled does not just depend on 
how strong it is, but also on what other properties it has, e.g., on 
whether it is rational or irrational, on what content it has, or the like. 
Strength is not all that counts: it is not always nonderivatively better 
for a desiring subject to have the stronger of two relevant intrinsic 
desires fulfilled, and the reason for this is that it is ceteris paribus 
better for a person to have desires of certain types (e.g., autonomous 
desires) fulfilled than to have desires of o ther types (e.g., heterono-
mous desires) fulfilled. 
If a desire theorist accepts (NID3) rather than (UD3'), he also has to 
reject (UD4'), i.e. the idea that the value of a life for the person who 
lives it is a function of how much desire-fulfilment and aversion-fulfil-
ment this life contains. But it seems (to me) impossible to find an intelli­
gible formulation that can replace (UD4'). 
This ends our "positive" characterization of (the satisfaction interpre­
tation of) the desire theory. We will soon give a negative characteriza­
tion of the same theory, viz. by contrasting it with hedonism. But be­
fore we do this, let us first, for the sake of c ompleteness, mention that 
there are also so-called idealized versions of t he desire theory. These theo­
ries are (on my view) not consistent with the satisfaction interpretation 
of the desire theory, and they can not be regarded as substantive 
theories (cf. note 56). Instead, they are formal theories that presuppose 
the object interpretation of the theory. To get a rudimentary grasp on 
what the idealized desire theory is about, let us contrast it against the 
object interpretation of th e unrestricted theory. 
If th e we replace the satisfaction interpretation by the object interpre­
tation, the conjunction of (Dl) and (UD2) has to be reformulated as 
follows: 
(OD1) A situation X is nonderivatively good for a person P if and 
only if (and because) P has an (actual) intrinsic desire that X ho lds, 
and a situation Y is nonderivatively bad for P if and only if (and 
because) P has an (actual) intrinsic aversion to Y57. 
An idealized desire theory rejects this idea, but also 
57This formal criterion is a conjunction of (Dl) and (D2) in appendix D. 
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(OD2) The nonderivative value of a situation X fo r a person is a 
function of o ne thing only, viz. how desirable or undesirable X is for 
this person. For example, if X a nd Y are both desired by a certain 
person, it is nonderivatively better for this person that X obtains than 
that Y obtains if and only if (and because) his desire that X is stronger 
than his desire that Y. 
Instead, it makes the following claims: 
(ID1) A situation X is nonderivatively good for a person P if and only 
if (and because) P would intrinsically desire that X under ideal circum­
stances (e.g., if he were fully rational, had all the relevant informa­
tion, were thinking clearly, or the like), and a situation Y is non­
derivatively bad for P if and only if (and because) P would, under 
ideal circumstances, have an intrinsic aversion to Y. 
(ID2) The nonderivative value of a situation X for a person P is a 
function of one thing only, viz. how desirable or undesirable X would 
be for P under ideal circumstances. For example, it is nonderivatively 
better for a person that X ob tains than that Y obtains if and only if 
(and because) he would (under ideal circumstances) intrinsically prefer 
X to Y. 
This ends our positive characterization of th e desire theory. Let us now 
take a quick look at how it differs from the hedonistic theory. 
The desire theory vs. hedonism 
From all that has been said above, we might (it seems) conclude that as 
far as nonderivative value-for is concerned, there is a rather strong dis­
agreement between the desire theory and the hedonistic theory. For 
example, one might believe that there is no "overlap" at all between the 
class of s ituations that are (on the desire theory) nonderivatively good 
and bad for a person, and the class of situations that are (according to 
the hedonistic theory) nonderivatively good and bad for a person. As a 
rule, this is true, but it is important to notice that there are two possible 
exceptions to this rule (two possible ways in which the two theories 
might, in part, coincide): 
First, most of u s have an intrinsic desire to feel good and an intrinsic 
aversion to feeling bad, and to the extent that we have such preferen-
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ces, the object interpretation of the desire theory implies that it is non-
derivatively good for us to feel pleasure, and nonderivatively bad for 
us to suffer. And second, we have not yet said anything about the 
nature of pleasantness and unpleasantness, but one of the dominant 
views on this matter is the so-called "preference-hedonist" view. On 
this view, an experience is (roughly speaking) pleasant for a person if 
and only if (and because) it is (in a certain way) desired by this person, 
and an experience is unpleasant if a nd only if ( and because) the expe­
riencing subject has a certain kind of a version to it. If t his is correct, it 
seems that all pleasant and unpleasant experiences can be viewed as 
fulfilments of a certain kind of "now-for-now" desires and aversions, 
and that the hedonistic theory can (for this reason) be regarded as a 
special case of the desire theory, viz. as a strongly restricted (object-
oriented) version of this theory. But again, this is only true on the 
object interpretation of th e desire theory. 
This suggests that there is no "extensional overlap" at all between the 
satisfaction interpretation of the desire theory and the hedonistic 
theory. If f act, there is (normally) not much of a n overlap between the 
object interpretation of the desire theory and the hedonistic theory 
either, e.g., we can safely assume that many of the situations that are 
(on the object interpretation of the desire theory) nonderivatively good 
for a person are not regarded as nonderivatively good by the hedonist, 
and (perhaps) vice versa58. This is (of c ourse) mainly due to the fact 
that hedonism is an "internalist theory" (it only attributes nonderivative 
value-for-P to intrinsic facts about P), while most versions of the desire 
theory are (on the object interpretation of this theory) "relationalist 
theories"59 (they also attribute nonderivative value-for-P to relational 
facts about P); there are even desire theories which can be regarded as 
"externalist theories" (they even attribute nonderivative value-for-P to 
facts that are external in relation to P). As Scanlon (1993) points out, 
[h]edonism takes certain mental states to be the only things of ulti-
58Or more specifically; all situations that are, according to the preference-hedonist, 
nonderivatively good for a person are also regarded as nonderivatively good by 
the object interpretation of the desire theory; however, there may well be 
situations that are regarded as nonderivatively good by the quality-hedonist but 
not by object interpretation of the desire theory. Cf. section 2.2. 
59The relationalist theory par excellence is of course the satisfaction interpretation 
of the desire theory. 
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mate value. Desire theories [here, Scanlon takes (like almost every­
body else) the object interpretation for granted] count things as valu­
able if they are the objects of ce rtain "mental states" or attitudes [i.e. 
desires], but the things valued need not be mental states and the 
attitudes which confer value need not themselves be valuable (p 189). 
Or alternatively, "Desire Theories [are likely to] reject the experience 
requirement and allow that a person's life can be made better and 
worse not only by changes in that person's states of c onsciousness but 
also by occurrences elsewhere in the world which fulfil that person's 
preferences" (ibid., p 186). 
However, these differences between the hedonistic theory and the 
object interpretation of the desire theory are consistent with the fact 
that they often agree on what particular situations that are good and 
bad (derivatively or nonderivatively) for a person60. The reason why 
they tend to agree on what particulars that are good and bad for a 
person is simple: To have one's desires fulfilled is often pleasant, and to 
have one's aversions fulfilled is often unpleasant. One might even 
believe (e.g., with Epicurus) that most of o ur pleasant experiences are 
based on (or caused by) desire-fulfilment, and that most of our suffe­
ring is based on (or caused by) "aversion-fulfilment". However, this is 
only true on condition that the person's beliefs about the world are (in 
the relevant respects) true, i.e. it would be more correct to say that 
many pleasant experiences are based on (or caused by) some belief (t rue 
or false) that some desired situation obtains (and similarly for suffe­
rings). This means that the two theories can not be expected to agree 
about what particular facts that are good and bad for a person when 
the person's beliefs about the world are (in the relevant respects) false. 
Now that we are familiar with the possible sources of disagreement 
(about particular cases) between the hedonist and the desire theorist, 
let us (now) take a look at what these disagreements might look like. 
There are at least four types of cas es here: 
(1) First we have the "weakest" type of case, where the two theories 
agree on that a particular desire-fulfilment is good for a person, but 
they disagree on how good it is. These are the cases where the satis­
faction of a desire is accompanied by a pleasant experience, but where 
60From now on, and until the end of this section, it is no longer important which 
of the two interpretations of the desire theory we have in mind. 
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the magnitude of the pleasantness does not "correspond to" the 
strength of the desire fulfilled. 
(2) There may also be situations which (on the desire theory), make a 
life better or worse, but where the Hedonistic Theory is "indifferent". 
These are the cases where the satisfactions of o ur desires or aversions 
are not accompanied by any pleasant or unpleasant experiences at all. 
The most interesting cases of this type are the cases where some prefe­
rence is, unknown to the desiring subject, satisfied. Suppose that my 
desire that my American friends are happy, or my aversion to being 
deceived, is satisfied without my knowing it. In this case, most versions 
of the desire theory would claim that this makes my life better (or 
worse) than it would otherwise have been, while the hedonist would 
regard the circumstance as irrelevant. This follows from the idea that 
"what you don't know can't hurt you (or benefit you)", an idea that 
(somehow) captures the essence of hedonism. 
(3) The disagreement between the two theories may be even stronger 
than this, viz. if there are cases where something is, on the desire 
theory, good for as person, while the hedonistic theory claims that it is 
bad for this person. For example, it may (on the desire theory) be in a 
person's interest to have a strong intrinsic desire fulfilled, even if this 
makes him less happy (cf. Parfit (1984), p 465). Kekes (1988), who is 
himself a desire theorist, gives the following examples: 
/ . . . /  the sat isfac t ion of  w ants ,  essent ia l  to  good l ives ,  need not  in­
volve episodes of feeling happy, necessary for happiness. The wants 
whose satisfaction we rationally seek may concern doing hard, 
unpleasant, altruistic, impersonal, dutiful, self-sacrificial, heroic, self-
denying, and occasionally even self-destructive things. And none of 
these is usually conducive to feeling episodically happy (p 167). 
(4) There may also (if the preference-hedonism is wrong about the 
nature of pleasure and displeasure) exist situations which the hedonist 
regards as making a person's life better or worse, but which the desire 
theorist conceives of as irrelevant. One possible example of this are the 
cases where someone is happy because he believes that some desired 
situation obtains, but where his belief is false. Another example is physi­
cal pain, which (it might be argued) is simply unpleasant, regardless of 
whether or not the person who is in pain has an aversion to being in 
pain. 
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This concludes the introductory sections on the first two types of 
theories of prudential value, i.e. hedonism and the desire theory. Let us 
now move on to the third type of theory listed by Parfit (1984), viz. the 
objective list theory (viewed as a substantive evaluative theory). 
"The Objective List Theory", or "non-internalist pluralism" 
This is how Parfit (1984) characterizes the Objective List Theory: 
According to this theory, certain things are good or bad for people, 
whether or not these people would want to have the good things, or 
to avoid the bad things. The good things might include moral good­
ness, rational activity, the development of one's abilities, having child­
ren and being a good parent, knowledge, and the awareness of true 
beauty. The bad things might include being betrayed, manipulated, 
slandered, deceived, being deprived of li berty or dignity, and enjoy­
ing either sadistic pleasure, or aesthetic pleasure in what is in fact ugly 
(p 499). 
Now, if we want to derive a plausible characterization of the objective 
list theory qua substantive evaluative theory from this passage, we have 
to focus on the second part, i.e. on all the things that such a theory 
might conceive of as nonderivatively good and bad for a person (the 
first part of t he characterization is not really a description of th e theory 
qua substantive evaluative theory; cf. appendix D). Now, if w e do this, 
it is (I think) rather clear that the theories that Parfit has in mind are 
those universalist61 (or general) substantive good theories that are both 
(1) pluralist theories, and (2) what Kagan (1992) calls externalist 
theories, and what may also be called relationalist theories62. So, let us 
(therefore) take a look at what the terms "pluralism", "externalism", 
and "relationalism" mean in this context. 
Monism vs. pluralism 
The hedonistic theory and the desire-fulfilment theory (on the satis­
faction interpretation) are both monist theories: they both claim (or imply) 
that all (local) situations that are nonderivatively good for a person are 
61This notion is explained elsewhere, e.g., in appendix D. 
62Cf. note 51 above. 
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of o ne arid the same type (i.e. pleasures or desire-fulfilments), and that 
all situations that are nonderivatively bad for a person are of another 
type (i.e. sufferings or aversion-fulfilments). The objective list theories, 
on the other hand, are pluralist theories of prudential value: they claim 
that the situations that are nonderivatively good for a person are of 
several different types, and that this holds for the nonderivatively bad 
situations as well. 
So, why is it so obvious that objective list theories are pluralist 
theories? Well, one reason is that if these theories were not pluralist, 
they could not be (plausibly) contrasted with hedonism. It seems that 
every plausible version of the objective list theory must accept the idea 
that it is (at least sometimes) nonderivatively good for a person to feel 
pleasure, and bad for a person to suffer, and this implies that a plausible 
objective list theory can not really be contrasted with hedonism unless it 
is a pluralist theory. 
That we should regard objective list theories as pluralist theories is 
also indicated by the term "list", and by the fact that these theories 
claim (according to Parfit) that certain things, in the plural, are good or 
bad for us. As the term "list" suggests, every objective list theory pro­
vides us with two lists of "things" (facts, situations), one "positive list" 
and one "negative list". The items to which the positive list refers are 
the different "things" which are, according to the theory, non­
derivatively good for us, i.e. facts which, if they obtain, make us better 
off t han we would otherwise have been (and similarly for the negative 
list). The types of facts referred to on the two lists may (of c ourse) be 
internal to the person, but they can also be relational facts about the 
person, or external in relation to the person, or even external in relation 
to the person's life. (If we look at Parfit's examples, however, it is 
obvious that the emphasis is on relational facts). 
It should be noted that the object interpretation of the desire theory 
is also a pluralist theory, viz. a subjectivist (and relativist) pluralist 
theory. That is, a pluralist theory of prudential value can be both sub­
jectivist and objectivist, and both "universalist" and "relativist". 
Universalist versions of pluralism assume that our respective lists are 
(given a general enough description) identical, while relativist versions 
of pluralism claim (instead) that our respective lists differ, i.e. that "what 
is good for me (or us) may not be good for you (or them)". It is likely 
that such relativist ideas are based on some kind of su bjectivism, but it 
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is also possible that a theory is both objectivist and relativist (cf. appen­
dix D). The objectivist theories with which we will be concerned in this 
book are all universalist, however. 
Let us now look at the second central feature of the objective list 
theories, i.e. the fact that they are "externalist" or "relationalist" 
theories, or in short, "non-internalist" theories. 
Internalism, relationalism, and externaiism 
As far as I can tell, the distinction between internalist and externalist 
theories of pr udential value was introduced by Kagan (1992) (who thinks 
that the distinction in question is the most interesting distinction 
between different substantive theories of prudential value (well-being). 
This is how he characterizes the difference: 
/.../ [T]he more fundamental distinction seems to be between 
theories that limit well-being to intrinsic facts about the person and 
theories that allow for relational facts to directly contribute to well-
being as well. Mental state theories [i.e. theories "which hold that an 
individual's well-being consists solely in the presence of the relevant 
kinds of mental states" (cf. p 169)] may be the most well-known or 
the most plausible examples of the former type of theory, but they do 
not exhaust the class. Perhaps this /.../ division should be labeled as 
the division between intrinsic theories and relational theories (or 
intrinsic theories and extrinsic theories), but I myself am drawn to a 
slightly different set of labels: some theories restrict well-being to 
facts internal to the person; other theories allow for the direct rele­
vance of facts external to the person as well (p 188). 
That is, a theory of w ell-being is internalist (in Kagan's terminology) if 
and only if i t claims that all facts that are nonderivatively good and bad 
for a certain person are "internal to this person", or alternatively, that a 
person's level of w ell-being depends solely upon "facts internal to this 
person" (physical or mental). A theory of well-being is externalist, on 
the other hand, if it rejects this idea, i.e. if and only if it makes a 
person's level of w ell-being directly dependent on not just on intrinsic 
facts about the person, but on other kinds of fac ts as well, viz. on "facts 
external to the person", or on "relational facts". 
On my view, this is a problematic distinction, and the reason for this is 
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that it is not quite clear what facts that Kagari has in mind when he talks 
about facts about the person. So, how should we distinguish facts 
about persons (or descriptions of per sons) from other kinds of facts (or 
descriptions)?63 For example, can (and should) a fact that is external to 
a person ever count as a fact about this person? 
It can hardly be doubted that " P  has a big nose" and "P  is generous" 
are descriptions of P. After all, these are descriptions by means of 
which some "more permanent" bodily or mental feature is attributed to 
P, descriptions which tell us what kind of person P is. It also seems clear 
that descriptions like "P is depressed", "P has a fever", and "P feels 
pleasure" are descriptions of P. These descriptions do not tell us what 
kind of person P is, however, and we might (therefore) think of them 
as state-descriptions of P-at-t rather than descriptions of P (as a 
person). 
The fact that P's desire to have children is fulfilled, the fact that P is 
married to Q, and the fact that P owns a sailing boat are all relational 
facts which involve P, and even though these facts are not (strictly 
speaking) about P, there is no reason why we should not (in this con­
text) think of them as such. 
In a similar way, we can think of ac tion-facts, activity-facts, and be­
havioural facts as facts about persons (e.g., qua agents). However, des­
criptions like "P is writing a book" and "P is scratching his (big) nose" 
are more easily regarded as descriptions of P's life than as descriptions 
of P 64. This makes it rather difficult to determine whether the facts to 
63There is also another reason why we might want to know what kinds of facts 
which are included in the category "facts about a person", viz. if we accept Kagan's 
claim that one of the conditions that an "adequate theory of well-being [i.e. a 
"theory [that] /.../ attempts to specify in general terms the set of facts that 
comprise the good for the individual"] would have to meet" is the condition "that 
the specified facts must be about the person" (ibid., p 185, my italics). 
64Descriptions of P are typically of the form "P has the feature F", where F is (like 
P himself) atemporal, i.e. it persists through time, but it is not (like an event) 
extended in time. But when we say about P that he is writing a book, or that he is 
scratching his nose, or that he feels pleasure, then we are not attributing any 
atemporal feature to P. Instead, we make a reference to something temporally 
extended (e.g., a mental event or an activity), and this suggests that we are 
describing P's life rather than P. But the reason why it is more appropriate to 
regard the fact that P is writing a book as a fact about P's life rather than as a fact 
about P is not just that actions are (by definition) temporally extended. The 
important thing in this context is that actions (etc.) are temporal wholes that can 
not be reduced to a mere sequence of states; this is why the fact that P is involved 
in the performance of a certain action at t is not (strictly speaking) a fact about P-
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which these descriptions refer should be regarded as intrinsic or rela­
tional, but this is one way in which it might be done: We should con­
ceive of an action-fact as relational if and only if it (its description) inclu­
des an implicit reference to something external, e.g., to an external re­
sult (as in the case of murder) or to certain conventions or social sys­
tems (as in the case of voting or writing a cheque). This suggests that all 
purely "behavioural facts" (like the fact that someone scratches his 
nose) and at least some action-facts (like the fact that someone is 
walking) can be regarded as "intrinsic". 
The fact that P's wife has an affair with another man, and the fact 
that P's son is harassed in school, are both external in relation to P, and 
they can (for this reason) hardly be regarded as facts about P. They 
might, however, be regarded as facts about P's life, viz. on the assump­
tion that P's wife and P's son are (in some sense) parts of P's life. The 
fact that the mountain gorilla survives as a species, or the fact that P's 
post-mortem reputation is excellent, on the other hand, are not just 
external in relation to P, but also in relation to P's life. 
Now, this shows (I think) that Kagan's distinction between internalist 
and externalist theories is rather vague, and that it needs to be modi­
fied. So, I will now propose a slightly different classification of substan­
tive theories of prudential value. This classification is (like every plau­
sible classification) based on the idea that a substantive theory of 
prudential value "attempts to specify in general terms the set of facts 
that comprise the good for the individual" (cf. ibid., p 185), or alter­
natively, that it attempts to specify the set of facts of which it is true 
that it is nonderivatively good and bad for a person that they obtain. 
Different substantive theories of p rudential value specify this set in dif­
ferent ways, and they can (therefore) be classified on basis of how they 
do this. The classification I want to propose is based on the distinctions 
between the different kinds of facts above, and the views which I will 
consider are (i) internalism, (ii) relationalism, (iii) person-externalism, and 
(iv) life-externalism. 
(i) Internalism 
In Kagan's terminology, internalist theories claim that the only facts that 
can be nonderivatively good and bad for a person are "facts internal to 
at-f. 
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the person" or "intrinsic facts about the person"65. Or if we borrow 
some terminology from Nagei (1970), we can say that an internalist is a 
person who claims that all the goods and evils that can befall a man are 
restricted to nonrelational properties ascribable to him at particular 
times (cf. p 6). That is, an internalist can claim that it has nonderivative 
value for a person to be in a certain state (bodily or mental), to have a 
certain kind of b ody, or to be a certain kind of p erson, but he can (as I 
see it) also allow for the fact that certain kinds of " internal" events can 
be nonderivatively good and bad for a person, e.g., different kinds of 
mental events, processes, or activities. 
Now, it is not very common that nonderivative value (positive or 
negative) is attributed to the fact that a person is in a certain bodily 
state, or that he has a certain kind of b ody, or that he is a certain kind 
of person, or that he is behaving in certain ways. In short, the most 
common form of internalism is "mental statism": the type of theory 
according to which the only facts that can have nonderivative value for 
a person are certain kinds of mental facts, e.g., that he is in a certain 
mental state, or that a certain kind of mental process takes place in him. 
(ii) Relationalism 
On the relational view, "there are goods and evils which are irreducibly 
relational", i.e. there are relational facts about us that have non-
derivative value for us, and how well off a person is at t depends (in 
part) upon how he is (at t) related to things (e.g., other people) external 
to himself. Some of t he relational facts which are (supposedly) good for 
P are "state-facts" of t he form "P stands in relation R to X (where X is 
external to P)", but there are also a number of action-facts, activity-
facts, and interaction-facts that are best regarded as relational. That is, 
a relationalist can claim that it has nonderivative value for a person to 
be married or to belong to a certain group, but he can also claim that it 
is good for a person to perform actions of certain types, or to be 
engaged in certain kinds of activities66. 
65This internalism has (of course) nothing to do with the metaethical (value 
theoretical) internalism that is discussed in appendix B. 
66It seems plausible to assume that most of the relational facts to which the 
relationalist attributes nonderivative value are "internal to" (or part of) a person's 
life. (Assuming that Nagel (1970) is correct when he claims that "a man's life 
includes much that does not take place within the boundaries of his body and his 
mind"). This suggests that most existing versions of relationalism (i.e. "person-
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(Hi) Person-Externalism 
The "person-externalist" attributes nonderivative value-for-P to facts 
that are external in relation to P (but not necessarily in relation to his 
life), e.g., he might claim that the value of a person's life at t is (in part) 
dependent on what properties certain external things have at t, or how 
certain external things are related to each other at t, or what external 
events are going on at t. Suppose that the male person P has a wife 
(Philippa) and a child (Bernard) whom he both loves. Suppose also that 
Philippa has an affair with another man, and that Bernard is harassed in 
school. Now, the idea that these facts are nonderivatively bad for P, 
even if he never finds out about them, is (I think) a good example of a 
person-externalist view (which is not necessarily life-externalist)67. 
Just as the hedonist theory is a good example of an internalist theory 
and the satisfaction interpretation of the desire theory is a good 
example of a relationalist theory, so the object interpretation of the un­
restricted desire theory is an example of a t heory which may well make 
(in particular cases) substantive claims of a person-externalist kind. In 
fact, it may even make substantive claims of a life-externalist kind. 
(iv) Life-externolism 
The "life-externalist" claims that facts which are external in relation to a 
person's life may have nonderivative value for this person. On this 
view, a person's well-being may be affected by states or events that (to 
speak with Nagel) "does not take place within the boundaries of his 
life". Now, the boundaries of a person's life are of two kinds; they are 
either temporal or "atemporal" ("spatial" is not a good term here), and 
depending on what type of boundary we have in mind, we get diffe­
rent versions of "life-externalism". 
The atemporal version of "li fe-externalism" claims that the value of a 
person's life at t may (in part) depend on facts that are external to his 
relationalism") are (at the same time) versions of "life-internalism". 
67I assume that the two facts are really external to P, i.e. that they are not 
relational facts about P. Now, as I see it, this is compatible with the idea that it can 
only be bad for P that a certain fact obtains if P i s (in some relevant way) related 
to this fact. The idea that it can only be bad for P that Philippa "deceives him" if he 
is in a certain way related to this fact (e.g., if he has an aversion to being deceived), 
and/or to Philippa, does not imply that the fact that she has sex with other men is 
a relational fact about P (it may count as a fact about his life, however). 
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life (facts that obtain at t ) ,  e . g . ,  on what properties certain external 
things have at t, or how certain external things are related to each 
other at t. As has already been suggested, the object interpretation of 
the unrestricted desire theory seems to be of this kind. If I have a 
strong intrinsic desire that the mountain gorilla survives (as a species), 
then it is (on this theory) nonderivatively good for me that this 
happens, even if it I do not know about it, and even if mountain gorillas 
are not part of my life. 
The temporal version of "l ife-externalism" claims that the value of a 
person's life (but not its value at any particular time!) may (in part) 
depend on what happened before he was born or what will happen 
after his death (events that are outside the temporal boundaries of h is 
life). It should be noted that this is an existing view, e.g., there are 
philosophers (like Aristotle and Nagel) who have claimed that a 
person's well-being can be affected by post-mortem events68. 
The Objective List Theory revisited 
Now that the distinctions between (i) monistic and pluralistic theories, 
and (ii) internalist, relationalist, person-externalist, and life-externalist 
theories, have been made, it is easy to see that all theories which has 
"traditionally" been classified as objective list theories (the theories 
which have been regarded as alternatives to both hedonism and the 
desire theory) are (1) pluralist theories, and (2) relationalist (and per­
haps also externalist) theories. Qua pluralist theories, they differ from 
hedonism and the satisfaction interpretation of the desire theory (which 
are both monistic theories), and qua relationalist theories, they differ 
from hedonism (which is an internalist theory), but not from the satis­
faction interpretation of the desire theory (which is a relationalist 
theory). This means that relationalist objective list theories can only be 
contrasted against the desire theory if we take them to claim (3) that 
there are other relational facts (besides desire-fulfilment and aversion-
68This is of course inconsistent with my idea that all goodness-for-P is goodness-
for-P-at-t (cf. appendix C). The assumption that the welfare subject is a temporally 
located person-at-a-certain-time simply makes Nagel's (1970) idea that a person's 
well-being might be affected by how he is related to "circumstances which may 
not coincide with him either in space or in time" too absurd. (How could the claim 
that the value of P's life at fi is (in part) dependent upon how he is related to 
something external that happens at t2 have any plausibility?). 
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fulfilment) that are nonderivatively good and bad for us. But as far as I 
can see, it need not reject the idea that desire-fulfilment is one of 
several relational facts which have value for a person69. 
This - i.e. (1), (2), and (3) - is the objective list theorist's answer to (I) 
"What kinds of local situations have nonderivative value for a person?". 
This is a verv unspecific "answer", however, and the reason for this is 
that "non-internalist pluralism" is not really a substantive evaluative 
theory, but a type of substantive theory. In fact, the different versions 
of the "theory" need not ("substantively speaking") have anything in 
common. Or alternatively put, although every concrete version of the 
"theory" makes specific claims about what is nonderivatively good and 
bad for us, no version of the "theory" makes any specific substantive 
claims qua non-internalist pluralist theory. This means that no "objective 
list theory" can really be assessed as suc h. Strictly speaking, there is no 
such thing as an objective list theory, of which there are different ver­
sions, and it is (therefore) more appropriate to refer to these "versions" 
as theories (in the plural). It is these concrete theories (or better: the 
specific substantive evaluative claims which constitute these theories), 
and nothing else, that can be assessed70. 
As far as (II) and (III) are concerned, it is worth noting that the non-
internalist pluralist theory does (as far as I know) not make any clear 
explicit claims about how we should determine how well off a certain 
person is (on the whole), or about how we should determine just how 
valuable a certain local situation is (e.g., how we should compare, with 
respect to value-for, a certain "amount" of one good with a certain 
"amount" of another good). However, we can make certain assump­
tions about how our pluralist would answer these questions. To begin 
with, we can (I think) safely assume that he would give the following 
(vague) answer to (III): 
(4) The prudential value of a person's life at t is somehow dependent 
69It is worth pointing out that as far as I know, there is no pluralist who has 
included desire-fulfilment in his or her list of goods. The reason for this is 
probably that almost everyone has taken the object interpretation of t he desire 
theory for granted. 
70In this respect, it differs from hedonism and the satisfaction interpretation of the 
actual desire theory. There are (as we have seen) several versions of t wo latter 
theories as well, but all these versions share a common substantive content, and it 
is therefore much more appropriate to regard these two theories as real 
substantive theories. 
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on "how much" of the different prudential values that this life "con­
tains" at t, or alternatively, of how well he is doing in a number of 
specified dimensions (areas, or domains). Or more specifically, the 
more a person "possesses" of these values, the higher is his level of 
well-being. 
Now, this suggests that we cannot determine how well off a person is 
(on the whole) unless the following two conditions are met: (i) We can 
determine how much he "possesses" of the different values (how well 
off he is in the different dimensions), and (ii) we can compare (with 
respect to value-for) a certain amount of one "value" with a certain 
amount of another "value", i.e. we can (so to speak) make inter-
dimensional comparisons with respect to prudential value. But how are 
we (on the assumption that it is possible) to do this? To the extent that 
it is possible, how do we determine (in principle) how well off a certain 
person is in a certain dimension, and how are we to compare (with 
respect to value-for) a certain amount of one "value" with a certain 
amount of another "value"? (This is what (II) looks like in this pluralist 
context). Well, 
(5) On the pure version of the "theory", we must not appeal to 
people's preferences71. 
(6) Concerning the issue on how we should compare (with respect to 
value-for) a certain amount of one "good" with a certain amount of 
another "good": Here, we can (I think) safely assume that there is no 
value which trumps (or is lexically prior to) any other value (cf. Griffin 
(1986), p 83), i.e. that there are no two prudential values such that 
any amount of the one value, no matter how small, is more valuable 
than any amount of the other value, no matter how large. 
(7) Concerning the issue on how we should compare (with respect to 
71To allow that we appeal to preferences in this context is to accept a kind of 
mixed theory of well-being, e.g., to be an objectivist about the good and the bad 
(about what the relevant dimensions are) and a subjectivist about how these 
dimensions should be weighed against each other. This type of mixed theory 
seems to be rather common in the context of "quality of life measurements", 
where it is often assumed that a person's overall quality of life is a function of how 
well he is doing in a number of "pre-determined domains", but where the subject 
himself is (so to speak) allowed to determine the relative importance of the 
different domains, e.g., to rank the domains with respect to their "contributive 
value". 
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value-for) different amounts of the same "good": We must no t  
assume that the prudential value of a certain valuable thing is propor­
tional to how much there is of the thing. That is, we must allow for 
the possibility that there are prudentially valuable things such that the 
marginal value of the thing is diminishing72. For example, in the case 
of friendship, we must not assume that how valuable different 
amounts of friendship are for a certain person is proportional to how 
large these amounts are. 
Should we also allow for the possibility that there are prudential values 
the marginal value of which is (in certain ranges) zero, or even nega­
tive? That is, should we allow for the possibility that there are pruden­
tial values which are not "the-more-the-better"-values? For example, is 
it plausible (for someone who regards friendship as a prudential value, 
that is) to reject the idea that the more friendship there is in a person's 
life, the better-for-him? 
To make this idea more precise, let us first distinguish between two 
senses of "more", the quantitative sense and the qualitative sense. I 
don't think our pluralist would deny that if the quantity of fr iendship 
(e.g., the amount of t ime that one spends in the company of fri ends) is 
held constant, then the more friendship (in the qualitative sense), the 
better. So the question is: Is there any reason to deny that "the more 
friendship (in the quantitative sense), the better"? Well, it may seem 
so73, but I think not. More generally, I think we can assume that all the 
72That a certain good (e.g., friendship) has diminishing marginal value simply means 
that the more there is of the good, the less is the increase in value that a certain 
addition of the good gives rise to. It is worth noting that this kind of ta lk does not 
really make sense unless both the good (e.g., friendship) and the value of the 
good are measurable on interval scales, which suggests that the talk in question is 
probably "senseless". 
73E.g., for the following two reasons: (i) "There are (as we know) other valuable 
things in life besides friendship. Now, it is highly likely that if a person who would 
spend all his time in the company of friends would suffer in other domains. So it is 
reasonable to believe that after a certain point has been reached, the more 
friendship there is in a life, the less there will be of other valuable things. 
Therefore, it is not the case that the more friendship, the better", (ii) "It seems 
plausible to assume that final value should primarily be attributed to a person's 
social life (or life as a whole) viewed as an "organic whole". Moreover, the value of 
this whole is (supposedly) not simply a function of the values of the ingredients 
(like friendship, love, more superficial relationships, and solitude), but also has to 
do with how these elements are balanced with each other. This suggests that the 
value of friendship is primarily "contributive", and this would (in turn) imply that 
it can not be assumed that "the more friendship, the better" (if something has 
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things that our pluralist regards as prudential values are "the-more-the-
better"-values. 
This is (roughly) what a pure non-internalist pluralist would (or 
should) claim. 
1.3. On "method": Some epistemological 
assumptions 
There are (roughly speaking) two sets of questions concerning the 
justification of value-for-claims, viz. (i) epistemological questions of a 
more general nature, e.g., "Assuming that there are valid value-for-
statements; is it possible to justify such statements?" and "If so, in what 
general way (or ways) can this be done?", and (ii) the more "sub­
stantive" (or specific) "Assuming that valid value-for-statements can be 
justified, how exactly can (and should) this be done?"74. In this essay, 
the emphasis will be on the more "substantive" questions, i.e. there will 
be little or no discussion of the epistemological questions. I am going to 
take certain answers to these questions for granted, however. 
My epistemological assumptions: Weak cognitivism 
First, I will assume that it is possible to justify valid value-for-statements 
(and value-for-beliefs)75. That is, I will assume that what Bergström 
(1990) calls "cognitivism" is true in this area, where cognitivism is under-
contributive value only, then we can not assume that the more there is of this 
thing, the better)". 
These are both bad arguments, however. The first ("pragmatic") argument does 
not show that less friendship can be (other th ings being equal) better than more 
friendship. And the second argument claims that what has prudential value is not 
friendship as such, but certain types of social wholes (where it may well be the 
case that such a whole can not have value unless it contains a certain amount of 
friendship, however). 
74Where subjectivism and objectivism (cf. appendix D) should be viewed as 
answer to the second question, and not to the first. 
75Here, we should remind ourselves that the claims which are of primary 
importance in this context are the claims made by general (substantive) theories 
of prudential value, viz. claims of the form "all facts of type X have nonderivative 
value for all human beings (at all times)". However, the idea is not just that these 
general claims can be justified, but also that it is possible to justify both particular 
claims of the form "the particular fact X is nonderivatively good (or bad) for a 
particular person P" and "semi-general" claims of the form "all facts of type X have 
nonderivative value for a particular person P". 
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stood narrowly (as a conception of justification) rather than broadly (as 
a conception of knowledge in the traditional sense, where knowledge 
implies truth, in some "non-minimalist" sense of the term)76. The 
assumption is that rational argument is possible in this area, i.e. that 
there is such a thing as having good reasons for accepting or rejecting a 
certain theory of prudential value. I will not assume that all valid value-
for-statements can be justified, however: the cognitivism I take for 
granted is "weak" rather than "strong". There is a place for rationality 
in this field (and in ethics in general), but there is also a limit to what we 
can achieve by being rational77. 
In the formulation of cognitivism just given, phrases like "having a 
good reason to accept (believe)" and "justified belief" are included. But 
as Bergström (1990) has suggested, such phrases are ambiguous (cf. p 
91): That a person P's belief that X is justified (that P has good reasons 
for his belief that X) can either mean (i) that P has a good reason for 
believing that X, or (ii) that he has a good reason for X. Or alternatively 
put, a person's belief that X can be justified in the "subjective sense", or 
in the "objective sense". That P's belief tha t X is "subjectively justified" 
means (roughly) that it is justified for P (from P's point of view), or 
rather; that P is justified in holding it (holding on to it, acquiring it)78. If 
P's belief that X is "objectively justified", on the other hand, it is really X 
that is justified (rather than the belief that X). And that X is justified 
means that there are good reasons for the validity of X, or alter­
natively, that there is evidence that supports X (ev idence that is avai­
lable, but not to anyone in particular), and that "everyone" has there-
76To the extent that justification does not presuppose truth, that is. It can be 
argued that a claim cannot be (objectively) justified unless it is true, however. 
77This weak cognitivist view suggests (but does not imply) that some 
disagreements about what our welfare consists in are "intractable" (they can 
survive "full discussion and full information", "extensive discussion and awareness 
of all relevant information"; cf. Harman (1996), pp 10-11), but that there are also 
disagreements which can be rationally resolved (settled by means of rational 
argument). 
78The idea that a person is justified in (has good reasons for) believing that a 
certain proposition is true is intimately connected to, but not identical with, the 
idea that it is rational for him to hold the belief (given the evidence available to 
him, and so on). There is (as e.g., Elster (1983) and Nozick (1993) have suggested) 
more to "theoretical rationality" than having good reasons; for a certain belief to 
count as rational, it may also be necessary that it has been formed in the right 
way, e.g., that it has been generated by a reliable procedure (a procedure which is 
good at generating valid (for example, true) beliefs). 
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fore (in principle) a good reason to believe that X is true. 
When I assume that there are such things as justified value-for-beliefs, 
it is primarily objective justification that I have in mind. The assumption 
that our beliefs about what is nonderivatively good (bad, better) for a 
person can be objectively justified is (in this context) more important 
than the assumption that these beliefs can be subjectively justified, i.e. 
the central question is the objective "What counts as a good reason for 
(or against) a certain value-for-claim?" rather than the subjective "When 
is it rational for a person to hold on to a certain value-for-belief?" or 
"How do we determine whether it is rational for a certain person to 
accept a certain value-for-statement?"79. 
Another source of unclarity is this: It seems that the justification of a 
claim (or statement) need not be an all-or-nothing matter, i.e. it seems 
intelligible to say that a certain claim is justified to a certain degree, or 
that some claims are more justified (more "well-founded", or more 
rational to accept) than others. In other words, even though there may 
79Here, one might ask whether cohereritism and foundationalism should be 
regarded as answers to the objective "When is the statement S justified?" or "What 
counts as a good reason for S?", or to the subjective "When is it rational for a 
person to accept S (to believe that it is true)?". As I see it, foundationalism claims 
(roughly) that a statement is justified if and only if it is either "self-evident" (e.g., it 
is obvious that it is true) or it can be "derived" (e.g., induced or deduced) from 
such self-evident statements, i.e. it is really a conception of objective justification. 
Coherentism, on the other hand, claims (again roughly) that a person P is justified 
in believing that X is true if and only if P's belief that X is part of a coherent set of 
beliefs, i.e. a set where the constituent beliefs are "closely knit together, explaining 
each other" (Tännsjö (1995), p 574). If this formulation is correct, it seems that 
coherentism is (at least primarily) a conception of subjective justification. In fact, it 
seems impossible to conceive of coherentism as a conception of objective 
justification, and the reason for this is that there is an essential reference to beliefs. 
However, it seems possible to construct an "intersubjective" version of 
coherentism, where a reference is made to the beliefs of a certain culture (or the 
like), rather than to the beliefs of individual persons (How else could a coherentist 
make sense of science?). 
We may also add that epistemological relativism seems plausible if we have 
subjective justification in mind, but that it can hardly be true if we have objective 
justification in mind. That is, it does not seem implausible to claim that two 
inconsistent beliefs (held by different people) can both be "maximally well-
founded" (cf. Bergström (1990), pp 117-121), but it seems rather absurd to claim 
that there are conclusive reasons both for and against a certain statement (the idea 
that there are "good reasons" both for and against a certain statement is far too 
weak to qualify as relativism). Part of the reason why this is such an odd view is (I 
think) that it seems to presuppose ontological relativism (in Bergström's sense) 
"within the same language community" ("conceptual system", or the like), which is 
an even odder view. 
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not be such a thing as a "fully (or maximally) justified" value-for-state-
ment, it is still possible that some value-for-statements are more justified 
than others, e.g., there may well be such a thing as "the most justified" 
answers to the questions of prudential value (at least as asked from 
some specified point of view; cf. e.g., appendix B). So, when I assume 
that value-for-claims can be justified, what do I mean? Well, I don't 
mean "fully justified" (that there are conclusive reasons for them, or 
that they can be proven), but rather that they can be justified to some 
degree or other. 
Another problem is this: Even though it seems reasonable to assume 
that invalid (e.g., false) claims can be maximally justified in the subjective 
sense, it can hardly be assumed that invalid claims can be fully justified 
in the objective sense, i.e. that there can be conclusive (objective) 
reasons for such claims. So, does it really make sense to say that an in­
valid evaluative claim be partly justified in the objective sense? Well, 1 
think it does, e.g., if there are good reasons both for and against such a 
claim. That is, if we only have "partial justification" in mind, it seems that 
we need not assume that all "justifiable" statements are valid. 
To sum up, we can formulate the weak cognitivist view as follows: At 
least some substantive claims of the form "all facts of type X have non-
derivative value for all human beings" can be at least partly justified in 
the objective sense80. 
So, is there any reason to believe that any general theory of pruden­
tial value can be fully justified in the objective sense, or that any sub­
stantive claim of the form "all facts of type X are nonderivatively good 
(or bad) for everyone" can be justified in this way? Well, there are at 
least two "sources of doubt": First, it can (as we have already seen) be 
doubted whether there are any universal prudential values, i.e. 
whether there are any true general claims about what is good (or bad) 
for all human beings at all times. If w e assume that a claim cannot be 
fully justified in the objective sense unless it is valid, this would mean 
that no such general claim can be fully justified in this sense. And 
second, even if we may assume that there are universal prudential 
80If we remind ourselves that the weak cognitivist view is supposed to hold for 
the other two kinds of value-for-claims as well (cf. note 75), we get: At least some 
substantive claims of the forms "the particular fact X is nonderivatively good for a 
particular person P" and "all facts of a certain type X are nonderivatively good for 
a particular person P" can be at least partly justified in the objective sense. 
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values (e.g., pleasure), if c an always be doubted whether the relevant 
general value-for-claims are fully justifiable in the objective sense. 
Let us now move on to the next question, viz. 
In what general way (or ways) can value-for-claims be 
justified (or refuted)? 
So, on the assumption that at least some claims of t he form "all facts of 
type X are nonderivatively good (or bad) for all human beings" are at 
least partially justifiable in the objective sense: How can they be justi­
fied81? Or alternatively, how do we determine whether a general 
theory of prudential value is well-founded or not? What counts as a 
good reason for or against such a theory? 
This question can be divided into two parts, viz. (i) "How can we jus­
tify (or prove) a general value-for-claim? What does a good reason for 
such a claim look like? Is there such a thing as a conclusive reason for 
such a claim?", and (ii) "How can we criticize (disprove, or refute) a 
theory of prudential value? What does a good reason against (rational 
criticism of) such a theory look like? Is there such a thing as a conclusive 
reason against a general value-for-claim, and if there is, what does it 
look like?". 
Let us now offer some possible answers to these questions. The basic 
idea here (which is of a coherentist kind) is that the most important re­
quirement that a general theory of value-for must meet is that it is con­
sistent with all plausible (e.g., justified or valid) value-for-judgements, 
especially those judgements which are of a "more particular" kind, i.e. 
ultimately, with all plausible particular judgements of the form "The par­
ticular fact X is nonderivatively good for P"82. This suggests that the 
major way in which we can justify or refute a general theory of 
prudential value is by testing it against other (plausible) judgements, 
ultimately against particular value-for-judgements. 
81 As I have already said, the focus will be on the objective question of justification, 
but on occasion, I will also (when necessary) deal with the subjective question. 
82The general idea that "more general" statements must be consistent with "more 
particular" statements can (of course) also be applied to value-for-statements of 
the "semi-general" kind. If we do this, we get the idea that (semi-general) 
judgements of the form "All facts of a certain type X are nonderivatively good for 
a particular person P" cannot be justified unless they are consistent with all 
plausible particular judgements of the form "The particular fact X is 
nonderivatively good for P". 
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The more particular judgements against which a general claim can be 
tested need not refer to actual situations: the situations referred to may 
also be imaginary (or purely hypothetical). The best way to make use of 
imaginary cases is the thought experiment, where hypothetical situa­
tions are (normally) compared to each other with respect to value-for, 
and the reason for this is that it allows us to make changes in one vari­
able while we keep the rest constant (it allows use to make use of the 
locution "other things being equal")83. 
But exactly how do we test the relevant general claims against other 
plausible judgements? For example, how do we conceive of the relation 
between the validity of a general statement and the validity of t he rele­
vant particular (or semi-general) statements? Here, I want to suggest 
that (i) and (ii) should be answered as follows: 
(i) Here, my (somewhat trivial) suggestion is that there are only two 
kinds of reasons ("good reasons") that can contribute to the objec­
tive plausibility of a general value-for-statement S, viz. (1) that S is 
compatible with all other plausible (e.g., justified) value-for-
statements, especially the particular (and semi-general) ones, and (2) 
that S can (somehow) be induced from those plausible statements that 
are of a more particular (or more specific) kind84. (If we take the 
problem of induction into account, this seems to imply that there is no 
such thing as a conclusive reason for a general value-for-statement. 
This is probably something that a falsificationalist would happily agree 
with). 
In answer to (ii), I suggest (again trivially) that there is only one type 
of good reason against a general value-for-statement S, i.e. that there 
is only one kind of reason that can "detract from" the (objective) 
plausibility of such a statement, viz. that S is inconsistent with some 
83A general value-for-judgement can (of cours e) only be tested against particular 
value-for-judgements that are "of the same form". For example, comparative 
thought experiments can only be used to test general comparative value-for-
claims, e.g., claims of the form "For all persons P: the more of X (som e good-
making feature) that a situation contains, the better for P". 
84This is something that the coherentist and the foundationalist can agree on. The 
difference between the two views is that while the foundationalist may claim that 
there are particular statements that are plausible (justified) "in themselves", the 
coherentist denies this, and claims instead that the reason why the relevant 
particular statements are justified is (at least in part) that S is justified. (We will 
return to this idea below). 
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plausible value-for-statement: or more precisely, that some statement 
that can be deduced from S is inconsistent with some plausible state­
ment, e.g., a value-for-statement of a more particular kind. 
So, does this mean that there is such a thing as a conclusive reason 
against a general value-for-claim? Suppose that there is only one plau­
sible particular statement that is inconsistent with a certain general 
theory. Does this mean that we should regard the theory as refuted, or 
should we (instead) "ignore" the particular judgement? What "weight" 
(or "authority") should we give the particular judgement and what 
weight should we give the theory? 
There are two fundamental views that one might adopt here, views 
which are best expressed in "subjective terms"85. On the first view 
(which also happens to be my own), we should give a lot of weight to 
our judgements about particular cases, or more precisely; if there is as 
much as one plausible (or "considered") particular judgement that is in­
consistent with the theory, then the theory must be modified. To gain a 
better understanding of this thesis, consider the following two points: 
First, to claim is that our considered judgements about particular cases 
should be "granted a privileged position" is not to claim that they 
should be regarded as infallible, or that we never will have a good 
reason to revise them86. And second, it is an open question what it is 
that makes a judgement considered (but some idea of reflective equi­
librium seems plausible here), and how many of our judgements about 
particular cases that can really be regarded as considered (e.g., it is not 
enough to be sufficiently convinced). These points suggest that our 
general theoretical beliefs should be given some weight, but only indi­
rectly, as one of several components in the equilibrium, i.e. it seems that 
the thesis in question is compatible with coherentism87. As Tännsjö 
(1995) points out, 
coherentism /.../ is compatible with a kind of f oundationalism in et-
85I hope they can also be expressed in objective terms, but I am not quite sure 
about this. It all depends on whether coherentism can also be viewed as a 
conception of objective justification. 
86One possible reason for this is (of course) that our particular judgements are 
sometimes theory-laden. 
87However, it is worth noting the type of coherentism adopted by me is rather 
"extreme": I tend to give less weight to our theoretical beliefs than most 
coherentists, including Rawls himself. 
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hies, a foundationalism according to which certain moral judgements 
(considered judgements about particular cases, say) are granted a 
privileged position; these statements are not incorrigible, but, accor­
ding to other beliefs in the reflective equilibrium, these statements 
may well have a privileged position (p 574). 
The alternative view gives less weight to our considered judgements 
about particular cases, and more weight to our theoretical beliefs. There 
are two versions of this idea: 
The first version makes the following claim: If there are only a few 
considered (more) particular judgements that are inconsistent with 
some general theory, then this does not give us a sufficient reason for 
rejecting (or modifying) the theory; instead, the relevant particular 
judgements may "safely be ignored". Since this idea is (on the face of it) 
contrary to reason, we must ask why some philosophers tend to hold 
on to it. As far as I can see, this is due to two fundamental convictions 
(which are, on my view, both implausible, at least in ethics). The first 
conviction is a too extensive theoretical ambition (or a too exaggerated 
"generalism") in ethics. Only a very theoretically ambitious person might 
say: "Yes, it is true that my theory has implications which are incon­
sistent with my considered judgements about particular cases, but I will 
hold on to it anyway; after all, it is the best general theory that we've 
got, and we really need a general ethical theory" (cf. Tännsjö (1993), pp 
30-32). The second conviction is the idea that the best (or true) theory 
must be a simple theory (cf. Tännsjö (1995), p 573), who regards lack of 
simplicity as a considerable intellectual price). On my view, both these 
convictions are totally unfounded (at least in ethics), e.g., what reason 
is there (really) to believe that "evaluative reality" (the part of reality 
that an evaluative theory is about) is simple?88 
The second way in which one might give more weight to general 
(theoretical) beliefs is this: These beliefs are (so to speak) granted a 
privileged position in the reflective equilibrium (there will be a belief in the 
equilibrium according to which these beliefs have a privileged position), 
and they will (because of this) determine (to a high extent) what parti­
cular judgements that will be regarded as considered. But if someone 
88On my view, these convictions also constitute one of the best explanations of 
why some people are attracted to utilitarianism. For other good explanations of 
this attraction, see Foot (1985) and Thomson (1992) and (1994). 
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has a strong conviction that a certain general theory is true (or justi­
fied), then this conviction must not (for purposes of justification) have 
too large an effect on his judgements about particular cases: If so meone 
accepts certain more particular statements as true because they are 
implied by a certain general theory, then coherentism implies that these 
more particular judgements can not be used to justify the theory. 
But as I have already stated, I tend to accept the first view. In short, 
I think we should (at least in ethics) proceed in "the spirit of induc-
tionism" rather than in "the spirit of deductionism". 
All this gives rise to the following question: If general value-for-claims 
are (at least in part) justified in virtue of being consistent with more 
particular judgements which are themselves justified, how can these 
judgements be justified? That is, how (in what general way) can claims 
of t he forms "all facts of ty pe X are good for a particular person P" and 
"the particular fact X is good for a particular person P" be justified? 
What kinds of reasons can be given for and against such claims? 
If w e look at how the semi-general claims can be justified, there are 
two possibilities here, viz. these claims can perhaps (1) be justified in an 
"inductive" way, but they may also be (2) justified in a "deductive" 
way. 
As far as the "inductive" type of justification is concerned, nothing 
really needs to be added to what has been said about general value-
for-statements above. In short, there are two kinds of goo d reasons for 
such a semi-general statement S, viz. (a) that S is consistent with all 
other plausible value-for-statements, especially the particular ones, and 
(b) that S can (somehow) be induced from the relevant particular state­
ments; and there is only one type of good reason against a semi-general 
value-for-statement S, viz. that some value-for-statement that can be 
deduced from S is inconsistent with some plausible statement. 
However, there is also the possibility that semi-general value-for-
statements can be justified in a "deductive" way, i.e. in terms of general 
value-for-statements. It might, for example, be claimed that it is non-
derivatively good for a certain person to feel pleasure because he is a 
certain type of creature (e.g., a sentient being, or a human being), and 
because feeling pleasure has nonderivative value for all creatures of th is 
type. It is worth noting that this deductivist idea is not inconsistent with 
the "inductivist" idea that we should give more "epistemological 
weight" to our more particular judgements than to our more general 
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judgements; it may (after all) be "partially valid" for coherentist 
reasons. It seems inconsistent with the strong "inductionism" expressed 
above, however (this is not changed by the fact that my "inductionism" 
is "falsificationalist" rather than "verificationalist" in spirit), and this 
suggests that the deductivist idea is of little or no help in this context. 
As far as the justification of particular value-for-statements89 is con­
cerned, it seems plausible to adopt the following generalist view: If a 
certain particular fact has nonderivative value for a certain person, then 
the reason for this is (at least in part) that the fact in question has 
certain good-making features (and lacks certain bad-making features). 
But this would mean that all facts of t he same type (i.e. facts that have 
the same features) are also good for the person. In short, whenever a 
particular fact has nonderivative value for a particular person, then this 
is so because it is of a certain type, and because all facts of this type 
have nonderivative value for the person in question (This is the idea of 
supervenience which is discussed more in detail in appendix B). 
Now, this view may seem inconsistent with the "inductionist" view 
that a semi-general value-for-statement can be partly justified in virtue 
of being consistent with all plausible particular value-for-statements, but 
the inconsistency is (I think) only apparent. The generalist view above 
does not imply that particular value-for-statements are justified in virtue 
of being deducible from plausible semi-general statements, i.e. it is not 
really a "deductionist" view. But still, the generalist view has (I think) 
certain "justificatory" implications, viz. it suggests that the value-for of 
particular facts should (in this context) not be regarded in isolation (we 
will soon return to this idea). 
This suggests that we should adopt the following "coherentist" (and 
"generalist") view: A particular value-for-statement S is at least partially 
justified (in the objective sense) if it is consistent with all other plausible 
particular statements, where S is consistent with another particular 
statement S' if and only if S' can be deduced from some plausible semi-
general statement that corresponds to S90. (And we should also add 
89It is worth noting that these statements will be ignored in the rest of th is book. 
My only reason for discussing them at all is that they have been granted the most 
privileged epistemological position. 
90That is, the idea is that a particular statement S can only be consistent with other 
particular statements via some semi-general statement to which it corresponds: if 
a particular fact X is nonderivatively good for P, then there exists some 
description of X su ch that all other particular facts that fall under the same 
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thai there is no such thing as a self-evident particular value-for-belief). 
All this suggests that there is no such thing as a conclusive reason for 
or against a certain particular value-for-statement (which is not to deny 
that the validity of such statements are sometimes "beyond reasonable 
doubt"). It also seems to have certain implications on the issue of 
"subjective justification", e.g., it seems to imply that there is little or 
nothing one can do to resolve disagreements about the value-for of 
particular facts in a rational way (unless we conceive of rhetoric tricks 
as rational argument, that is). If t his is correct, we must also (as a con­
sequence) accept that those "general (e.g., theoretical) disagreements" 
which are based on such "particular disagreements" are also intractable, 
and that it is in many cases not possible to convince "every rational 
person" (by means of rational argument) that a certain general value-
for-claim is valid or invalid. In fact, it seems likely that we can only con­
vince someone who shares the relevant intuitions about particular cases. 
For example, suppose I argue against a certain general theory by trying 
to show that it has implausible implications in more particular cases, e.g., 
suppose I say: "Hedonism implies that life in the experience machine (cf. 
section 3.2 below) can be good, but such a life can never be good, and 
therefore, hedonism is implausible". What do I do if the opponent 
thinks that a life in the experience machine may well be a good life91? If 
description (that are of the same type) are nonderivatively good for P too. Or in 
other terms: For every plausible particular statement of t he form "this is good for 
P", there are a number of a corresponding plausible semi-general value-for-
statements on different levels of generality, e.g., "it is good for P that he has a 
pleasant musical experience", "it is good for P that he has a pleasant aesthetic 
experience", or "it is good for P that he has a pleasant experience". And the 
corresponding (plausible) semi-general statement that is of most interest in this 
context is (of course) the most general one: "it is good for P that he has a pleasant 
experience" is (if valid) of more interest than "it is good for P that he has a pleasant 
musical experience", and so on. 
That a certain particular statement is consistent with other particular statements 
in this way (via some semi-general statement) is probably the strongest type of 
reason one can find for regarding it as valid. To say that a particular statement is 
justified if it can be deduced from some justified general statement is (as we have 
seen) not very helpful in this context. And it is also doubtful whether there is such 
a thing as an evaluative counterpart to "good observational conditions"; we could 
(of course) always refer to the good (e.g., mentally healthy) human being, but this 
would (it seems) only give rise to new difficult problems. 
91It is also possible that the opponent does not accept that the theory has a certain 
implication, e.g., like those hedonists (yes, I have met some) who refuses to accept 
that the theory implies that a pleasant life in the experience machine is a good life. 
How does one respond to someone who refuses to accept one's "data" as data? 
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we want to resolve our disagreement in a rational way, how do we go 
on from here? For example, can we resolve our disagreement by 
moving on to another "level of discourse", e.g., by starting to talk 
about the nature of our disagreement? I think not. On my view, there is 
really nothing we can do here. 
This pessimistic view concerning the "foundations of ethics" gives rise 
to at least two questions, viz. (i) if I accept the idea that there is no such 
thing as an evaluative counterpart to "good observational conditions" 
in science, why do I give such epistemological weight to our judgements 
about particular cases?, and (ii) why do I hold on to cognitivism at all; 
why don't I take one step further and become a full-fledged scepticist? 
(i) My reason for giving more epistemological weight to our judge­
ments about particular cases than to our more general judgements is 
simple: It is true that we may well be mistaken about what particular 
facts that are nonderivatively good for us, but it is more likely that we 
are mistaken in our more general beliefs, viz. because the latter beliefs 
contain much more information. Just as the belief that all allergies are 
psychosomatic is more likely to be false than the belief that this parti­
cular allergy is caused by psychological factors, so the value-for-belief 
that it is nonderivatively good for everyone to feel pleasure is much 
more likely to be false than my belief that it is nonderivatively good for 
me to feel whatever I am feeling right now. So, even though our 
judgements about particular cases may be mistaken; they are at least 
more certain than the alternatives. 
(ii) So, in the light of my "foundational pessimism", what reasons do I 
have for rejecting full-fledged scepticism, i.e. the idea that there is no 
such thing as an objectively good reason in this area, and that our 
value-for-beliefs can be neither justified nor refuted? Well, my only 
reason for rejecting scepticism about value-for is the idea that particular 
value-for-statements can (for "coherentist reasons") be at least partially 
justified. If this is not a good reason, then I am (it seems) forced to 
accept scepticism. 
(And how does one respond to someone who thinks we should consider the fact 
that the experience machine may break down??!). 
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Chapter Two 
A formulation of the hedonistic theory 
(and its different versions) 
The first traditional conception of prudential value which we will look at 
is the hedonistic theory. The discussion of hedonism will have the 
following structure. In this chapter, I will try to give a formulation of 
the theory (and its different versions) that is as precise as possible. In 
connection with this, several topics will be discussed, e.g., "What is the 
nature of pleasantness (and unpleasantness)?" and "To what is plea­
santness primarily attributed, to 'whole lives of experience at certain 
times' or to 'experiences' (in the plural)?". The central questions in chap­
ter 3 are questions of plausibility. By looking at arguments that can be 
given for and against the theory, I will try to find out whether the 
hedonistic theory is a plausible theory of prudential value or not, and 
which version of the theory that is most plausible. 
To recapitulate how the pure version of the hedonistic theory was 
characterized in chapter 1, here is a brief summary: 
(HI) The Experience Requirement: The only facts that can have non-
derivative value for a person at a certain time are facts about his or 
her own experience at that time. 
(H2) More specifically, the only thing that is nonderivatively good for 
a person is to have pleasant experiences, and the only thing that is 
nonderivatively bad for a person is to have unpleasant experiences. 
(H3) The Thesis of Unrestrictedness: All pleasant experiences are 
nonderivatively good for the experiencing subject, and all unpleasant 
experiences are nonderivatively bad, regardless of what other pro­
perties these experiences have. 
(H4) If we ignore the issue of d uration, then every good experience 
is good in virtue of its pleasantness only, and every bad experience is 
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bad in virtue of its unpleasantness only. 
(H5) The "intensity-orientation" and the idea of proportionality: To 
the extent that it is possible to determine how valuable it is for a cer­
tain person to have a certain experience: The value of an experience 
for the person who has it is (if we ignore the issue of duration) a 
function of one thing only, viz. how pleasant or unpleasant it is. Or 
more specifically: The positive (or negative) value that a pleasant (or 
unpleasant) experience has for the experiencing subject is propor­
tional to how pleasant (or unpleasant) the experience is. This means 
(among other things) that the marginal value of pleasure (and dis­
pleasure) is not diminishing. 
(H1)-(H5) are claims about the value-for of l ocal situations (or "atomic 
facts"). (H6), on the other hand, is a claim about the value-for of w hole 
lives-at-certain-times, situations the value-for of which cannot be 
determined directly. 
(H6) The final value that a certain life-at-a-certain-time has for the 
person who is living it is a function of how much pleasure and how 
much suffering this life contains. The more pleasure it contains, the 
better, and the more suffering it contains, the worse. 
As it stands, this claim is far too imprecise. So, how would a pure 
hedonist make it more precise? Well, this is the position that he would 
most likely adopt: 
(H6:a) First, he would (of course) assume that evaluative atomism is 
true, i.e. (in this particular case) that the final value of a person's 
existence at a certain time has for this person is a function (e.g., a 
sum) of the (positive and negative) nonderivative values-for of its 
constituent parts1. 
So, how should this function be characterized, i.e. how does the hedo­
nist tackle the problem of synchronic aggregation? Well, as a first 
approximation, we know that the hedonist would adopt the following 
1 Where "parts" should (I think) be understood in a broad sense, e.g., as "aspects" 
or "features". However, in a hedonistic context, it doesn't really matter whether 
we use the term in a strict sense or in a broader sense. The reason for this is that 
on the hedonistic view, the only relevant feature of a complex situation is its 
experiential "content", something that can be referred to as "parts" in the strict 
sense. 
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rudimentary theory of aggregation: The more pleasure and the less 
suffering that a certain life contains, the better it is for the person who 
is living this life. But how exactly do we determine how much pleasure 
or suffering a life contains? And how do we deal with the cases where 
one possible life contains both more pleasure and more suffering than 
another possible life? The hedonistic answer to these questions can be 
divided into two parts: 
(H6:b) This is the procedure that should (in principle, and if po ssible) 
be adopted in order to determine how much pleasure and how much 
suffering a life contains: We assign a positive number to each pleasant 
experience, and a negative number to each unpleasant experience, 
that the life contains. (How great these numbers are depends on how 
pleasant or unpleasant the experiences are). We then add all the posi­
tive numbers we have assigned to the pleasant experiences, and all 
the negative numbers we have assigned to the sufferings. If we do 
this, we get two sums, viz. the positive sum E (P), and the negative 
sum E (S). We can now say that the greater the sum E (P) is, the more 
pleasure a life contains, and the more negative the sum E (S) is, the 
higher the amount of suffering2. 
(H6:c) Once our hedonist has access to the two sums E (P) and E (S), 
he can make the idea that "the more pleasure and the less suffering 
that a certain life contains, the better for the person who is living this 
life" more precise, viz. in the following way: The greater E (P) is, the 
better, and the smaller £ (S) is, the worse. 
But how exactly should we understand the idea that the value-for of a 
life is a function of the two sums E (P) and E (S)? That is, how should 
we (according to the hedonist) calculate the final value-for of a life from 
its E (P) and E (S)? There are two different ways in which a pure 
hedonist might answer this question, viz. he can either appeal to (i) to 
the difference thesis, or to (ii) some kind of ra tio thesis. 
(i) The Difference Thesis is (in the case of lives-at-certain-times) the idea 
that a life LI is finally better (more pleasant) than another life L2 if 
2It is important to point out that for this type of aggregation to be at all possible, 
two rather dubious assumptions has to be made, viz. (i) both pleasantness and 
unpleasantness are measurable on ratio scales, and (ii) both pleasantness and 
unpleasantness satisfy "the criterion of additivity". 
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and only if LI contains more "net pleasure" than L2, i.e. iff " the total 
net sum" [I (PI) +E(S1)] is bigger than the sum [I (P2) + E (S2)]. Or 
alternatively put, LI is better than L2 if and only if the difference 
[I (PI) - IE (SI) I ] is bigger than the difference [E (P2) - I X (S2) I ]. 
(ii) The Ratio Thesis, on the other hand, is (roughly) the claim that a life 
LI is better than another life L2 if and only if LI has a better "balance 
of pleasure over pain" than L2. But how exactly should this idea be 
understood? Well, the idea is most certainly not that LI is better than 
L2 if and only if the ratio E (PI)/ IE (SI) I is bigger than the ratio 
E (P2)/ IE (S2) I (thi s would have the absurd implication that one tiny 
pleasure is enough to make a life free from suffering "infinitely 
good"). This is one of several possible interpretations that is far more 
plausible: LI is better than L2 iff the ratio E (P1)/[E (PI) + IE (SI) I ] is 
bigger than the ratio E (P2)/[E (P2) + IE (S2) I p. 
This is how the pure hedonist would make (H6) more precise. Let us 
now turn our attention to (H1)-(H5). As these claims stand, they are 
not sufficiently clear and precise for our purposes, i.e. in order to find 
out how plausible the different versions of hedonism are, we need to 
formulate the claims in a more precise way. So, what is it about these 
claims that is in need of clarification? What is it we need to know in 
order to arrive at a sufficiently precise formulation of pure hedonism? 
On my view, there are two "sources of unclarity", viz. the following 
ones: 
(1) When the hedonist claims that the value of a n experience (for the 
person who has it) is dependent on how pleasant or unpleasant it is, it 
is not entirely clear what the terms "pleasant" and "unpleasant" mean, 
3Here, it is important to notice that for these "operations" are not possible unless 
two very strong conditions are (in addition to (i) and (ii) in note 2, that is) met, viz. 
the following ones: (iii) Pleasantness and unpleasantness are measurable on the 
same ratio scale, something which (among other things) presupposes that the 
positive values of o ur pleasures can be fully compared to the negative values of 
our sufferings: if P is a pleasure and S is a suffering, then either the negative value 
of S is "smaller than", or it is "as big as", or it is "larger than" the positive value of P. 
(iv) It is not just that we can obtain the two sums X (P) and 2 (S), we can also (once 
we have obtained them) perform arithmetic operations on these sums. That is, the 
two sums can be added, divided by each other, and so on. Or alternatively put, it 
is not just meaningful to add the positive (or negative) numbers assigned to a 
person's pleasures (or sufferings); it also makes sense to add (etc.) the positive 
numbers assigned to his pleasures and the negative numbers assigned to his 
sufferings to each other. 
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and what they refer to. So the first thing we need to know is how the 
terms "pleasantness" and "unpleasantness" should be interpreted in 
this context, i.e. how these key terms are actually used by the hedonist 
when he states his claims. We also want to know which of the possible 
interpretations of the terms that makes the hedonistic theory most 
plausible, or alternatively put, which of the possible senses of t he terms 
"pleasant" and "unpleasant" that are most ethically relevant, but with 
the following "proviso"; this interpretation must not deviate too much 
from the ordinary meaning (or meanings) of the terms. 
These questions need not be formulated in semantic terms, however; 
they can also be formulated in terms of conceptions of p leasantness and 
unpleasantness. A conception of pleasantness is a theory that purports to 
give answers to certain central questions about pleasantness, e.g., 
questions like the following ones: What is it for someone to have a plea­
sant experience? What is it that makes an experience pleasant: what 
does the pleasantness of an experience consist in? Do all experiences 
which are properly conceived of as pleasant have anything in common, 
some property (intrinsic or relational) in virtue of which they are plea­
sant, or is the class of pleasant experience a "heterogeneous class"? 
That is, are all pleasant experiences of the same genus (in the traditional 
sense of the term) or not? And what fundamental forms (e.g., species ) 
of pleasantness are there? 
So, what conceptions of the pleasant and the unpleasant does diffe­
rent hedonists have in mind? And what conception of p leasantness and 
unpleasantness makes (if combined with the hedonistic theory) the 
theory most plausible, i.e. what conception of pleasantness and un­
pleasantness is (so to speak) most ethically relevant?4 
4It is also worth mentioning what we are not really interested in in this context. 
We are not looking for the true meaning (nominal definition) of the terms 
"pleasant" and "unpleasant", a meaning which captures the real nature (or essence) 
of pleasantness and unpleasantness. Even if there were such a thing as the nature 
of the pleasant and the unpleasant (which is doubtful), and even if knowledge 
about this "thing" would (so to speak) give us "the true meaning of hedonism", we 
could still ignore it. What we want to know is not what pleasure (displeasure) 
really is, but what the hedonist really m eans, and above all, what he should mean. 
Neither are we particularly interested in what the terms "pleasant" and 
"unpleasant" mean in ordinary speech, nor in how we should conceive of these 
terms "in a defensible psychological conceptual scheme", i.e. in what conceptions 
of the pleasant and the unpleasant that are "most useful for psychological theory" 
(cf. Brandt (1979), p 35). 
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(2) The hedonist conceives of pleasantness and unpleasantness as fea­
tures of experience, i.e. as something that is properly attributed to 
experience. But when pleasantness or unpleasantness are attributed to 
"experience", to what exactly are they attributed? Is pleasantness 
something that is primarily attributed to whole lives of experience at 
certain times, or is it something that is primarily attributed to experi­
ences (in the plural, in the sense in which a person can have several 
experiences going on at the same time)5? Is pleasantness something that 
can be attributed to whole experiential lives at certain times, and if it 
can, is it something that can be directly attributed to whole experiential 
lives? And if it is more plausible to conceive of pleasantness as a feature 
of experiences (in the plural), then how should such experiences be 
individuated "in the synchronic", i.e. how do we separate two simulta­
neous experiences from each other? 
These are the questions we have to answer in order to arrive at a 
precise enough formulation of pure hedonism6. Let us start with the 
second one, i.e. the question of w hat pleasantness and unpleasantness 
are (primarily) attributed to. 
2.1. To what exactly is pleasantness and 
unpleasantness primarily attributed? 
Some preliminaries: How we attribute pleasantness and 
unpleasantness in ordinary speech 
In everyday speech, pleasantness is attributed to many different kinds 
of things, e.g., to "sniffing a perfume, eating a steak, dozing in a deck-
chair, playing tennis, a general euphoria or sense of well-being or 
content, announcing to someone else that he is receiving an award, lis­
tening to a symphony, watching a football game, making preparations 
5This is how I expressed myself when formulating (H1)-(H5). 
6But what if the value of an experience for the person who has it is not just 
dependent on how pleasant or unpleasant it is, but also on its duration (on how 
long it lasts)? This would give rise to yet another "source of unclarity", viz. the 
following one: How exactly should the term "duration" should be understood 
here? Should it be understood in the objective sense or in the subjective sense? Is 
it objective time (clock time) or subjective time (felt time) that matters? There will 
be a detailed (and rather speculative) discussion of these questions in appendix E. 
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for a trip, day-dreaming about some hoped-for event, and so on" 
(Brandt (1979), p 35), or to "satisfying an intense thirst or lust, listening 
to music, solving an intellectual problem, reading a tragedy, and 
knowing that one's child is happy" (Parfit (1984), p 493). 
This list indicates that in ordinary speech, pleasantness is not only 
attributed to experiences (like euphoria or day-dreaming), but also to 
"doings" or activities (where the term "activities" should be understood 
in a broad, "Aristotelian", sense, i.e. as including the activities of the 
mind), like eating, playing tennis, or solving a problem7. So, in virtue of 
what do we attribute pleasantness to activities? What is it to take plea­
sure in an activity, and what is it that makes a pleasant activity 
pleasant? 
On my view, there are three kinds of reasons for attributing plea­
santness to a certain person P's engaging in a certain activity, viz. 
(i) it (or the experience of it , which I regard as included in the activity) 
causes that P has a pleasant experience; or 
(ii) it is the intentional object of some pleasant experience that P has, 
e.g., P is happy with engaging in it; or 
(iii) P enjoys to be engaged in the activity, where the term "enjoys" is to 
be understood as follows: 
Someone enjoys an activity to the extent he engages in the activity 
because of its own intrinsic properties, not simply because of what it 
leads to or produces later. Its intrinsic properties are not limited to 
felt qualities, though; this leaves open the possibility that something is 
enjoyed yet not pleasurable (Nozick (1989), p 104)8. 
That is, an activity is not enjoyed (in this sense) if the agent desires to 
engage in it because of the experiences it gives rise to. Rather, that an 
agent enjoys an activity means that he desires to engage in it "in and 
for itself", i.e. that he has an intrinsic desire to engage in the activity, 
7On this view, it is not appropriate to attribute pleasantness to things that are 
neither experiences nor activities, e.g., to external events. Now, it may seem as if 
pleasantness might sometimes be correctly attributed to "things" like games or 
pieces of music, but this is not really so. What we attribute pleasantness to in cases 
like these are (rather) things like watching a game, or listening to music. 
8Where it is not entirely clear what an intrinsic property of an activity is. For 
example, if someone performs a certain action because he believes it is his duty, is 
this action enjoyed in Nozick's sense? 
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supposedly when he engages in it9. 
To conclude: If p leasantness is (correctly) attributed to something that 
is not an experience, then (a) this something is an activity (in the wide 
sense), and (b) the reason why the activity is properly regarded as 
pleasant is either that it is (in some relevant way) connected to some 
pleasant experience that the agent has, or that it is enjoyed or liked. 
That is, we are left with two things, viz. pleasant experience and en­
joyment. Enjoyment is of little or no interest to most hedonists, how­
ever10, so from now on, we will restrict our attention to pleasant 
experience. 
In ordinary speech, we rarely attribute pleasantness and un­
pleasantness to whole experiential lives-at-certain-times. Instead, plea­
santness and unpleasantness are normally attributed to certain parts of 
such "synchronic wholes", viz. to different kinds of e xperiences (in the 
plural). More specifically, the kinds of experiences to which pleasantness 
and unpleasantness are most often (and most naturally) attributed are 
feelings (in the broadest sense of the term), viz. bodily sensations, 
emotions, and moods. 
9It is worth pointing out that Griffin's (1986) use of the term "enjoyment" is similar 
to Nozick's. This is what Griffin writes about enjoyment: "There is a cluster of 
terms which even in their everyday use seem to fall conveniently between mental 
states and fulfilment of desires: namely, enjoying or liking things, finding them 
pleasing or satisfying or fulfilling, being pleased or happy with them. Let us use 
the term enjoyment to cover them all. Enjoyment /.../ is not anything so narrow as 
experiencing a single state or one of a range of states /... / [and] it is nothing so 
broad as having merely desires / ../ fulfilled. Also, let us allow that people enjoy 
things other than states of mind [e.g., helping others or advance knowledge]. 
I... I But let us put a limit to the range by requiring that all the objects of 
enjoyment fall within our experience" (p 18). 
10Or am I wrong about this? I can't help feeling that the exclusion of enjoyment is 
(somehow) against "the true spirit of hedonism". Anyway, it is worth considering 
what an "enjoyment-hedonistic" theory would look like: It would claim that the only 
thing that is nonderivatively good for a person is that he enjoys doing what he is 
doing, and the only thing that is nonderivatively bad for a person is to be 
engaged in activities that he does not enjoy at all, or to be engaged in activities 
which he positively dislikes to be engaged in. It would claim that the more 
enjoyed activity and the less disliked activity a life contains, the better it is for the 
person who is living the life. And it would claim that how good it is for a person 
to engage in an activity depends on how much he enjoys it, i.e. to what extent he 
engages in it because of its own intrinsic properties. On my view, this theory is 
not bad at all. 
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Pleasant and unpleasant sensations 
There are at least two things that all sensations have in common: First, 
they are not directed towards intentional objects, and second, every 
sensation is associated with some sense organ (or type of receptor). 
This last fact provides us with the most natural way of classifying sen­
sations, viz. on basis of what kind of sense (or receptor, or neural 
pathway) that the sensation is associated with. In this way, we dis­
tinguish between visual sensations, sensations of taste or smell, tactile 
sensations, sensations of cold, sensations of pa in, and so on. 
It seems that the kinds of s ensations to which we normally attribute 
pleasantness and unpleasantness are the most "physical" ones, i.e. the 
sensations which are associated with the proximal senses, like tactile 
sensations, sensations of smell, sensations of taste, sensations of pain, 
and so on. That is, visual and auditory sensations (e.g., seeing a patch 
of red) are (unlike visual and auditory perceptions, which also have 
cognitive components) not often conceived of as pleasant or unpleasant. 
Examples of sensations that are normally (but not always) pleasant to 
have are the taste caused by a good wine; the bodily feelings that are 
caused by things like getting a massage, relaxing, or taking a hot bath; 
the sensations of cold in the throat that one gets from drinking some­
thing cold when thirsty; the sensations of touch that are caused by 
kissing and caressing a person that one finds attractive, or by being 
kissed or caressed by such a person; and so on. Examples of s ensations 
that are normally considered unpleasant are sensations of pain, itchings, 
or the sensations that are associated with things like the following; 
receiving an electric shock, having to stay awake when sleepy, being 
unable to breathe (or to have one's breathing restricted), being (bodily) 
tense, being too cold or too hot, tasting something really sour, or 
smelling something rotten. 
Pleasant and unpleasant emotions 
Emotions are intentional mental states or events, i.e. they are always 
directed towards (intentional) objects. Every emotion has (in virtue of 
its intentionality) some cognitive content, it is in part constituted by 
"cognitions" (in a wide sense of the term) about its object. These cog­
nitions are (it seems) of two different kinds: they are either beliefs 
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about the object11, or they are "pro- or con-attitudes" towards the 
object. That is, when someone is emoting, he believes something about 
the object, and he is (perhaps as a result of h aving these beliefs) either 
"for" or "against" the object, e.g., he evaluates it in a positive or nega­
tive way, he likes or dislikes it, or the like. Emotions are not purely 
intentional states (like thoughts or fantasies), however; they also have 
sensory content, or more specifically, they are (on my view) partly con­
stituted by bodily sensations (or felt qualities of a "bodily" type)12. 
Examples of emotions that are normally (but not always) pleasant to 
have are happiness13, gladness, joy, infatuation, pride, and hope, and 
examples of emotions that are normally unpleasant are grief, anger, 
fear, worry, despair, guilt, shame, hatred, and unhappiness. Most emo­
tions that are considered pleasant are also "positive" (they are, in part, 
constituted by a positive evaluation of its object), and most unpleasant 
emotions are "negative", but there is (as far as I can see) no necessary 
connection between pleasantness and "positivity", or between unplea­
santness and "negativity", e.g., it may well be the case that an emotion 
is both positive and unpleasant (as in the case of intense longing). 
Pleasant and unpleasant moods 
The third type of experience to which pleasantness and unpleasantness 
are most typically attributed is the moods. According to Nozick (1989), 
a mood is a "tendency to make certain types of evaluations, to focus 
11Where "perceiving something in a certain way" might be regarded as a form of 
believing. That is, if I perceive a bull as dangerous (if th e bull appears dangerous 
to me), then it is (in this "emotional" context) appropriate to ascribe to me a belief 
that the bull is dangerous. 
12A11 this is in line with Nozick's (1989) theory of emotion. On his view (cf. pp 87-
89), emotions have a common structure, consisting of three components: (i) a 
belief that something is or is not the case, (ii) a positive or negative evaluation, 
and (iii) a feeling, sensation, or "inner experience". 
13Emotional happiness is probably the most pleasant emotion there is, especially 
the type of happiness that Nozick (1989) calls "feeling that your life is good now". This 
is how he describes it: "Recall those particular moments when you thought and 
felt, blissfully, that there was nothing else you wanted, your life was good then. 
I... I What marks these times is their completeness. There is something you have 
that you want, and no other wants come crowding in; there is nothing else that 
you think of wanting right then. /.../ [I]n the moments I am describing, these 
other desires /.../ simply are not operating. They are not felt, they are not lurking 
at the margins to enter. There is no additional thing you want right then, nothing 
feels lacking, your satisfaction is complete. The feeling that accompanies this is 
intense joy" (pp 108-109). 
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upon facts that can be evaluated in that way, and to have the ensuing 
feelings" (p 114). I agree with Nozick that moods are, to a considerable 
extent, dispositions (or "filters"). However, on my view, a mood is 
more than just a set of dispositions; it is also (at least in most cases) con­
stituted by (i) a certain "outlook" (on the world), and (ii) a diffuse 
(perhaps global) feeling (cf. Brülde (1992), pp 98-99). 
(i) It seems that every mood is (at least in part) constituted by a cer­
tain way of "perceiving" the world. To be in different moods is to see 
the world in "different lights", or even (in some sense) to "live in diffe­
rent worlds". (That is, moods are not intentional states, they are not di­
rected towards specific objects). To describe the "light" in which we see 
the world, we often use colour metaphors (like in "all is grey today"), 
or we talk in terms of darkness and light (like in "today, I see 
everything from the bright side"). Being in a mood is like wearing a pair 
of glasses, and we are always wearing some pair or other, i.e. we are 
(as Heidegger has pointed out) always in some particular mood or 
other. 
(ii) To be in a certain mood is (at least in most cases) to feel in a certain 
way: Most (perhaps all) moods are partly constituted by feelings. These 
constitutive feelings are, I suggest, bodily feelings, but most of them do 
not have a distinct location; instead, they are rather "diffuse", and they 
are typically attributed to the body as a whole. Examples of such 
"global states of feeling" are; to feel calm, empty, tense, relaxed, or low; 
to feel "nothing" (to be numb); to feel at ease (to be comfortable); to 
feel tired, sleepy, awake, alive, or energetic. To describe these feelings 
(and the mood-states which contain them) we use (more or less meta­
phorically) term pairs like "full vs. empty", "awake vs. asleep", and 
"alive vs. dead". However, the most common metaphor in this area is 
probably "high vs. low": we are (in a metaphorical sense) always on 
some "energy level" or other, e.g., when we feel depressed, we are in a 
low mood. 
Examples of moods that are normally (perhaps always) pleasant to be 
in are "mood-happiness" (happiness qua mood), "mood-joy", and har­
mony, and examples of moods that are typically unpleasant to be in are 
depression, anxiety, boredom, "mood-sadness", and "mood-anger" (to 
be irritated in general). 
The global character of the moods makes them very important from a 
hedonistic point of view. How pleasant or unpleasant a person's total 
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state of mind is at a certain moment is (to a considerable extent) depen­
dent on what mood he is in, e.g., listening to good music or drinking a 
good wine is not particularly pleasant for a depressed person. 
So, are sensations, emotions, and moods the only kinds of experiences 
to which we attribute pleasantness and unpleasantness, or do we also 
attribute these properties to other kinds of mental states and events, 
e.g., to thoughts, fantasies, or (visual or auditory) perceptions? Well, 
we most certainly do if these states are accompanied by some pleasant 
feeling. However, I don't really know whether we attribute pleasant­
ness to fantasies or perceptions "regarded in isolation". In any case, 
pleasantness and unpleasantness are typically and normally attributed 
to experiences that are (at least in part) constituted by some bodily sen­
sation, i.e. to experiences that have "felt qualities". (And the only kinds 
of experiences that are of this type are bodily sensations, emotions, 
moods, or more complex experiences which contain sensations, 
emotions, or moods as elements). 
Pleasant experiences vs. pleasant "experience" 
Now that the "preliminaries" are over, let us turn to question (2) on p 
73. Is pleasantness primarily attributed to total experiential states at 
certain times (as "the total view" claims), or is it primarily attributed to 
experiences (in the plural), i.e. to certain parts of our total conscious 
mental states (as "the partial view" claims)? 
The issue is not whether it is possible (and meaningful) to attribute 
pleasantness to whole experiential lives-at-certain-times and/or to 
experiences in the plural. To adopt the partial view is not to deny that 
pleasantness can be meaningfully attributed to total experiential states, 
and to adopt the total view is not to deny that we can attribute plea­
santness to "experiences" (assuming that there is some way in which 
experiences can be separated from each other). 
So, how exactly do the two views differ from each other? Well, "the 
total view" claims that pleasantness is primarily ascribed to total experi­
ential states. As I see it, this claim can be divided into two parts, viz. (i) 
the idea that pleasantness can be directly attributed to total conscious 
mental states (at certain times), and (ii) the holistic idea that in order to 
determine how pleasant or unpleasant a certain separate experience is, 
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we must not regard it in isolation; instead, we should regard it in rela­
tion to the organic whole of which it is a part, and the reason for this is 
that the pleasantness of the part is somehow conceived of as dependent 
on the pleasantness of th e whole. 
"The partial view" rejects the first of t hese claims, e.g., it denies that 
pleasantness can be directly attributed to a person's total experiential 
state at a certain time. Instead, it claims that pleasantness can only be 
directly attributed to separate experiences. This view implies (I think) 
that the only way in which we can determine the pleasantness or un­
pleasantness of an experiential whole is by "deriving" it from the plea­
santness (unpleasantness) of its constituent parts. This means that if the 
holist is right and the atomist wrong (if the pleasantness or unpleasant­
ness of a total experiential state is not a function of h ow pleasant or un­
pleasant its constituent pleasures and displeasures are), then it is not 
really possible to determine just how pleasant or unpleasant a certain 
experiential whole is. 
So, which view is most plausible, the total view or the partial view? 
Let us first note that the total view has certain features that makes it 
attractive to the hedonist, viz. if it is correct, then the hedonist can 
ignore both the problem of synchronic aggregation and the problem of 
how concrete experiences can (and should) be separated from each 
other (how a person's total experiential state at a certain time is to be 
divided into experiences). However, the presence of these features 
does not give us any reason to regard the view as correct. The same 
thing holds for the perhaps most attractive feature of the partial view, 
viz. that it is more in line with the way we speak, think, and act in our 
everyday lives. In ordinary speech, pleasantness is normally (perhaps 
always) attributed to separate experiences, like sensations, emotions, or 
moods. And most of the time, we also seem to think (and deliberate) in 
terms of separate experiences rather than in terms of experiential totali­
ties, e.g., as in "if you do this or that, you will have a great experience". 
What we need to know in order to determine which view is most 
plausible is whether pleasantness can be directly attributed to a 
person's total experiential state or not. Now, on my view, this is not 
possible. This does not mean that I accept atomism, however; the claim 
is rather (i) that it is almost always possible (and often necessary) to 
divide a person's total experiential state (at a certain time) into parts, 
some of which are more or less pleasant while other parts are more or 
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less unpleasant, and (ii) that the pleasantness or unpleasantness of a 
total conscious state is (in part) dependent on how pleasant or unplea­
sant its constituent experiences are (i.e. there is some truth in atomism). 
Now, it might seem that it can often be directly determined how plea­
sant or unpleasant a person's total experiential state is (e.g., by the 
person himself), but this is not really true. On my view, it is often 
possible for a person to determine how pleasant or unpleasant his mood 
is, but a person's mood state (a relatively homogenous state which can 
remain the same for days or more) should not be confused with his 
total experiential state (a heterogeneous and complex state which 
changes from moment to moment). 
As far as "the problem of individuation" is concerned, I don't think it 
constitutes much of a threat to the partial view. First, it is not very diffi­
cult to divide our total sensory experience into parts (i.e. on basis of 
sense modality), and second, even though there is no non-arbitrary 
way to divide a person's "emotional life" into parts, there is a way in 
which this can be done, viz. the one that is provided by our ordinary 
language. 
If I a m right about all this, we can safely stick to ordinary speech. We 
can continue to talk in terms of experiences (in the plural), and we can 
be "sure" that it makes sense to attribute pleasantness to sensations, 
emotions, moods, and so on. We can discuss the pros and cons of 
hedonism in terms of experiences, and we can ask what the pleasant­
ness of a particular (separate) experience consists in. 
Let us now turn to question (1) on pp 71-72, i.e. the question of w hat 
the terms "pleasant" and "unpleasant" are (and should be) referring to 
in this context. 
2.2. What do the terms "pleasantness" and 
"unpleasantness" refer to? Different conceptions of 
pleasantness and unpleasantness 
Before we look at the most common (and most plausible) conceptions of 
pleasantness and unpleasantness, let us first formulate some platitudes 
which every plausible conception must accept. The platitudes I have in 
mind can all be regarded as variations on a single theme, viz. the idea 
that it is of great importance to make a distinction between pleasure 
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and displeasure (suffering), on the one hand, and pain (i.e. physical 
pain) and "plain"14 (the positive counterpart to pain, assuming that 
there is such a thing), on the other. In the following, I will restrict my 
attention to the distinction between suffering (or displeasure) and pain 
(it is, after all, doubtful whether there are such things as "plains", or 
"sensations of p leasure"). 
(i) The term "pain" refers to one or several kinds of mental object 
(event or state), viz. to one or several kinds of s ensation. That is, to be 
in pain is to have a special, distinct kind of sensation, a sensation which 
is properly described as a "sensation of pain", rather than as a "painful 
sensation". The term "displeasure", on the other hand, does not refer 
to any special kind of mental object (like "sensations of displeasure"), 
but to those objects which have the property (quality or relational pro­
perty) unpleasantness. To maintain awareness of the fact that displea­
sure and suffering is really a matter of properties of experiences, I 
suggest that we replace the nouns "displeasure" and "suffering" with 
the corresponding adjectives and/or adverbs, i.e. "unpleasant" (but 
"unpleasantness" will also do). That is, we should talk in terms of un­
pleasant experience rather than in terms of displeasure or suffering. 
There are a number of other ways in which unpleasant experience can 
(and should) be distinguished from the sensation of pain: 
(ii) Not all unpleasant experiences belong to the category of sensation; 
e.g., we also attribute unpleasantness to moods and emotions. And all 
moods and emotions which are properly classified as unpleasant are not 
unpleasant because they contain sensations of physical pain (or even 
unpleasant sensations) as components. 
(iii) But even if we restrict ourselves to the case of s ensation, the dis­
tinction still stands. To see why unpleasant sensations have to be dis­
tinguished from sensations of pain, we only have to consider first, that 
it is not necessarily unpleasant to be in pain (it might even be pleasant), 
and second, that every unpleasant sensation is not a sensation of pain, 
e.g., as in the case of certain itchings and muscular tensions. 
Once the distinction between the unpleasant and the painful is made, 
it is obvious that what the sensible hedonist is primarily concerned with 
is the former rather than the latter. More specifically, the hedonist 
would claim: (a) that it is not bad for a person to have a sensation of 
14This is my translation of Furberg's (1993) "närtor" (as opposed to "smärtor"). 
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pain unless it is also unpleasant, and (b) that it is bad for a person to 
have an unpleasant sensation, even if it is not a sensation of pain. 
There are at least two more ways in which unpleasantness and pain 
differ from each other, viz. the following ones: 
(iv) A sensation of pain need not have any other sensory qualities 
besides its pain-ness, something which is explained by the fact that the 
"pain-ness" of the experience does not supervene on any other 
qualities. (This phenomenon is intimately connected to some physio­
logical facts about us: we are equipped with certain "sense organs" 
whose function it is to "detect pain" (nociceptors), and there are certain 
(sensory) neural pathways for the transmission of "pain signals"). 
In the case of u npleasantness, it is different: there is no such thing as 
an experience that is "just unpleasant", that has no other properties 
(e.g., qualities) besides its unpleasantness. (And the truth of this claim is 
not affected by the fact that experiences can be individuated in diffe­
rent ways; it is simply not possible to individuate an unpleasant experi­
ence in such a way that it is "nothing but unpleasant"). One possible 
explanation of this circumstance is that unpleasantness is a supervenient 
property. 
(v) The fact that every (physical) pain is a kind of mental object implies 
that it is possible to distinguish between the pain itself and the aware­
ness of it, and this suggests that it is (conceptually) possible to be in pain 
without being aware of it . In the case of suffering, on the other hand, it 
is does not seem possible to distinguish the unpleasantness itself from 
the awareness of it. As Hare (1981) points out, "if I am suffering to a 
certain degree or with a certain intensity, I must know that I am suffe­
ring to that degree and with that intensity, and vice versa" (p 93, my 
italics). 
Two kinds of conceptions of pleasantness (unpleasantness) 
Let us now look at the most common (and most plausible) types of con­
ceptions of pleasantness and unpleasantness, viz. (i) the hedonic-quality 
theories (quality-of-experience theories, or sensation models) and (ii) 
the relational theory (preference-theory, desire theory, motivational 
theory, or attitude model). 
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The Quality Theories 
The hedonic-quality theories claim (roughly) that pleasantness and un­
pleasantness are sensory qualities of experiences. These so-called 
hedonic qualities are (on the theory) felt qualities, or "introspectible" qua­
lities, i.e. all quality theories conceives of " being pleasant" as "identical 
with some introspectible fact of experience" (cf. Brandt (1979), p 36). 
The most common form of this theory is probably the "monistic" view 
that Brandt attributes to Karl Duncker, viz. 
the proposal that pleasantness is a quality or attribute of a sensation, 
emotion, feeling, or complex of these /.../. It is said to be a quality 
which enables us to order the experience it qualifies in an order of 
more and less. It is, Duncker says, a 'tone pervading experience', in­
complete by itself, essentially of something else, adjectival (ibid., p 38). 
Brandt also adds that on this view, the intensity of the hedonic tone is 
supposed to be ranging from extreme pleasantness through indifference 
to extreme unpleasantness (cf. ibid., p 38). Now, as I understand it, this 
is not to say that a pleasant experience has more of something of w hich 
an unpleasant experience has less (what is being claimed is rather that 
pleasantness and unpleasantness can be measured on the same scale). 
That is, the view is compatible with the plausible idea that the hedonic 
quality which makes an experience pleasant (what Broad refers to as 
"the pleasant form of hedonic tone") is not the same hedonic quality 
which makes an experience unpleasant ("the unpleasant form of hedonic 
tone"). 
The reason why I use the term "monistic" to denote this type of 
quality theory is that the theory assumes that there is only one kind of 
"pleasantness-making" sensory quality, a kind of hedonic quality that is 
shared by all pleasant experiences. And the same thing is (of course) 
supposed to hold for unpleasant experiences: The hedonic quality which 
makes a certain particular experience unpleasant is (on this monistic 
theory) the same kind of quality which makes all other unpleasant 
experiences unpleasant. 
A quality theorist need not be "monistic" in this sense, however, i.e. 
he does not have to assume that "hedonic tone" is a "determinable 
quality having two and only two determinate forms under it, viz., plea­
santness and unpleasantness"; he can also admit for the possibility that 
there are "several different determinate forms of pleasantness and un-
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pleasantness" (cf. Broad (1930), p 232). Or as Brandt (1979) puts it, a 
quality theorist might also claim that 
[the phrase] 'is pleasant' is a multivalent phrase having different 
meanings in different contexts. /.../ On this view one could claim 
that it is a mistake to look for some special feeling or quality of 
feeling, identical among /... / [all pleasant experiences], the intensity 
of which correlates with our judgement of how pleasant something is 
(p 37). 
On this pluralistic view, there are (instead) several different kinds of 
"pleasantness-making" (and "unpleasantness-making") felt qualities: our 
pleasures do not just differ with respect to their non-hedonic qualities, 
but with regard to their hedonic qualities as well. Every pleasant 
(unpleasant) experience is pleasant (unpleasant) in virtue of some 
hedonic quality or other, however; it is just that the hedonic quality that 
makes one experience pleasant need not be of the same kind as the 
hedonic quality that makes another experience pleasant. (This means 
that the quality theory is as compatible with Mill's "qualitative 
hedonism" as it is with Bentham's "quantitative hedonism"). 
To sum up, the quality theory claims that every pleasant experience is 
pleasant in virtue of some hedonic quality that it has; the monistic 
quality theory claims (on top of this) that all pleasant experiences are 
pleasant in virtue of having the same hedonic quality; and the pluralistic 
quality theory claims (instead) that the hedonic qualities which make 
experiences pleasant are of different kinds. Or alternatively put, 
(Q) An experience is pleasant if and only if (and because) it is "per­
vaded by" some kind of pleasant hedonic tone (quality). 
(MQ1) An experience is pleasant if and only if (and because) it is 
"pervaded by" the pleasant form of hedonic tone. 
(PQ1) Here, (Q) is supplemented by the claim that there are several 
different kinds (or forms) of "pleasant hedonic tone"15. 
15The claim that there are different kinds of pleasantness-making hedonic qualities 
should not be understood as entailing that these kinds have something in 
common, or that there is a genus "pleasantness-making hedonic quality" such that 
all elements that belong to this class have something in common. The idea is 
(rather) that the class of pleasantness-making hedonic qualities is a radically 
heterogeneous class. 
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The comparative counterpart to (MQ1) is 
(MQ2) How pleasant a certain pleasure is depends on (or more 
specifically, is proportional to) "how much" pleasant hedonic tone it 
has, or how "intense" this pleasant hedonic tone is. 
So, how should we (on the pluralistic quality theory) determine how 
pleasant a certain pleasure is for the experiencing subject? Well, we can 
assume that if two pleasures are pleasant in virtue of the same hedonic 
tone, i.e. if they are of the same qualitative type, then the pleasure 
which has more of th is pleasant hedonic tone is also more pleasant. But 
how should we compare qualitatively different pleasures with respect 
to pleasantness? It seems that the theory has no answer to this ques­
tion. If t wo pleasures have no hedonic (or non-hedonic) quality in com­
mon, then there is nothing of which the one pleasure has more and the 
other less, and it is (for this reason) not possible (not even "in prin­
ciple") to compare them with respect to their pleasantness. In short, 
there is (as far as I can see) no full-fledged comparative counterpart to 
(PQ1). 
The Relational Theory 
The second major type of conception of pleasantness and unpleasant­
ness is the relational theory (desire theory, preference-theory, atti-
tudinal model, or perhaps motivational theory). The fundamental claim 
that this theory makes is (roughly) that the pleasantness and unplea­
santness of a person's experiences are somehow constituted by certain 
kinds of desires and aversions (likes and dislikes) that the person has. 
Or more specifically, a pleasant experience is (roughly) an experience 
that is, when experienced, intrinsically desired (preferred, approved of, 
liked, etc.) by the experiencing subject. In a similar way, an experience is 
unpleasant for a person if and only if he, when he has it, has an intrinsic 
aversion to it. In the case of pleasantness, this view can be spelled out 
as follows: 
An experience is pleasant if a nd only if (and because) the following 
conditions are met: 
(i) The experiencing subject has some kind of pro-attitude towards 
the experience: he desires it, likes it, approves of it, or the like. To say 
that the subject desires the experience is not specific enough, how-
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ever; the object of his "pleasantness-making" desire is (rather) that he 
has it, or that he continues to have it (cf. Brandt (1979), p 39)16. 
(ii) The experience is desired (etc.) by the experiencing subject when 
it is experienced. 
(iii) The experience is desired in a certain way, viz. "in and for itself", 
i.e. intrinsically, or "as a goal", i.e. "finally"17. 
On Parfit's (1984) view, this is the conception of pleasantness and un­
pleasantness that the hedonist should accept (i.e. the conception which 
makes hedonism most plausible). He writes: 
What pains and pleasures have in common are their relations to our 
desires. On the use of 'pain' which has rational and moral significance, all 
pains are when experienced unwanted, and a pain is worse or 
greater the more it is unwanted. Similarly, all pleasures are when 
experienced wanted, and they are better or greater the more they 
are wanted. /.../ On this view, one of two experiences is more 
pleasant if it is preferred (p 493, my italics). 
It is worth noting that the type of "rationally and morally significant 
pain" to which Parfit refers is more or less identical with what Hare 
(1981) calls "suffering". On Hare's view, "it would be self-contradictory 
to report suffering but claim that one did not mind it, and had no 
motive for ending or avoiding it, even ceteris paribus (p 93)". That is, 
every suffering is (on this view) partly constituted by a desire to put an 
end to it or to avoid it, or alternatively put, suffering is (at least in part) 
16In connection with this, Brandt also adds another condition, viz. that it is the 
experience which makes the experiencing subject want its continuation. He writes: 
"When an experience is pleasant, the (increased) occurrent valence of [d esire for] 
the continuation of that experience is causally dependent on the experience already 
going on /... / [T]he occurring experience is the differential cause, of the increased 
positive valence of [desire for] the continuation of that experience" (p 40). 
So, is it plausible to claim that an experience cannot be pleasant unless the 
subject wants it to continue? Well, it seems so, at least in the case of pleasant states. 
However, there are also pleasures that we don't necessarily want to prolong, e.g., 
the pleasures we get when a certain unpleasant state is removed. It can be very 
pleasant to have a bodily appetite satisfied (e.g., to drink when thirsty or eat when 
hungry), but this does not in any way imply that we (when we have it) want the 
experience to continue. 
17Where intrinsic desire and final desire is not necessarily the same thing, 
however. Cf. the discussion in section 4.4. 
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a motivational state18. 
Some relational theorists have not supplemented (i) and (ii) with (iii), 
however, but with the following condition: 
(iv) The reason why the experiencing subject desires to have the ex­
perience is (at least in part) that it has certain felt (sensory) qualities. 
That is, an experience can (on this view) not be pleasant unless it is 
desired on certain grounds, viz. (at least in part) because it has the felt 
qualities it has. In a similar way, a person's experience cannot be un­
pleasant unless it is (in part) disliked because of its felt qualities. 
An example of such a relational theorist is Sidgwick (1907). After 
having defined pleasure as "feeling which the sentient individual at the 
time of feeling it implicitly or explicitly apprehends to be desirable" (i.e. 
after having accepted (i) and (ii) above)19, he then adds 
18This formulation of the theory might well be sufficiently precise for our 
purposes, but it is important to see that it can be made even more precise, viz. if i t 
is supplemented by a conception of desire, i.e. by a theory about what it is for a 
person to desire something, e.g., that a certain experience continues (this will be 
one of the major issues in section 4.1 and in appendix F). To see what a relational 
theory would look like if it would (so to speak) incorporate a conception of desire, 
consider Brandt's (1979) theory. On Brandt's "functional conception" of desire, 
desires and aversions (positive and negative "valence") are motivational states 
which are conceptually connected to action-tendencies (A more detailed account 
of Brandt's conception of desire is presented in appendix F). If we incorporate this 
conception into (i) above, we get: (i') The pleasantness of a pleasant experience 
partly consists in a "tendency not to do anything which would extinguish the 
experience which is pleasant; and, if the person thinks that the experience will 
continue only if h e does something, there will be a tendency to do that. /... / In 
contrast, if some kind of experience is unpleasant, the continuation of it will be 
negatively valenced, and hence there will be action-tendencies to do whatever is 
believed likely to remove, expunge, or produce its non-existence" (p 39). This 
explains Brandt's idea that being pleasant "is what is designated by some 
theoretical construct defined by its relation to behaviour" (ibid., p 36). This is how 
he (finally) defines the phrase "the experience E of the person P is pleasant for P at 
f": "'an experience of the kind E is going on in the person P at t; and the experience 
E is the differential cause at t of an increment in the positive valence of the 
continuation of E beyond t, or at the neonate level, of the occurrence of tendencies 
to act in a way likely to result in the continuation of E'. In short, an experience is 
pleasant if and only if i t makes its continuation more wanted. The transposition 
for being unpleasant will be obvious" (ibid., pp 40-41). 
19Cf. also ibid., p 127, where Sidgwick writes that "the only common quality that I 
can find in the feelings so designated [as pleasures] seems to be that relation to 
desire and volition expressed by the general term desirable' /.../. I propose 
therefore to define Pleasure /.../ as a feeling which, when experienced by 
intelligent beings, is at least implicitly apprehended as desirable or - in cases of 
comparison - preferable" (p 127). 
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- desirable, that is, when considered merely as a feeling, and not in 
respect of its objective conditions or consequences, or of any of the 
facts that come directly within the cognisance and judgment of others 
besides the sentient individual (p 131, my italics). 
Another example is Broad (1930), who gives the following formulation 
of the relational theory: 
Is it not possible that what we have called "hedonic quality" is really a 
relational property and not a quality at all? Is it not possible that the 
statement: "This experience of mine is pleasant" just means: "I like this 
experience for its non-hedonic qualities"? /.../ On this view we should 
no longer divide the qualities of an experience into hedonic and non-
hedonic. All its qualities would be non-hedonic. But, if its qualities 
were such that I liked it for them it would be pleasant, and if its 
qualities were such that I disliked it for them it would be painful (pp 
237-238, my italics). 
A third example is Nozick (1989). He writes: 
By a pleasure or pleasurable feeling I mean a feeling that is desired 
(partly) because of its own felt qualities. The feeling is not desired wholly 
because of what it leads to or enables you to do or because of some 
injunction it fulfills. If i t is pleasurable, it is desired (in part at least) 
because of the felt qualities it has. I do not claim here that there is just 
one felt quality present whenever pleasure occurs. Being pleasurable, 
as I use this term, is a function of being wanted partly for its own felt 
qualities, whatever these qualities may be. On this view, a masochist 
who desires pain for its own felt quality will find pain pleasurable (p 
103, my italics). 
This does not mean that we need to introduce a second version of the 
relational theory, however, viz. for the following reason: Condition (iii) 
states that the experience is desired for its intrinsic properties, while 
condition (iv) states that it is desired for its felt qualities. Now, if we 
assume (plausibly) that all the intrinsic properties of an experience are 
(experienced) qualities, and vice versa, there is only one way in which 
the two conditions may differ from each other, viz. the following one: If 
there are qualities of experience which are not felt qualities, e.g., sensa­
tions of red, then there might be experiences which are pleasant accor-
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ding to (iii) which are not pleasant according to (iv), e.g., looking inten­
sely at a patch of red. So the question arises: What does "felt quality" 
mean in this context (and what should it mean)? Does it refer to all 
qualities of experience (including sensations of red), or does it only 
refer to those qualities which are associated with bodily feelings? Well, 
on my view, we should adopt the broader notion. That is, we should 
conceive of all (experienced) qualities as felt qualities, i.e. we should 
regard Nozick's and Broad's formulations of the relational theory as 
extensionally equivalent. The reason for this is mainly evaluative: On my 
view, an intrinsically desired experience can be nonderivatively good 
for the experiencing subject even if it lacks felt qualities in the narrow 
sense, and a desired experience that has such felt qualities (in the 
narrow sense) can be good for a person even if it is desired for its 
other ("non-felt") qualities. (The narrow notion of felt quality is pro­
bably more in line with ordinary language, though; it seems that in or­
dinary speech, we do not attribute pleasantness to an experience unless 
it has felt qualities in the narrow sense; cf. pp 75-79 above). In short, we 
should conceive of felt qualities in a way which makes conditions (iii) 
and (iv) extensionally equivalent. 
Now, all this suggests that a pleasant experience El is more pleasant 
than another pleasant experience E2 if and only if El is more desired for 
its (felt, non-hedonic) qualities than E2. But what is this supposed to 
mean? As far as I can see, it may mean two different things, viz. (1) "El 
and E2 are both desired for their qualities, and the experiencing subject 
desires El more than he desires E2", or (2) "El is more desired for its 
qualities than E2 is desired for its qualities; the desire to have El is, to a 
larger extent, based on the fact that it has the qualities that it has". On 
my view, (2) seems to be the more plausible interpretation, partly 
because it is consistent with the fact that an experience El may be more 
pleasant (more desired for its qualities) than another experience E2, 
even if the subject desires E2 more than he desires El. 
To sum up, the relational theory makes the following claims: 
(Rl) An experience is pleasant for a person P if and only if (and 
because) P intrinsically wants to have it (and perhaps also that it 
continues) when he has it, or alternatively put, if and only if (and 
because) it is (in part) desired by P because of its own felt qualities. 
(R2) How pleasant it is for a person to have a certain experience is a 
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function of (or more specifically, proportional to) how strongly it is 
intrinsically desired, i.e. of how much it is desired for its qualities. 
This ends our survey of the most common conceptions of pleasantness 
and unpleasantness, or alternatively, of the most common philosophical 
uses of the terms "pleasant" and "unpleasant". So, let us now see what 
happens when these conceptions are combined with (incorporated into) 
pure hedonism. 
Three different versions of pure hedonism 
There are (as we have seen) several different conceptions of pleasant­
ness and unpleasantness, and for each such conception, there is a corre­
sponding version of pure hedonism. And what version of the theory a 
pure hedonist ends up with, this is (of course) dependent on what con­
ception he adopts, what he thinks the terms "pleasant" and 
"unpleasant" refer to. So, let us now look at one conception of 
pleasantness and unpleasantness at the time, incorporate it into the 
hedonistic theory, and see what the resulting version of pure hedonism 
is like. We will start with the two versions of the quality theory. 
The Quality Hedonisms 
The Monistic Quality Theorist uses the terms "pleasant" and "unplea­
sant" as names of two kinds of recognizable sensory qualities, viz. the 
pleasant and unpleasant forms of hedonic tone. If we combine this idea 
with pure hedonism, we get Monistic Quality Hedonism (or what Parfit 
(1984) calls "Narrow Hedonism"). This version of the hedonistic theory 
can be summarized in the following two claims, of which the first is non-
comparative and the second comparative: 
(MQH1) An experience is nonderivatively good for a person if and 
only if (and because) it has a certain (pleasant) hedonic quality, i.e. if 
it is pervaded by the pleasant form of hedonic tone, and an expe­
rience is nonderivatively bad for a person if and only if (and because) 
it is pervaded by the unpleasant form of hedonic tone20. 
(MQH2) The nonderivative value that a certain experience has for 
20Is this claim based on the assumption that an experience cannot be pervaded by 
pleasant hedonic tone and unpleasant hedonic tone at the same time? If it is, is the 
assumption plausible? 
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the experiencing subject is dependent on what hedonic qualities it 
has, or more specifically, it is (if we ignore the issue of duration) pro­
portional to how pleasant or unpleasant its hedonic tone is. For 
example, the more pleasant hedonic tone a pleasant experience has, 
the better it is for the experiencing subject to have it. 
On the Pluralistic Quality Theory, the term "pleasant" always refers to 
some hedonic quality or other, but it does not always refer to the same 
hedonic quality. The same thing holds for the term "unpleasant"; this 
term also refers to different qualities in different contexts. Now, if this 
theory is incorporated into pure hedonism, we end up with Pluralistic 
Quality Hedonism. This version of the hedonistic theory claims: 
(PQH1) An experience is nonderivatively good for a person if and 
only if ( and because) it has some kind of (pleasant) hedonic quality, i.e. 
if i t is pervaded by some kind of p leasant hedonic tone, and an expe­
rience is nonderivatively bad for a person if and only if ( and because) 
it is pervaded by some kind of unpleasant hedonic tone. 
(PQH2) The nonderivative value that a certain experience has for the 
experiencing subject is (if we ignore the issue of duration) wholly 
dependent on what hedonic qualities it has (this is a feature that is 
shared by both versions of quality hedonism). But how exactly does 
the pluralistic quality hedonist think we should compare experiences 
with regard to value-for? Well, if there is no way in which two quali­
tatively different experiences can be compared with respect to plea­
santness and unpleasantness (cf. p 86 above), then neither can they 
(on the assumption that pure hedonism is true) be compared with 
respect to value-for21. 
21This means that Pluralistic Quality Hedonism is a "methodological disaster", and 
it is not unlikely that these difficulties will make the pluralistic quality theorist 
abandon pure hedonism altogether, e.g., that it will make him reject (H5), i.e. the 
idea that the value of an experience for the person who has it is a function of one 
thing only, viz. how pleasant or unpleasant it is. Instead, he might claim (as Mill 
seems to have done) that the value-for of an experience is also dependent on what 
kind of hedonic tone it has. This type of modified hedonism may well be more 
methodologically appealing than Pluralistic Quality Hedonism: If an experience is 
not valuable in virtue of i ts pleasantness only, then incomparability with respect 
to pleasantness need not give rise to incomparability with respect to value-for, 
e.g., if s ome kinds of hedonic qualities are, so to speak, nonderivatively better 
than others. 
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Preference-Hedonism 
If t he relational theory is combined with pure hedonism, i.e. if the pure 
hedonist incorporates (Rl) and (R2) into his theory, the resulting 
version of the hedonistic theory is (roughly) what Parfit (1984) calls 
Preference-Hedonism. This theory can be characterized as follows: 
(PHI) An experience is nonderivatively good for a person if a nd only 
if (but not because!22) he has an intrinsic desire to have it when he 
has it, or alternatively, if and only if (but not because) he wants to 
have the experience (when he has it) because of its felt qualities. In a 
similar way, an experience is nonderivatively bad for a person if a nd 
only if h e has an intrinsic aversion to having it when he has it, i.e. iff 
(but not because) he wants to get rid of the experience because of its 
felt qualities. 
(PH2) How nonderivatively good it is for a person to have a certain 
pleasant experience is (if we ignore the issue of duration) propor­
tional to how strongly the person (intrinsically) desires to have it 
when he has it, or alternatively, to how much it is desired for its own 
felt qualities. That is, the stronger an experience is desired, and the 
higher the extent to which this desire is based on the fact that the 
experience has the felt qualities it has, the better it is for the expe­
riencing subject to have the experience. (In a similar way, the degree 
to which a certain unpleasant experience is bad is a function of how 
strongly it is "negatively valenced" by the experiencing subject). This 
means that it is nonderivatively better for a person to have a certain 
pleasant experience El than to have another pleasant experience E2 if 
and only if El is more desired for its felt qualities than what E2 is 
desired for its felt qualities. 
This theory should be carefully distinguished from the version of the 
desire theory that I call the experience-oriented Success theory (a theory 
which will be further discussed in section 5.2.1). On the object inter­
pretation of this theory, the only type of situation that is nonderi­
vatively good for a person is that he has an experience that he wants to 
have, and the only thing that is nonderivatively bad for a person is that 
22The reason why a certain experience is good for a certain person is still that it is 
pleasant, and not that it is desired! Cf. the discussion on the experience-oriented 
Success Theory below. 
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he has an experience that he wants not to have. The experience-
oriented Success theory also claims that it is nonderivatively better for a 
person to have an experience El than it is to have another experience 
E2 if and only if he intrinsically prefers El to E2. 
Now, the object interpretation of this theory might appear identical 
with Preference-Hedonism, but this is not really the case. It is true that 
both theories accept (HI), i.e. "the experience requirement", but there 
are also differences between the theories. 
First, both theories imply that a certain experience cannot be nonderi­
vatively good for a certain person unless he has an intrinsic desire to 
have it, but whereas the experience-oriented Success Theorist claims 
that it is nonderivatively good for a certain person to have a certain ex­
perience if and only if h e has an intrinsic desire to have the experience, 
the Preference-Hedonist claims that it is nonderivatively good for a 
certain person to have a certain experience if and only if he has an 
intrinsic desire to have the experience when he has it (and so on)23. 
However, it can be argued (and it will, viz. in section 4.3) that all 
23Even though this feature is included in Parfit's (1984) own "definition" of 
Preference-Hedonism, (cf. the quotation on p 87 above), he sometimes tends to 
ignore it totally. Look at what he writes: "Near the end of his life Freud refused 
pain-killing drugs, preferring to think in torment than to be confusedly euphoric. 
Of these two mental states, euphoria is [in the ordinary sense of 'pleasure'] more 
pleasant. But on Preference-Hedonism thinking in torment was, for Freud, a 
better mental state. It is clearer here not to stretch the meaning of the word 
'pleasant'. A Preference-Hedonist should merely claim that, since Freud preferred 
to think clearly though in torment, his life went better if it went as he preferred" 
(pp 493-494). 
Here, Parfit is most certainly wrong about what a Preference-Hedonist would 
say about Freud's case. Let us (for the sake of argument) make the rather dubious 
assumption that thinking in torment is an experience, and that Freud's preference 
for thinking in torment to being confusedly euphoric is a preference for one type 
of experience to another one. Now, it is very likely that Freud had this preference 
at one particular time, supposedly when he was thinking in torment, or when he 
was neither thinking in torment nor being confusedly euphoric, and not when he 
was confusedly euphoric. In short, the two Freudian desires whose respective 
strengths are being compared are most probably not the desire to think in 
torment when thinking in torment and the desire to be confusedly euphoric when 
being confusedly euphoric. 
Moreover, if we add the requirement (which Parfit sometimes seems to forget 
about) that the relevant desires are intrinsic, it is rather clear that a Preference-
Hedonist would regard it as better for Freud to be confusedly euphoric. In fact, he 
would even allow for the possibility that it was nonderivatively bad for Freud to 
think in torment. It is, after all, not likely that Freud desired to think in torment 
because of what it felt like. (However, an enjoyment-hedonist (cf. note 10) would 
probably regard thinking in torment as better for Freud). 
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plausible desire theories regard both prospective and retrospective 
desires as irrelevant. Now, if the experience-oriented Success Theory 
we have in mind shares this feature (if it gives weight to now-for-now 
desires only), we can see that the object interpretation of this theory is 
extensionally equivalent with Preference-Hedonism: the two theories 
attribute nonderivative value-for-P to exactly the same facts. This does 
not make the two theories identical, however. The experience-oriented 
Success Theory does not (unlike the hedonistic theories) claim that it is 
good for a person to feel pleasure, and it does not make any claims 
whatsoever about what is pleasant and unpleasant. What it claims is 
that it is nonderivatively good for a person P to have an experience E if 
and only if (and because!) P has an intrinsic now-for-now desire to 
have E (and so on), i.e. that every good experience is good in virtue of 
being intrinsically desired by the experiencing subject. The Preference-
Hedonist, on the other hand, claims that good experiences are good 
because they are pleasant, and not because they are intrinsically 
desired. (As I see it, this is not changed by the fact that he also makes 
another claim, viz. that all pleasant experiences are pleasant in virtue of 
being intrinsically desired). 
This concludes the survey of the different versions of pure hedonism. 
A critical discussion of the different conceptions 
Let us now try to determine which theory of pleasantness is (in this 
context) most plausible, or alternatively put, which version of pure 
hedonism is most plausible. Now, the only way in which this can be 
done is by examining a number of arguments that has been (and can be) 
given for and against the respective theories. These arguments are (as 
we will see) of different kinds: Some of them appeal to our evaluative 
intuitions, while others appeal to our semantical, ontological, or pheno-
menological intuitions. 
It should be pointed out that the only arguments which are (strictly 
speaking) arguments for and against the different versions of pure 
hedonism are the "evaluative" arguments; all the other arguments are 
really arguments for and against the different conceptions of pleasant­
ness on which the different hedonisms are based. 
The background assumption on which the arguments are based can 
be formulated as follows: A conception of p leasantness and unpleasant-
95 
ness cannot be plausible unless it meets the following three require­
ments, viz. (i) it should use the terms "pleasant" and "unpleasant" in a 
way that has "rational and moral significance", or more specifically, it 
should "make" the hedonistic theory as plausible as possible; (ii) it 
should be ontologically sound, i.e. it should not presuppose the 
existence of something which does not exist (the terms "pleasant" and 
"unpleasant" should refer to something that exist); and (iii) the terms 
"pleasant" and "unpleasant" should be used in a way that is "in line 
with" ordinary speech, that does not deviate too much from ordinary 
speech24. 
Let us now look at the arguments for and against the different con­
ceptions. There will first be a more general discussion of the pros and 
cons of the quality theory, a discussion which mainly consists of seman­
tical and/or phenomenological arguments. This discussion is also (to a 
large extent) a discussion of the pros and cons of the relational theory: 
In the present context, every argument for the quality theory is, after 
all, an argument against the relational theory (and vice versa). 
The Quality Theory vs. the Relational Theory: A general 
discussion 
The arguments in this section appeal to our semantical and/or pheno­
menological intuitions. Most of them are "ordinary language" argu­
ments, and are (as such) based on requirement (iii) above. 
Let us first look at some arguments that can be given for the quality 
theory and against the relational theory: 
(1) We often talk about pleasantness as if it is something we can feel, 
e.g., as when we say that we "feel pleasure", or that we feel how plea­
sant a certain on-going experience is. This shows that the quality theory 
is (somehow) embedded in ordinary speech, and in the common sense 
conception of pleasantness. 
(2) We tend to believe (with Hare (1981)) that "if I am suffering to a 
certain degree or with a certain intensity, I must know that I am suffe­
ring to that degree and with that intensity, and vice versa" (p 93); this 
24 A conception of pleasantness and unpleasantness need not (at least not in this 
evaluative context) be "methodologically appealing" in order to be plausible, 
however. Suppose that there are two alternative conceptions of pleasantness, CI 
and C2, and that CI "makes" pleasantness measurable in a stronger sense than C2 
does. This is no reason whatsoever for regarding CI as more plausible than C2. 
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is how we use the word "suffering". So, if this is so, how do I know 
that a certain experience of mine is pleasant (or unpleasant) to a certain 
degree? The quality theory gives a simple and plausible explanation of 
this alleged fact, viz. it tells me that the reason why I know that a 
certain experience is pleasant to a certain degree is that I feel that it is 
pleasant to that degree. For the relational theory, it is not as easy to 
come up with such a good explanation, e.g., it would have to assume 
that we can have introspective knowledge of our "experiential desires". 
(3) We tend to think that if a certain person intrinsically wants a 
certain on-going experience to continue, then the reason for this is pro­
bably that the experience is pleasant. Or alternatively put, we think it 
makes sense to say about a person that he intrinsically likes to have a 
certain experience because it is pleasant, and we also tend to find such 
statements informative. This "observation" supports, if correct, the 
quality theory. It is incompatible with the relational theory, however, 
and for the following reason: The claim that every pleasant experience 
is pleasant in virtue of being intrinsically liked (etc.) by the experiencing 
subject implies that it is tautological (and not at all informative) to say 
that someone intrinsically likes a certain on-going experience because it 
is pleasant. 
The next argument is against the quality theory and for the relational 
theory: 
(4) It is hard to deny that there is a very intimate connection between 
two kinds of facts, viz. facts about pleasure and facts about certain 
intrinsic desires. For example, it seems that whenever a person feels 
pleasure, he also has an intrinsic desire to feel what he is feeling25 (but 
not necessarily vice versa; cf. below). So the questions arise: Why is it 
that we always (or almost always) like the experiences we find plea­
sant? And what is the nature of the connection between the fact that a 
certain person has a certain pleasant experience, on the one hand, and 
the fact that this person, when he has the experience, intrinsically likes 
to have it, on the other? 
Consider the case of sensation: Suppose that I find the taste of cognac 
pleasant, and that I intrinsically like the sensation when it is going on. 
How is the fact that the sensation is pleasant connected to the fact that 
25Note that this claim is compatible with the fact that some people have an "non-
intrinsic" aversion against pleasure, e.g., that someone dislikes a certain pleasure 
on moral grounds, or for instrumental reasons. 
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Ï like the sensation? On the relational theory, the pleasantness of the 
sensation is constituted by my liking to have it when I have it, i.e. the 
relation is conceived of a s conceptual (or logical). On the quality theory, 
on the other hand, the relation is (rather) contingent, e.g., causal (cf. 
internalist vs. externalist views on the nature of the connection between 
evaluation and motivation). 
This means that the relational theorist is in a better position to explain 
why we always (or almost always) like the sensations that we find plea­
sant. It is more difficult for the quality theorist to explain why we so 
often happen to like the pleasant sensations we have, but far from im­
possible. So, why do we (according to the quality theorist) intrinsically 
prefer pleasant sensations to unpleasant sensations, and why do we 
want pleasant sensations rather than sensations of blue? Well, all he can 
do here is to claim that "that's how we happen to be constituted". But is 
it really a contingent fact about us that we want to avoid suffering?26 
Here are two similar arguments, but now directed against the rela­
tional theory: 
(5) It seems plausible to assume that whenever a person has a plea­
sant experience, he also has an intrinsic desire to have the experience, 
and that this fact is of a conceptual nature. But the relational theorist 
makes a stronger claim, i.e. he also claims that whenever a person has 
an intrinsic desire to continue having a certain on-going experience, this 
experience is a pleasant experience. This is far from obvious, however. 
Or more precisely, the stronger claim may well be incompatible with our 
common sense conception of pleasantness. 
(6) On the relational theory, the pleasantness of every pleasant expe­
rience is constituted by the fact that the experiencing subject intrinsically 
desires to have the experience when he has it. Now, consider the case 
of emotion: Here, the relational theory claims that the only reason why 
a pleasant emotion is pleasant is because it is liked (etc.) when it is going 
on. However, it seems that an emotion may also be pleasant for other 
reasons, e.g., there are cases (think of the type of happiness described 
in note 13) where the pleasantness of an emotion is (at least in part) 
constituted by the pleasantness of its component sensations27. And if 
26As Hare claims, "it would be self-contradictory to report suffering but claim that 
one did not mind it, and had no motive for ending it or avoiding it" (cf. p 87 
above). 
27Where the relational theorist may (of course) be right about what the 
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this is so (if it is sometimes the case that a pleasant emotion is pleasant in 
virtue of having a pleasant sensory content), the relational theory must 
be wrong. 
The next argument, which is directed against the quality theory, also 
has to do with the pleasantness and unpleasantness of more complex 
experiences, e.g., emotions or moods. 
(7) So, what would the quality theorist say about the pleasantness 
and unpleasantness of emotions and moods? Well, he would have to 
claim that an emotion (or mood) is pleasant or unpleasant in virtue of its 
sensory content (felt qualities) only, e.g., that the only reason why a 
certain pleasant emotion is pleasant is because it contains certain 
pleasant sensations. Let us call this idea the sensory component thesis. 
We have assumed (cf. argument (6) above) that there is some truth in 
this thesis, i.e. it seems that pleasant emotions may sometimes be plea­
sant in virtue of having a pleasant sensory content. However, there are 
(it seems) cases of pleasant emotion where the pleasantness of the emo­
tion is also constituted by other things, and not just by the pleasantness 
of its component sensations. To see this, consider an emotion that can 
(depending on the context) be both pleasant and unpleasant, e.g., a ne­
gative emotion like anger or grief. Let us now ask what the difference 
between pleasant anger and unpleasant anger consists in. Is it really 
nothing but the sensory components of the two emotions that make 
them differ in this way? I think not. It is true that pleasant anger does 
not feel exactly the same as unpleasant anger, but the "sensory simila­
rities" between two angers are (nevertheless) greater than the 
"sensory differences". This means (I think) that the difference in feeling 
between the two angers does not suffice to explain why one of them is 
pleasant while the other is unpleasant. Instead, we can assume that the 
reason why the first anger is pleasant is (in part) that the angry subject 
likes to have it when he has it, and the reason why the second anger is 
unpleasant is (in part) that the angry subject dislikes to have it. And if 
this is correct, the quality theory is wrong. 
So, what conclusions can we draw from this semantical and/or 
phenomenological "discussion"? Well, it seems that our semantical intu­
itions are somewhat "ambiguous"; most of them support the quality 
theory, but there are also a few that support the relational theory. The 
pleasantness of these constituent sensations consists in. 
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most plausible explanation of this circumstance is probably that the 
terms "pleasant" and "unpleasant" have several different meanings in 
ordinary speech, or more specifically, that the quality theory and the 
relational theory are both "embedded" in ordinary speech. This 
suggests that both types of theories meet requirement (iii), i.e. that 
neither of them (especially not the quality theory) deviate too much 
from the common sense conception embedded in ordinary speech. If all 
this is correct, we cannot really decide between the two theories on 
semantical grounds. But even if one of the theories were superior in this 
respect (if it were much more in line with ordinary speech), we should 
not put too much emphasis on this fact; ordinary language is (after all) 
defective in several ways, i.e. it may contain (or be based on) false 
ontological assumptions, and so on. 
So, let us now look at a different set of a rguments, arguments which 
do not appeal as much to our semantical intuitions. The first of these 
arguments is directed against the Monistic Quality Theory, and the 
second against the Pluralistic Quality Theory. 
A heavy objection to the Monistic Quality Theory 
The major objection to the Monistic Theory is this: The theory assumes 
that there is a kind of hedonic sensory quality which is shared by all 
pleasant experiences (and which makes them pleasant), and that there is 
another kind of hedonic quality which makes all unpleasant experiences 
unpleasant. This ontological (and phenomenological) assumption is false, 
however; the two hedonic qualities postulated by the theory do not 
exist28. The argument against the assumption is simple: The idea is that if 
we consider "the variety of pleasant experience", i.e. if we consider 
how much our pleasures differ from each other, then we will realize 
that they do not have any felt quality (hedonic or non-hedonic) in 
common. Parfit's (1984) criticism of what he calls "narrow hedonism" 
(the version of the hedonistic theory which is based on the monistic 
quality theory) is a good example of this type of argument: 
Narrow hedonists ass ume, falsely, that pleasure and pain are two dis­
ait is important to note that this is a phenomenological claim, and that it should 
(as such) be carefully distinguished from the methodological idea that it is not 
possible to measure the pleasantness or unpleasantness of a ll experiences on the 
same pleasantness-unpleasantness scale. 
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tinctive kinds of experience. Compare the pleasures of satisfying an 
intense thirst or lust, listening to music, solving an intellectual pro­
blem, reading a tragedy, and knowing that one's child is happy. 
These various experiences do not contain any distinctive common 
quality (p 493). 
Griffin's (1986) criticism of Monistic Quality Hedonism is of a similar 
kind (but it also contains an evaluative element: it also appeals to our 
intuitions about what has "utility"). On the Monistic Quality Hedonist's 
"psychological account of 'utility'", Griffin writes, 
[pleasure or happiness is presented as a 'state of feeling', and pain or 
unhappiness as a feeling on the same scale as, and the opposite of, 
pleasure or happiness. And the utilities of all our experiences are 
supposed to be determinable by measuring the amount of this homo­
genous mental state that they contain. 
The trouble with thinking of utility as one kind of mental state is 
that we cannot find any one state in all that we regard as having 
utility - eating, reading, working, creating, helping. What one mental 
state runs through them all in virtue of which we rank them as we 
do? /.../ 
So, if the mental state account [i.e. hedonism] takes this simple form, 
the objections to it are insurmountable (p 8). 
How can the Monistic Quality Theorist meet this objection? Well, he can 
always refuse to accept the objection, and cling to his theory on "intu­
itive grounds". He can admit that the "pleasantness-making" sensory 
quality may seem elusive, but still claim (like Broad once did) that 
hedonic tone is a quality "which we cannot define but are perfectly 
acquainted with" (cf. Brandt (1979), p 38). And how we should 
respond to this, I don't know29. 
On my view, the objection given to the Monistic Quality Theory is a 
heavy objection, and the theory should therefore be rejected. So, let us 
now see whether the Pluralistic Quality Theory is more plausible. 
29Cf. the following case: How should we respond to someone who, after having 
read the relevant paragraphs in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, exclaims: 
"Yes, but all games must be games in virtue of something, and even though we 
may not be able to specify what this is, we are perfectly acquainted with it. We do, 
after all, know how to use the word 'game'!". 
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Two objections against the Pluralistic Quality Theory 
As far as I can see, there is no knock-down argument against the 
Pluralistic Quality Theory; it does not get hit by the objection against 
the monistic theory, it is hard to prove that the hedonic qualities it 
postulates do not exist, and it gets some support from ordinary speech 
(especially from (1) and (2) above). It does give rise to certain diffi­
culties, however. 
The most difficult problem that a Pluralistic Quality Theorist has to 
face is (of course) this: The theory assumes that the class of pleasant 
experiences is a ("qualitatively speaking") radically heterogeneous class, 
i.e. that there are different forms of pleasantness, forms which have 
(qualitatively speaking) nothing in common. This assumption gives rise 
to the following problem: What is it that makes all these different kinds 
of pleasant experiences pleasant? In virtue of what are all these "forms 
of p leasantness" forms of pleasantness? Now, it is doubtful whether the 
Pluralistic Quality Theorist can solve this problem, i.e. it is likely that he 
must (as Brandt (1979) suggests), in principle, "leave unanswered the 
questions why we happen to apply 'is pleasant' to this particular set of 
experiences" (p 37). 
Another difficulty has already been pointed out, viz. on p 86: The fact 
that there are (on the theory) several different kinds of pleasant 
(unpleasant) hedonic tone makes it hard (or even impossible) to tell how 
our experiences should ("in principle") be compared with respect to 
pleasantness and unpleasantness. This means that if a pure hedonist 
accepts this conception of pleasantness, then it will be immensely diffi­
cult for him to formulate his comparative claims (his claims about 
betterness-for) in a coherent way. (It is easier for the hedonist to 
handle this difficulty if he switches to a modified version of the theory, 
however; cf. note 21 above)30. 
3°That is, the idea is not just that pleasantness cannot be measured (given a certain 
criterion on how it should be measured), but that it may even be impossible to 
formulate such a criterion in a coherent way. This does not necessarily count 
against the pluralistic quality theory, however. 
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Why we should prefer the Relational Theory to the Pluralistic 
Quality Theory 
The obvious alternative to the Pluralistic Quality Theory is the Relational 
Theory, so let us try to figure out which type of theory that is most 
reasonable. 
As I see it, there is only one reason for preferring the Pluralistic 
Quality Theory, viz. that it (qua quality theory) tends to get more 
support from ordinary speech (especially from (1) and (2) above). 
However, there are several reasons for regarding the Relational 
Theory as the more plausible theory: 
(i) It is as ontologically sound as it can be, i.e. it does (most definitely) 
not presuppose the existence of something which does not exist. In this 
respect, it is superior to the Pluralistic Quality Theory. It is (as we have 
seen) hard to prove that the hedonic qualities postulated by the latter 
theory do not exist, but their existence can most certainly be doubted. 
(ii) The Relational Theory does not give rise to any of the difficulties 
that the Pluralistic Quality Theorist has to face. First, the Relational 
Theory has a simple answer to first of the Pluralist's problems, viz. 
"What is it that makes all these qualitatively different kinds of pleasant 
experiences pleasant?". His answer is (of course): "They all stand in the 
same relation to the desires (or likes) of the experiencing subject". As 
Griffin (1986) writes: 
Suppose we said that utility [pleasure] consisted of s everal different 
mental states. What then would make them into a set [e.g., make 
them comparable with respect to their pleasantness]? The obvious 
candidate would be desire; we could say /.../ that utility combines a 
psychological [quality] element and a preference element. 'Utility', we 
could say, is 'desirable consciousness', meaning by 'desirable' either 
consciousness that we actually desire or consciousness that we would 
desire if we knew what it would be like to have it (pp 9-10). 
The Relational Theorist avoids the second difficulty as well. He has (as 
we know) a simple and coherent view on how our experiences should 
(in principle) be compared with respect to pleasantness and unpleasant­
ness, and it will therefore be easy for the Preference-Hedonist to give a 
clear and coherent formulation of his comparative claims. 
(iii) The last reason why we should prefer the Relational Theory to 
the Pluralist Quality Theory is evaluative, viz. because the Relational 
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Theorist uses the terms "pleasant" and "unpleasant" in a way that has 
more "rational and moral significance". Or in other terms, Preference-
Hedonism is a more plausible version of the Hedonistic Theory than 
Pluralistic Quality Hedonism. To argue for this view, we have to con­
struct an example where the two theories disagree. This is kind of di ffi­
cult, however. First, we have to assume that there are such things as 
hedonic qualities, and we have to imagine two experiences, El and E2, 
that have the same kind of hedonic quality. We then have to assume 
that El has more of this hedonic quality than E2, but that the experi­
encing subject intrinsically prefers E2 (when he has it) to El (when he 
has it). (It is hard to be more concrete than this). We then have to ask 
which experience is better for the subject to have, El or E2. On my ten­
tative view, E2 is the more valuable experience, and preference-
hedonism is (for this reason) the more plausible view31. 
This ends the chapter on how pure hedonism should be formulated 
(but see also appendix E, where there is a discussion of the issue of 
duration). Let us now try to find out whether hedonism is a plausible 
theory of prudential value. 
31 At this point, we may also add the following "argument" against quality-
hedonism (monistic or pluralistic), viz. that quality-hedonism is an objectivist 
theory, and as such, it suffers from a number of defects (cf. chapter 7). 
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Chapter Three 
is hedonism a plausible theory 
of prudential value? 
A critical discussion of the hedonistic theory 
The main purpose of this chapter is to find out whether hedonism is (in 
any of i ts versions) a plausible theory, where the term "plausible" may 
either mean "valid" (e.g., "true") or "justified" (or "well-founded"). 
The central question here is (of c ourse) whether any version of hedo­
nism is a valid theory. This question might not be possible to answer, 
however. First, there might not be such a thing as valid theory of 
prudential value (where validity can be clearly distinguished from "well-
foundedness"), and second, even if there is such a thing, it might not be 
possible to determine whether the hedonistic theory is valid or not. In 
any case, it is clearly not possible to gain knowledge about its validity in 
any direct way (it is, after all, a general theory). So, what we will focus 
on here is (rather) the question of whether hedonism (in any of its 
versions) is a justified (or well-founded) theory, i.e. whether there are 
good reasons for its truth and/or for accepting it. 
More specifically, there are two questions we want to answer: First, is 
any version of hedonism justified, i.e. can (HI) and (H2) be justified? 
And second, if the answer is yes (if we can assume that some version of 
hedonism is justified); which version of the theory is most well-
founded, pure hedonism or some version of modified hedonism? Or in 
other terms, are (H3) and/or (H4)-(H6) well-founded claims? 
To be able to answer these questions, we have to look at a number of 
arguments that has (or can) be given for and against the theory, and 
then ask ourselves whether these arguments are good arguments. For 
example, are there good reasons for regarding (H1)-(H6) as true? Are 
there good reasons for regarding any of these claims as false, i.e. can 
pure hedonism be refuted? 
What we are primarily interested in here is (of course) objective justi­
fication (cf. section 1.3 above), i.e. whether there are good reasons 
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(period) for or against the theory. This might not be possible, however. 
First, it might be impossible "in principle" to determine whether a 
theory of prudential value is justified (refuted) in the objective sense. 
As Bergström (1990) suggests, it seems that a statement cannot be 
objectively justified or refuted unless it has truth-value, and that value 
statements have truth-values is something that can be doubted. Second, 
even if th ere is such a thing as "being justified (refuted) in the objective 
sense" in this area, it is probably "practically impossible" to determine 
whether a certain theory of prudential value (e.g., pure hedonism) is 
objectively justified or not. Philosophers simply have too different opi­
nions about what counts as a good reason for and against a certain 
theory, and it seems almost impossible to construct arguments that 
everyone can accept. This suggests that it might be better if we focus on 
the subjective side of the issue, i.e. if we (instead) ask whether it is 
rational for us (me, you, etc.) to believe that hedonism is true. Are we 
(I, you, etc.) justified in regarding the hedonistic theory (in any of its 
versions) as valid (or invalid)? 
Corresponding to the distinction between objective and subjective 
justification, there are two ways in which we can conceive of the argu­
ments that are given for and against a certain theory (e.g., hedonism): 
We can regard them "objectively", as reasons for or against the truth of 
the theory, but we can also regard them "subjectively", as attempts to 
convince a certain audience (an audience that is already equipped with 
certain "intuitions") that the theory is true or false1. Insofar as it is 
iThis is not to deny that most arguments for and against hedonism are (in fact) 
attempts at objective justification or refutation. For example, it seems quite clear 
that what Nozick was actually trying to do when he offered his famous 
experience machine argument was to refute the hedonistic theory (objectively). 
That is, his argument was not just an attempt to make us believe (with rational 
means, by appealing to our intuitions) that hedonism is false. But what he was 
actually trying to do is one thing, and what he was actually doing (and succeeded 
in doing) is another. If th ere is no such thing as being an objectively justified (or 
refuted) theory of prudential value, then it is better if we conceive of his argument 
as a "subjective reason" rather than as an "objective reason". Moreover, there are 
also a number of arguments which seem to aim at convincing rather than 
"proving" (or establishing truth), arguments which purport to make hedonism 
more or less plausible for a certain audience (equipped with certain intuitions). For 
example, hedonists normally try to show that it is not nonderivatively good for a 
person to be autonomous, to have friends, to have his desires fulfilled, to 
accomplish something, or the like (i.e. that (H2) is well-founded), but few 
hedonists try to show that it is nonderivatively good for us to feel pleasure (that 
(H3) is justified). The reason for this is most probably that the hedonist's primary 
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possible, we will conceive of th e arguments as "objective reasons", and 
evaluate them accordingly. But at times, it might be more appropriate to 
regard them as "subjective reasons". And when we do this, we will 
have to evaluate them in a somewhat different way, e.g., we will have 
to ask whether they actually succeed in convincing a certain audience in 
a rational way. 
Now that we are aware of these things, let us look at a number of 
arguments that can be given for and against hedonism. Let us start 
with the pro-arguments. 
3.1. Arguments for hedonism 
Before we look at the pro-arguments themselves, it is important to 
make a few general remarks about what is needed in order to justify a 
theory of p rudential value in general, and hedonism in particular. What 
would a good argumentation for hedonism have to be like? 
Arguing for (justifying) hedonism: some générai remarks 
What the hedonist needs to establish is (roughly) that pleasantness and 
unpleasantness have a very special evaluative status. More specifically, 
the key claims that he has to argue for are (H2) and (H3). What he 
needs to show is that there are good reasons for regarding these two 
claims as true. 
First, he needs to show that (H3) is well-founded, i.e. that there are 
good reasons for believing that it is always nonderivatively good for us 
to have pleasant experiences, and that it is always bad for us to suffer. 
It is normally not necessary to give arguments for (H3) in order to 
convince an anti-hedonist, however (see note l)2. 
Second, he needs to show that (H2) is justified, i.e. that there is 
nothing else besides feeling pleasure or displeasure that is nonderivati­
vely good or bad for a person. This means that every argument for 
goal is to convince the anti-hedonist. The ordinary anti-hedonists already tend to 
accept the view that it is nonderivatively good for us to feel pleasure, and this 
means that the hedonist can put his efforts elsewhere. But if his only aim were to 
justify his theory objectively, he would have to argue for (H3) as well. 
2With a few exceptions, that is. For example, it might be necessary to convince 
some anti-hedonists that it is nonderivatively good for a person to feel sadistic 
joy. 
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(H2) will also be an argument against some alternative theory of pru­
dential value. That is, in order to justify hedonism, it is not sufficient to 
show that the positive claim (H2) is justified; the hedonist also has to 
refute all the alternative theories of prudential value. In practice, this is 
where the great challenge lies. It is as hard for a hedonist to make an 
non-hedonist believe (by rational means) that hedonism is true as it is 
for a non-hedonist to convince an hedonist that hedonism is false. 
So, what type (or types) of a rguments would count as good reasons 
for the truth of (H2) and (H3)? If we assume that there are in fact 
good reasons for these claims, what would these reasons have to be 
like? 
The three most common types of pro-arguments 
(1) Arguments for (H2), and against some alternative theory, are Often 
of the following kind: The hedonist takes some non-hedonistic belief 
(e.g., the belief that it is nonderivatively good for us to engage in crea­
tive activity) and tries to explain its occurrence in "hedonistic terms". 
The reason why some people tend to regard it as nonderivatively good 
for us to be "creatively active" is (on this type of view) that creatures 
like us tend to take pleasure in it; if it would not give us pleasure, we 
would probably not regard it as good at all3. 
Arguments of this type are far from conclusive, but this does not 
mean that they are bad. In any case, it is clear that such arguments 
might be highly effective, or more specifically, if a person would come to 
believe that all his non-hedonistic beliefs can be explained in this way, 
then it is likely that he would convert to hedonism. 
3Cf. Smart's (1973) arguments for pure hedonism and against modified hedonism: 
(i) The reason why some of us (e.g., Mill) believe that complex and intellectual 
pleasures are nonderivatively better than sensual and simple pleasures is that the 
former are often fecund while the latter do not only lack fecundity, but are 
actually (often) the reverse of fecund (cf. p 17-18). (ii) The reason why some of us 
(e.g., Moore) tend to think that sadistic pleasure has "no intrinsic value at all, or 
perhaps even a negative intrinsic value" (ibid., p 25) is that we feel a distaste for the 
consequences of sadism, and not an immediate distaste for sadism as such: "Our 
repugnance to the sadist arises, naturally enough, because in our universe sadists 
invariably do harm" (ibid., p 25). In both cases, the modified hedonist is 
(somehow) characterized as confused, conceptually or psychologically: The reason 
why he is not a pure hedonist is either that he blurs the distinction between final 
and instrumental values, or that he is bad at introspection. 
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(2) Arguments of type (1) are often supplemented by arguments of a 
similar type. These arguments can be characterized as follows4: The 
hedonist considers an opposing view, such as the idea that it is non-
derivatively good for people to be engaged in creative activity. He then 
asks (rhetorically): "Would it be good for a person to engage in creative 
activity, if it brought no enjoyment at all to him to do so, and if h e did 
not have the slightest desire that the experience of doing so conti­
nue?"5. He gives a "no" answer to this question, and then concludes 
that the value of engaging in creative activity must lie in the pleasure it 
produces, and in it arousing a desire that the experience of i t continue. 
As Parfit (1984) points out, " [t]his reasoning assumes that the value of 
a whole is just the sum of t he values of its parts" (p 501), i.e. if this ato­
mistic assumption is not made, the alleged fact that a certain whole (e.g., 
P-is-happy-because-he-wants-to-engage-in-creative-activity-and-now-
he-does-it) can not have final value for P unless it contains pleasure as a 
part does not give any support to the hedonistic idea that the value-for 
of the whole resides in this part. This assumption is not plausible, how­
ever, and we therefore have to conclude that (b) is (at least qua argu­
ment for pure hedonism) a bad argument. 
The other premise of t he argument is not implausible, however, i.e. it 
may well be the case that a situation cannot have final value for a 
person unless it includes pleasure as a component. If we reject atomism 
but accept this premise, we will end up with the following type of view: 
We might then claim that what is best for people is a composite. It is 
not just their being in the conscious states that they want to be in. 
Nor is it just their having knowledge, engaging in rational activity, 
being aware of true beauty, and the like. What is good for someone 
is neither just what Hedonist's claim, nor just what is claimed by 
Objective List Theorists. We might believe that if we had either of 
these, without the other, what we had would have little or no value 
(Parfit (1984), p 502). 
Even though this argument is not an argument against pure hedonism 
4The description that follows is a reconstruction of what Parfit (1984) writes 
(somewhat confusedly) on p 501. 
5At this point, he might also invite us to make comparisons of the following type: 
"Suppose that there is this person who suffers from being creative, but takes 
pleasure in performing routine tasks. Is it really nonderivatively better for this 
person to be creative?". 
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itself, but only an argument against an argument for pure hedonism, it 
does weaken the hedonist by "disarming" him. If we take this weapon 
away from him, what has he got left? How can he support his thesis 
now? 
(3) Well, he can also argue as follows: "Let us (again) consider the idea 
that it is nonderivatively good for people to be engaged in creative 
activity. This view implies that a person can become better off even if 
there is an increase in his suffering, viz. if there is a large enough in­
crease in creative activity. This is implausible, however, and the view 
should therefore be rejected. Moreover, it seems that whatever alleged 
value we replace creative activity with, we get the same result: There 
simply is no thing such that a decrease in a person's level of happiness 
can be compensated by an increase in this thing". 
This argument might strike some people as convincing, but it is not as 
strong as it may seem. First, it is not really an argument for pure hedo­
nism. It is true that the idea that every decrease in happiness is also a 
decrease in well-being implies that the pure versions of the opposing 
views must be wrong, but the idea is not inconsistent with all the oppo­
sing views, e.g., it is perfectly consistent with Parfit's idea that "what is 
best for people is a composite". And second, it is doubtful whether the 
argument can convince anyone who isn't already a hedonist. Consider 
this person who has a strong intrinsic desire to learn more about him­
self. Now, suppose he learns something about himself which makes him 
suffer a little more. This does not necessarily make him worse off, espe­
cially not if he himself intrinsically prefers painful knowing to painless 
ignorance. 
On subject-oriented vs. object-oriented justification of 
value-for-statements, and why subject-oriented justification 
is necessary 
Even though some of the arguments above might be sufficient to con­
vince some non-hedonists, they can never constitute a full objective 
justification of the hedonistic theory. First, a complete (and satisfactory) 
justification of (H2) must be (in part) "subject-oriented"6. Second, the 
6Cf. appendix B. It is also worth reminding ourselves that the distinction between 
subject-oriented and object-oriented justification has nothing to do with the 
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hedonist also has to show that there are good reasons for believing 
that it is always nonderivatively good for us to feel pleasure (etc.), and 
this justification must also be (to some extent) "subject-oriented". In 
short, it is not just that both (H2) and (H3) need to be justified; they 
also need to be justified in a "subject-oriented" way, the hedonist also 
has to tell us what it is about us (e.g., our human nature) that makes 
hedonism plausible. Let us elaborate further on this idea. 
What the hedonist is trying to justify (in this context) is a number of 
general value-for-statements, however, e.g., he tries to show that there 
are good reasons for believing that nothing but pleasant experience is 
nonderivatively good for us. Now, the fact that value-for is a relation 
between an object and a subject strongly suggests that if a certain 
object is nonderivatively good for a certain subject, then this is so be­
cause there is a "fit" between the object and the subject: The object has 
certain properties, the subject has certain other properties, and the two 
sets of properties match each other well (cf. appendix B). In the present 
case, this means that general value-for-statements of t he form "all facts 
of type X ar e nonderivatively good for all human beings" can not be 
justified by referring solely to what X's are like; one must also refer to 
what human beings are like, e.g., to "human nature". (In the case of 
value-period, it is different. An attribution of final value to an object is 
justified by referring solely to intrinsic (or perhaps relational) features 
of t his object, i.e. by referring solely to "the nature" of this object). 
Let us now make the following distinction between object-oriented 
and subject-oriented justification: A particular statement of the form 
"the fact X is good for the person P" is justified i n an object-oriented ivay 
if the justification refers to features of the object (X), i.e. if i t takes the 
form "X is good for P because X is constituted in such-and-such a way". 
A subject-oriented justification of a particular value-for-statement, on the 
other hand, "appeals" to features of the subject (P), i.e. it takes the 
form "X is good for P because P is constituted in such-and-such a way". 
The point made above can now be formulated in the following way: A 
goodness-for-statement can not be completely justified unless the justi­
fication is both object-oriented and subject-oriented, i.e. unless it takes 
the form: "X is good for P because X is constituted in such-and-such a 
distinction between objective and subjective justification. (It is important that 
these two distinctions are kept separate). 
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way and because P is constituted in such-and-such a way". 
This does not necessarily apply to general statements of the form "all 
facts of type X are nonderivatively good for all human beings", how­
ever, viz. for the following reason: When we see such statements, we 
already know what it is about X's that is supposed to make them good 
for us, viz. that they are X's, that they fall under the general description 
"being an X (e.g., being pleasant)". This means that justifications of 
general value-for-statements might not have to be object-oriented at all, 
not even in part. Instead, the central requirement is this: A general 
goodness-for-statement can not be completely justified unless the justification is 
subject-oriented, i.e. unless it takes the form "All facts of type X are non­
derivatively good for all human beings because human beings are consti­
tuted in such-and-such a way" (assuming that X does not contain any 
essential reference to our intrinsic features; cf. appendix B, including 
notes 38 and 39). 
This implies that the hedonistic theory can not be completely justified 
unless it can be established what it is about us (our nature, our consti­
tution) that makes it nonderivatively good for us to have pleasant 
experiences, and so on. So, what kinds of subject-oriented justifications 
can be given here? What kinds of human features might be of relevance 
in this (hedonistic) context? 
Well, it hardly makes sense to say that it is good for us to feel plea­
sure because we are sentient beings (because we have a capacity for 
pleasure and pain), or because we have a need for pleasure, or because 
feeling pleasure constitutes a realization of " the human potential". As I 
see it, a subject-oriented justification of hedonism can only make sense if 
it appeals to our intrinsic desires or evaluations; either to our actual 
(intrinsic) desires or evaluations, or to our hypothetical (intrinsic) desires 
or evaluations (i.e. to what we would intrinsically want or value under 
certain circumstances). On this view, there are four major subject-
oriented ways in which hedonism might be justified, viz. (1) by 
appealing to our actual desires; (2) by appealing to our actual evalu­
ations; (3) by appealing to our informed or rational desires; or (4) by 
appealing to our informed or rational evaluations. Let us take a closer 
look at these different kinds of subject-oriented justifications. 
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Subject-oriented arguments for hedonism 
(1) The first type of subject-oriented argument for hedonism is "the 
appeal to our actual desires". Here, an attempt is made to justify hedo­
nism in the following way: "The reason why it is always nonderivatively 
good for us to have pleasant experiences is that feeling pleasure is 
(always) intrinsically desired by us7, and the reason why nothing be­
sides pleasant experience is nonderivatively good for us is that we 
never desire anything else as an end, or for its own sake". (That is, an 
appeal is made to the object interpretation of the actual desire theory, 
regarded as a "method of justification"). 
Mill's argument 
This is how Mill (1863) argued when he tried to justify evaluative 
hedonism in terms of psychological hedonism, i.e. the idea that pleasure 
alone is the object of our actual (intrinsic) desires. Mill's argument can 
be formulated in the following way: 
(i) Psychological hedonism is true: nothing but pleasure (our own 
pleasure, that is) is desired as an end ("for its own sake", or "in and 
for itself"). 
(ii) The "justificatory" idea that "the sole evidence it is possible to 
produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it" 
(ch. IV, p 32), or if we have value-for rather than value-period in 
mind: The idea that the sole evidence it is possible to produce that 
anything is nonderivatively good for people is that people actually 
desire it as an end. 
(i) and (ii) suggest that hedonism is valid. 
On Moore's (1903)8 view, this is a bad argument, and the reason for 
this is that both (i) and (ii) are false. Is Moore right about this? Well, it 
seems quite clear that (i) is false: We often desire to feel pleasure, but it 
is (as Moore points out) certainly not the case that nothing but pleasure 
is (intrinsically) desired. (We could also add that people's actual intrinsic 
desires are different, and that a universal theory like hedonism can, for 
7On the preference-hedonistic theory, it is (of course) analytically true that feeling 
pleasure is (always) intrinsically desired. However, the theory does not imply that 
it is good for us to feel pleasure because pleasant experience is intrinsically desired. 
8Moore's criticism of Mill can be found in Moore (1903), pp 64-72. 
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this reason, not be justified in terms of what we actually desire). 
If it is correctly understood, (ii) is not an implausible idea, however. It 
is of course true that the descriptive statement "we all desire to feel 
pleasure" does not entail the evaluative statement "it is good for all 
people to feel pleasure", but surely the truth of the former statement 
suggests (or indicates) that there is some truth in the latter statement. Or 
alternatively put, to believe that psychological hedonism is true while 
evaluative hedonism is false, this is a rather odd position. 
In any case, even though Mill was mistaken in believing that we can 
appeal to our actual desires here, it seems that he understood some­
thing that Moore did not, namely that hedonism cannot be a justified 
theory of prudential value unless there is something in our "nature" that 
can "explain" why pleasant experience is the only thing that has non-
derivative value for us. And if we cannot appeal to actual desire here, 
to what can we appeal instead? This is what we have to ask ourselves. 
(2) The next question is whether it is possible to justify hedonism by 
appealing to our actual (intrinsic) evaluations. Now, it is not entirely 
clear what type of evaluations we are supposed to appeal to here, e.g., 
whether we should appeal to evaluations of the form "The only thing 
that is nonderivatively good for me is to feel pleasure" or to evaluations 
of the form "The only thing that it is nonderivatively good for all 
human beings is to feel pleasure". Suppose that we have the former 
type of "intrinsic" evaluation in mind. The idea that general value-for-
statements like (H2) and (H3) can be justified in terms of people's 
evaluations can then be spelled out in the following way: "The reason 
why it is nonderivatively good for all people to have pleasant 
experiences is that every person believes that it is nonderivatively good 
for him or her to feel pleasure, and the reason why nothing besides 
pleasant experience is nonderivatively good for us is that every person 
believes that the only thing that is nonderivatively good for him or her 
is that he or she feels pleasure". 
Is this a good subject-oriented argument for hedonism? I think not. In 
fact, this argument has the same weaknesses as "the appeal to our 
actual desires": it is simply not true that everyone believes that feeling 
pleasure is the only thing that is nonderivatively good for him or her, 
i.e. it is simply not the case that all people are hedonists with respect to 
what is nonderivatively good and bad for him or her. This means that 
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just as (H2) could not be justified by appealing to our actual desires, 
neither can it be justified by appealing to our actual evaluations9. 
Furthermore, we have different beliefs about what is good for us, and 
a universal theory like hedonism can only be justified by appealing to 
something which is common to everyone. What the hedonist has to 
show is that there is some common human feature that can explain why 
pleasant experience, and nothing but pleasant experience, has non-
derivative value for us. 
So, how can the hedonist meet this challenge? As far as I can see, 
there are only two routes open to him: He can either stop appealing to 
our actual desires or evaluations, and start appealing to our hypo­
thetical desires or evaluations, or he can put certain restrictions on what 
an intrinsic desire or evaluation must be like in order to have "justi­
ficatory force". The latter route was taken by Wetterström (1986), 
when he tried to justify hedonism by appealing to our "H-evident 
subjective evaluations" (intuitions that are supposedly shared by all 
normal people). Wetterström's argument can be regarded as a 
"restricted version" of (2), a version that is based on the idea that our 
actual intrinsic evaluations do not have "justificatory force" unless they 
meet certain (rather strong) requirements. 
Wetterström's argument 
Let us first note that Wetterström is not really interested in finding out 
what types of f acts that has nonderivative value for a person. Instead, 
he wants to find out what kinds of properties that "deserve to be 
appointed intrinsic v-characteristics", i.e. what properties that has 
intrinsic value-period. So, in order to make it clear how his ideas may be 
relevant to my purposes, I formulate his argument in my own terms. 
Wetterström (1986) recognizes that an evaluative theory must be 
justified in a subject-oriented way: "How could any promising account 
of ethical justification fail to be based on certain assumptions about 
human nature", he writes (p 274). So, what are the "assumptions about 
human nature" that can, on his view, justify hedonism? His answer is 
(roughly) "the fact that all normal people share the same H-intuitions". 
9And it is also worth pointing out that it is even harder to justify (H5) - the idea 
that the more pleasant a pleasant experience is, the better - in this way. We do not 
always believe that the more pleasant a pleasant experience is, the 
nonderivatively better it is for the subject to have it. 
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More specifically, he thinks that the reason why hedonism is valid is 
that "the H-intuitions of normal people are identical with hedonists' 
ultimate intuitions" (cf. ibid., p 267). 
So, what does the term "H-intuition" refer to here? Well, let us first 
point out that all H-intuitions belong to the category of "subjectively 
intrinsic evaluations", i.e. that every H-intuition is (in Wetterström's 
terminology) of the form "X is good (or bad) as an end". In this 
context, however, it is more fruitful to regard H-intuitions and other 
intrinsic evaluations as being of the form "X is nonderivatively good (or 
bad) for P". 
So, how do we determine whether a certain subjectively intrinsic 
evaluation is a H-intuition or not? This is where Wetterström introduces 
"the notion of an intuition being H-evident ['H' for 'Hume'] to a 
person": H-intuitions are "evaluations that are H-evident to actually 
existing people" (ibid., p 271), where the notion of H-evidence should 
be understood as follows: An evaluation e is H-evident to a person P 
(at a time t) if and only if as far as P is concerned, "you do something 
absurd or impossible if you question e - if you demand a reason for e or 
voice an objection to e" (ibid., p 271). He also adds that "[t]he labels of 
'H-evident' and 'H-intuition' apply to concrete evaluations in the first 
place and to abstract evaluations in a derivative sense" (ibid., p 271). 
That is, if we have value-for-beliefs in mind, H-evidence is primarily 
attributed to evaluations of the form "a particular fact X i s good (or 
bad) for a particular person P", where P is most probably me. 
Now that we are familiar with Wetterström's terminology, his argu­
ment can be spelled out in the following way: 
(i) An evaluation of the form "X is nonderivatively good (bad) for P" 
is valid if and only if it is H-evident to actually existing normal 
people10. That is, a person P's belief that a fact X is nonderivatively 
good for someone (e.g., for him) is valid if and only if P is normal and 
P would consider it absurd if someone were to question the belief. (It 
is important to note that this is a rather strong "principle of justi­
fication", e.g., it is much stronger than Mill's (ii)). 
(ii) Most people have H-intuitions, and the H-intuitions of normal 
10Or in Wetterström's own terminology: A property must be a v-characteristic in 
relation to a normal person's H-intuition in order to deserve to be appointed an 
intrinsic v-characteristic (cf. p 267). 
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people are identical with hedonists' ultimate intuitions (cf. ibid., p 
267). The idea that the H-intuitions of normal people coincide with 
hedonists' ultimate intuitions can be divided into two parts: (a) Every 
normal person would (in fact) regard it as absurd if you were to 
question the idea that it is nonderivatively good for a person to feel 
pleasure (or if you would demand a reason for this idea); and (b) if 
someone believes that there are other things besides pleasant experi­
ences that have final value for us (e.g., autonomous living), and if h e 
thinks that it would be absurd or impossible to question this belief, 
then he is an abnormal person. The only "intrinsic evaluations" that it 
is absurd to question are the evaluations that constitute the hedo­
nistic theory. 
From (i) and (ii), we can conclude that hedonism is valid, or in 
Wetterström's terms, that "nothing but mental qualities deserve to be 
appointed intrinsic v-characteristics". 
Let us now see whether this is a good argument or not, i.e. whether (i) 
and (ii) are plausible claims. Let us start with (ii), the factual premise: 
On my view, (ii) is not an implausible idea, e.g., it is immensely more 
plausible than Mill's (i), i.e. psychological hedonism. Wetterström is (I 
think) "fundamentally right" in assuming that it is much harder for us to 
question the idea that it has final value for us to feel pleasure than it is 
to question the idea that it is nonderivatively good for us to have 
friends, or to engage in creative activity, or to live our lives in an 
autonomous way. 
It seems that there are exceptions to both (ii:a) and (ii:b), however, 
particularly to the latter idea. This is rather obvious if we consider 
examples of a more holistic kind: Suppose that it is H-evident to me that 
it is bad to live in the experience machine, and that a life totally devoid 
of activity or intimacy is a bad life. Does this make me abnormal? I think 
not. So, it seems that it can not really be assumed that the H-intuitions 
of normal people are identical with hedonists' ultimate intuitions. 
Let us now turn to (i), the "principle of justification". Is this a plausible 
principle? I think not (e.g., it is not as plausible as Mill's counterpart, i.e. 
(ii) on p 113). To say that an "intrinsic evaluation" should not be regar­
ded as valid unless it is H-evident to normal people is a very strong re­
quirement. But why should we accept such a strong requirement? In 
fact, it seems that the principle is designed with the purpose of justi-
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fying hedonism. If it i s harder for us to question (H3) than it is to ques­
tion the idea that it is nonderivatively good for us to live autonomously, 
then we can save hedonism by stipulating that the "justificatory line" 
should be drawn somewhere in between the two. 
In particular, it is not clear how Wetterström would handle the follo­
wing objection: Suppose that I am "abnormal", and that my belief that it 
is nonderivatively good for me to have friends is H-evident to me. Why 
can't we conclude that it is (in this case) nonderivatively good for me to 
have friends? Do we really have to assume that the most plausible 
theory of p rudential value is a universal theory, i.e. a theory which im­
plies that if situations of a certain type are nonderivatively good for me, 
then they are also nonderivatively good for you, and vice versa? As far 
as I can see, Wetterström does not give us any reason why we should 
make this universalist assumption, so what is there to prevent us from 
regarding his justificatory principle as support for the following formal 
theory: "X is good for P if and only if (and because) it is H-evident to P 
that X is good for P"?n (A further problem with Wetterström's argu­
ment is that it is doubtful whether it can be used to justify the hedo­
nist's comparative claims. For example, is it H-evident to all normal 
people that it is always better to have a more pleasant pleasure than to 
have a less pleasant pleasure?). 
To conclude, Wetterström's argument is not a good-enough argu­
ment. This means that none of the attempts to justify hedonism by 
appealing to our actual desires or evaluations are successful. So what 
we have to ask ourselves now is this: Is it possible to justify hedonism 
by appealing to our hypothetical desires or evaluations, e.g., by appe­
aling to what we would want if w e were fully rational, fully informed, 
free of neuroses, assessing the matter "in a cool hour", or the like? 
nIsn't this criticism a little "unfair"? After all, Wetterström had value-period in 
mind, and not value-for. Well, I think a similar kind of criticism can be formulated 
with regard to value-period, viz. the following one: Do we really have to assume 
that all intrinsic values are agent-neutral values? As far as I can see, Wetterström 
does not give us any reason why we should make this assumption, so what is 
there to prevent us from regarding his justificatory principle as support for the 
following theory: "P has a reason to promote X if and only if (and because) it is H-
evident to P that X is intrinsically good-period"? 
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Appealing to hypothetical desires or evaluations 
This is what such a justification would look like: 
(3) In terms of desire: The reason why feeling pleasure is the only 
thing that is nonderivatively good for us is that if we were fully in­
formed, free of neuroses, thinking clearly, and the like, this is the only 
thing we would desire as an end (That is, an appeal is made to the idea­
lized desire theory, regarded as a "method of justification"). 
(4) Or in terms of evaluation: The reason why feeling pleasure is the 
only thing that is nonderivatively good for us is that this is the only 
type of fact to which a fully rational person P would attribute non-
derivative goodness-for-P. 
Are any of these two arguments a good subject-oriented argument 
for hedonism? I think not, for the following reasons: 
First, they are both based on false factual assumptions: There is no 
reason to believe that if we were rational, we would all be hedonists. 
This claim is hard to prove, however. 
Second, the principles of justification on which the arguments are 
based are not bad, but they both suffer from a certain kind of incom­
pleteness. Or alternatively put, as they stand, these principles are not 
really subject-oriented at all. It can hardly be doubted that these prin­
ciples have a certain "justificatory power", e.g., if I honestly came to 
believe that I would be a hedonist if I were rational, this would at least 
suggest that hedonism is a plausible theory. Now, this is the reason 
why the principles are incomplete: Suppose that if we were rational, we 
would all be hedonists. In a sense, this would be a fact about us, but it 
is not a fact that we would rest content with in this justificatory context; 
we would still want to know why we would be hedonists if we were 
rational. On the assumption that pleasant experience is the only thing a 
rational person would desire as an end, we would need to know what 
it is about us human beings that explains this alleged fact. If w e were 
rational, we would have a clearer and more unclouded view, but what 
is it (e.g., in us, or about us) that we would see if we were rational that 
we do not see now? For example, is pleasant experience the only thing 
we really desire, deep down? Is some version of psychological hedonism 
true after all? (Are all our "non-hedonistic" intrinsic desires and evalu­
ations somehow "mistaken"?) How would one justify such a claim? Do 
these deep desires exist at all? 
In short, the second (more general) reason why (3) and (4) will not 
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do is that a subject-oriented justification of hedonism cannot be com­
plete unless it refers to what the subject is actually like, unless it "takes 
hold" of something that is actually there, "in" the subject. But if (1) and 
(2) do not work either, i.e. if the hedonist cannot appeal to our actual 
desires or evaluations, then what human feature (if an y) is left for him 
to "take hold of"? It seems that there is nothing there. In short, it 
seems that all attempts to justify hedonism in a subject-oriented way are 
failures. 
This ends the list of pro-arguments. Let us now look at how the 
hedonistic theory can be criticized. 
3.2. Arguments against hedonism 
Before we take a closer look at some of the counter-arguments that can 
be directed against hedonism, let us first make a few general remarks 
about what these arguments are (in fact) like, and what they have to be 
like in order to be successful. What would it take to refute the hedo­
nistic theory? 
Arguing against (criticizing, refuting) hedonism: some 
general remarks 
Let us first point out that it is not just a complete justification of h edo­
nism that must be subject-oriented; a complete refutation of the theory 
must also be based on some kind of c onception of human nature: the 
anti-hedonist must (ideally) give us an account of human nature that 
"explains" why hedonism is a bad theory of prudential value. 
This is most probably one reason why some anti-hedonists (e.g., 
Nozick) tend to point out that we (most of us) intrinsically want other 
things besides pleasant experiences, that we are not really hedonists 
(that we tend to reject (H2)), and so on12. Now, it is important that 
these references to our desires and evaluations are recognized for what 
they are, viz. as a kind of subject-oriented criticism of the theory. (If 
this is not understood, these references will simply be dismissed as ir­
relevant, which is not very fair). Furthermore, it is also important that 
12The other reason is rhetorical: To appeal explicitly to our intuitions, to what we 
want and believe (e.g., as in "we all know that..."), can be an effective way to 
convince an audience. 
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these subject-oriented arguments against hedonism are properly under­
stood, viz. as a kind of c hallenge to the hedonist: "The thing in us that 
makes hedonism plausible is not our actual desires or evaluations, so 
you'd better tell us what it is!". If t his is so, all the references to the fact 
that our desires and/or evaluations are often "anti-hedonistic" are best 
regarded as counter-pro-arguments, i.e. as arguments against possible 
arguments for hedonism (e.g., like Mill's argument). That is, what these 
arguments do is that they make it hard (or even impossible) for the 
hedonist to come up with an acceptable subject-oriented justification of 
his theory. 
Most arguments against hedonism are not subject-oriented, however, 
but (rather) attempts to show that hedonism has unaccep table implications, 
i.e. that the theory has implications which are inconsistent with certain 
valid (or widely accepted) judgements. Or alternatively put, the idea is 
to demonstrate that if the hedonistic theory is tested against other 
(more particular or more specific) value judgements, it will not survive 
the test. 
The value judgements against which the theory is tested are almost 
always more specific than hedonism itself, but they rarely include refe­
rences to particular persons. This gives rise to the following problem: I 
have claimed (e.g., in section 1.3) that we should (in contexts of justi­
fication) give much more weight to our judgements about particular 
cases than to our more general judgements, e.g., if any of t he particular 
statements that can be deduced from a general theory are inconsistent 
with our judgements about particular cases, we should tend to give up 
the theory13. But what if t he value judgement with which the theory is 
inconsistent is on the same level of g enerality, as in the following case: 
"Hedonism implies that "what you don't know can't hurt you", e.g., 
that it can never be nonderivatively bad for a person to be deceived 
without knowing it. But it is sometimes bad for a person to be deceived 
without knowing it, and this means that hedonism is wrong". Here, the 
13The reason why we should not always choose to give up the theory is this: We 
think that our judgements about particular cases should be granted a privileged 
position (that we should try to "save" our intuitions about particular cases), but we 
also want them to be coherent (consistent) with each other. And it seems that the 
only way in which such coherence can be assured is via some general theory (cf. 
section 1.3 above); this is why it is important that we have some sort of theoretical 
ambition in this area. And if we have this ambition, it seems that we can't always 
give more weight to our particular judgements. 
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following question arises: Is it really plausible to give more weight to the 
idea that it is sometimes bad for a person to be deceived without 
knowing it than to hedonism itself? Is there any reason why we should 
grant such general judgements a more "privileged position" than our 
general theories? Well, I think there is, but only if the judgement in 
question is (so to speak) more specific than the theory. 
This problem is closely connected to another set of problems, viz.: 
How should arguments of this kind (arguments that purport to show 
that hedonism has unacceptable implications) be understood? What do 
they purport to show, what do they actually show, and how should 
they be assessed? 
To the extent that it is possible, we will regard all arguments of this 
kind as "objective reasons" against hedonism, i.e. as attempts to refute 
the theory. Now, this suggests that we should evaluate these argu­
ments as follows: First, we should ask ourselves whether the evaluation 
to which the argument appeals (e.g., the idea that it is sometimes bad 
for a person to be deceived without knowing it, or that a life in the ex­
perience machine would be a bad life) is valid or justified, and second, 
we should ask ourselves whether the evaluation really constitutes a 
threat against hedonism (whether it is relevant), i.e. we should ask "if 
the evaluation is valid, does this mean that hedonism has to be 
rejected?". 
Now, it seems that the hedonist and the anti-hedonist rarely disagree 
on issues of relevance, i.e. they tend to agree on what the implications 
of the theory are, and what would constitute a threat against the 
theory. There are often disagreements on whether the evaluation to 
which a certain argument appeals is justified, however, and this gives 
rise to the following central question: Is it at all possible to determine 
whether such an evaluation is justified or not, and if it is, how should it 
be determined? 
Roughly speaking, a certain crucial anti-hedonistic evaluation is justi­
fied if and only if it is consistent with other evaluations and if it has 
"inductive support" from those of these evaluations which are more 
specific (or more particular) (cf. section 1.3 above). That is, I s trongly 
reject the generalist-deductivist idea that a more specific evaluation 
(intuition) is justified only if it can be deduced from a valid (or justified) 
general theory. This suggests that we should not think of a more speci­
fic anti-hedonistic evaluation as presupposing that some alternative 
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general theory is valid or justified. It is probably true that if a certain 
evaluation can be used against hedonism, then it can also be deduced 
from some alternative general theory, but this does not imply that the 
anti-hedonistic evaluation cannot be valid or justified unless the general 
theory from which it can be deduced is valid. For example, the idea that 
a life in the experience machine would be a bad life does not presuppose 
that some alternative general theory is true, i.e. if it happens to be valid, 
the reason for this is not (necessarily) that it can be deduced from a 
valid general theory. The validity of a more specific anti-hedonistic 
evaluation is (to a considerable extent) independent of the validity of all 
alternative general theories, and this is why it might give "inductive 
support" to some non-hedonistic general theory, like the desire theory. 
This is how we should view the fact that the crucial anti-hedonistic intu­
itions can often (or always) be deduced from some alternative theory, 
viz. as a fact that explains why most arguments against hedonism are 
also arguments (inductive reasons) for some other theory. 
Now, we all know that there is a lot of intractable disagreement in 
this area, and this might give rise to the suspicion that it is often impos­
sible to determine whether arguments of th is kind (arguments that pur­
port to show that hedonism has unacceptable implications) are good or 
not. So maybe we should regard them "subjectively" rather than 
"objectively" (cf. pp 106-107), i.e. as more or less successful attempts to 
convince people that hedonism is a bad theory. The problem with this 
approach is that it makes it impossible to evaluate the arguments in a 
general way. For example, we can not say that an argument has to 
convince (in a rational way) everyone (or every normal person) in 
order to count as a good subjective reason. The reason for this is that 
arguments of this type will only convince those people who share the 
relevant intuitions, like anti-hedonists or certain tender-minded or un-
reflected "hedonists", i.e. they will not convince a reflected, tough-
minded hedonist about anything (if so meone accepts the implications, 
there is little or nothing that can be done to convince him in a rational 
manner). In short, if an argument is regarded subjectively, it can only 
be evaluated in relation to some person (audience) or other, a person 
that is already equipped with a number of be liefs, evaluations, desires, 
and so on, and this makes the subjective approach rather unattractive. 
So, it seems that the only reasonable thing to do at this point is to 
present the arguments and let the reader decide for himself whether 
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they are good or not. 
The arguments against hedonism: A brief overview 
Before we look at the counter-arguments themselves, it is important to 
notice that these arguments have somewhat different "targets", and it 
might be helpful to classify them on basis of what version or versions of 
the hedonistic theory that they purport to refute (or succeeds in re­
futing), or alternatively, on basis of what hedonistic claim or claims they 
purport to disprove. If the arguments are classified in this way, they 
will fall into three groups: 
First, there are the arguments which are directed at all kinds of 
hedonism, i.e. at (HI) (the Experience Requirement) and/or (H2)14. 
This is where we find the arguments which purport to show that a 
person's well-being can be directly affected by things he doesn't know 
anything about. 
In the second group, we find a number of arguments that are pri­
marily directed at (H6): arguments that purport to show that expe­
rience is not the only thing that matters, that the value that a life has for 
the person who is living is does not just depend on how it feels from 
the inside. Now, the idea that there are other things besides experience 
that matters is not very precise, so we must ask ourselves: How (in 
what way) do these other things matter? Or alternatively put, what 
other hedonistic claims besides (H6) do these arguments (if they are 
valid) hit? Well, they hit (H4)-(H5), and maybe also (H3), but not ne­
cessarily (HI) and (H2). That is, they hit pure hedonism, but they need 
not hit modified hedonism. This should not surprise us; one of these 
arguments (viz. Mill's "pig-argument") is constructed by a modified 
hedonist, and there is really no essential difference between this 
argument and arguments like Nozick's experience machine15. 
Arguments of the third kind all purport to criticize pleasures of cer-
14Here, it is important to notice that only some of the arguments are of this type. 
That is, most of the arguments against hedonism are not really directed against 
hedonism "as such". 
15However, if we take a closer look at the arguments that have been put in this 
group, we see that there is (in some cases) more to these arguments than the 
attack on (H6), e.g., several of these arguments contain a subject-oriented 
element, and some of the things that Griffin says seems to be directed against 
(HI). 
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tain kinds. These arguments are directed against pure hedonism, and 
they are delivered from the standpoint of some kind of modified 
hedonism. That is, (HI) and (H2) are never put in question by these 
arguments, and it is therefore possible (but not necessary) to regard 
the arguments as parts of a "discussion" that is (so to speak) internal to 
hedonism. There are two kinds of arguments in this group, viz. (i) 
arguments against (H3), the thesis of Unrestrictedness, and for (RH3), 
some restriction claim, and (ii) arguments against (H4)-(H5) (and in­
directly against (H6)) and for (MH4), some claim concerning relative 
weights. 
These arguments may well be "extensionally equivalent" with the 
arguments in the second group (they may well hit the same hedonistic 
theses), and the objections in the third group are (moreover) often 
"derived" from the objections in the second group. However, there are 
still good reasons for keeping the two groups separate. First, the argu­
ments in the second group are often aimed at hedonism as such, but 
this does not hold for the arguments in the third group. Second, the 
arguments in the second group are first and foremost directed against 
(H6), and only indirectly against (H4)-(H5), while the arguments in the 
third group are of a more "atomistic" (or "local") kind; they are 
primarily directed against (H3) and/or (H4)-(H5), and only indirectly 
against (H6). 
Let us now look at the counter-arguments themselves. We will start 
with the arguments that belong to the first group. 
Arguments directed against (HI) and/or (H2) 
Arguments of t his kind purport to show that there are other things be­
sides pleasure and suffering that are nonderivatively good and bad for 
a person, or more specifically, that a situation need not have any "expe­
riential content" at all in order to have nonderivative value for a 
person. There are at least two kinds of arguments for the idea that 
non-experiential situations can have nonderivative value for us, viz. (i) 
arguments which appeal to the idea that a person's well-being can be 
directly affected by things he does not know anything about, and (ii) 
arguments that purport to show that some non-experiential version of 
the desire theory (e.g., the Success Theory) is superior to hedonism. It 
is worth noting that arguments of these kinds are often, but not 
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always, subject-oriented arguments that appeal to our actual desires or 
evaluations. 
Arguments which purport to show that a person's welfare can be 
directly affected by things he doesn't know anything about 
The hedonist claims (roughly) that a situation cannot benefit a person 
unless it gives him pleasure, and it cannot harm him unless it makes him 
suffer. Now, this view does not really imply that "what you don't 
know can't hurt you" (a person may, after all, be exposed to nuclear 
radiation without knowing it), but it does imply that a person cannot be 
benefited or harmed "directly" by what he doesn't know: If a person 
does not know that a certain situation X holds, and if t he occurrence of 
X does not affect P's experiential life negatively in other ways, then P 
can not be harmed by X16. This means that if there are cases where a 
person can be harmed directly without knowing it, the hedonistic 
theory must be false. So, are there any cases of this kind, and if there 
are, what would they be like? The following examples are offered by 
Nagel (1970): 
[On the hedonistic view] /.../ what you don't know can't hurt you. 
It means that even if a man is betrayed by his friends, ridiculed 
behind his back, and despised by people who treat him politely to his 
face, none of i t can be counted as a misfortune for him as long as he 
does not suffer as a result (p 4). 
Loss, betrayal, deception, and ridicule are on this [hedonistic] view 
bad because people suffer when they learn of them. But it should be 
asked how our ideas of human value would have to be constituted to 
accommodate these cases directly instead. One advantage of such an 
account might be that it would enable us to explain why the discovery 
of these misfortunes causes suffering - in a way that makes it reaso­
nable. For the natural view is that the discovery of betrayal makes us 
unhappy because it is bad to be betrayed - not that betrayal is bad 
because its discovery makes us unhappy (ibid., p 5). 
Now, it is important to see that this argument does not presuppose any 
particular view on why is it nonderivatively bad for a person to be 
16True, it is possible that hedonism can allow for subnoticeable changes in well-
being, but I regard this idea as somewhat peripheral in this context. 
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betrayed, deceived, or ridiculed behind his back, e.g., whether it is bad 
because the person happens to have an intrinsic aversion against it (as 
the desire theorist who accepts the object interpretation would say), or 
because it is simply bad for him (as an objective list theorist might say). 
That is, as the argument stands, we only know that it presents a serious 
threat to hedonism; we don't know what other theory that is 
supported by it. 
A special case: Post-mortem events 
A rather special case is this: Suppose that a person has intrinsic desires 
about what will happen after his death, e.g., that his money will be 
spent to relieve famine, and that no organs will be removed from his 
body. He then dies, but his wishes are not respected. His relatives use 
the money to buy drugs, and medical students dissect his body. Is the 
person being harmed here? Is it plausible to claim that a person's well-
being can be affected in a negative way, after his death? The hedonist 
does not think so, e.g., on his view, 
a man is not injured if his wishes are ignored by the executor of his 
will, or if, after his death, the belief becomes current that all the 
literary works on which his fame rests were really written by his 
brother, who died in Mexico at the age of 28 (Nagel (1970), p 4). 
If we don't share this intuition, we have to reject hedonism. An example 
of a philosopher who disagrees with the hedonist on this point is 
Aristotle. In NE, book I, chapter 10, he "writes" that 
/.../ both evil and good are thought to exist for a dead man, as 
much as for one who is alive but not aware of them; e.g. honours and 
dishonours and the good or bad fortunes of c hildren, and in general 
of descendants (p 19). 
As far as I can see, there are two possible reasons for sharing this 
Aristotelian view: (i) One may appeal to the preferences that the person 
had when he was still alive (this move is not open to an objective list 
theorist like Aristotle, however), (ii) One may also appeal to the idea 
that since we are creatures who view ourselves both "from within" and 
"from without", an assessment of a person's well-being should not be 
made from a first-person-perspective only: it is also necessary to adopt 
a third-person-perspective (This is probably the kind of reasoning on 
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which philosophers like Aristotle and Nagel base their views). 
Is this a good argument? I think not17. 
Arguments that purport to show that the desire theory is superior 
to hedonism 
As I see it, there are at least two arguments of this type. The first one is 
rather general and theoretical, while the other argument purports to 
show that the desire theorist can explain something that the hedonist 
can not, viz. that death is an evil for the person who dies. 
A general argument against the experience requirement 
This argument purports to show that some non-experiential version of 
the desire-fulfilment theory (e.g., the Success Theory) is superior to 
hedonism. The argument has two steps: 
(a) The first step consists in trying to establish that Preference-
Hedonism and/or the experience-oriented Success Theory is more 
plausible than Quality Hedonism. This step was taken on pp 100-104 
above, i.e. it seems that we can assume that if E l and E2 are two expe­
riences, and if the experiencing subject has an intrinsic now-for-now 
preference for E2 over El, then it is nonderivatively better for the 
subject to have E2 than to have El. 
(b) We have now entered the framework of the desire theory. That 
is, we have (so to speak) left hedonism behind, but we have not yet 
abandoned the experience requirement. The second step of the argu­
ment consists in showing that the ordinary Success Theory is more 
plausible than the experience-oriented version of the theory, i.e. that 
the experience requirement (i.e. (HI)) is implausible within the framework 
of the desire theory 19. This is an example of how this could be established: 
Suppose that P intrinsically wants to have self-knowledge (to have true 
beliefs about himself), and that this desire is stronger than his (intrinsic) 
desire to avoid certain kinds of suffering. Now, suppose that there is a 
17It is worth noting that this is (on the assumption that death is annihilation) 
naturally explained by an idea put forward in appendix C, viz. that all value-for-P 
is value-for-P-at-t. It may even provide some support for the idea. 
18That is, the second step of the argument is based on the assumption that (H2) is 
already refuted, and it is (therefore) not really necessary to include it in this 
context. The reason why I include it anyway is that it shows that if (H2) is 
implausible for a certain reason (i.e. because the experience-oriented Success 
Theory is superior to hedonism), then we must also regard (HI) as implausible. 
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certain fact X about P (or his history) which would, if P found out about 
it, make him suffer (if P would believe that X, this would produce an 
experience in him that he would desire not to have). But all the same, P 
happens to prefer painful knowing to pleasant not-knowing (or "blissful 
ignorance"). In a case like this, it would be better for P to find out 
about X than to remain in an ignorant state, even if h e, "experientially 
speaking", would prefer the latter state. 
This point can also be formulated in a more general way: If we can 
appeal to preferences within the domain of experience, why can't we 
appeal to preferences "all the way"? If our preferences do (in fact) 
matter in this context, what reason is there for disregarding the fact 
that "we do seem to desire things other than states of mind, even in­
dependently of t he states of mind that they produce" (cf. Griffin (1986), 
p 9), and what reason is there for accepting the idea that "when, with 
eyes open, I prefer something not a mental state to a mental state and 
so seem to value the former more than the latter", it is in fact better for 
me to have what I value less (cf. ibid., p 10)? In short, it seems that the 
experience requirement is quite arbitrary within the framework of the 
desire-fulfilment theory. 
Is death an evil for the person who dies? 
The next argument against the hedonistic theory is based on two 
assumptions, viz. (i) the idea that death can be an evil for the person 
who dies, and (ii) the idea that a theory of prudential value cannot be 
plausible unless it is compatible with (i), and unless it can explain (i). The 
main thing that the argument purports to show is that hedonism is in­
compatible with the idea that death can be an evil for the person who 
dies, i.e. if (i) and (ii) are plausible assumptions, then hedonism must be 
regarded as an implausible theory19. However, it also purports to show 
that there is at least one theory of prudential value that is compatible 
with (i), and that can explain (i), viz. the object interpretation of the 
desire theory. (The reason why this is necessary is this: If no theory of 
prudential value were compatible with (i), (ii) would be a strange 
condition). 
Let us first try to show that if hedonism is correct, then a person's 
19Hedonism qua conception of nonderivative value-for, that is. Hedonism qua 
theory of final value-period is certainly compatible with the idea that it is bad-
period that a person dies! 
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death can not really be regarded as bad for this person. 
On the hedonistic theory, the only facts that can have nonderivative 
value for a person P are facts of the type "P has an experience E". If w e 
combine this idea with the idea that the subject for which a particular 
situation is good or bad is always a-person-at-a-time, and that we 
should always think of value-for-P as value-for-P-at-f or value-for-P-at-
any-t (but never as value-for-P-over-time), we get the following idea: 
The only facts that can have nonderivative value for P-aM are facts of 
the type "P has an experience E at t". This idea is an instance of a more 
general idea, viz. the idea that a situation can not have nonderivative 
value for P-at-f unless it occurs at t (cf. appendix C). 
The hedonistic conception of deriva tive value-for can be characterized 
as follows: A situation is derivatively good for a person if it gives a 
causal contribution to him having certain pleasant experiences in the 
future, or if it makes certain future pleasures possible, or if it makes 
certain future sufferings impossible or improbable, or the like. A situ­
ation is derivatively bad for a person if it gives a causal contribution to 
future sufferings, or if it makes certain future sufferings possible, or if it 
makes certain future pleasures impossible or improbable, or the like. 
This means that if a certain situation has derivative value vis-a-vis a 
certain nonderivatively valuable situation, then the derivatively valuable 
situation can not occur after the nonderivatively valuable situation. 
Let us now assume (as Epicurus and Lucretius did) that death is real, 
i.e. that death is annihilation. This means that a person's death is not an 
experience, and it can therefore (on the hedonistic theory) not be non­
derivatively bad for this person. So, can death be derivatively bad for 
the person who dies? Well, a person's death can not be experienced by 
himself, and it can not cause any experiences in him, and it can 
(therefore) not be derivatively bad for him in any of these two ways. 
Does this show that a hedonist must accept the Epicurean idea that a 
person's death is not an evil for this person20? Maybe not. Maybe the 
idea that death is an evil for the person who dies is compatible with 
hedonism after all, viz. for the following reason: "It is bad for most of 
us that we are going to die because our deaths will deprive us of al l the 
future pleasures we would have if we would not die. And for most 
20It is (of course) assumed here that if X is bad for P, then it is either 
nonderivatively bad for P or derivatively bad for P. Can this assumption be 
questioned? 
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dead people, it was bad for them that they died, because if they had 
not died, they would have continued to have pleasant experiences". 
This idea is based on a total misunderstanding of what annihilation 
means, however. A person's life is not a piece of property which 
belongs to him (it is not something that he can lose in any literal sense). 
Neither is it a state that he can either be in or not be in. To lose one's 
life is to stop existing, and it is therefore inaccurate to conceive of a 
person's death as a loss for him; to "lose one's life" is to disappear, and 
when a person dies, there is no longer anyone there who can meaning­
fully be said to have lost a life. The same kind of re asoning can be app­
lied to the issue of d eprivation of future experiences: To die is not to be 
deprived of future experiences, because there is no one there anymore 
who can be regarded as deprived. To die is not like losing one's 
fortune or one's position; in the latter cases the person continues to 
exist, i.e. there is someone around which can be identified as the 
deprived one. 
Or alternatively put, there is no time t such that P's death is bad for 
P-at-f. A future event can not be bad (nonderivatively or derivatively) 
for P-now; P's death cannot be bad for P-when-it-occurs (since it is 
neither an experience nor an experienced event); and P's death can not 
be bad for P-after-death, because if death is annihilation, there is no 
such thing as P-after-death. In short, Epicurus was right; if one assumes 
that hedonism is correct, and that death is annihilation, then it follows 
that death can not be an evil for the person who dies. So if you think 
that your own death is (or will be) an evil (for you), you cannot be a 
Hedonist. 
However, the desire theory is compatible with the idea that a 
person's death can be an evil for this person, and it can also explain this 
idea. The reason why it is bad for most of u s have a very strong intrin­
sic aversion against dying. We do not want to die, period. 
Is this a good argument? I think not, and the main reason for this is 
that (ii) is a faulty premise. On my view, there is no plausible theory of 
value-for that can explain the alleged fact that death can be an evil for 
the person who dies (which of course does not prevent an objective list 
theorist from simply claiming that it is nonderivatively bad for us to 
die21). For example, a desire theory can only be consistent with the idea 
21There is of course also the possibility that P's death is not really an evil for P 
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that it is bad for a person to die if i t assumes that it can be good for a 
person to have his prospective desires fulfilled, but this is not a plausible 
assumption (I will try to show this in section 4.3). A "synchronistic" 
desire theory can explain why it is good for a person to continue 
living22, however, but so can the hedonist, i.e. there is really no diffe­
rence between the theories in this particular respect. 
Arguments that purport to show that pleasure is not all that 
matters 
Can pleasant sensation ever be sufficient to make a life good? 
Nagei's contented infant 
The first argument is not an attempt to show directly that pleasure is 
not he only thing that matters; what it purports to show is rather that 
pleasant sensation is not sufficient to make a human life good. 
The pure hedonist claims that the value that a certain life has for the 
person who is living it is a function of how much pleasure and suffering 
it contains. The more pleasure and the less suffering a life contains, the 
better this life is for the person who is living it, period. Here, it does not 
matter at all to what category a person's pleasures belong, e.g., 
whether they are sensations or emotions; all that matters is how plea­
sant these pleasures are. This means that if a person has a lot of plea­
sant sensations (and if he does not suffer too much), this is (on pure 
hedonism) sufficient to make his life good, no matter what other fea­
tures this life has. On this view, a life that is totally devoid of emotional 
content might well be good for the person who lives it, and so might an 
extremely fragmentary life (a life that consists in a sequence of discon­
nected pleasant sensations). The theory also implies that "the life of a 
pig" might well be better for a person than "the life of a human being", 
i.e. that it does not really matter (from an evaluative point of view) 
whether a life is "recognizably human" or not. These implications are 
(according to the argument) not acceptable, however, and pure hedo­
nism therefore has to be rejected. 
after all, i.e. (i) may well be a faulty premise too! Cf. appendix C. 
22Notice that the idea that it is good for a person to continue living (i.e. not to die) 
does not imply that it is bad for a person to die, or that it is better for a person to 
continue living than to die. However, it strongly suggests that it is bad-period that 
someone dies, and that it is better-period that a person continues living than that 
he dies. 
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Let us now look at a "more detailed" version of this argument. The 
argument is based on an example given by Nagel (1970): 
Suppose an intelligent person receives a brain injury that reduces him 
to the mental condition of a contented infant, and that such desires as 
remain to him can be satisfied by a custodian, so that he is free from 
care. Such a development would be widely regarded as a severe 
misfortune, not only for his friends and relations, or for society, but 
also, and primarily, for the person himself (p 5)23. 
The pure hedonist would not necessarily regard the injury as a "mis­
fortune for the person himself", however. That is, on his view, it is not 
necessarily bad for a person to be "reduced to the mental condition of a 
contented infant"; it all depends on whether there happens to be more 
pleasure in his life after the injury or not. This is what a pure hedonist 
might say: 
If we did not pity him then [when he was three months old], why 
pity him now; in any case, who is there to pity? The intelligent adult 
has disappeared, and for a creature like the one before us, happiness 
consists in a full stomach and a dry diaper (ibid., p 6). 
This is not an acceptable view, however, and pure hedonism should 
therefore be rejected. But again, if there is a tough-minded hedonist 
who accepts this implication, there is really nothing we can do to con­
vince him24. 
23He then adds that it is the intelligent adult who has been reduced to the condition 
of a contented infant, and not the "contented infant", who should be regarded as 
the subject of the misfortune (ibid., pp 5-6). Now, if w e share this intuition, the 
argument really belongs in the same category as the "death-is-an-evil-for-the-
person-who-dies"-argument above. So, let us therefore (for the sake of argument) 
assume that the "contented infant" and the intelligent adult are the same person, 
and that it is this person's well-being who is affected (for better or worse) as a 
result of the injury. 
24Before we move on to the next argument, it should be noticed that Mill's (1863) 
idea that "[i]t is better [for a human being, that is] to be a human being dissatisfied 
than a pig satisfied; better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied" (ch. II, 
p 9) can also be regarded as a version of this argument, but only if it can be 
assumed that a pig's (etc.) level of satisfaction is dependent on one thing only, viz. 
on what how much pleasant sensation there is in his life. We will return to Mill's 
argument below. 
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Let us now look at a number of arguments which purport to show that 
experience is not all that matters, or more specifically, that the value of a 
life (for the person who is living it) does not just depend on what its 
experiential content is like, i.e. on how much pleasure and suffering this 
life contains. This is not all that these arguments purport to show, how­
ever; some of them can also be viewed as arguments for the stronger 
thesis that a person's well-being can be affected by things he does not 
know anything about (cf. pp 126-128 above), or for the idea that it is 
better for a person to have pleasures that are based on true beliefs than 
to have pleasures that are based on false (or illusory) beliefs (cf. (RW2) 
on p 147 below). 
It is worth noting that all these arguments appeal to the fact that 
hedonism is incompatible with our "ordinary notion of well-being", that 
we (most of us) regard other things besides pleasure as nonderivatively 
valuable, that we often take pleasure in something because we regard it 
as nonderivatively valuable (rather than the other way around), and so 
on. Or alternatively put, the arguments are (so to speak) based on the 
idea that it is proper to adopt an immanent perspective in this context, 
and the hedonist is accused of disregarding our own perspectives25. 
This does not mean that the arguments are based on the assumption 
that the desire theory is correct, however. An appeal is made to the 
fact that most of us are (in fact) not hedonists, and the reason for this is 
that it is assumed that there is an intimate connection between what we 
regard as good and bad for us and what is (in fact) good and bad for 
us. Now, it is true that this assumption is compatible with the desire 
theory, but it is also compatible with the objective list theory. What 
these two theories disagree upon is not whether there is an intimate 
connection or not between our evaluations and what is (in fact) valu­
able, but on the nature of this connection. On the object interpretation 
of the desire theory, the connection is conceptual, and the hedonist is 
wrong because he disregards what we want and do not want, period. 
The non-internalist pluralist, on the other hand, has a different idea 
about why our actual evaluations should not be disregarded. On his 
view, there are things which are good and bad for us regardless of 
what our desires and aversions are, and he therefore conceives of the 
25Besides hedonism, there is another theory that also tends to adopt a 
"transcendent perspective", viz. the satisfaction interpretation of the desire theory. 
Cf. Rabinowicz and Österberg (1996), pp 12-13. Cf. also section 5.3 below. 
134 
connection between evaluations and facts of value as contingent; the 
reason why our evaluations are often correct is that we (most of us, or 
some of us) have an ability to recognize (or discover) what is, in fact, 
nonderivatively good and bad for us. On this view, the hedonist's mis­
take consists in not recognizing that "we" are often right about what is 
good and bad for us. However, it should be noted that the arguments 
that are to follow are not just compatible with the objective list theory; 
some of them (e.g., the first three) also appeal directly to what they 
take to be "objective prudential values". Let us now look at the argu­
ments themselves: 
Griffin's argumenf 
This is how Griffin (1986) criticizes the hedonistic theory. It is mainly 
directed against the pure version, but if i t is successful, it also hits all 
modified versions. 
It [the Experience Requirement] seems in the end simply too drastic. 
It bans things that our ordinary notion of well-being cannot, without 
damage, do without. It is common that, as many persons' values 
mature, such things as accomplishment and close authentic personal 
relationships come more and more to fill the centre of their lives. If 
the Experience Requirement excludes these values from 'utility' [i.e. if 
it tells us that these things are not nonderivatively good for us], then 
'utility' will have less and less to do with what these persons see as 
making their own lives good. And those values do seem excluded. 
Suppose that someone is duped into thinking that those close to him 
are behaving authentically. What enters experience is the same 
whether he has the real thing or a successful deceit. But it is only the 
real thing, he thinks, that makes his life better. According to the 
enjoyment account [hedonism], what affects well-being can only be 
what enters experience, and the trouble is that some of the things 
that persons value greatly do not. My truly having close and authen­
tic personal relations is not the kind of th ing that can enter my expe­
rience; all that can enter is what is common to both my truly having 
such relations and my merely believing that I do. And this seems to 
distort the nature of t hese values. If I w ant to accomplish something 
with my life, it is not that I want to have a sense of accomplishment. 
This is also desirable, but it is different from, and less important than, 
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the first desire. I... I If either I could accomplish something with my 
life but not know it, or believe that I had but not really have, I should 
prefer the first. That would be, for me, the more valuable life (p 19)26. 
Is this a good argument? Yes, it is. 
Rachels' argument 
This is Rachels' (1986) story about Wonmug, followed by his own 
comments: 
Wonmug was a somewhat stupid but very vain college student 
interested in physics. The other students would amuse themselves by 
making fun of him; but to his face they pretended to have great 
respect for his intellect. As a result, Wonmug came to believe himself 
to be their intellectual leader. The others thought this very funny. 
/.../ Gradually, the entire scientific establishment came to parti­
cipate in the charade. /.../ Finally, he was awarded the Nobel Prize. 
As Wonmug delivered his pompous acceptance speech, the woman he 
loved, but who ridiculed him behind his back, sat beside him beaming 
with false pride, and the members of the Swedish Academy could 
barely keep from laughing. When Wonmug died he sincerely believed 
himself to have been the greatest and most beloved figure in science 
since Einstein. 
/.../ Was Wonmug a fortunate individual, or an unfortunate one? 
Did he have a good life, or not? In an obvious way he was very for­
tunate. He received honours that most of us can only dream about. 
But of course there was something radically wrong. Although he 
thought he achieved great things in science, he really achieved 
nothing. Although he thought he had many friends, he really had no 
friends. But what is wrong with that? Hedonism says that all the 
things we value - knowledge, achievement, the love and respect of 
other people - are good only in that they cause pleasant states of 
consciousness. It is only the states of consciousness that are good 'in 
themselves'. Wonmug, in fact, had all the states of consciousness 
26To see why there is (most probably) an appeal to objective values here, imagine 
a person who evaluates (in a positive way) degradation and irrational behaviour 
rather than achievement and friendship. Would Griffin consider it to be better for 
this person to be "authentically degraded" than to just have a "sense of 
degradation"? I think not. 
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associated with achievement, respect, and the rest. So according to 
hedonism he had everything good associated with these things. His 
life was just as good as Einstein's, and maybe even better. 
/.../ [Wonmug] is happy only because he is ignorant of what is 
going on. And if he were to discover what is really happening, he 
would /.../ come to see himself /.../ [as a pathetic figure], and his 
happiness would be shattered. But why would his happiness be 
diminished? The answer is that what he values (and what we value 
too) is such things as achievement and friendship. It is because he 
values these things, and because he thinks he has them, that he is 
happy. /.../ 
This is I... I the 'logical mistake'. In saying that achievement and 
friendship are good because they make us happy, hedonism gets 
things the wrong way round. They are not good because they make 
us happy. Rather, having them (and other things like them) makes us 
happy because we recognize them as goods27. To explain their value, 
then, we have to look elsewhere than to the conscious states that 
accompany them (pp 46-48). 
This is also a good argument. 
Nozick's "Experience Machine" 
Nozick (1974) and (1989) asks us to imagine an experience machine that 
could give us any experience that we desired. Being plugged into the 
machine, one would all the time be floating in a tank, with electrodes 
attached to one's brain, and the machine would stimulate the brain in 
any way pre-programmed. While in the tank, one would not know that 
one is there; one would think that it is all actually happening. Nozick 
now asks us (rhetorically) whether we would plug into this machine for 
life. Well, for most of us, the answer is "no", and the reason for this is 
(of course) that "something matters to us in addition to experience" 
(Nozick (1974), p 44), or alternatively, that we "care about things in 
addition to how our lives feel to us from the inside" (Nozick (1989), p 
104). 
27That is, the reason why friendship makes us happy is (among other things) that 
we value it, but the reason why it is good for us is (on Rachels' view) not that we 
value it. On the contrary, the fact that it is objectively good for us to have friends 
might explain why we value it. That is, Rachels' argument does not appeal to our 
preferences, but to objective prudential values. 
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So, what is it that matters to us in addition to experience? What is it 
that we want (value, care about, etc.) that the experience machine can 
not give us? This is how Nozick himself answers this question: 
First, we want to do certain things, and not just have the experience 
of doing them. /.../ A second reason for not plugging in is that we 
want to be a certain way, to be a certain sort of person. Someone 
floating in a tank is an indeterminate blob. /.../ Thirdly, plugging into 
an experience machine limits us to a man-made reality, to a world no 
deeper or more important than that which people can construct. 
There is no actual contact with any deeper reality, though the expe­
rience of it can be simulated. Many people desire to leave themselves 
open to such contact and to a plumbing of deeper significance 
(Nozick (1974), p 43). 
What is most disturbing about them [e.g., experience machines] is 
their living of our lives for us. /.../ Perhaps what we desire is to live 
(an active verb) ourselves, in contact with reality. (And this, machines 
cannot do for us) (ibid., pp 44-45). 
We care about more than just how things feel to us from the inside; 
there is more to life than feeling happy. We care about what is actu­
ally the case. We want certain situations we value, prize, and think 
important to actually hold and be so. /.../ We want to be importantly 
connected to reality, not to live in a delusion. /.../ What we want 
and value is an actual connection with reality. /.../ To focus on 
external reality, with your beliefs, evaluations, and emotions, is valu­
able in itself, not just as a means to more pleasure or happiness. /.../ 
We do not, of course, simply want contact with reality; we want con­
tact of certain kinds: exploring reality and responding, altering it and 
creating new actuality ourselves (Nozick (1989), p 106). 
No doubt, too, we want a connection to actuality that we also share 
with other people. One of th e distressing things about the experience 
machine, as described, is that you are alone in your particular illusion 
(ibid., p 107). 
It seems too that once on the machine a person would not make any 
choices, and certainly would not choose anything freely. One portion 
of what we want to be actual is our actually (and freely) choosing, 
not merely the appearance of that (ibid., p 108). 
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Now, if these claims are understood as empirical claims about how 
people actually are, this is not a good argument against hedonism: From 
the empirical fact that we want other things besides pleasant expe­
riences, we can not conclude that it would not be good for us to spend 
our lives in the experience machine. However, there is no reason to 
believe that Nozick's claims should be understood in this way (only). 
They should, rather, be understood as substantive evaluative claims 
about what is good and bad for people. Nozick himself is quite clear 
about this: 
Notice that I am not saying simply that since we desire connection to 
actuality the experience machine is defective because it does not give 
us whatever we desire /.../. Rather, I am saying that the connection 
to actuality is important whether or not we desire it - that is why we 
desire it - and the experience machine is inadequate because it doesn't 
give us that (ibid., pp 106-107). 
That is, the fact that he makes almost all his points in terms of what 
matters to us, what we want, what we care about, what we value, and 
what is important to us, is best regarded as a kind of rhetorical device. 
So, what Nozick claims is that there are a number of "non-experien-
tial" things that are objectively important to us (e.g., to be importantly 
connected to reality), and that the experience machine is inadequate 
because it doesn't give us these things. But how should claims of this 
type be understood? For example, how should we interpret the idea 
that it is objectively important to us to be connected to reality? Well, let 
us first note that he does not necessarily mean that it has final value for 
us to be connected to reality, nor that it is always (not even ceteris 
paribus) nonderivatively better for us to be connected to reality than to 
be "disconnected" from reality. The reason why interpretations of this 
type are not open to us is that his claims are (it seems) consistent with 
modified hedonism, i.e. with Parfit's idea that "what is best for people is 
a composite" (cf. p 109 above). If we take this into account, we can 
understand his claim as follows: It has "contributory value" for a 
person to be connected to reality, i.e. a life cannot be good unless the 
person who is living this life is connected to reality, unless it (the life) is 
lived in actual connection with reality. 
So, if we understand Nozick's argument in this way, is it a good 
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argument against pure hedonism? That is, can it be plausibly assumed 
that a person's well-being is (normally, in most cases) not only a func­
tion of how his life feels to him from the inside, e.g., that it is also 
directly dependent on whether he is connected to reality or not, and 
whether he lives his life autonomously or not? I think it can, but it is not 
easy not provide any strong arguments for this view (and as far as I 
can see, Nozick does not even try)28. 
A short note on Mill's Pig 
It should not surprise us that Nozick's argument is consistent with 
modified hedonism. After all, his argument is (structurally speaking) 
almost identical with an argument that Mill (himself a modified hedonist) 
gives against pure hedonism, viz. the following one: Most of us would 
not consent "to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise 
of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures", or "to be a fool", or "an 
ignoramus", or "selfish and base", even if we would be "persuaded 
that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot" 
than we are with ours (Mill (1863), ch. II, p 8). In short, "[i]t is better to 
be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be a 
Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied" (ibid., p 9)29. 
Now, this argument must (obviously) be regarded as an argument 
against (H6), the idea that the value that a life has for the person who is 
living it is a function of one thing only, viz. how much pleasure and 
suffering it contains. What the argument shows us (if successful) is that 
a life which contains nothing but lower pleasures cannot be a good life 
(or more specifically, a good human life) for the person who is living it, 
or alternatively, that a human life is not a good human life unless it also 
contains higher pleasures, e.g., pleasures stemming from successful use 
of our "higher", characteristically human, capacities (cf. Tranoy (1973)). 
As far as I can see, this is really all that Mill purports (and manages) to 
show: "A life full of l ower pleasures but devoid of higher pleasures is 
not good enough, and you should (for this reason) not always choose 
the lower of two pleasures". That is, he does not give us any reason to 
believe that a life full of h igher pleasures but devoid of lower pleasures 
28There has been attempts to justify different versions of th e objective list theory, 
however. We will return to this issue in chapter 7. 
29There is one difference between the two arguments, however: Both Socrates 
and the fool are (presumably) in contact with reality. 
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(assuming that such a life is possible) would be a good life, and he does 
not give us any reason to accept the view that Smart (1973) attributes 
to him, viz. when he writes that "Mill would wish to say that the plea­
sures of t he philosopher were more valuable intrinsically than those of 
the dog, however intense these last might be" (p 17)30. 
Now, it is important to note that if Mill's argument is valid, it also hits 
(H5), the idea that the value of an experience for the person who has it 
is proportional to how pleasant or unpleasant it is. But it is far from 
obvious with what Mill would replace this claim, e.g., as I see it, it is far 
from certain that Mill's view implies that if two pleasures are equally 
pleasant, and if one is higher while the other is lower, then it is always 
(under all conditions) better for a person to have the higher pleasure. 
(That is, I don't think that Mill's view forces him to accept (c) on p 33). 
In any case, Mill's primary claim is a claim about the good life, and we 
should be careful when we try to draw conclusions about the value-for 
of particular experiences from such "holistic" claims. 
HAPPY 
Think of some "non-experiential" kind of situation that you strongly 
want (intrinsically) to be a "part of your life". It may be to be with a 
loved person, to have an intimate and reciprocal relationship, to engage 
in some creative activity, to act morally, to develop as a person, to 
achieve something important, or the like. For simplicity's sake, call this 
intrinsically desired situation X. 
Now, imagine that you accept the hedonistic theory. You then believe 
that X can only be good for you in the instrumental sense (this is so, 
even if you happen to desire it intrinsically). X is good for you because 
it contributes to your happiness, e.g., because you take pleasure in it. 
Now, ask yourself: If X would no longer make you happy, would you 
stop regarding it as good for you? If the answer is "yes", this gives 
some support to the hedonistic theory, but this support is far from 
conclusive. You must also ask yourself whether it would make your life 
better if you would give up X for some small increase in happiness31. Let 
us assume that you are now reasonably happy, partly because X is the 
case. Now, imagine that you would be offered (for free) a harmless 
30Personally, I don't think Mill held this view, i.e. I think he would accept (e) on pp 
33-34 above. 
31Cf. pro-argument (3) on p 110! 
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drug called HAPPY. If you take HAPPY, you will be happier than you 
are now, but you will also lose interest in X. X will not concern you 
anymore, you will simply stop wanting that X obtains, and this is also 
the reason why you will become happier. Would you be better off if 
you take HAPPY than if you don't? 
The same story can be repeated for "non-experiential" things that 
you think are bad for you. This could be being totally deceived, being 
enslaved, being totally passive or utterly lonely. Call this bad thing Y. 
Here, taking HAPPY will change your attitude toward Y in a special 
way. It will make you start liking Y, and as a result of this, you will 
become happier than you would otherwise have been. In this case, 
would you be better off if y ou take HAPPY? 
If y ou say no to HAPPY32, you are not really a hedonist: the expe­
riential dimension is not the only dimension you really care about. Most 
of us want more than to be happy, we also want to be happy "for the 
right reason" or "on the right grounds". We want, I think, certain 
kinds of wholes, where happiness is only one (let alone essential) com­
ponent. And the reason why we want this is that we have realized that 
pure hedonism is an implausible theory. 
We have now looked at all the arguments in the second group, and it 
is now time to turn to the third group of arguments, viz. the arguments 
that are specifically directed against (H3), the thesis of unrestrictedness, 
and/or (H4)-(H5). 
Arguments against pure hedonism that are, at the same 
time, arguments for some modified version of the 
hedonistic theory: The criticism of pleasures 
There are two kinds of a rguments in this group. Arguments of the first 
kind are directed against (H3), the thesis of Unrestrictedness, i.e. they 
purport to show that (RH3) is plausible, that we should accept the idea 
that there are pleasant experiences that are not nonderivatively good 
for the experiencing subject, and that there might even be pleasures 
which are bad for the subject. (As far as I know, there has been no 
attempts to show that there are unpleasant experiences that are not 
32Qua self-interested, that is; it is of course possible to say no to HAPPY for other 
(e.g., moral) reasons; just as it is possible to refuse to plug into the experience 
machine for moral reasons. 
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nonderivatively bad for the suffering subject). More specifically, all 
arguments of this kind can be viewed as attempts to establish that some 
restriction claim is plausible, i.e. that there is good reason to accept at 
least some claim of the form "If a pleasant experience has the 'non-
hedonic' feature F (e.g., if it is irrational), then it is not nonderivatively 
good for the subject to have it, in spite of its pleasantness". 
Arguments of the second kind are directed against (H4)-(H5), i.e. 
they purport to show that (MH4) is correct, that we should accept the 
idea that the nonderivative value-for of an experience is not just de­
pendent on how pleasant or unpleasant this experience is, but also on 
what other features it has. More specifically, all arguments of this 
second kind can be viewed as attempts to demonstrate that there is 
good reason to accept some claim concerning relative weights. If we have 
pleasures in mind, such claims are of the following form: "If the pleasant 
experience El has the non-hedonic feature Fl, and if t he pleasant expe­
rience E2 has the non-hedonic feature F2, then it may be nonderivati­
vely better for the subject to have El, even if E2 is more pleasant than 
El. And if El and E2 are equally pleasant, it is better to have El than to 
have E2. (And the reason for this is that El has Fl while E2 has F2)"33. 
Now, the number of possible restriction claims is considerable, and so 
is the number of possible claims about relative weights, and it would 
take up too much space to go through them all. So what I will do is this: 
I will restrict my attention to a few claims of each kind, viz. the claims 
that I myself find most intuitively plausible. I will then ask whether 
these claims are justified, i.e. whether there are good reasons for 
accepting them34. 
In what follows, I will mainly be concerned with pleasant emotions, i.e. 
with pleasures which have intentional objects, or alternatively, with 
33Similar claims can (of cou rse) be made for sufferings, and it is not impossible 
that some claims of this type are plausible. In this context, I will ignore the case of 
displeasure, however, in part because unpleasantness seems to have a more 
dominant standing among the bad-making features (of experiences) than 
pleasantness has among the good-making features. 
34So, is it really sufficient for our purposes to restrict our attention to a few 
claims? Well, if the purpose is to refute pure hedonism, it is: after all, all we need 
in order to achieve this purpose is to establish that there is at least one valid 
restriction claim or claim concerning relative weights. But if the purpose is to find 
the best theory of prudential value, it might not be sufficient: Or more specifically, 
if som e form of mo dified hedonism is the best theory, it is not sufficient to keep 
things this short. 
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pleasures which cari be described as taking pleasure in something. In this 
context, there are a few things that need to be pointed out, viz.: 
(i) The object that we take pleasure in when we take pleasure in 
something is not necessarily real. Roughly speaking, we do not take 
pleasure in how things actually are (e.g., in what is actually the case), 
but in how they appear to us (e.g., in what appears to be the case). 
(ii) The objects of our pleasant emotions are often situations, or more 
precisely (but still roughly), what we believe is (or was, or will be) the 
case. These situations can be real or imagined, and they can be past, 
present, or future. 
(iii) A type of "taking pleasure in" that is of particular interest in this 
context is "taking pleasure in doing something"35. It is therefore fruitful 
to make a distinction between those of a person's pleasant emotions 
that are "directed at" his own activity and those of h is emotions which 
have other objects. 
The restriction claims that are (on my view) most worth considering 
are: 
(Rl) If a pleasant experience is associated with some morally unaccep­
table act or activity (on the part of the experiencing subject), then it is 
not nonderivatively good for this subject to have the experience; it 
may even be bad for him. Examples of such immoral activities 
(activities that it is, on this type of view, not good for a person to 
take pleasure in) are: The intentional infliction of pain or mental 
suffering on another sentient being, at least when this is done in 
order to feel pleasure or sexual gratification (and not, e.g., in order 
to get revenge), i.e. pure sadistic activity; actions which are mani­
festations of some moral vice (like greed); and actions that are 
motivated by pure malice36. 
35This is one way in which a pleasure can be associated with an activity; the other 
is that engaging in a certain activity can give rise to pleasure (or more precisely: 
that P's experience of engaging in an activity can cause that P feels pleasure). 
36The idea that the value that a pleasant experience has for the experiencing 
subject is dependent on the moral sta tus of the activity with which it is associated 
can be regarded as a version of a more general idea, viz. the Aristotelian idea that 
the nonderivative value-for of a pleasant experience is (at least in part) a function 
of the value of the activity to which it attaches (the activity which it "completes"). 
According to Annas (1980), this is "Aristotle's main thesis about pleasure and 
goodness: pleasures vary in goodness with the activities that give rise to them" (p 
292). If we combine this idea with the idea that an activity is good if and only if it is 
excellent (or "virtuous"), i.e. if it is a manifestation of some excellent trait of 
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CR2) If th e object of a pleasant emotion is an "objectively unpleasant" 
situation37, then it is not nonderivatively good for the subject to have 
the emotion; it may even be bad for him to have it, in spite of its plea­
santness. Examples of such "objectively unpleasant" situations 
(situations that might, on this type of view, not be worth taking plea­
sure in) are: The fact that someone else suffers, e.g., as a result of 
being tortured or humiliated by a third party; or the fact that the 
experiencing subject himself is humiliated, deceived, dominated, or 
degraded. That is, neither sadistic nor masochistic pleasure are (on 
this view) regarded as good for a person38. 
If s omeone doubts that it makes sense to say about a certain situation 
(e.g., an activity) that it is objectively unpleasant, i.e. that it is not worth 
taking pleasure in it, even though most people would (in fact) take plea­
sure in it, it might be helpful, as a comparison, to look at fear and 
danger: If a person P is afraid of something X, then X appears to P as 
dangerous, i.e. X is subjectively, or apparently, dangerous. It may not 
be objectively dangerous, however; it is a well-known fact that we are 
sometimes afraid of things that are not really dangerous, and that we 
are not always afraid of t hings that are really dangerous. That is, as far 
as the dangerous is concerned, the distinction between the objective 
and the subjective makes perfectly good sense. So why would it not 
make sense to distinguish between the subjectively pleasant and the 
objectively pleasant? On my view, it seems that just as there are things 
or situations which it is appropriate to be afraid of (i.e. objective 
dangers), there may be activities or situations which are "not worth 
taking pleasure in", or even "worth taking displeasure in", i.e. things 
character (like courage, truthfulness, or justice), and that an activity is bad if a nd 
only if i t is a manifestation of some fault (or flaw) of character (like cowardice, 
self-indulgence, or undue humility), we can at least "deduce" the following claim 
concerning relative weights: "If a pleasant experience El is associated with an 
excellent activity, and if another pleasant experience E2 corresponds to a flawed 
(or defect) activity, then El is ceteris paribus the better pleasure". 
37The situations I have in mind here do not include the subject's own actions, i.e. 
facts of the type "the subject performs a certain action, or engages in a certain 
activity" are excluded. 
38Is it as plausible to claim that the negative value of an unpleasant experience can 
be a function of i ts "moral status"? For example, is it nonderivatively worse for a 
person to be unhappy because someone else is happy than to be unhappy 
because someone else is unhappy? 
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which are objectively unpleasant. 
So, are (Rl) and (R2) justif ied claims, and if they are, how can they be 
justified? Notice that the question is not whether it is nonderivatively 
good -period that someone gets a kick out of engaging in sadistic activity, 
but whether it is not-good (e.g., bad) for the sadist to take pleasure in 
harming someone else, and if so, why. Assuming that there is such a 
thing as the objectively unpleasant, why should we attach any impor­
tance to it in this context? Harming another sentient being may well be 
objectively unpleasant, but the sadist does (after all) take pleasure in 
what he is doing, and isn't this what is of re levance here? 
So, on what grounds can one reasonably claim that it is not good for 
a person to feel sadistic or masochistic pleasure? Well, apart from 
appealing directly to people's "local" intuitions, there are (as I see it) 
only two things we can do here, viz. (i) we can appeal to people's intu­
ition about the good life (like the counter-arguments of the second type 
did), or (ii) we can appeal to some conception of the well-functioning 
person, i.e. we can claim that sadists and masochists are "abnormal" 
("sick", or "crazy") people, and that their pleasures are "abnormal" 
pleasures. 
The first claim concerning relative weights that is (on my view) worth 
considering is this: 
(RW1) If the pleasant emotion El is appropriate, and if the pleasant 
emotion E2 is inappropriate, then it may be nonderivatively better for 
the subject to have El, even if E2 is more pleasant than El. And if 
two emotions are equally pleasant, then it is better to have the 
emotion that is more appropriate. 
So, what does the appropriateness (inappropriateness) of an emotion 
consist in? If w e accept Nozick's (1989) idea that an emotion consists of 
a belief, an evaluation, and a bodily feeling (cf. note 12 on p 77 above), 
we can say (still following Nozick) that 
[a]n emotion can be defective or inappropriate in three ways: the 
belief can be false; the evaluation can be false or wrong; or the feeling 
can be disproportionate to the evaluation. /.../ 
Let us say that an emotion fits when it has the /.../ threefold 
structure of belief, evaluation, and feeling, and moreover when the 
belief is true, the evaluation is correct [informed, unbiased, supported 
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by reasons, justified, or whatever], and the feeling is proportionate 
to the evaluation (p 89). 
On this view, the notions of appropriateness and inappropriateness are 
both "three-dimensional". An emotion is appropriate in the "belief-
dimension" if i ts constituent beliefs are true, and inappropriate if t hey 
are false; it is appropriate in the "evaluative dimension" if its constituent 
evaluation is correct (justified, etc.), and inappropriate if it is wrong 
(etc.); and it is appropriate in the third dimension if its constituent 
feeling is "proportionate to its constituent evaluation", and inappro­
priate if the feeling is "disproportionate to the evaluation". 
This suggests that (RW1) can be broken down into the three claims 
(assuming that all three dimensions are of relevance, that is); (RW2), 
(RW3), and (RW4). 
(RW2) If the pleasant emotion El is based on a true belief, and if t he 
pleasant emotion E2 is based on a false belief, then it may be intrin­
sically better for the subject to have El, even if E2 is more pleasant 
than El (and so on). For example, it is ceteris paribus better for a 
person to take pleasure in what is actually the case than to take 
pleasure in something that is not the case. 
(RW3) If the pleasant emotion El is based on a correct (justified) 
evaluation, and if the pleasant emotion E2 is based on an incorrect 
(unjustified) evaluation, then it may be nonderivatively better for the 
subject to have El, even if E2 is more pleasant than El. Or alter­
natively (if we assume that the evaluation "X is good in way W" is 
correct if and only if X is (in fact) good in this way): It is ceteris paribus 
better for a person to take pleasure in a valuable object than to take 
pleasure in something that is not valuable39. 
39Note that this claim is not identical with the claim that if a pleasant emotion El 
has a more valuable object than another pleasant emotion E2, then it may be 
nonderivatively better for the subject to have El, even if E2 is more pleasant than 
El. Now, this idea is a version of the more general idea that the value of a 
pleasant intentional mental state (e.g., an emotion, a perception, a fantasy, or a 
thought) is a function of how valuable its object is. This idea can also be 
formulated in Aristotelian terms, i.e. in terms of activity. If we do this, we get: "If a 
pleasant experience is associated with an intentional mental activity (e.g., like 
emoting, perceiving, fantasizing, or thinking), then the value of t his experience is 
(in part) a function of the (objective) value of the object of the activity". This view 
was held by Aristotle himself, who believed (i) t hat the value of a pleasure is a 
function of t he value of t he activity with which it is associated, and (ii) that if th e 
147 
As far as I can see, the constituent evaluation of an emotion can be of 
many kinds, e.g., it can be of t he form "X (the object) is beautiful", or of 
the form "X is nonderivatively or derivatively good for me (him, her)", 
or of the form "X has final or instrumental value-period". That is, the 
idea is that if a person takes pleasure in something because it appears to 
him as beautiful, it is ceteris paribus better for him if the object of his plea­
sant emotion is in fact beautiful rather than ugly (assuming that beauty 
and ugliness are not in the eye of the beholder), and if a person takes 
pleasure in something because it appears to him as good-for-him, it is 
ceteris paribus better for him if the object of his pleasant emotion is in fact 
good-for-him rather than bad-for-him. 
(RW4) If El is a pleasant emotion whose constituent feeling is more 
proportionate to its constituent evaluation, and if E2 is a pleasant 
emotion whose constituent feeling is less proportionate to its consti­
tuent evaluation, then it may be nonderivatively better for the subject 
to have El, even if E 2 is more pleasant than El. And if two emotions 
are equally pleasant, then it is ceteris paribus better to have the 
emotion whose constituent feeling is more proportionate to its consti-
activity with which a pleasure is associated is a mental activity with an intentional 
object, e.g. an activity of one of t he different senses, then the value of the activity 
is a function of two things, viz. the value of the object and the value of the 
"organ". This is Aristotle's own formulation of (ii) (in NE, book X, chapter 4): "Since 
every sense is active in relation to its object, and a sense which is in good 
condition acts perfectly in relation to the most beautiful of its objects /.../, it 
follows that in the case of each sense the best activity is that of the best-
conditioned organ in relation to the finest of its objects. And this activity will be 
the most complete and pleasant. For, while there is pleasure in respect of any 
sense, and in respect of thought and contemplation no less, the most complete is 
pleasant, and that of a well-conditioned organ in relation to the worthiest of its 
objects is the most complete; and the pleasure completes the activity (p 256). For 
example, if a person takes pleasure in thinking about something, the value of this 
pleasure is a function of (a) how good a thinker he is, and (b) how valuable the 
object of his thought is, e.g., it is (on Aristotle's view) better to take pleasure in 
thinking about eternal things than in thinking about human affairs: "there are 
other things much more divine in their nature even than man, e.g. most 
conspicuously, the bodies of which the heavens are framed" (NE, book VI, chapter 
7). And if someone takes pleasure in looking at something, the value of this 
pleasure is a function of (a) how well he can see (how "well-conditioned" his "eyes" 
are), and (b) how beautiful the object is. That is, if "the eye of the beholder" 
remains the same, it is better for him to take pleasure in looking at something 
objectively beautiful than to take pleasure in looking at something objectively 
ugly. 
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tuent evaluation. 
So, what is it for a feeling to be proportionate (disproportionate) to an 
evaluation? This is an example, given by Nozick (1989), of dispro­
portion: 
Suppose, walking along the street, I find a dollar bill and feel ecstatic. 
You ask whether I think it indicates this is my lucky day or that my 
fortunes have changed or that I am beloved by the gods, but no, it is 
none of these things. I simply am ecstatic. But finding a dollar bill isn't 
that wonderful a thing; the strength and the intensity of the feeling 
should bear some proportionate relationship to the evaluation of how 
good a thing finding a dollar is - to the measure of the evaluation (p 
89)40. 
Here, it is important to keep in mind that there is also another way in 
which a feeling can be disproportionate to an evaluation, viz. that it can 
also be "too weak" in relation to the evaluation. An example of this kind 
of d isproportion is when someone (e.g., because of depression or some 
deep-seated inhibition) is unable to take pleasure in the fact that his love 
is reciprocated, or in the fact that he got the job he values the most41. 
The last claim concerning relative weights that we will consider is this: 
(RW5) If the pleasant emotion El is directed at a real (actual, present) 
object, and if the pleasant emotion E2 has an imaginary (unreal) object 
(e.g., if E2 is an anticipatory pleasure), then it may be nonderivatively 
better for the subject to have El, even if E2 is more pleasant than El. 
In order to clarify this idea, let us distinguish between the following 
three types of c ases: 
(a) A person takes pleasure in something that is actually the case 
(right now), e.g., he is satisfied with his job, or he enjoys his holiday 
fully. 
40Where the term "I" seems to refer to a normal adult, and not to a small child. 
41A similar claim could be made for sufferings, viz. that it is ceteris paribus less bad 
to have an unpleasant emotion whose constituent feeling is more proportionate 
to its constituent evaluation. For example, it might be claimed that the reason why 
it is bad for a person to suffer intensely from an ordinary mosquito-bite is not just 
that it is unpleasant, but also that the feeling is disproportionate, or it might be 
claimed that it is not always better for a person to grieve the loss of a loved one 
less, e.g., that it may even be bad for a person if he (because of some deep-seated 
inhibition) is unable to grieve the loss of a loved one. 
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(b) A person takes pleasure in something that is no longer the case, 
e.g., he remembers with pleasure how much fun he had when he was a 
teenager, or when he was in Greece last year. 
(c) A person takes pleasure in an imaginary state, e.g., by day­
dreaming about a perfect relationship or about next Summer (when the 
weather will be perfect and there will be no insects around). Many of 
the pleasures which belong to this category are "anticipatory 
pleasures", i.e. the imaginary situations in which we take pleasures are 
often "future situations". 
Now, the idea is that it is ceteris paribus better for a person to have 
pleasures of type (a) than to have pleasures of t ypes (b) and (c)42. (That 
is, there is an "extensional overlap" between (RW5) and (RW2), but the 
two are not identical). 
So, are (RW2)-(RW5) justified claims? The pure hedonist thinks not, 
and it is likely that he bases his rejection of the claims on the following 
type of argument: "It is true that it is often better for a person to have 
pleasures that are based on true (rather than false) beliefs, or to take 
pleasures in real (rather than imaginary) things, but it is hardly non-
derivatively better for him. The belief that it is is based on a confusion; 
if we think clearly, we will see that the reason why we regard certain 
pleasures as superior to others is really that they are more permanent, 
stable, fecund, or the like"43. 
So, what arguments can be given for (RW2)-(RW5), e.g., what 
reasons are there for believing that it is ceteris paribus nonderivatively 
better for a person to have pleasant emotions whose component beliefs 
are true than to have pleasant emotions whose component beliefs are 
false (and so on)? Well, I don't think it is really possible to come up with 
any arguments that the pure hedonist would accept. What we can do is 
to appeal to different kinds of intuitions, e.g., we can construct concrete 
examples that appeal to our intuitions about particular cases, we can 
construct arguments that appeal to our intuitions about good lives, or 
we can appeal to our intuitions about the well-functioning person (cf. p 
146 above). 
42It is worth noting that there are objects of pleasant emotions which are hard to 
classify as "real" or "imaginary". For example, if someone take pleasure in the fact 
that he has certain abilities and/or opportunities, to which category does this 
pleasure belong? 
43Cf. note 3 on p 108 above. 
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For example, this is how one might argue for (RW2), the idea that it is 
ceteris paribus nonderivatively better for a person if the belief component 
of a pleasant emotion is true than if it is false: Consider (again) Rachel's 
story about Wonmug. Wonmug took pleasure in achieving great things, 
but he really achieved nothing, and he took pleasure in having many 
friends, but he didn't really have any friends. That is, Wonmug's plea­
sures were (primarily in a conceptual sense, but also in a causal sense) 
based on a number of f alse beliefs, e.g., the false belief that he was (in 
fact) achieving great things, and the false belief that he had many good 
friends. Now, Wonmug never discovered that his beliefs were false, 
but it would (on my view) still have been better for Wonmug if his 
beliefs were true, i.e. if he had really achieved something and if he 
really had friends. But why would this be better for him? Well, in part 
because it would have been good for him to achieve great things and 
have good friends (either because he desired to have these things, or 
because achievement and friendship are objective prudential values)44, 
but this is not the whole explanation: It is also good for a person to be 
in contact with reality, e.g., to have true beliefs45, and to have such 
contact is a constituent "part" of being a well-functioning person. 
This is how one might argue for (RW4), the idea that it is ceteris 
paribus better for a person to have a pleasant emotion whose consti­
tuent feeling is proportionate to its constituent evaluation than to have 
a pleasant emotion whose constituent feeling is disproportionate to its 
constituent evaluation: Let us stick to Nozick's example, and ask: 
Would it not be better for the person if he felt just as ecstatic about 
44That is, it is not all about having true beliefs, e.g., it is also necessary to take 
(RW3) into account. To see this, consider a person who takes pleasure in 
something bad, like being humiliated, rather than in something good, like having 
many good friends. Now, compare the following possible states: In State 1, the 
person is happy because he believes he has just been humiliated, but his belief is 
false, and in State 2, he is happy for the same reason, but this time, his belief is 
correct, i.e. he is happy because he knows that he has just been humiliated. In this 
case, it might well be better for the person if State 1 holds, i.e. if he has, in fact, not 
been humiliated. But this does not show that it does not matter whether his beliefs 
are true or not; all it shows is that the prudential goodness of having true beliefs 
can sometimes be outweighed by other objective prudential values, e.g., by the 
fact that it is bad for a person to be humiliated. 
45That is, there are two reasons why it might be good for P that his belief that he 
has friends is true: (i) it is good for him to have true beliefs, and (ii) it is good for 
him to have friends (Where (ii) is probably more important from P's own 
(immanent) perspective). 
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something more valuable than finding a dollar, e.g., getting the job he 
had applied for? Of course it would, but this intuition is better explai­
ned by (RW3) than by (RW4), i.e. we seem to need a better test. So, let 
us instead ask: Would it be better for the person who found the dollar 
if he would have been less ecstatic? I think it would, and this belief is 
(again) based on the idea that it is (in general) better for a person to be 
in contact with reality than to be "out of touch" with reality. 
My argument for (RW5) also appeals to the idea that it is (in most 
cases) good for a person to be in contact with reality. But notice that 
(RW5) does not follow from this idea in any straightforward manner; to 
take pleasure in something that is no longer the case is, after all, not to 
be "out of touch" with reality, and the same thing holds for anticipatory 
pleasure; anticipating future events with pleasure is hardly incompatible 
with being in contact with reality. However, what we can say is that a 
person who tends to dwell in the past or the future much more than in 
the present is not really in touch with reality, and if he often takes plea­
sure in what is no longer that case, or in imaginary future situations, but 
never in what is actually the case, then this circumstance detracts from 
the value of his life. 
This ends the section on the arguments against (pure) hedonism. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, there are a number of strong arguments against pure 
hedonism, and this theory should therefore be rejected. The strongest 
of these arguments do not hit modified hedonism, however, and we 
should therefore be reluctant to reject this theory. In fact, it seems that 
this is a theory of prudential value that can easily incorporate two very 
plausible claims, viz. (i) the idea that a theory of well-being (the good 
life) can not be plausible unless it includes a number of n on-hedonistic 
components, and (ii) the idea that a complex situation (a whole) cannot 
have nonderivative value for a person unless it has some pleasant expe­
riential content. One possible version of this "modified hedonistic 
position" has been formulated by Parfit (1984)46: 
What is good for someone is neither just what Hedonist's claim, nor 
just what is claimed by Objective List Theorists. We might believe that 
46Cf. also p 109 above. 
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if w e had either of these, without the other, what we had would have 
little or no value. We might claim, for example, that what is good or 
bad for someone is to have knowledge, to be engaged in rational 
activity, to experience mutual love, and to be aware of beauty, while 
[taking pleasure in] /.../ these things. On this view, each side in this 
disagreement saw only half of the truth. Each put forward as suffi­
cient something that was only necessary. Pleasure with many other 
kinds of object has no value. And, if they are entirely devoid of 
pleasure, there is no value in knowledge, rational activity, love, or the 
awareness of beauty. What is of value, or is good for someone, is to 
have both I... I (p 502). 
This may well be a plausible theory of prudential value, but in order to 
find out whether this is really the case (i.e. in order to find out whether 
(ii) is a plausible claim), we first have to take a closer look at the 
remaining two theories, viz. the desire-fulfilment theory and the 
objective list theory. We will begin with the former. 
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Chapter Four 
A formulation of the Unrestricted 
Desire-Fulfilment Theory 
The discussion of t he desire theory will have the following structure. In 
the present chapter, I will try to give a formulation of the unrestricted 
desire theory that is as precise as possible1. In connection with this, 
several topics will be discussed, e.g., what it is for someone to desire 
something, what it is for a desire to be stronger than another desire, 
what it is to have a desire fulfilled (or satisfied), and what it is for a 
desire to be intrinsic. The central questions in chapter 5 are questions of 
plausibility. By looking at a number of a rguments that can be given for 
and against different versions of the desire theory, I will try to find out 
(i) what version of the theory that is the most plausible theory of 
prudential value, and (ii) whether any version of t he theory is plausible. 
The chapter will start with a critical discussion of the unrestricted desire 
theory, but other (modified) versions of t he desire theory will be intro­
duced as we move along. The reason why I choose this "order of pre­
sentation" (why I do not formulate all the versions first, and discuss 
them later) is that the other versions of the theory are best understood 
as modifications of the unrestricted theory; modifications that have 
been made in order to deal with certain objections that have been 
directed against the unrestricted theory. 
To recapitulate how the satisfaction interpretation of t he unrestricted 
desire theory was characterized in section 1.2, here is a brief summary: 
(Dl) Nothing but (actual) desire-fulfilment can be nonderivatively 
good for a person, and nothing but "aversion-fulfilment" can be non­
derivatively bad for a person. 
1The reason why I will start from this version of the desire theory is that it is, in a 
certain sense, the most fundamental version of the theory; see below. 
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(UD2) The thesis of Unrestrictedness: There are no (intrinsic) desires 
that it is not nonderivatively good for a person to have fulfilled, and 
there are no (intrinsic) aversions that it is not nonderivatively bad to 
have "fulfilled". 
(UD3) To the extent that it is possible to determine just how strong 
our desires and aversions are: The positive (or negative) value that a 
certain desire-fulfilment (or aversion-fulfilment) has for a certain 
desiring subject is proportional to how strong the desire (or aversion) 
is. That is, to the extent that desires and aversion are comparable 
with respect to strength: The stronger (the more "intense") an intrin­
sic desire (aversion) is, the nonderivatively better (worse) it is for the 
desiring subject to have it fulfilled. This is the "intensity-orientation" 
of the theory. 
(D1)-(UD3) are claims about the value-for of local situations (or "atomic 
facts"). (UD4), on the other hand, is a claim about the value-for of 
whole lives-at-certain-times, situations the value-for of which cannot be 
determined directly. 
(UD4) To the extent that it is possible to determine how well off a 
certain person is: The value that a certain life has for the person who 
is living it is a function of how much desire-fulfilment and how much 
aversion-fulfilment this life "contains". The more desire-fulfilment and 
the less aversion-fulfilment a life contains, the better this life is for the 
person who lives it2. 
As it stands, this claim is far too imprecise. So, how would an un­
restricted desire theorist make it more precise? Or alternatively put, 
how exactly should we determine how well off someone is: how should 
the function in question be characterized? Here, it is likely that our un­
restricted desire theorist would use the same approach as the pure 
hedonist (see pp 69-71), i.e. that he would adopt the following position: 
(UD4:a) First, he would (as we have seen) assume that "evaluative 
atomism" is true, i.e. that the final value-for of a person's existence is 
a function of the nonderivative values-for (positive and negative) of 
2Here, it might be tempting to say that the value that P's life has for P is a function 
of to what extent (to what degree) his preferences are satisfied, but as we will 
soon see, this would be a big mistake. 
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its constituent parts. 
So, how do we calculate a person's level of well-being at a certain time 
from the positive and negative values-for of the particular desire-
fulfilments and aversion-fulfilments that his life "contains" at that time? 
In short, how does the desire theorist tackle the problem of aggre­
gation? Well, as a first approximation, we know that the unrestricted 
desire theorist would adopt the following rudimentary theory of 
aggregation: The more desire-fulfilment and the less aversion-fulfilment 
a certain life contains, the better for the person who is living it. For 
example, a person's well-being is improved if th ere is an increase in the 
"amount of desire-fulfilment" that his life contains, while the "amount of 
aversion-fulfilment" remains the same. 
But how do we determine how much desire-fulfilment or aversion-
fulfilment a life contains? And how do we deal with the cases where 
one possible life contains both more desire-fulfilment and more 
aversion-fulfilment than another possible life? The desire theoretical 
answer to these questions can (just like the hedonistic answer) be 
divided into two parts: 
(UD4:b) This is the procedure that should (in principle, and if 
possible) be adopted in order to determine how much desire-
fulfilment and how much aversion-fulfilment a certain life contains: 
We assign a positive number to each desire-fulfilment, and a negative 
number to each aversion-fulfilment, that the life contains3. (How 
great these numbers are depends on how strong the desires and 
aversions are). We then add all the positive numbers we have assig­
ned to the desire-fulfilments, and all the negative numbers we have 
assigned to the aversion-fulfilments. If w e do this, we get two sums, 
viz. the positive sum E (df), and the negative sum E (af). We can now 
say that the higher the stim E (df) is, the more desire-fulfilment a life 
contains, and the lower (the more negative) the negative sum E (af) 
is, the higher the amount of aversion-fulfilment4. 
3Assuming that a person's desires and aversions can be individuated in a 
satisfactory way, that is. We will return to "the problem of in dividuation" on pp 
158-159 below. 
4It is important to point out that for this type of aggregation to be at all possible, 
two assumptions have to be made, viz. (i) that the strengths of our desires and 
aversions are measurable on ratio scales, and (ii) (which is more dubious) that the 
values-for of our desire-fulfilments and aversion-fulfilments satisfy "the criterion 
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Here, it is worth pointing out that we can safely ignore how many 
desires and aversions that are not fulfilled. The reason for this is simple: 
The idea that we cannot calculate the value-for of a person P's life 
unless we take into account how many desires that are not fulfilled (and 
how strong these desires are) is based on the idea that the value that 
P's life has for P is a function of to what extent his desires are satisfied. 
This idea is mistaken, however, and the reason for this is that it is based 
on the dubious assumption that it is bad for a person not to have his 
desires fulfilled (and good for a person not to have his aversions ful­
filled). In short, when we realize that non-fulfilment (of desires and 
aversions) is neither good nor bad for a person, we also realize that it 
does not matter per se to what degree his desires and aversions are 
satisfied. That is, the only reason why it is better for a person to have 
ail his desires fulfilled than to have only some of them fulfilled is that the 
number of desires fulfilled is higher in the former case, and it is not 
always better for a person to have few desires and have them all ful­
filled than to have many desires and only have some of them fulfilled5 6. 
(UD4:c) Once our desire theorist has access to the two sums E (df) 
and Z (af), he can make the idea that "the more desire-fulfilment and 
the less aversion-fulfilment that a certain life contains, the better for 
the person who is living this life" more precise, viz. as follows: The 
of additivity" (i.e. that the numerical values assigned can be meaningfully added). 
5This is in line with what Nordenfelt (1991) says, but he expresses himself in an 
unfortunate way. If we focus on the desire-theoretical component of his theory of 
"happiness", we find the following view: "Happiness" has two dimensions, and 
how happy a person is (on the whole) is a function of how happy he is in these 
dimensions. The first dimension is the "equilibrium dimension", and how happy a 
person is in this dimension depends on to what degree his desires are fulfilled (on 
how large a proportion of h is desires that are fulfilled). The second dimension is 
"the richness dimension", and how happy a person is in this dimension depends 
(roughly) on how much he desires (on how many and how "ambitious" his desires 
are). But instead of complicating the issue in this way, why not say right away that 
it is the "amount of desire-fulfilment" that counts?! (It is possible that I am a bit 
unfair here; it is likely that Nordenfelt has accepted a phenomenological 
conception of d esire, a conception on which it might well be bad for a person not 
to have his desires fulfilled. This could also explain why he does not treat our 
aversions separately). 
6A1! this has an interesting practical implication: If we accept some "non-
phenomenological version" of t he desire theory, and if w e want to improve our 
lives, we should not use the well-known strategy of trying to minimize our 
desires; what we should try to minimize is our aversions! 
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greater E (df) is, the better, arid the "smaller" (the more negative) 
E (af) is, the worse. But how exactly should we (according to the 
desire theorist) calculate the nonderivative value-for of a life from its 
E (df) and E (af)? 
There are at least two different ways in which an unrestricted desire 
theorist might answer this question, viz. he can either appeal to (1) the 
difference thesis, or to (2) some kind of ra tio thesis. 
(1) The Difference Thesis is the idea that a life LI is nonderivatively 
better than another life L2 iff the difference [E (dfl) - IX (afl) I ] is 
bigger than the difference [E (df2) - IE (af2) I ]. 
(2) This is a possible Ratio Thesis: A life LI is better than another life 
L2 if and only if th e ratio E (dfl)/[E (dfl) + I E (afl) I ] is bigger than 
the ratio E (df2)/[E (df2) + IE (af2) I ]7 8. 
It is worth noting that this formulation of (UD4) is open to a number of 
methodological objections, e.g., it might be claimed that at least some of 
the methodological assumptions on which it is based9 are false. Now, 
even though all methodological issues have been more or less excluded 
from this book, there is one methodological difficulty that is actualized 
by (UD4) which is worth pointing out in this context, viz. "the problem 
of individuation": The idea that a person's overall level of well-being is 
a function of how many of his desires and aversions that are fulfilled 
(and how strong they are) can only make sense if it is (in principle) 
7Again, it is important to notice that these "operations" are not meaningful unless 
the following two conditions are (in addition to (i) and (ii) in note 4) satisfied: (iii) 
"Desire-strength" and "aversion-strength" are measurable on the same ratio scale, 
i.e. the strengths of our desires are fully comparable to the strengths of our 
aversions, and (iv) it is not just that the two sums X (df) and E (af) can be "defined", 
it is also meaningful to perform arithmetic operations (like addition or division) 
on these sums (once they have been defined). 
8If we restrict ourselves to desires and aversions that are roughly equal in 
strength, and if we assume that a person's desire-fulfilments and aversion-
fulfilments can be counted (something that presupposes that our desires and 
aversions can be properly individuated), and if we let N(df) (and N(af)) denote the 
number of desires (aversions) fulfilled, then the difference thesis would claim that 
the bigger the difference between [N(df) - N(af)] is, the better, and the ratio thesis 
would claim that the bigger the ratio [N(df)/[N(df) + N(af)] is, the better. (That is, 
both theories imply that it is better if N(df) > N(af) than if N(df) = N(af); and that it 
is better if N(df) = N(af) than if N(d f) < N(af)). 
9In particular, (i)-(iv) in notes 4 and 7. 
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possible to separate a person's desires and aversions from each other10. 
This might be very difficult, however (it might even be impossible). This 
is one way in which the problem can be formulated: A complete descrip­
tion of a person's total desire-state at a certain time has to include a 
complete description of what it is that the person desires at that time. 
But it is not unlikely that such an "object-description" would contain 
certain overlaps, e.g., a certain person might (to take a simple example) 
want a car, but he might "also" want a Swedish car and a Volvo. Now, 
if w e regard these desires as different, this implies that the same parti­
cular occurrence (he gets a Volvo) will constitute a fulfilment of several 
different desires at the same time. And if we (on top of this) accept 
(UD4), we would have to accept that it is better for me to get a Volvo if 
I want a Volvo and a Swedish car than if I just want a Volvo. But this is 
(as I see it) hardly plausible. This suggests that for (UD4) to be plau­
sible, we have to require that the descriptions of the objects of a 
person's desires are somehow "independent", so that the same parti­
cular situation cannot be counted several times. So the question arises: 
Is it possible to give such a description of w hat a person desires? Does 
our ordinary language (on which our common sense individuation of 
our desires and aversions, i.e. in terms of propositional content, is 
based) have "what it takes"?11 
Let us now turn our attention to (D1)-(UD3). As these claims stand, 
they are not sufficiently clear and precise for our purposes; in order to 
find out how plausible the different versions of the desire theory are, 
they have to be formulated in a more precise way. So, what is it that is 
in need of clarification here? What is it that we need to know in order 
to arrive at a sufficiently precise formulation of the unrestricted desire 
10Assuming that it makes sense to think of a person's "total desire-state" at a 
certain time as consisting of a number of individual desires and aversions. We 
have already seen (on pp 79-81), that there is a similar problem in connection with 
hedonism, but it seems that the present problem is of a more serious kind. If it is 
correct to think of a desiring subject as having one big desire-state (a state that can 
be satisfied to different degrees), then is the most plausible way to analyze (or 
describe) this state really in terms of individual desires? Well, it seems that as long 
as we stick to ordinary language, there is no other way (cf. below). 
11Another possible solution is this: "If a particular, concrete situation constitutes 
the fulfilment of several desires, count only (for purposes of aggregation) the 
strongest one". The problem with this suggestion is that it seems inconsistent with 
the fact that it is sometimes possible to kill two birds with one stone. 
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theory? On my view, there are at least four "sources of unclarity", viz. 
the following ones: 
(1) When the unrestricted desire theorist claims that it is always non-
derivatively good for us to have our (intrinsic) desires fulfilled, and bad 
for us to have our aversions fulfilled, it is not entirely clear how the 
terms "desire" and "aversion" should be understood. How should 
these key terms be interpreted in this context? What we want to know 
here is not just how the terms are actually used by the desire theorist, 
but also (and this is really the primary thing) how he should use them. 
That is, what we primarily want to know is which of the possible inter­
pretations (or senses) of the terms "desire" and "aversion" that makes 
the desire theory most plausible, but with the following "proviso"; this 
interpretation must not deviate too much (especially not extensionally) 
from the ordinary use (or uses) of the terms, and it must be consistent 
with at least some of our common sense beliefs about desire, e.g., with 
the belief that we are sometimes mistaken about what we want. (This is 
mainly to secure that the resulting "theory" is a theory about desire, and 
not about something else). 
These questions need not be formulated in semantic terms, however; 
they can also be formulated in terms of conceptions of desire (and 
aversion). A conception of desire is a theory that purports to give 
answers to certain central questions about desire, e.g., questions like: 
What is it for someone to desire something? Do all mental states which 
are properly conceived of as desires have anything in common, some 
property (intrinsic or relational) in virtue of which they are classified as 
desires, or is the class of desire a "heterogeneous class"? That is, are all 
desires of the same genus (in the traditional sense of the term) or not? 
What fundamental forms (e.g., species) of desire are there? And how 
are our desires connected to things like our intentions, motives, 
reasons, values, emotions and actions? 
If w e formulate our questions in terms of c onceptions, we get: What 
conception of desire is it likely that the desire theorist has in mind? And 
(above all) which possible conception of desire makes (if combined with 
the desire theory) the theory most plausible?12 
12It is also worth mentioning what we are not really interested in in this context. 
We are not looking for the true meaning (nominal definition) of the term "desire", 
a meaning which captures the real nature (or essence) of desire. Even if there 
were such a thing as the nature of desire (which is doubtful), and even if 
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(2) When the unrestricted desire theorist claims (roughly) that it is 
nonderivatively better for a person to have a stronger (intrinsic) desire 
fulfilled than to have a weaker desire fulfilled, or that the positive value 
that it has for a person to have a certain desire fulfilled is a function of 
how strong the desire is, it is not entirely clear how the terms 
"stronger" and "strong" should be understood. So, in order to under­
stand these claims, we need to know how the term "strength" is actu­
ally used in this context. But above all, we want to know what notion 
of strength that makes an "intensity-oriented" desire theory most 
plausible13. 
(3) It has already been suggested (in section 1.2) that terms like "ful­
filled" and "fulfilment" are normally understood in the following way: 
A person's desire that a situation X obtains is fulfilled if a nd only if h e 
desires that X and X holds, and a person's aversion to a situation Y is 
fulfilled if and only if he has an aversion to Y and Y obtains14. This idea 
can also be expressed as follows: A desire or aversion is fulfilled if and 
only if its propositional content is true (this notion of fulfilment 
"follows" naturally from the idea that desires and aversions are propo­
sitional attitudes; cf. section 4.1 below). 
Now, it is important to note that this "traditional" notion of fulfilment 
has at least two interesting implications, viz. the following ones: (i) A 
person can have a desire fulfilled without knowing that it is fulfilled. As 
Brandt (1979) points out, that a person's desires are satisfied means 
that the desired "states of affairs" occur, "with no implications about his 
enjoyment of, or even knowledge about, [these occurrences]" (pp 146-
147). (ii) A desire can (it seems) be fulfilled after it is long gone. If a 
knowledge about this "thing" would give us "the true meaning of the desire 
theory", we could still ignore it. What we want to know is not what desire really is, 
but what conception of desire that is most relevant in this particular context. 
Neither are we particularly interested in how the term "desire" is used in ordinary 
speech, nor in what conception of desire that is most useful for psychological 
theory. 
13These questions are (of c ourse) intimately connected to the questions in group 
(1), i.e. the answers given to (1) will put restrictions on what answers that can be 
given to (2), and vice versa. 
14As far as I can see, this is not the only possible "definition" of what it is to have a 
desire fulfilled, e.g., one might also specify the notion of fulfilment as follows: "If P 
desires that X, then this desire is fulfilled if an d only if X ac tually obtains". Notice 
that this formulation is (so to speak) weaker than the "explication" we have 
chosen, viz. "A person's desire that X is fulfilled if and only if he desires that X and 
X holds". The latter proposition implies the former, but not vice versa. 
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person desires at ti that X holds at some future time t2, and if X in fact 
holds at t2, then the desire he had at tt is fulfilled, even if he has lost the 
desire in the meantime. As Brandt writes: "Suppose Mr. X at a time t 
wants an occurrence O at some time Ë, or at any of many moments t i to 
tn. Then, if O actually occurs at some one of these times, X's desire has 
been satisfied" (ibid., p 249)15. 
This gives rise to the following questions: Is it really plausible to allow 
for the possibility that a person's well-being can be directly affected by 
things he does not know anything about (cf. pp 126-128 above)? And is 
it plausible to assume that it can be nonderivatively good for us to have 
our "now-for-then-desires" fulfilled? Or alternatively put, is the tradi­
tional notion of fulfilment really the notion which has most "moral and 
rational significance", or is there some alternative notion of fulfilment 
which makes the desire theory more plausible? For example, should the 
desire theorist replace the traditional notion of fulfilment with (i) the 
idea that P's desire that X is fulfilled (in the relevant sense) if and only if 
P desires that X, X holds, and the desire and its object are simultaneous 
(the time of the desire coincides with the time of the occurrence of X); 
or with (ii) the idea that P's desire that X is fulfilled (in the relevant 
sense) if and only if P desires that X, X holds, and P is aware of the 
occurrence of X; or with (iii) the combination of (i) and (ii)16? 
In this chapter, I will restrict my attention to the following question: 
Which notion of fulfilment is more relevant, the traditional notion or (i)? 
Or alternatively put, is it really plausible to allow for the possibility that 
it is nonderivatively good for a person to have a prospective (or retro­
spective) desire fulfilled? (In connection with this, there will also be 
some discussion of some other "temporal issues" that are actualized by 
the desire theory)17. 
15There is also a third implication (which is of less importance in this context), viz. 
that desire-fulfilment is an all-or-nothing matter. That is, there is (on this view) no 
such thing as degrees of desire-fulfilment. 
16This idea can be spelled out as follows: P's desire that X is fulfilled (in the rele vant 
sense) if and only if t he following four conditions are met: (a) P desires that X, (b) 
X holds, (c) the desire and X are simultaneous, and (d) P is aware of the occurrence 
of X. 
17The alternative notion (ii) will not be discussed in this chapter, but in chapter 5. 
My reason for postponing this discussion is simple: This notion of fulfilment 
deviates too much from the notion which is actually adopted by desire theorists (it 
also deviates too much from the ordinary usage of the term "fulfilment), and it is 
(for this reason) doubtful whether a desire theory which incorporates (ii) can be 
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(4) The unrestricted desire theorist seems to assume that it can not be 
nonderivatively good for a person to have a desire fulfilled unless this 
desire is intrinsic. So, what is it for a desire to be intrinsic; what is it to 
desire something in an intrinsic way? And if there are several possible 
answers to this question: What notion of intrinsicality makes (if 
adopted) the "intrinsicality condition" most plausible? 
A central problem that is intimately connected to (4) (but also to (2)) is 
this: We know that the positive nonderivative value that it has for a 
person to have an intrinsic desire fulfilled is (on the unrestricted desire 
theory) a function of how strong the desire is. But what about all those 
desires that are in part intrinsic and in part extrinsic (e.g., instrumental); 
how do we determine (in principle, that is) how nonderivatively good it 
is for a person to have such a desire fulfilled? Suppose a person P's 
desire that X a nd his desire that Y are both "mixed" in this way, i.e. 
suppose P has two kinds of reasons for wanting X and Y to obtain, viz. 
because these situations have the intrinsic properties they have (or the 
like), but also because he believes that they will have certain effects that 
are (on his view) desirable, or because he believes that they will make 
something desirable possible. In this type of case, how do we determine 
which of the two desires that it is nonderivatively better for P to have 
fulfilled? Well, supposedly by isolating "the intrinsic component" of the 
desires, and then determine which is stronger (in the relevant sense). 
But is it possible to separate the intrinsic component of a "mixed" desire 
(or preference) in this way, and if it is, how should it be done? For 
example, should we first ask P to imagine two possible worlds that are 
identical in all respects, apart from the fact that X (but not Y) obtains in 
the one world while Y (but not X) o btains in the other, and then ask 
him which of the two worlds he would prefer? Or should we try to 
specify the propositional content of the two desires in such a way 
(individuate the desires in such a way) so that we will end up with a 
larger number of "pure desires", all of which are either intrinsic or 
extrinsic? Personally, I tend to adopt the latter solution, but this is only 
a tentative view. In any case, the important thing here is to notice that 
the type of desire theory which has been formulated here presupposes 
that this problem can be solved, i.e. that it is (in principle) possible to 
isolate the intrinsic component of our mixed desires and preferences. 
regarded as an unrestricted theory. 
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These are some important questions we have to answer in order to 
arrive at a precise enough formulation of the unrestricted desire theory. 
Let us start with the first one, i.e. the question of what a desire is. 
4.1. What is a desire? 
To begin with, desires are not separate entities; every desire is some­
one's desire. Moreover, to desire is always to desire something. In 
other words, when we think of desires (or wants, which will be regar­
ded as the same thing), we must think of them as "embedded" in the 
following structure: "Someone (a subject) desires (or wants) something 
(an object)"18. In order to understand what a desire is, we need to take 
a closer look at the three elements of this structure, viz. the desiring 
subject, the object of desire, and the desiring "itself". 
The desiring subject 
In the present context, we are only interested in the desires of human 
beings. So, what can we say about the human subject of desire? Well, all 
that needs to be said here is that when we attribute desires to a human 
being, we always attribute desires to him or her qua conscious agent (or 
qua person, in some minimal sense). To be able to attribute full-fledged 
desires to a human being or some other animal, it is necessary that we 
view him or her from "the psychological perspective", i.e. (roughly) as a 
conscious agent, where the term "agent" should be understood as 
"capable of voluntary action" (or something of the sort), and not 
merely as "intentional system", or "someone or something that displays 
goal-oriented behaviour"19. 
This is not to say that viewing an animal as a desiring subject requires 
18It is worth noting that it would be possible to expand the structure of desire 
further, e.g., by including the time of the desiring and the situation the desiring 
subject is in as elements, but this would be rather superfluous in the present 
context. 
19That is, we do not attribute desires to human beings qua complex biological 
systems that display behaviour of various kinds. To view a human being (or some 
other animal) from "the perspective of natural science" is (on my view) 
incompatible with attributing desires to it. (Viewed purely as a biological system, 
an animal may have needs (of a physiological kind), but it cannot have any 
desires). 
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that we first view it as a conscious agent, however: To attribute full-
fledged desires to an animal is to view it from a psychological perspec­
tive, to view it as a desiring subject is part of viewing it as a conscious 
agent. (But to attribute a particular desire to it seems to require that it is 
first viewed as a conscious agent, i.e. as a desiring subject). The point is: 
"desire-hood" cannot plausibly be regarded as separate from con­
sciousness or voluntary agency, the three stand and fall together, so to 
speak20 21. 
The object of desire: desire for and desire that 
As said, to want is always to want something; desires are intentional 
states, they are directed toward objects. But what is the object of 
desire? When someone wants something, what kind of th ing is it that is 
being wanted? 
There are two main types of answer that can be given to this ques­
tion, viz. the thing-view and the situation-view. On the former view, the 
objects of desire are things (or things-under-descriptions), and to 
desire something is to have a desire for such a thing. On the situation-
view, the objects of desire are situations (or situations-under-descrip-
tions), and to desire something is to desire that some situation obtains, 
20Cf. Kenny's (1989) view on the connection between desiring and consciousness. 
According to him, "consciousness cannot be identified as such independently of 
wanting. /.../ [T]he notions of consciousness and wanting become applicable 
together when the behaviour of an agency manifests the appropriate degree of 
complexity" (p 34). As far as the relation between being a desiring subject and 
being an agent (between desire and action) is concerned; see below. 
21 Is there anything else that can be generally said about human beings qua 
desiring creatures? Well, it is sometimes claimed (e.g., by Nussbaum (1986), Ch. 9, 
and Kenny (1989), Ch. 3) that every desiring creature is a needy creature, and we 
would not have desires if we did not have needs. This might well be true, but 
there is (as I see it) no reason why we should regard the alleged connection 
between need and desire as conceptual. First, it is pretty obvious that there are 
particular desires which are not conceptually connected to particular needs. (This 
is so, even if one falsely assumes that "desiring X" implies "lacking X"). Second, if 
the idea is that the general notion of desire somehow presupposes the general 
notion of need, I can't see how. There are at least some kinds of desiring which 
seem to be fully compatible with not needing anything at all. God, for example, is 
sometimes conceived of as a being with plans, goals and purposes (i.e. as an 
agent), but without needs. This may be a silly conception of G od, but it is surely 
not a conceptual mistake! In short, we should conceive of the connection between 
need and desire as contingent rather than conceptual. 
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i.e. that something is the case22. 
So, which of the two views is the most ethically relevant view of the 
object of desire, and which of the two views should the desire theorist 
accept? Before we look at this issue, let us first take a closer look at the 
two views. 
The thing-view 
In ordinary language, desire-statements are sometimes of the form "P 
(a desiring subject) desires X" or "P has a desire for X" (rather than "P 
desires that X" or "P desires to O"). Examples of this are when we say 
that someone desires (or longs for, or craves, or has a desire for) a 
certain woman (or man), a certain job, or a certain car. This suggests that 
the objects of desire are (sometimes) things other than situations (but 
cf. below). 
The thing-view is often combined with the idea that desiring X implies 
lacking X; to desire something, or want something, is to be in want of it 
(cf. Jeffrey (1983), pp 62-63). It is not surprising that the two views are 
so easy to combine. The kind of desire which seems to best fit the 
thing-view is unsatisfied appetite (longing, or craving); "to have a 
desire for X" often means "to have an unsatisfied appetite for X". And 
since this prototypical kind of desire for is essentially unsatisfied, it is easy 
to see how well the thing-view fits the idea that "to want is to be in 
want of". 
Nussbaum (1986) seems to attribute the thing-view to Aristotle, when 
she characterizes orexis (Aristotle's general notion of wanting or desi­
ring) as a selective, object-oriented, active "going for", or "reaching 
after", objects that are seen to have a certain relation to one's needs 
(pp 274-276). What she seems to suggest is that orexis should be con­
ceived of as orexis for something, and that the objects of orexis are things 
rather than situations. 
The situation-view: Desires as propositionai attitudes 
The situation-view seems to start from the idea that the typical desire-
statement is of the form "P desires that X is the case", or that it can 
22It should be noted that this difference between "desire for" and "desire that" 
seems to be pretty analogous to the difference between "thinking of" and 
"thinking that". 
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easily be translated into a statement of this form23. Examples of such 
statements are "I want you to do this for me" and "I desire that the 
weather will be fine tomorrow". This suggests that the typical object of 
a desire is a situation, i.e. a state of affairs, an event, or the like. To 
desire is to desire that something is (or will be) the case, that some situa­
tion holds or obtains (will hold or obtain)24. 
Because of the intimate connection between situations and proposi­
tions, the situation-view can also be expressed in "propositional terms" 
(this is why desires are, on the situation-view, regarded as propo­
sitional attitudes). Qua intentional states, desires (this goes for desires for 
as well as for desires that) have "semantic content", they require (as 
Hare (1981) puts it) "a linguistic form for their full description". Now, 
the semantic content of a desire that is always a proposition: When 
someone desires that something is the case, we always describe this by 
saying that he desires that X, where X is a proposition (and where "X" 
is a sentence). To desire that X i s, so to speak, to have a particular 
attitude toward the proposition X. This does not imply that the objects 
of desires that are propositions, however. To desire that X is, rather, to 
desire that the proposition X is true, i.e. it is also possible to think of the 
object of a desire that as the truth of some proposition. 
The situations which are the objects of our desires that are probably, in 
most cases, more complex than we think. The propositional contents of 
these desires are rarely as simple as "state of affairs S holds", "person P 
is in mental state M", "event E happens", or "person P performs action 
A". Suppose I want you to help me move my furniture. This is not a full 
description of what I want. A fuller specification of the object of my 
desire would have to include things like "and I want you to help me 
before Sunday" and "I don't want you to help me if you don't want 
to". And if I desire that Z. wants me, I also want her to want me at 
some time or times (e.g., "now" or "forever" or "not all the time"), in 
23In ordinary language desire-statements are often of the form "P desires to O", 
where "®" is a verb phrase. Examples of such statements are "P desires to win" or 
"P wants to go for a swim". However, these desire-to-statements are easily 
reformulated as "P desires that he wins" or "P desires that he goes for a swim". 
24Past situations are normally not objects of desire. An interesting issue, where 
different opinions are held, is whether past situations can be objects of desire. We 
sometimes say things like "I wish it wouldn't have happened", but are such 
utterances really expressions of desire? We will return to this question below, in 
section 4.3. 
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the right way (e.g., "not too possessively"), and for the right causes 
(e.g., "freely, and not because she was given an aphrodisiac")25. 
Why the situation-view is superior in ethical contexts 
At this point, it should be rather obvious that the desire theorist should 
accept the situa tion-view. The reason for this is simple: Because of the 
intimate connection that holds between the object of a desire that and its 
fulfilment, we know what it is for a desire that to be fulfilled: a desire 
that X is (roughly speaking) satisfied if a nd only if X ac tually holds. In 
the case of de sire for, on the other hand, there is no such direct connec­
tion between object and fulfilment, and this makes it hard to tell what 
the fulfilment of s uch a desire consists in. In fact, the only reason why 
we can often determine whether a certain desire for has been fulfilled is 
that most desires for correspond to a number of desires that. Suppose a 
person P wants, has a desire for, a certain woman; How can we tell (or 
know) whether this "appetite" of his is fulfilled or not? It should be 
noted that the disappearance of the desire is not a sufficient condition 
for fulfilment. The fulfilment of P's desire may, of course, cause it to dis­
appear, but it may also disappear in other ("wrong") ways, e.g., 
because he met someone else, or because time passed, or because he 
took a desire-eliminating pill. So, how do we distinguish between the 
fulfilment of a desire for and the disappearance of a desire for? For this to 
be possible, there must be some kind of correspondence between 
desire-for-statements and desire-that-statements, i.e. desire-for-
statements must, at least in some approximate way, entail desire-that-
statements. 
Now, luckily enough, this is often the case, e.g., if P has a desire for a 
certain woman, this seems to entail (in some sense of the term) that he 
desires that a number of s ituations obtain (or will obtain), situations in 
which the woman in question is a "component part". In general, to have 
a desire for something seems to be connected with things like desiring 
to possess it, own it, or consume it, wanting it to be present, or desiring 
to be in contact with it. As Jeffrey (1983) points out, "in such cases 
[when the objects of desires are not propositions] the highly flexible 
notion of having something is linked with the notion of desiring it: to 
25This suggests that many of our complex desires can be fulfilled to different 
degrees (at least in those cases where the propositional content of the desire is 
naturally conceived of as a conjunction). 
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desire x is to desire that one have x (in the appropriate sense of 
'have')" (p 60). 
In short, the only reason why we understand what it is for a certain 
desire for to be fulfilled is that it is (in a certain way) connected to a 
number of desi res that. It might even be suspected that desires for cannot 
(properly speaking) be fulfilled at all (at least not "as such"). For 
example, if one has a clear idea of what would constitute the fulfilment 
of w hat seems to be a particular desire for, then this desire is probably a 
desire that rather than a desire for. 
What we have shown this far is that desires for can not be directly 
relevant in a desire theoretical context; the only way in which they can 
be of r elevance is indirectly, by corresponding to a number of desires 
that which are themselves of direct relevance. So, is there any other 
way in which a person's desires for can be directly relevant for his well-
being? I think not, but there is at least one other way in which they 
may be of indirect relevance, viz. for hedonistic reasons26. The perhaps 
most typical example of desire for is, as we have seen, unsatisfied appe­
tite. If someone has an unsatisfied appetite for something, this is often 
something he feels, and the feeling in question is normally unpleasant. 
Furthermore, an unsatisfied appetite is often (especially if it is a bodily 
appetite) felt more or less continuously until it is satisfied. It is, I think, 
mainly the connection between unsatisfied appetite and unpleasantness 
which makes it ethically relevant that someone has an unsatisfied appe­
tite for something, but we should also notice that it is often pleasant to 
have a such desire satisfied. 
To conclude, the ethical relevance of desires for either consists in the 
fact that they may be unpleasant to have, or in the fact that they may 
correspond to a number of desires that (which may be, in themselves, 
ethically relevant). That is, the notion of desire for a thing is not directly 
relevant in this context, and a plausible conception of well-being do not 
have to take our desires for things into account, 
26Desires that do (of course) not differ from desires for in t his respect, i.e. they may 
also be indirectly relevant in this (hedonistic) way. 
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The desiring (by the subject, of the object): A rudimentary 
conception of desire 
What is it for someone to desire that something is the case? How, for 
example, does the desire that X obtains differ from other prepositional 
attitudes, like the belief that X obtains? What conception of desire (i.e. 
desire that) is it likely that the desire theorist has in mind, and above all, 
what conception of desire (and aversion) makes the desire theory most 
plausible? 
On my view, there are a number of conditions that a conception of 
desire (and aversion) must satisfy if it is to qualify as maximally relevant 
in this context, viz. the following ones: 
First of all, the most relevant conception of desire must accept the 
following two claims: 
(i) Desires and aversions are propositional attitudes (cf. above). 
(ii) Desires are pro-attitudes, while aversions are con-attitudes, no 
matter how the contents (objects) of t hese attitudes are specified27. This 
idea can be given a more exact formulation in terms of preference and 
indifference, viz. in the following way. Let us first define "neutrality" as 
follows: A person P is neutral to the occurrence of a certain situation X 
if and only it does not matter to him whether X holds or not, i.e. if and 
only if he is indifferent between X a nd not-X (which implies that he 
does not prefer X to not-X, or vice versa). Armed with this definition of 
neutrality, we can now say that P desires that a situation X obtains if and 
only if h e prefers X to some situation to which he is neutral, and that P 
has an aversion to a situation Y if and only if he prefers some neutral 
situation to Y28. 
(iii) Moreover, we can also assume that the desire theory cannot be 
plausible unless the desire theorist uses the term "desire" in a very 
27It is worth noting that this is inconsistent with the (implausible) idea that the 
difference between desires and aversions is a difference in content (or object), viz. 
that the content of a desire is positively specified, while the content of an aversion 
is negatively specified, i.e. that an aversion is (by definition) a desire that a certain 
(positively specified) situation does not obtain. 
28This has certain interesting implications, viz. the following ones: Suppose that P 
prefers X to not-X. In this case, we can not conclude that P desires that X (in the 
above sense), i.e. we can not conclude that it is good for P that X obtains. Neither 
can we conclude that P has an aversion to not-X, i.e. it is not necessarily the case 
that not-X is bad for P. The only thing we can conclude from the fact that P prefers 
X to not-X is that either X is good for P or not-X is bad for P. 
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broad sense, i.e. unless he uses the term in such a way that a very large 
and heterogeneous class of mental states can be subsumed under it. To 
get an idea of how broad the relevant notion of desire may be, con­
sider the following quotations. The first one is from Kekes (1988): 
Some of them [our desires, or wants] are insistent enough, so there is 
no special difficulty in being aware of them. But not all wants speak 
with a loud voice; some are inarticulate; some concern the distant 
future; some have disturbing emotional undercurrents; some are 
confused longings for impossible goals, like wishing the past to be 
different, or undoing present unpleasantness in fantasy, or hoping 
for wildly unrealistic future developments (p 159). 
The next quotation is from Kenny (1989). In his terminology, there are 
two fundamental kinds of want, viz. "desires" and "volitions". This is 
how he characterizes the difference between the two: 
/.../ desire, unlike volition, seeks immediate satisfaction; that is, it is 
a want for something now, a want that is felt more or less conti­
nuously until it is satisfied. Volition, by contrast, may be for some­
thing distant in time, and it may be operative without being an item in 
the flow of consciousness (p 36). 
He also adds (on p 37) that "volition involves the exercise of concepts 
which need language for their expression, whereas desire need involve 
only the exercise of s impler and more rudimentary concepts, which can 
be manifested in non-linguistic behaviour". 
So, it seems that on the relevant use of "desire", the class of desire 
includes things as different as volitions and intentions, appetites and 
longings, projects and purposes, requirements and demands, wishes 
and regrets, i.e. the class of desire is, in many respects, a very hetero­
geneous class. So, in virtue of what common feature (assuming that 
there is such a feature) do all these different psychological states belong 
to the same category, i.e. the class of desire? This is a question that a 
more complete conception of desire has to answer. (However, it is likely 
that the grouping of all these states into a single genus "involves a 
degree of philosophical regimentation" (cf. Kenny (1989), p 41), i.e. it 
can be suspected that the relevant notion of desire is a rather technical 
notion). 
(iv) It is also desirable that a conception of desire does not deviate 
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too much from the ordinary use (or uses) of the term "desire" (cf. p 160 
above), especially not from its "explanatory" or "theoretical" use (i.e. 
the use from which the technical, philosophical notion of desire has 
"arisen"). We often use the term "desire" in this theoretical sense, e.g., 
when we say that all actions are (in part) manifestations of desires, or 
that all actions must be explained in terms of desires and beliefs, or that 
"a desire may be had in the absence of its being felt" (cf. Smith (1994), p 
109), or that we do not always know what we want (that we are 
sometimes fallible about the desires we have). It may not be necessary 
that a relevant conception of desire is consistent with all the ordinary 
uses of the term "desire", however (since it might simply not be possible 
to construct such a conception29). 
Now, it is easy to see that this rudimentary conception is far from 
complete. For example, we do not really know what an attitude is, or 
what it is for someone to prefer something to something else30. So the 
question arises: How should we complete the rudimentary conception 
above, i.e. what must a complete conception of desire be like if i t is to 
satisfy conditions (i)-(iv)? For example, should we adopt some kind of 
phenomenological conception of d esire, or should we (instead) go for a 
functional conception? This question will not be discussed here, how­
ever, but in appendix F. 
4.2. What is it for a desire to be stronger than 
another desire? 
So, when the desire theorist claims that the value it has for a person to 
have a relevant desire fulfilled is a function of one thing only, viz. how 
strong the desire is, what conception of strength should he have in 
mind? What conception of strength makes the theory most plausible? 
As far as I can see, there are (in this particular context) three ways in 
which the term "strength" can be understood, viz. (i) as felt intensity, 
(ii) as motivational force, or (iii) as rank in a preference ordering (where 
preference is not understood in terms of felt intensity or motivational 
29For example, it might not be possible to construct a conception of d esire that is 
consistent both with (i) the idea that we are sometimes directly aware of our 
desires, and (ii) the idea that all actions are (in part) manifestations of d esires. Cf. 
appendix F. 
30The notion of preference will be treated more in detail in section 4.2. 
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force)31. Let us take a closer look at these three senses of the term, and 
see which one that makes the desire theory most plausible. 
(i) On the first sense of "strength", a desire is stronger than another 
desire if and only if it is more intensely felt32. This can not be the rele­
vant sense of "strength", however. First, it presupposes (falsely) that 
some kind of phenomenological conception of d esire is true (cf. appen­
dix F), and second, there is no reason to assume that it is better for a 
person to have a desire fulfilled just because it is more intensely felt. But 
why is this? On Griffin's (1986) view, "felt intensity is too often a mark 
of such relatively superficial matters as convention or training to be a 
reliable sign of anything as deep as well-being" (p 15), but doesn't this 
hold for the other two senses of "strength" as well? On my view, the 
reason is (rather) that the felt intensity view makes the strengths of our 
desires too dependent of our probability judgements (cf. below). 
(ii) If "strength" is understood in the second way, the "strongest" 
desire is "the motivational winner", the desire with the strongest moti­
vational force33. This is probably the sense of "strength" that is most in 
harmony with the functional conception of desire (cf. appendix F), 
especially with the idea that desire is an explanatory notion, but this 
31There is also a fourth sense, viz. "rank in a cool preference ordering, an ordering 
that reflects appreciation of the nature of the objects of desire" (Griffin (1986), p 
15), or "place in an informed preference order" (cf. ibid., p 99). On Griffin's view, 
this is "the relevant sense of 'strength'", the sense that is incorporated into Griffin's 
own "informed-desire account of well-being". This is not a conception of strength 
that the unrestricted actual desire theorist can accept, however. 
32There are (it seems) two possible interpretations of the claim that a desire D1 is 
more intensely felt than another desire D2, viz. (a) Dl, or some sensation (e.g., 
tension) which accompanies Dl, is more strongly felt, and (b) the object of Dl 
exerts (phenomenologically speaking) a stronger attraction, or pull, on the 
subject. 
33This notion of strength is probably identical with what Gauthier (1986) calls 
revealed preference, and what Sumner (1996) calls the behavioural notion of 
utility, or preference in terms of actual (market) choice, i.e. the view that a person 
prefers X to Y just in case he actually chooses X when he could have chosen Y 
instead (whatever that means). This behavioural notion of preference is contrasted 
against the attitudinal notion (which is, on Sumner's view, the relevant notion in 
this context), according to which a person prefers X to Y if a nd only if h e likes X 
better than Y, or finds X more agreeable. But what is this supposed to mean, i.e. 
how should the term "attitude" be understood in this context (on the assumption 
that it should not be understood in behavioural terms)? Well, as far as I can see, 
there are only two possibilities here: Either the attitudinal view is just another 
version of the "felt intensity" view described above, or we have to think of 
attitudes in functional (but not behavioural) terms. 
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does not make it relevant in the context of well-being. As Griffin writes, 
"the relevant sense of 'strength' is not simply the desire that wins out in 
motivation", because if "strength were interpreted as motivational 
force, then 'utility' would lose it links with well-being" (ibid., p 15). But 
why? Well, first, the motivational force view makes strength far too 
dependent of probability judgements (even more so than the felt inten­
sity view), and second, the view suggests that to the extent that our 
actions are successful, and to the extent that the desires we act on are 
intrinsic, we are as well off as we can be, but this is surely an implausible 
view34. 
(iii) That a person's desire that X is stronger than his desire that Y in 
the third sense means that he prefers X to Y. This idea can also be for­
mulated in terms of utility, viz. in the following way: A person P's 
desire that X i s stronger than his desire that Y if and only if X has 
higher utility for P than Y has (if X is more desirable for P than Y is)35. 
But how should this idea be interpreted, i.e. what is it for someone to 
prefer something to something else? Or more specifically: If we want to 
keep the preference view distinct from both the felt intensity view and 
the motivational force view, what conception of preference is most rele­
vant in this context? Well, personally I tend to accept the idea that 
preference should be understood in terms of hypothetical choice, i.e. 
that a person prefers X to Y if a nd only if he would, under conditions 
of certainty, choose X. H owever, it has also been suggested (e.g., by 
Gauthier (1986), p 27) that "attitudinal preference" should be under-
34Another problem with the behavioural view (which was pointed out to me by 
Jan Österberg) is that it can not account for the difference between picking and 
choosing, where "[w]e speak of choosing among alternatives when the act of 
taking (doing) one of them is determined by the differences in one's preferences 
over them. When preferences are completely symmetrical, where one is strictly 
indifferent with regard to the alternatives, we shall refer to the act of taking 
(doing) on of them as an act of picking" (Ullmann-Margalit and Morgenbesser 
(1977), p 757). 
35Where utility is (roughly speaking) essentially a reflection of, or measure of, a 
person's preferences; in this case, his intrinsic preferences. For example, to say 
that X has more utility for P than Y has is equivalent to saying that P prefers X to 
Y, and to say that X and Y has the same utility for P is equivalent to saying that P 
is indifferent between X and Y. (And here, it doesn't really matter which of the 
two possible interpretations of "utility" one has in mind; utility as subjective 
desirability (or relative importance to the desiring subject), or utility as a measure 
of subjective desirability (i.e. a number that reflects the relative importance of an 
outcome)). 
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stood as something which is "essentially" expressed in speech, i.e. ver­
bally. But can (and should) this view really be regarded as a claim about 
what preference is, e.g., should we attribute to Gauthier the idea that a 
person prefers X to Y if and only if he would (when asked) express (in 
speech) a preference for X over Y36? I think not. On my view, the idea 
is better understood as an idea of how we should gain knowledge of 
someone's preferences37. 
Regardless of exactly how the notion of preference is to be under­
stood, it is (I think) pretty clear that "rank in a preference ordering" is 
the sense of "strength" (of the senses that are, so to speak, "open" to 
the unrestricted desire theorist) that is most closely linked with well-
being, and one important reason for this is that it is the use of 
"strength" on which the strengths of our desires are most likely to be 
independent of our probability judgements (but cf. e.g., pp 208-211 
below). The felt intensity of a person's desire that X i s most certainly 
dependent on how probable he thinks it is that X occurs (or can be rea­
lized), and the same thing holds (to an even larger extent) for the moti­
vational force of the desire. But it is surely implausible to make the value 
that a certain situation has for a person dependent on his probability 
judgements. And since "rank in a preference ordering" is (it seems) also 
most consistent with the rudimentary conception of desire in section 4.1 
above, this is the sense of "strength" that the unrestricted desire 
theorist should accept38. 
Or alternatively put, the interpretation of (UD3) that makes this claim 
most plausible is this: It is nonderivatively better for a person to have 
his intrinsic desire that X (or aversion to X) fulfilled than to have his 
intrinsic desire that Y (or aversion to Y) fulfilled if and only if he intrin­
sically prefers X to Y, i.e. if and only if X is ranked higher than Y on his 
intrinsic preference ordering. 
36But what question should he be asked? Here it might be argued that we should 
ask the person what he would choose (but not pick) under conditions of certainty, 
i.e. the two ideas might not be so different after all. 
37Another possible view on the connection between preference and choice is this: 
If a person prefers X t o Y, t hen he has a non-arbitrary tendency to choose X 
instead of Y (cf. Bergström (1991), p 10). 
38It is also worth mentioning that this third conception of strength is also the most 
methodologically appealing one. Or more specifically, it is the conception that 
makes strength intrapersonally and intratemporally measurable to the highest 
degree. However, if w e have the interpersonal or (intrapersonal) intertemporal 
cases in mind, it is not as appealing. 
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4.3. Desire and time: Some temporal issues 
We have already seen (on pp 161-162) that on the traditional use of 
"desire-fulfilment", the time of the desire need not coincide with the 
time of i ts fulfilment (i.e. the time of i ts object). Or more specifically, if 
this notion of fulfilment is adopted, both "now-for-then desires" 
(desires about the future, or "prospective desires") and desires about 
the past (or "retrospective" desires)39 can (assuming that there is such a 
thing as full-fledged intrinsic desires about the past) be fulfilled. So the 
question arises: Should the unrestricted desire theorist accept this 
broad notion of f ulfilment, i.e. should he accept (a) the idea that it can 
have nonderivative value for a person to have his "prospective desires" 
fulfilled, and (b) that it can (also) be good for a person to have his 
"retrospective desires" fulfilled?40 
(a) So, is it nonderivatively good for a person to have an intrinsic 
now-for-then desire fulfilled? For example, is it possible for a person to 
improve his life by fulfilling the prospective desires he once had but no 
longer has? And can it be good for a person that his present pro­
spective desire will be fulfilled in the future, i.e. can a person's well-
being be affected "retroactively"? I think not, and for the following 
reason: Suppose that a person P has an intrinsic desire at ti that a situa­
tion X holds at some future time £2, and that it is claimed that it is non­
derivatively good for P to have this desire fulfilled. We can then ask: 
39The term "now-for-then desire" is from Hare (1981), and the terms "prospective" 
and "retrospective" from Bykvist (forthcoming). 
40It is worth noting that all this is inconsistent with Sumner's (1996) idea that 
desires are essentially prospective (cf. pp 128-129). This is not the only way in 
which Sumner's conception of desire differs from the conception adopted here, 
however. For example, desire has (on Sumner's view) no negative counterpart; 
according to him, "[a]version is the opposite not of wanting but of liking"; cf. note 
24 on p 125. Moreover, desire seems (on his view) to imply lack; cf. p 129, where 
he writes that "I can want only what I have not yet got" (but shouldn't he write 
"what I believe I have not yet got"?). In short, Sumner's notion of desire is quite 
narrow, something which is intimately connected with the view that desiring X is 
only one of many possible ways in which we can be in favour of X (where liking 
X, enjoying X, approving of X, and endorsing X are examples of other possible 
ways). On the conception adopted here, desire is a much broader phenomenon 
(e.g., most likings are regarded as desirings). However, this (broader) notion of 
desire is not necessarily as broad as the notion of pro-attitude; there may be 
positive attitudes which can not be regarded as desires, e.g., enjoyments (where 
enjoying X implies being aware of X). 
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For whom is it supposed to be good that X obtains at 12? Good for P, of 
course, but good for P-when? It seems that it cannot be good for P-aM2 
(when he no longer has the desire)41. Neither can the fact (if it is a fact) 
that X will occur at 12 be ("retroactively") good for P-at-fj. This 
suggests that there is no point in time t at which it is good for P-at-t to 
have the desire fulfilled. So, can it be good for P-over-time that X 
obtains at 12? I think not. On my view (cf. appendix C), all goodness-
for-P is goodness-for-P-at-some-time, and there is (for this reason) no 
such thing as goodness-for-P-over-time. And if it is also the case that 
only things which occur at t can be nonderivatively good for P-at-f, this 
means that the unrestricted desire theorist can (and should) regard all 
prospective desires as irrelevant42. 
If t his is so, it can never be good for a dead person P to have his last 
(prospective) wish fulfilled (assuming that death is real, that is). If death 
means annihilation, there is no such thing as P-after-death (for whom 
things can be good or bad), and neither can it be "retroactively good" 
for P-before-he-died to have the wish fulfilled. And if there is no point 
in time t at which it is good for P-at-f to have the wish fulfilled, then it 
can not be good for P to have it fulfilled (this follows from the idea that 
41Especially not if P -at-t2 is not aware of t he fact that the once desired situation 
obtains, or if "the desired state of affairs turns out upon later experience to be 
disappointing or unrewarding" (Sumner (1996), p 132). In this context, it is also 
worth noting that "just as we can be disappointed when we get what we expect or 
have aimed for, so we can be pleasantly surprised when we get what we do not 
expect and have not aimed for" (ibid., p 132). That is, a situation may well be good 
for a person even if he had no prospective desire for this situation, and this means 
that if desires were essentially prospective (as Sumner believes), then (Dl) would 
be refuted. 
42However, it might be objected: "Of course it can be good for me to have my 
past desires fulfilled. This idea can only be rejected by someone who has an 
extremely superficial conception of what it means to have an identity. The 
connection between who and what I am now, and who and what I once used to 
be, is not merely a causal connection; the connection is much stronger than that. 
We are 'historical beings', e.g., what we are is not just causally dependent on our 
respective histories, it is also (in part) constituted by how we conceive of our 
respective histories. My 'life story' (as I conceive of i t) is (somehow) part of my 
identity, and this means that 'my past selves' are (in a sense) 'parts' of my 'present 
self. This implies that some of my past desires may (in some sense) be present 
desires, especially if they once played an important and central role in my life. For 
this reason, it may be good for me to have them fulfilled now; this may, for 
example, improve my story!". The argument is interesting, but I still tend to 
believe that the fulfilment of past prospective desires can not contribute directly to 
a person's well-being. 
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all goodness-for-P is goodness-for-P-at-some-time). This is not to say 
that it can never be good-period that a person's last wish is respected, 
however. In fact, I think we often have a reason to try to satisfy the 
prospective wishes of the dead, regardless of whether this is (strictly 
speaking) good for them or not. 
(b) The next question is whether it can ever be nonderivatively good 
for a person to have an intrinsic retrospective desire (a desire about the 
past) fulfilled43. Suppose P has an intrinsic desire at £2 that a situation X 
obtained at some past time fj (e.g., that he desires now that he had a 
job last year). Is it good for P to have this desire fulfilled (that he, in 
fact, had a job at the time)? I think not. It is not good for P-at-fj (who 
does not yet have the desire), and neither is it (or so it seems) good for 
P-at-^2, nor for P-over-time. In short, if all goodness-for-P is goodness-
for-P-at-some-time (and if X ca n not be nonderivatively good for P-aM 
unless it occurs at t), it can not have nonderivative value for us to have 
our retrospective desires fulfilled. Moreover, the idea that it has non-
derivative value for us to have our intrinsic retrospective desires ful­
filled implies that we can improve the quality of our present lives directly 
(and to a considerable extent) simply by wanting (intrinsically) that our 
43Assuming that there are such desires, that is. But is this really so? That is, (i) are 
there such things as full-fledged retrospective desires, and (ii) if there are, are 
these desires ever intrinsic? (i) Well, it seems that there are full-fledged 
retrospective desires; my regretful wish that I behaved differently yesterday is (it 
seems) a good example of a such a desire. This common sense belief is not 
necessarily consistent with a functional conception of desire, however (cf. 
appendix F). It is true that my retrospective wish may well be connected to action-
tendencies and/or dispositions to act in certain ways (e.g., the tendency to 
compensate the person I wronged, or "to set things right"), but (so the argument 
goes) the wish is not properly connected to action-tendencies. The tendency to "set 
things right" is properly connected to the prospective desire to "set things right", a 
desire that may or may not be caused by my retrospective wish. It might be 
objected, however: "The reason why our retrospective desires are not 'properly 
connected to action-tendencies' is not that they are retrospective, but that they are 
impossible to satisfy (and that we believe this), and that they are (for this reason) 
impossible to act on. If we could affect the past, and if w e would believe that it 
were possible (e.g., by making time travels, or by asking God to change the past), 
then we would sometimes take steps to undo parts of the past, and in these cases 
our retrospective desires would be properly connected to action-tendencies. This 
means that we can accept the functional conception of desire and still regard these 
desires as full-fledged desires", (ii) So, are retrospective desires ever intrinsic? 
Well, it seems possible that they are, but it is (I think) rather "abnormal" to have 
such desires. 
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respective histories are what they are, and this is absurd44. That is, the 
unrestricted desire theorist can (and should) regard all retrospective 
desires as irrelevant. 
To sum up, the unrestricted desire theorist should regard both pro­
spective and retrospective desires as irrelevant, That is, he should 
accept the idea that if the time of a desire does not coincide with the 
time of its object, i.e. with the time of its fulfilment (in the traditional 
sense), then it can never have nonderivative value for the desiring 
subject to have the desire fulfilled. Or alternatively put> the desire 
theorist should reject the traditional notion of f ulfilment and replace it 
with the idea that P's desire that X is fulfilled (in the relevant sense) if 
and only if P desires that X, X h olds, and the desire and its object are 
simultaneous (the time of the desire coincides with the time of the 
occurrence of X)45 (cf. (i) on p 162). 
Now, if we accept this view, there are (it seems) a number of 
problems that we will have to face. The first problem is this: The 
synchronist view seems to suggest that Bert's present desire to be 
together with Alice from now on (e.g., until death do them apart) and 
his present desire to be together with Alice now (where this now has at 
least some temporal extension) are equally relevant, i.e. that it is equally 
good for Bert-now to have the two desires fulfilled (in the traditional 
sense)46. But is this really a plausible idea? Well, this seems to depend 
on how the propositional content of the latter ("now-for-nowish") 
desire is specified. If the object of this desire is to be together with Alice 
now (period), I don't think the claim is plausible. However, if the object 
of the desire is (instead) to be together with Alice now "qua part of a 
much larger temporal whole"47, the claim is far from implausible: it is, 
44This is (of course) not to say that it can not be good for a person to be satisfied 
with his past for other reasons, e.g., for hedonistic reasons. 
45This is the view that Tännsjö (forthcoming) calls "The Theory of Simultaneous 
Satisfaction of Preferences", and it is similar to the view that Bykvist (forthcoming) 
calls "synchronism". It is also implicit in Hare's (1981) conception of happiness 
(according to which happiness is a matter of fulfilment of "now-for-now desires"; 
cf. p 103). 
46This is based on the assumption that the "now-for-now content" (or "now-for-
now component") of the former desire is identical with the content of the latter 
(now-for-now) desire. 
47So, when Bert desires to be together with Alice now qua part of a much larger 
temporal whole, what exactly is it he desires? Well, roughly, he desires (i) that he 
be together with Alice now, (ii) that their relationship is open, that their future 
prospects are good, and (iii) that this permeates their being together. (This is, I 
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after all, likely that the situation "being with Alice now qua beginning" 
ranks much higher on Bert's preference ordering than the situation 
"being with Alice now (period)". But this gives rise to yet another 
problem: Are desires for things qua parts of larger temporal wholes 
really now-for-now (or "now-for-nowish") desires, i.e. can the 
synchronistic view really regard such desires as relevant? Well, if the 
interpretation that was given in note 47 is adopted, I think the answer 
is "yes". In short, it seems that the synchronist view need not "ignore" 
the fact that we are future-oriented, i.e. that some of our strongest 
desires are (in part) prospective48. (We may also ask whether desires 
for things qua parts of larger temporal wholes are really intrinsic. I think 
they are, at least if we take "intrinsic" to mean "final" rather than 
"intrinsic proper"; cf. pp 183 and 186 below). 
This is another problem which is actualized by the synchronistic view: 
It seems that there are desires (e.g., certain bodily appetites) which dis­
appear when they are satisfied. Moreover, some of these desires (e.g., 
longing) are "essentially" desires for something which is absent: they 
are essentially connected to lack. Such a desire can exist only as long as 
it is not satisfied, and it therefore disappears as soon as it is fulfilled. 
Now, it seems that it is good for a person to have such a desire fulfilled, 
even though the time of the desire does not coincide with the time of its 
fulfilment49. Does this mean that we have to reject the synchronistic 
view? I think not. Or more specifically, I think that if we understand 
why it is good for us to have such essentially unsatisfied desires ful­
filled, we will see that there is no real threat to this view. 
So, suppose that P has an (intrinsic) unsatisfied desire (e.g., that he is 
thirsty), and that this desire is fulfilled at t, and therefore disappears. 
Suppose also that it is (nonderivatively) good for P to have the desire 
fulfilled. But why is this? If we accept the sychronistic view, it seems 
suggest, the "now-for-now component" of Bert's present desire to be together 
with Alice from now on). 
48It is worth pointing out that Bykvist (forthcoming) has, for similar reasons, 
given up the synchronistic view altogether. His own alternative is what he calls 
"the existence requirement". 
49This is (of course) an idealization. In real life, there is almost always some 
overlap in time, e.g., if I am thirsty and strongly want to drink some water, it is 
unlikely that this desire disappears as soon as I start drinking; it will at least take a 
few seconds before it disappears. But then it really disappears, i.e. it does not just 
seem to disappear, it is not just the unpleasant feeling with which it is associated 
that disappears. 
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that we cannot explain this intuition on desire theoretical grounds: If 
the time of the desire does not coincide with the time of its fulfilment, 
and if a ll goodness-for-P is goodness-for-P-at-some-f, then it can not be 
good for P to have the desire fulfilled. It is not good for P-before-£ 
(who has the desire), and neither it is good for P-after-i (who no 
longer has the desire). So, why is it good for P to have the desire ful­
filled? As I see it, there are two possible explanations, both of which are 
fully compatible with "the theory of simultaneous satisfaction of 
preferences": 
(i) It is good for hedonistic reasons: The reason why this kind of 
desire-fulfilment is good is not that the desire is fulfilled, but that it is 
eliminated. And the reason why it is good for P to have it eliminated is 
mainly that it is unpleasant to have unsatisfied appetites, but it may also 
be positively pleasant to get rid of them. 
(ii) What we think of as an unsatisfied appetite is a complex thing, 
e.g., to be thirsty is not merely to have a desire to drink, it also contains 
an aversion to not-drinking, and maybe also an aversion to the feeling 
of thirst (aversions that may well be intrinsic). What is "good" for P 
when he has the appetite satisfied is not (strictly speaking) that he has a 
desire fulfilled, but that aversions that were fulfilled before t are no 
longer fulfilled, i.e. his well-being has been improved by removing 
something bad rather than adding something good. 
In short, the problem concerning "essentially unsatisfied appetites" 
are not really a problem, and we can retain the "synchronistic view". 
The remaining temporal issue has to do with duration rather than 
with the relation between the time of a desire and the time of its ful­
filment. The problem I have in mind is this: Suppose a person P has a 
desire fulfilled at t. Suppose also that the desire came into existence 
before t, i.e. that it has been unfulfilled for some time. Does it (on the 
desire theory) matter how long P had the desire before it was fulfilled? 
Or more specifically, if P has two intrinsic desires that are equally 
strong, and if one of them is "old" (he has had it for a long time) and 
the other is much "younger" (it came into existence more recently), isn't 
it (nonderivatively) better for P to have the older desire fulfilled than to 
have the younger desire fulfilled? I think not. How old a desire is is not 
in itself relevant; it is relevant only if (an d because) P himself prefers to 
have older desires fulfilled than to have younger desires fulfilled, i.e. if 
the "age" of a desire will (for P) have an impact on its strength. That is, 
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the unrestricted desire theorist need not reject the idea that "strength 
is what matters" (at least not for this reason); he can safely accept the 
idea that it is better for the desiring subject to have the stronger of two 
intrinsic desires fulfilled, no matter how long this subject has had the 
desires50. 
4.4. The intrinsicality condition 
We have already seen that the desire theorist (as characterized by me) 
accepts the "intrinsicality condition", i.e. the view that intrinsicality is a 
necessary condition for relevance, that it can never be nonderivatively 
good for a person to have a desire fulfilled unless this desire is intrinsic. 
In order to determine whether this is a plausible condition, we first 
have to know how it should be understood, i.e. what it is that makes a 
desire intrinsic. 
So, what is it to desire something intrinsically, in an intrinsic way? Let 
us look at some typical answers that have been given to this question. 
According to Rabinowicz and Österberg (1996), to prefer something 
intrinsically is to "prefer it for its own sake" (p 1), and according to 
Parfit (1984), intrinsic (or "un-derived") desires are desires that are not 
"for what are mere means to the fulfilment of other desires" (p 117). 
And in Brandt's (1979) terminology, to have an intrinsic desire that a 
certain situation obtains is (roughly) to simply want it to obtain, "for no 
further reason", and not because of its probable further effects51. 
50Another problem concerning duration and value-for is this: If it is 
nonderivatively good for a person to have his intrinsic desires fulfilled, and 
nonderivatively bad for him to have his intrinsic aversions fulfilled, doesn't this 
imply that it is (nonderivatively) better for him the longer his intrinsic desires are 
fulfilled, and that it is worse for him the longer his intrinsic aversions are fulfilled? 
Now, this problem has already been discussed in connection with hedonism (cf. 
appendix E), and my answer is again that such claims do not really make sense. 
(There is no such thing as goodness-for-P-over-time, and there is no point in time 
t such that it is better for P-at-f that a desire is fulfilled for a longer time). What we 
can meaningfully say is this: (i) "At every point in time t, it is nonderivatively good 
for P-at-f to have his intrinsic f-for-f desires fulfilled and bad for P-at-f to have his 
intrinsic f-for-t aversions fulfilled", and (ii) "It is better-period if a certain desire is 
fulfilled for a longer time than if it is fulfilled for a shorter time". 
51Or to be more specific, this is the definition of " occurrent intrinsic valence" that 
Brandt (1979) offers (a definition which is based on his particular version of the 
functional conception of desire): "/.../ an outcome O is occurrently intrinsically 
valenced for a person at a time t if a nd only if his central nervous system at t is 
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None of these answers are precise enough, however. As I see it, 
there at least three ways in which the phrase "X is desired intrinsically" 
can be understood in this context, viz. the following ones: 
(i) A situation is desired intrinsically (in "the proper sense"; cf. appen­
dix A) if and only it is desired for its intrinsic properties, or in isolation, 
rather than for its relational properties, i.e. extrinsically52. 
(ii) A situation is desired intrinsically if and only it is desired "finally", 
i.e. as an end53, rather than instrument ally, i.e. as a means, or "for the 
sake of something else". (That is, to have an instrumental desire that a 
situation obtains is to want it to obtain for a certain kind of reason, i.e. 
because it is probable that it will have certain effects, or because it will 
make certain other situations possible). 
(iii) A desire is intrinsic if and only it is un-derived r ather than derived, 
where a desire is underived if and only if it is not derived. So, what is it 
for a desire to be derived? Derived from what, and how? The idea is 
that desires can be derived from other (more fundamental) desires, on 
the one hand, and beliefs, on the other (just like beliefs can be derived 
from other beliefs). Here are three examples of how a desire can be 
derived (or "inferred") from a more fundamental desire and a belief: 
P desires to engage in some physical activity 
P believes that hiking is a physical activity 
Therefore54, P desires to go hiking55 
such that if h e judged (thought with belief) that a certain act by him at t would 
tend to bring about O, then, even in the absence of any further judgements about 
O (such as its probable further effects) not contained in the concept of O, there 
would be an increase in his tendency to perform the act. We must also require 
that the O said to be intrinsically valenced be stripped down so as not to include 
elements irrelevant to the increase of the person's tendency to perform the act" (p 
32). Apart from being too imprecise with regard to what it is for a desire to be 
intrinsic, this definition also suffers from another defect, viz. it implies that a 
person can only desire something intrinsically if h e believes that he can bring it 
about (which is surely a strange implication). 
52It is worth noting that this terminology is really easier to grasp in the case of 
desire-for (where the objects are things) than in the case of desire-that (where the 
objects are situations). Cf. appendix A, note 16. 
53This is the second possible interpretation of "for its own sake". 
54This is (of course) not the whole story, much more than this is required, e.g., 
that P thinks that hiking is (at the moment) the funniest, or most accessible (to 
him), physical activity. This holds for the other two "inferences" as well: the 
conclusions do not follow from the premises unless a number of assumptions are 
added. 
55It should be noted that in cases like this, when a desire is derived in this way, a 
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P desires that his life be good 
P believes that having friends is an essential part of a good life 
Therefore, P desires that he has friends 
P desires to be happy 
P believes that if he gets a job, then he will be happy 
Therefore, P desires to get a job 
These examples are illustrations of what I think are the three major 
kinds of derivations of desires. The reason why the three inferences 
are so different is that the beliefs involved (i.e. the propositional con­
tents of these beliefs) are of different kinds: In the first case, the belief 
is a "subsumption" (or classification); hiking is classified as a physical 
activity. In the second case, it is believed that something is a part of 
something else (a whole). In the third case, the belief is (so to speak) 
"instrumental": it is a belief about what causal connections hold in the 
world. 
So, this is (roughly) how desires can be derived. But what is it for an 
actual desire to be derived? Well, in my terminology, a person P's desire 
DD is actually derived if and only if P has a more fundamental desire D 
and a belief B such that (i) DD is derivable from D and B, and (ii) P has 
actually performed the inference (correctly)56. 
Let us now look at how these three distinctions are related to each 
other. First, what is the relation between the intrinsic/extrinsic distinc­
tion and the final/instrumental distinction? Well, to begin with, it is clear 
that all instrumental desires are extrinsic: To desire X because of its 
probable further effects is to desire it for its (probable) relational 
properties, i.e. extrinsically. But is it also the case that all extrinsic 
desires are instrumental? Not necessarily. Consider the desire to have 
friends, where this circumstance is not regarded in isolation, but qua 
part of a certain kind of l ife. This desire is not intrinsic, but it may well 
be "final"57. That is, the first two distinctions are not necessarily exten-
sionally equivalent with each other. 
fulfilment of the derived desire is also (on the assumption that the belief is true) a 
fulfilment of the desire from which it is derived. 
56Or something of the sort: it is possible that (ii) is too strong a condition. 
57Another possible example of such a desire is the desire to make more money 
than one's friends. This desire may well be "final", but can it be intrinsic? Well, I 
tend to think it can, but I am not sure. 
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So, how is the distinction between underived and derived desire 
related to the other two distinctions? Well, it seems that all our un­
derived desires are "final" desires (intrinsic or extrinsic)58, but not vice 
versa, i.e. there are (obviously) final desires (e.g., intrinsic desires) 
which are derived. For example, a desire that is derived from an intrin­
sic desire and a non-instrumental belief of the identification type may 
well be intrinsic, and the same thing holds for those of our desires that 
are derived from an intrinsic desire and a non-instrumental belief of the 
part-whole type59. (Examples of this are already given above; we just 
have to assume that the more fundamental desires in the examples are 
intrinsic). That is, not all derived desires are extrinsic (e.g., instru­
mental); there are desires that are both intrinsic and derived. 
Let us now ask ourselves which of these three senses of "intrinsic 
desire" that a desire theorist should accept, i.e. which of the three 
senses that makes the intrinsicality condition most plausible. For 
example, should the desire theorist just ignore a person's instrumental 
desires, or should he also ignore those of his derived desires and/or 
extrinsic desires which are not (strictly speaking) instrumental? 
Let us first establish that the desire theorist should not conceive of 
intrinsic desires as underived desires, i.e. that in order to be plausible, 
the intrinsicality condition should not be conceived of as a condition of 
"underivedness". To establish this, we have to consider a desire that is 
(at the same time) intrinsic (in the proper sense), final, and derived, and 
then ask whether it can (on a plausible desire theory) be nonderivati-
vely good for a person to have such a desire fulfilled. And of c ourse it 
can (would anyone who had the difference between the two distinc­
tions pointed out to him reject this view?)60. It is not entirely unproble-
58That is, there are no underived instrumental desires; all instrumental desires are 
derived (e.g., from intrinsic desires and instrumental beliefs). 
59Desires derived in these ways may be intrinsic, but they need not be intrinsic: It is 
not the intrinsicality (or "finality") of a desire that is derived, but its propositional 
content. For example, that someone wants intrinsically that a certain whole is the 
case does not imply that he wants all the parts intrinsically (as far as I can see, it 
doesn't even imply that he wants all the parts!). 
60This difference between the intrinsicality condition interpreted as a condition of 
"underivedness" and the other interpretations of the intrinsicality condition might 
be of little practical importance, however, viz. for the following reason: It is often 
the case that the fulfilment of a derived intrinsic desire is, at the same time, a 
fulfilment of the intrinsic desire from which it is derived (e.g., if the desire to go 
hiking is fulfilled, so is the desire to engage in physical activity; cf. note 55 above). 
But in cases like this, it hardly has nonderivative value for a person to have his 
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matic to attribute nonderivative value to the fulfilment of derived 
desires, however. Suppose a person P has two intrinsic desires, D1 and 
D2, and that D2 is derived from Dl. Suppose also that if D 2 is fulfilled, 
so is Dl. Is it, in this case, really plausible to attribute nonderivative 
value-for-P both to the fulfilment of Dl and to the fulfilment of D2? 
Well, I can't see why not. It is important that we do not conceive of the 
two fulfilments as separate, however, and that we do not think that 
both fulfilments contribute to P's overall well-being (cf. pp 158-159 
above)61. 
So, which "condition of intrinsicality" should the desire theorist 
accept; should he accept (i) the idea that it can never be nonderivatively 
good for a person to have a desire that X fulf illed unless X is desired 
for its intrinsic properties (in isolation), or (ii) the idea that it can never 
be nonderivatively good for a person to have a desire that X fu lfilled 
unless X is desired as an end? 
Well, on my view, it is rather obvious that the desire theorist should 
accept (ii), especially if the synchronistic view has already been adopted. 
Let us return to the example that was given on p 179. If the desire 
theorist wants to retain the difference between Bert's intrinsic desire to 
be together with Alice now qua part of a life-long relationship (in the 
sense this was given in note 47) and his intrinsic desire to be to with 
Alice now (period), and if h e wants to give more weight to the former 
than to the latter (as he should), then he must accept (ii) rather than (i). 
What matters is what we desire as ends, and not what we desire in 
isolation. 
The unrestricted desire theory has now been given a sufficiently 
precise formulation, and we can now move on to "the questions of 
plausibility". 
derived intrinsic desires fulfilled because these fulfilments are, at the same time, 
fulfilments of some underived intrinsic desire. 
61It is also worth noting that if we regard certain derived desires as relevant, this 
might (as Jan Österberg has pointed out) mean that there are relevant desires the 
strengths of which are not as independent of probability judgements as I would 
want them to be (cf. pp 172-175 above). 
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Chapter Five 
Is the desire theory (in any of its versions) 
a plausible theory of prudential value? 
A critical discussion of the desire theories 
The main purpose of this chapter is to find out whether the desire 
theory (in any of it s versions) is a justified (or well-founded) theory of 
prudential value. The focus will be on the satisfaction interpretation, 
rather than on the object interpretation, of the theory1. And since we 
have assumed that it is not possible to give a satisfaction interpretation 
of a desire theory unless it is an actual desire theory2, this implies that 
we will focus on actual, rather than idealized, desire theories3. 
xThe main reason for this is that the former theory is a substantive evaluative 
theory (it makes substantive claims about value-for), while the latter theory is a 
formal theory (rather than making substantive claims about what is good and bad 
for us, it tells us how to determine what is good and bad for a person) (cf. pp 26-
29). 
2That is, on my view, all idealized desire theories presuppose the object 
interpretation. Or alternatively put, if we accept the satisfaction interpretation, we 
also have to accept (Dl)(cf. e.g., p 35), but if w e accept the object interpretation, 
we need not accept the counterpart to (Dl), viz. the idea that if X is 
nonderivatively good for P, then it is desired by P (this idea is a part of (OD1) on p 
40). The main reason why idealized desire theories cannot be given satisfaction 
interpretations is that it would be implausible to attribute nonderivative value-for-
P to queer entities like the conjunction "P would have intrinsically desired that X 
obtains if he were rational (informed, or the like) and X obtains". 
3However, the fact that the idealized desire theory (even though it is not a 
substantive theory of prudential value) constitutes a threat against all actual desire 
theories means that we can not ignore it altogether. We will take a closer look at 
the idealized desire theory on pp 275-278. 
At this point, we may also add that as long as we are concerned with questions 
of plausibility, and as long as it is actual desire theories that we are interested in, it 
doesn't really seem to matter which of the two interpretations that we have in 
mind. For example, most arguments for or against an actual desire theory do not 
presuppose a certain interpretation, they "support" or "hit" both interpretations of 
the theory equally well. Now, there are arguments that are for or against one of 
the interpretations only (e.g., the idea that desire is not prior to value, which is 
only directed against the object interpretation of the actual desire theory), but 
these arguments all seem to be "metaethical" or "value theoretical" (or perhaps 
"justificatory"), rather than evaluative (or normative), in character. On the issue of 
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So, what we primarily want to know is whether there are good 
reasons for regarding any version of the actual desire theory as valid 
(or true). Or more specifically, what we want to find out is this: 
(i) What possible version of t he actual desire theory is the most plau­
sible theory of prudential value, the unrestricted version or some kind 
of m odified (e.g., restricted) version? 
(ii) Is this (most plausible) version of t he theory a plausible theory of 
prudential value? This question is intimately connected to, but not iden­
tical with, the question of whether (Dl) ("the thesis of actuality") can be 
justified4. 
We will deal with (i) first, and save (ii) until later. When we deal with 
(i), we will (so to speak) put (ii) in brackets, or more specifically, we will 
assume that there is such a thing as a plausible version of the actual 
desire theory, i.e. that (Dl) is valid, that nothing but actual desire-ful-
filment can have nonderivative value for a person. It might not be pos­
sible to avoid (ii) entirely when discussing (i), however. Or to be more 
precise; it seems that we need to introduce the "arguments" for (Dl) at 
a pretty early stage. The reason for this is that it might not be possible 
to conduct the discussion of (i) (what version of the theory that is most 
plausible) independently of these "arguments". In particular, there are 
certain arguments for the unrestricted version of the theory (and 
against alternative versions) that do not just presuppose that (Dl) is 
correct, but that also seem to presuppose that it can be backed up by 
certain specific "arguments"5. 
which interpretation that is to be preferred, cf. the debate in Rabinowicz and 
Österberg (1996). 
4Here, it should be kept in mind that these questions might both be asked from 
different normative perspectives, and that the plausibility of various answers 
might be "strongly influenced by the point of v iew of the question" (cf. p 24 and 
appendix B). For example, it is possible that some version of the desire theory is 
the most plausible theory of prudential value from the first-person-perspective 
but not from the third-person-perspective (or in an interpersonal normative 
context), and it is possible that the version of the desire theory that is most 
plausible from the first-person-perspective differs from the version that is most 
plausible from the third-person-perspective (or in an interpersonal normative 
context). I don't think it will be necessary to make any use of this "insight", 
however (cf. e.g., p 25). 
5There is also another reason for presenting the arguments for (Dl) at an early 
stage, viz. because it helps the reader to understand what is attractive about the 
actual desire theory. 
So, why don't we begin with the question of whether (Dl) is plausible: why 
don't we also check out what counts against (Dl) at this stage? After all, if (Dl) 
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So, what version of the actual desire theory is most plausible? In 
order to find an answer to this question, we will first take a critical look 
at the only version of the actual desire theory with which we are (so 
far) familiar, viz. the unrestricted desire theory6. So, is the unrestricted 
desire theory a plausible version of the desire theory? 
5.1. A critical discussion of the unrestricted desire 
theory 
To recapitulate, these are the claims of the unrestricted desire theory 
(as it has been formulated above): 
(Dl) The only thing that can be nonderivatively good for a person is 
to have his actual intrinsic now-for-now desires fulfilled (and so on). 
(UD2) The thesis of Unrestrictedness: There are no (intrinsic, now-
for-now) desires that it is not nonderivatively good for a person to 
have fulfilled (and so on). 
(UD3) To the extent that it is possible to determine just how strong 
our desires and aversions are: The nonderivative value (positive or 
negative) that it has for a person P to have the desire that X (or 
aversion to X) fulfilled is proportional to the utility of X (for P). That 
would turn out to be implausible, we would know that there is no plausible 
version of t he actual desire theory, and we would not have to bother with trying 
to find out what version that is most plausible. Well, let us put it this way: There 
are people who accept (Dl), and my answer to (i) is written with these people in 
mind. Moreover, there is (as we will see) more to the question "Is the most 
plausible version of t he actual desire theory plausible?" than whether or not (Dl) 
is plausible, and this "extra stuff" may well help us to decide which theory is the 
best alternative to the actual desire theory, an idealized desire theory or some 
"objective" theory (this claim might seem unintelligible at this point, but it will 
hopefully start making sense in due time). 
6We will not introduce any other (alternative) versions of the actual desire theory 
until we have seen how the unrestricted version can be (and has been) criticized. 
The reason for this is that these alternative versions are best understood as 
modifications of the unrestricted theory, modifications that have (roughly 
speaking) been made in order to deal with certain objections that have been 
directed against the unrestricted theory (cf. p 154 above). Why "roughly 
speaking"? Well, every argument against the unrestricted desire theory can also 
(at least if we take (Dl) for granted) be regarded as an argument for some 
modified version of the theory, and we should (for this reason) not get the 
impression that the objections directed against the unrestricted theory are (so to 
speak) independent of the modified theories. 
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is, to the extent that our desires and aversions are comparable with 
respect to strength: It is nonderivatively better for a person to have 
his intrinsic desire that X (or aversion to X) fulfilled than to have his 
intrinsic desire that Y (or aversion to Y) fulfilled if and only if he 
intrinsically prefers X to Y. This is the "intensity-orientation" of the 
theory. 
(UD4) To the extent that it is possible to determine how well off a 
certain person is: The value that a certain life has for the person who 
is living it is a function of how much desire-fulfilment and how much 
aversion-fulfilment that this life "contains", i.e. of how many of his 
(intrinsic, now-for-now) desires and aversions that are fulfilled, and 
of how strong these (fulfilled) desires and aversions are. The more 
desire-fulfilment and the less aversion-fulfilment a life contains, the 
better this life is for the person who lives it. 
So, in order to find out (i) whether the unrestricted theory is a plausible 
theory of prudential value, we have to find out whether (D1)-(UD4) 
are well-founded claims, and in order to find out (ii) whether the un­
restricted theory is a plausible version of the actual desire theory, we 
have to assume that (Dl) is valid, and then ask whether (UD2)-(UD4) 
should {given this assumption) be accepted or rejected7. In short, we 
have to look at the arguments that have (or can) be given for and 
against these claims, and ask ourselves whether they are good argu­
ments (and when we consider the arguments for and against (UD2)-
(UD4), we have to bear it in mind that most of them are based on the 
assumption that (Dl) is valid). Let us start with the pro-arguments. 
5.1.1. Arguments for the unrestricted desire theory 
Before we look at the pro-arguments themselves, let us make some 
general remarks on what it would take to justify (or argue successfully 
for) the unrestricted desire theory. 
In order to justify his theory, there are two rather different things 
that the unrestricted desire theorist needs to do: He needs to show 
7If we have "subjective justification" in mind, the question is (rather) whether we 
(I, you, etc.) are, on the assumption that we are justified i n regarding (Dl) as valid, also 
justified in regarding (UD2)-(UD4) as valid. 
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that (Dl) is justified, and he needs to show that (UD2)-(UD4) is justi­
fied, given that (Dl) is justified. Or more specifically: First, he needs to 
justify the idea that there is nothing else besides desire-fulfilment and 
aversion-fulfilment that is nonderivatively good or bad for a person: he 
needs to give us good reasons for accepting some version of the actual 
desire theory as valid. However, this means that he needs to show that 
there are good reasons for regarding all the alternative theories (e.g., 
hedonism) as false. Second, he also needs to show that there are (on the 
assumption that (Dl) is valid) good reasons for accepting (UD2)-(UD4) 
as valid too. However, to show (in this way) that the unrestricted 
theory is the most plausible version of the actual desire theory involves 
showing that no other version of the actual desire theory is (on the 
assumption that (Dl) is valid) plausible. 
So the question arises: How can unrestricted desire theorist possibly 
show all this? What type (or types) of a rguments would count as good 
reasons for preferring the actual desire theory to all the alternative 
theories of prudential value, and what type (or types) of arguments 
would count as good reasons for preferring (on the assumption that 
(Dl) is valid) the unrestricted theory to all the other versions of the 
actual desire theory? If we assume that there are (in fact) good reasons 
for this, what do these reasons have to be like? 
Let us first note that it is (probably because of the "subject-oriented 
nature" of the theory itself) impossible to come up with any subject-
oriented arguments for the desire theory, e.g., for (Dl)8. To see this, 
consider the following question: "What is it about us (our nature, our 
constitution) that makes it nonderivatively good for us to have our 
desires fulfilled?". This is an odd question, and it is rather obvious that 
it has no satisfactory answer, e.g., it seems odd to say that it is good 
for us to have our desires fulfilled because we are desiring beings, or 
because we have a need for desire-fulfilment, or because we desire to 
have our desires fulfilled. In short, there are no human features that 
could possibly be of relevance in this context, i.e. there are no facts 
8However, it might be possible to construct subject-oriented arguments against 
(Dl), and for some alternative (competing) theory, viz. arguments of the 
following kind: "The fact that human beings have the feature F (e.g., the fact that 
we are "social beings") suggests that situations of type X (e.g., spending time with 
one's friends) are nonderivatively good for us, no matter what we want and do 
not want". We will take a closer look at this type of argument in chapter 7. 
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about us that could possibly constitute a good reason for the idea that 
it is nonderivatively good for us to have our intrinsic desires fulfilled. 
(And it is important to note that it is not just the satisfaction inter­
pretation of the desire theory that can not be justified in a subject-
oriented way: There are no subject-oriented arguments for the object 
interpretation either. Too see this, consider the question "What is it 
about all persons P that makes it reasonable to believe that X is good 
for P iff (and because) P desires that X?")9. 
Now, it is not just that it is impossible to give a subject-oriented justi­
fication of the desire theory; it is hard to come up with any proper 
arguments, subject-oriented or object-oriented, for the idea that it is 
sometimes (or always) nonderivatively good for us to have our intrinsic 
desires fulfilled: What possible answers, if any, are there to questions 
like "Why does it sometimes have nonderivative value for us to have 
our intrinsic desires fulfilled?" or "Why is it sometimes nonderivatively 
good for a person to get what he intrinsically wants?"? It seems that if 
there are any proper (objective) arguments for (Dl) at all, they would 
have to take the form of counter-arguments against competing 
theories10, and if there are any proper arguments for (UD2)-(UD3) at 
all, they would have to take the form of counter-arguments against 
modified versions of the desire theory. As I see it, the only plausible 
alternative to this "negative view" is the idea that there are no proper 
pro-arguments at all, only "sources of appeal", or "subjective argu­
ments" that can convince certain people that the (unrestricted) desire 
theory is valid. 
Let us now look at the "arguments" that can be given for the un­
restricted desire theory. As has already been suggested, it is fruitful to 
divide these arguments into two groups, viz. (a) arguments for (Dl) 
and against those theories of prudential value which do not accept 
(Dl), i.e. "objective theories" and "idealized desire theories", and (b) 
9This is why we can't say that it is always the case, for every type of theory of 
prudential value, that a complete justification of this theory must be (in part) 
"subject-oriented". Instead, we should (because of the desire theoretical case) 
restrict the scope of this justificatory principle to substantive good theories of a 
more "objective" type (theories which do not contain any essential reference to 
our intrinsic features): It is only if a theory of prudential value is of this type that it 
needs to be justified in a "subject-oriented" way (cf. e.g., pp 110-112 above). 
i°Where these counter-arguments may also (at least in part) be of a metaethical 
nature, e.g., by appealing to the idea that there are no objective prudential values, 
only prudential evaluations. 
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arguments which purport to establish that (UD2)-(UD4) are valid, and 
that all modified desire theories are invalid, given that (Dl) is valid. We 
will start with the first group of arguments. 
"Arguments" for (Dl) and against other theories 
One of the main "reasons" why the desire theory seems intuitively plau­
sible to many people (at least to many "modern westerners") is that it 
appeals to "the idea of the Sovereign Subject"11, or what Harsanyi 
(1982) calls "the Principle of Preference Autonomy", i.e. the idea that "in 
deciding what is good and bad for a given individual, the ultimate cri­
terion can only be his own wants and his own preferences" (p 55)12. 
Now, it is rather obvious that this appeal to the principle of preference 
autonomy does not constitute an argument for the desire theory: The 
desire theory is best regarded as one of several possible interpretations 
(or specifications) of the principle, and it would be absurd to insist that 
the claim interpreted can constitute a good reason for accepting a 
certain interpretation of th is claim. Or alternatively, the principle of pr e­
ference autonomy is merely a rather vague (but catching) reformulation 
of the desire theory, and as such, it can not be conceived of as an 
argument for this theory. It still remains to be seen why we should 
accept the idea that "in deciding what is good and bad for a given 
individual, the ultimate criterion can only be his own wants and his own 
preferences". 
(i) One possible argument for the desire theory (and for the principle of 
preference autonomy) is this: A plausible conception of well-being must 
be flexible enough to "allow for the fact that the best lives for different 
people may contain quite different ingredients" (cf. Scanlon (1993), p 
190). Or as Sumner (1996) puts it, a theory of welfare can not be "des­
criptively adequate" unless it allows for the fact that "rich and rewar­
ding lives come in a variety of forms" (p 18). Now, as we already 
nThis phrase is from an earlier version of Scanlon (1993). 
12Or as Sumner (1996) puts it, the desire theory is "in tune with the liberal spirit of 
the modern age, which tend to see human agents as pursuers of autonomously 
chosen projects. Unlike objective theories, on which the sources of our well-being 
are dictated by unalterable aspects of our nature, the desire theory offers us the 
more flattering picture of ourselves as shapers of our own destinies, determiners 
of our own good" (p 123). 
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know, the actual desire theory puts very few restrictions on what a life 
must be like in order to qualify as "finally good" for this person, and it 
is therefore maximally flexible in this sense. But does this circumstance 
really constitute a reason for accepting the theory? 
This is how one might argue for a "no" answer: "First, it is (as 
Sumner (1996) points out) true that the desire theory is 'well placed to 
satisfy our demand for a unified account of th e nature of welfare, while 
allowing for the multiplicity and variety of it s sources' (p 122), but this 
does not mean that the desire theory is the most flexible theory, e.g., it 
seems that hedonism is just as flexible. And second, even if i t happens 
to be the case that the desire theory is more flexible than all the plau­
sible alternatives, this does not give us any reason for rejecting these 
theories: The alternative theories are surely flexible enough (this holds 
for all plausible versions of the 'objective list theory' as well), and by the 
way, flexibility is not everything." 
To this argument, the (unrestricted) desire theorist can respond as 
follows: "To demonstrate why our theory should be accepted, let us 
deal with the objective list theory first, and hedonism later. As far as 
the objective list theory is concerned, it is simply not true that it is flex­
ible enough, not even in its most plausible versions. To see this, consider 
what it is for a theory of w ell-being to be flexible enough. This is what 
Sumner (1996) suggests: 
No descriptively adequate theory of w elfare can simply favour /... / 
planning over spontaneity, /.../ complexity over simplicity, /.../ 
civilization over tribal life, I... I excitement over tranquillity, /.../ 
risk over safety, /.../ perpetual striving over contentment, /.../ 
sexuality over celibacy, /.../ companionship over solitude, /.../ 
religious conviction over atheism, /.../ rationality over emotion, 
I... I the intellectual life over the physical, or whatever (p 18). 
If we accept the idea that a plausible requirement of flexibility should be 
this strong13, we can hardly regard any objective list theory as flexible 
enough, and all such theories should therefore be rejected. And as far 
as the hedonistic theory is concerned, it is simply not true that it is as 
flexible as our theory (e.g., it does not allow for the possibility that an 
unpleasant life is a good life, regardless of what other features it has). 
13However, this requirement will be questioned in chapter 7, on pp 305-306. 
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Moreover, there are also (as we have seen) other reasons for rejecting 
the hedonistic theory. And note that it is not just that the objections 
made against hedonism (in section 3.2) do not hit the unrestricted 
desire theory; this theory also offers a possible explanation of why 
these objections have the force they have14. To sum up, both the hedo­
nistic theory and the objective list theory should be rejected". 
(ii) On my view, this is the strongest argument for (Dl): "Consider an 
opposing view, such as the idea that it is nonderivatively good for 
people to feel pleasure, or to be engaged in creative activity. Now, ask 
yourself: Do you really think it would be good for a person to feel plea­
sure, or to engage in creative activity, if he did not have the slightest 
desire to do so? If t here is this person who strongly desires to perform 
routine tasks, and who has an aversion to being creative, do you really 
think it would be better for this person to be creative? Of course not! 
Depending on whether we choose to express ourselves in the idiom of 
the object interpretation or in the idiom of the satisfaction inter­
pretation, we can either conclude that it can not have nonderivative 
value for a person to engage in creative activity (etc.) unless he desires 
to do so15, or that nothing but actual desire-fulfilment can have non-
derivative value for a person, i.e. that (Dl) is valid". On my view, this is 
a striking argument, but it remains to be seen whether it is good 
enough to give us a sufficient reason to accept (Dl). We will return to 
this issue in section 5.3. 
Arguments for (UD2)-(UD3) and against modified desire 
theories 
If we assume that (Dl) is valid, how can the unrestricted desire theorist 
possibly show that (UD2)-(UD3) are valid, i.e. that all modified versions 
of the desire theory are wrong? What possible arguments can our un­
restricted desire theorist come up with? 
14Here, it is important to note that many of the objections directed against 
hedonism in the last chapter is not really compatible with the strong requirement 
of flexibility that was put forward above. But some of the objections are, and it is 
these that we should have in mind here. 
15It is worth noting that from this idea, it is but a short step to (OD1) on p 40, i.e. 
the stronger claim that it is good for a person to engage in creative activity (etc.) if 
and only if (and because) he has a desire to do so. 
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Well, the only argument I can think of is "the argument from purity". 
This is how such an argument for (UD2) (the idea that every intrinsic 
now-for-now desire is relevant) and against all restricted theories, 
would look like: It is important to keep it in mind that all restricted 
desire theorists are desire theorists, i.e. that they accept (Dl). Now, 
there is (on the face of i t) nothing incoherent about accepting (Dl) while 
rejecting (UD2), but if we go somewhat deeper, we will see that this is a 
somewhat problematic position. The problem can be formulated as 
follows (in the idiom of the object interpretation): Suppose we are 
restricted desire theorists: suppose we accept the idea that if X i s good 
for P, then P desires that X, but we reject the idea that if P desires that 
X, then X is good for P. But if we reject the idea that desire is sufficient 
for value, why should we accept the idea that desire is necessary for 
value? Or alternatively put, if we reject the idea that desire is sufficient 
for goodness, we also have to reject (OD1), i.e. the idea that X is good 
for P if a nd only if ( and because) P desires that X. But if w e reject this 
idea, what reason do we have for accepting the idea that desire is 
necessary for goodness? In short, all the modified versions of the 
desire theory involve some departure from the intuition that made us 
accept the desire theory in the first place, viz. "the idea of the 
Sovereign Subject". But if we reject this idea, it is not clear why we 
should accept (Dl). (That is, restrict, and you weaken your position in 
relation to objective theories and idealized desire theories16). It has 
been assumed that (Dl) is valid, however, and if we assume that it is 
valid "for a reason", it seems that we must also accept (UD2). So, this is 
the question that the restricted theorist has to face: "If you accept (Dl), 
and if you have a reason for accepting this claim, then you have to be 
faithful to that reason when you restrict. And if y our reason for accep­
ting (Dl) is the reason I think it is: why do you restrict at all?"17. 
So, is this a good argument? I think not, and the reason for this is 
that the purist assumption on which it is based is rather dubious. As has 
already been pointed out (on p 63), why assume that the most plausible 
16That is, the restricted desire theories are (so to speak) "squeezed" between the 
unrestricted desire theory and objective theories like quality hedonism. (Just like 
the self-interest theory can, on Parfit's view, be squeezed to death between 
consequentialism and the present-aim theory). We will return to this idea in 
section 5.3, when we look at the arguments against (Dl). 
17This is probably what Tännsjö (1993) has in mind when he claims (on p 78) that 
there is something arbitrary about all restrictions of the class of relevant desire. 
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theory of p rudential value is a simple theory? After all, we want to find 
the theory that best fit our semantic, evaluative, and normative intu­
itions18, and it is not likely that this is a simple theory. In particular, it is 
unlikely that the most plausible version of the desire theory is a simple 
theory. As Scanlon (1993) suggests (on p 187), if we want a desire 
theory that is in line with "the ordinary meaning of t he phrase 'quality 
of a person's life'", and that (at the same time) "preserves the idea that 
any improvement in a person's well-being has positive ethical value", 
then it seems that we simply have to reject the unrestricted version of 
the theory. 
This ends the list of arguments for the unrestricted actual desire 
theory. Let us now look at how this theory can be criticized. 
5.1.2. Arguments against the unrestricted desire 
theory 
Before we take a closer look at (some of) the arguments that can be 
directed against the theory, let us first make a few general remarks 
about what these arguments are (in fact) like, and what they have to be 
like in order to be successful. What would it take to refute the un­
restricted desire theory? 
Arguing against the unrestricted desire theory: A few 
general remarks 
Let us first point out that just as the unrestricted theory can not be jus­
tified in a subject-oriented way, neither can it be refuted (or criticized) 
in this way (there is a possible exception to this rule, however; cf. note 8 
above). This suggests that most (perhaps all) arguments against the un­
restricted desire theory can be regarded as attempts to show that the 
theory has unacceptable evaluative and/or normative implications, i.e. 
that the theory has implications which are inconsistent with certain valid 
(or widely accepted) evaluative and/or normative judgements19. As a 
18Cf. Sumner's (1996) idea (e.g., on pp 8-10) that a theory of welfare must be both 
normatively and descriptively adequate. 
19So, what about the idea that a theory of well-being should be consistent with 
our "semantic judgements", or more specifically, that it must not deviate too much 
from the ordinary meaning of the phrase 'quality of a person's life'"? Is this a third 
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rule, the judgements against which the theory is tested are more specific 
than the theory itself. They are rarely "fully particular" (i.e. of the form 
"the particular fact X is nonderivatively good for a particular person 
P"), however; at times, they are even "fully general", e.g., as in the 
following argument: "The desire theory implies that 'what you don't 
know may well hurt you', but this is not so, and the theory must there­
fore be rejected". 
At this point, it is important to keep in mind what our present aim is, 
viz. to determine whether the unrestricted desire theory is a plausible 
version of the desire theory (qua theory of prudential value). This fact, 
i.e. the fact that the theory we want to put to the test is a theory of 
prudential value, puts certain restrictions on what a normative or evalu­
ative intuition must be like in order to qualify as a "possible falsifier" of 
the theory. So, we have to ask ourselves what kinds of evaluative and 
normative judgements that are of r elevance in this context. What kinds 
of judgements should be included in the class of possible falsifiers (the 
class of judgements against which a theory of prudential value might, 
and ought to be, tested), and what kinds of judgements should be ex­
cluded from this class? This is how I think this question should be 
answered: 
The intuitions that are most relevant in this context are (of course) 
certain kinds of evaluative intuitions, viz. non-comparative intuitions 
about what desires and aversions it is nonderivatively good and bad 
for the desiring subject to have fulfilled, and comparative intuitions 
about which of two relevant desires that it is better for the desiring 
subject to have fulfilled. 
As I see it, there two kinds of normative intuitions that are of special 
interest in this context, viz. the following ones: 
(i) Intuitions about what kinds of desires that it is (on the desire-
fulfilment version of the self-interest theory of rationality) rational to 
try to fulfil20, or more precisely, intuitions about what version of 
kind of judgement with which a theory of well-being must be consistent? I think 
not. On my view, it is impossible to distinguish our evaluative intuitions from our 
semantic intuitions. This could explain why Sumner (1996) includes both in his 
criterion of "descriptive adequacy", the idea that a theory of welfare must "fit /... / 
our ordinary experience of welfare and our ordinary judgements concerning it" (p 
S). 
20Here, I ignore the possibility that trying to achieve what is good for one might 
make one worse off than one would otherwise be. 
198 
"preference-egoism" that is the most plausible theory of rational choice. 
(ii) Intuitions about what kinds of desires that it is morally right (from 
a preference-utilitarian point of view) to try to fulfil21, or more precisely, 
intuitions about what version of " preference-utilitarianism" that is the 
most plausible moral theory22. 
We must not assume that all intuitions of t ype (ii) are of r elevance in 
this context, however. As an illustration of this, consider the case of 
sadistic desire. It seems reasonable to assume that on the most plausible 
version of preference-utilitarianism, such desires should not be taken 
into account. This does not imply that it is never good for us to have 
our sadistic desires fulfilled, however, and neither does it imply that it is 
never rational to try to fulfil a sadistic desire. (The last wishes of the 
dead is another example). 
The following kinds of in tuitions are most certainly irrelevant in this 
context, i.e. they must not be regarded as possible falsifiers of a theory 
of prudential value: 
(i) Intuitions about what kinds of desires and aversions that it is (on 
the instrumental theory of rationality) rational for the agent to "act 
upon" (e.g., try to fulfil), or more precisely, intuitions about what 
version of the instrumental theory that is the most plausible theory of 
rational choice. The fact that intuitions of this kind are irrelevant has 
certain implications, e.g., the following one: Even though it may well be 
the case that "acting rationally means acting consistently on beliefs and 
desires that are not only consistent, but also rational" (Elster (1983), p 
15), this does not allow us to conclude that it is never good for us to 
have our irrational desires fulfilled. 
(ii) Intuitions about what kinds of desires and aversions that should 
be taken into account by a utility-oriented theory of social justice, i.e. 
intuitions about what kind of utility that should be justly distributed 
between the members of a society (assuming that it is utility, viewed as 
preference-fulfilment, and not something else, that should be justly 
distributed). 
21Here, I ignore the possibility that trying to achieve what is good-period might 
actually result in less good than some of the alternative courses of action. Cf. note 
20. 
22These are not the only relevant normative intuitions, however, e.g., intuitions 
about what one should do in order to benefit one's children or friends must also 
be regarded as relevant. Cf. also appendix B. 
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(iii) Intuitions about what version of "the social choice theory" that is 
the most plausible theory of collective rational choice, i.e. intuitions 
about what kinds of individual preferences that should serve as inputs 
to a collective choice if this choice is to be regarded as rational 
(assuming that a collective decision can not be rational unless it reflects 
the actual preferences of the members, that is). To see what is implied 
by the fact that intuitions of this kind are irrelevant, consider the follo­
wing case: Even though Elster (1983) may well be correct in claiming 
that "[f]or the purpose of social choice theory, we should not take 
wants as given, but inquire into their rationality or autonomy" (p 140), 
this does not allow us to conclude that it is never nonderivatively good 
for us to have our adaptive intrinsic desires fulfilled. 
To sum up, the important thing to notice here is that there are several 
evaluative and normative contexts in which desires and preferences 
might be of interest, and that preferences that are of relevance in one 
of these areas may well be irrelevant in the other areas. If we are not 
aware of this fact, we may take intuitions we have about one area and 
try to use them in another area, something which will most probably 
result in a terrible muddle. 
The arguments against the unrestricted desire theory: A 
brief overview 
There are at least two different ways in which the objections against 
the unrestricted actual desire theory can be classified. (1) First, they can 
be classified on basis of what claim or claims that is the primary target, 
i.e. on basis of what exactly that they purport to refute (or disprove). If 
we classify the objections in this way, we end up with the following 
categories: Arguments which are primarily directed against (Dl), argu­
ments which are primarily directed against (UD2), arguments which are 
primarily directed against (UD3), and arguments which are primarily 
directed against (UD4)23. (2) However, the objections to the un­
restricted desire theory (particularly the objections to (UD2) and 
(UD3)) can also be divided into the following three categories: Object-
oriented (or content-oriented) objections, rationality-oriented objec-
23However, it is worth pointing out that many of these "counter-arguments" are 
(as we will soon see) really "counter-claims" rather than proper counter­
arguments. 
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tions/ and objections that are neither object-oriented nor rationality-
oriented. So, let us now take a closer look at these categories of 
objections. 
(1) If w e classify the objections on basis of w hat claim or claims that 
they purport to refute, they will fall into the four categories mentioned 
above: 
(i) Arguments against (Dl), i.e. arguments that purport to show that 
there are other things besides actual desire-fulfilment that can be non-
derivatively good for a person. All these arguments are (at the same 
time) arguments for some alternative theory of p rudential value, either 
for some objective theory, or (if w e remain within the framework of t he 
desire theory) for some idealized version of the desire theory. 
However, since the present aim is to find out which version of the 
actual desire theory that is most plausible (given that (Dl) is true), we 
will not deal with these arguments until later. 
(ii) Arguments against (UD2) (the thesis of unrestrictedness), i.e. 
arguments that purport to show that there are actual intrinsic desires 
which it is not good for the desiring subject to have fulfilled. Most of 
these arguments are based on the assumption that (Dl) is true, and 
some of them also takes (UD3) for granted. It is important to observe 
that if (Dl) is taken for granted, then every argument against (UD2) is 
(at the same time) an argument for some restricted version of the desire 
theory. Or alternatively put, if (Dl) is not questioned, then every 
argument against (UD2) can be viewed as being delivered from the 
standpoint of some kind of re stricted desire theory: it can be viewed as 
part of a "discussion" that is (so to speak) internal to the desire 
theory24. 
(iii) Arguments against (UD3), e.g., arguments that purport to show 
that it is not always the case that the stronger a (relevant) desire is, the 
better it is for the desiring subject to have it fulfilled. It seems that all 
arguments of this kind take (Dl) for granted25, and furthermore, that 
they are not really directed against the intensity-orientation itself, but 
24So, what about arguments that purport to show that what people actually want 
may be "grossly against their interests" (cf. Parfit (1984), p 127)? Should these 
arguments be classified as arguments against (Dl) or as arguments against (UD2)? 
Well, on my view, all such arguments hit (if successful) (UD2), but I also suspect 
that most (or all) of them hit (Dl). 
25Whether or not (UD2) is taken for granted here does not matter. 
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the "actual intensity-orientation" of the theory, or the conjunction of 
(UD3) and (Dl). If it is true that (Dl) is always taken for granted in this 
way, then every argument against (UD3) is (at the same time) an argu­
ment for some non-intensity version of the actual desire theory, i.e. for 
some specific claim concerning relative weights26. 
(iv) Arguments directed against (UD4), i.e. arguments that purport to 
show that we should (roughly speaking) not regard a person's overall 
level of well-being as a function of how much desire-fulfilment and 
aversion-fulfilment there is in his life. Now, the counter-arguments I 
have in mind here are evaluative (or normative) rather than methodo­
logical27, i.e. they purport to show that even if (UD4) were methodo­
logically sound (e.g., even if i t were possible to individuate a person's 
desires in a proper way, calculate the relevant sums, and so on), it 
would not be valid anyway. It is worth noting that these arguments are 
not (at the same time) arguments for any particular alternative view, 
and they do not "in themselves" suggest any alternative (evaluative) 
claim that could replace (UD4). However, there are certain views that 
have been put forward in response to the criticism of (UD4), but most 
of these views can (as we will see on pp 217-219) hardly be considered 
as possible replacements of this claim. 
(2) Let us now take a closer look at the other possible way in which 
the objections to the unrestricted actual desire theory can be classified. 
To classify the counter-arguments in this way is (as we have already 
seen) to divide them into the following three categories: 
26It is worth noting that for every possible objection against (UD3), there is a 
corresponding objection against (UD2) (and vice versa), and that objections of the 
latter kind are always stronger than objections of the former kind. For example, 
the objections against (UD2) that purport to show that it is never good for us to 
have our irrational desires fulfilled are stronger than the corresponding objections 
against (UD3), viz. the objections that purport to show that it might be better for a 
person to have a rational desire fulfilled than to have an irrational desire fulfilled, 
even if t he latter desire is stronger. As we will see below, this circumstance has 
certain implications for in what order the objections against the unrestricted 
theory are best presented. 
At this point, it is also worth noting that the three types of objections (i)-(iii) 
correspond to the three possible ways in which the unrestricted actual desire 
theory can be modified, viz. (i) idealizations, (ii) restrictions (or eliminations), and 
(iii) modifications of the intensity-orientation, i.e. modifications which result in 
"non-intensity versions" of the actual desire theory. 
27There are (as we already know) strong methodological arguments against 
(UD4), arguments that have been "sketched" on pp 155-159 above. There will be 
no further elaboration of th ese arguments, however. 
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(a) Object-oriented objections, i.e. objections that purport to show 
that desires with certain kinds of objects (or propositional contents) 
should be regarded as more relevant than desires with other kinds of 
objects (contents). Objections of this kind are either directed against 
(UD2), the thesis of unrestrictedness, or against (UD3), the idea of 
proportionality (which includes the intensity-orientation). In the former 
case, it is claimed that desires with the "wrong kind" of content (e.g., 
desires that are not about the life of the desiring subject) should not 
count at all, and in the latter case, it is claimed that desires with the 
"right kind" of content should be regarded as more relevant than 
desires with the "wrong kind" of content. 
(b) Rationality-oriented objections, i.e. objections that purport to 
show that it is (roughly speaking) better for us to have our rational 
desires fulfilled than to have our irrational desires fulfilled. Again, 
objections of this kind can be directed both against (UD2) (they may 
purport to show that all irrational desires should be regarded as irrele­
vant) and against (UD3) (they may "merely" purport to show that 
rational desires should be regarded as more relevant than irrational 
desires). However, it is important to note that there are also rationality-
oriented arguments against (Dl), viz. when it is claimed that if P would 
desire that X under ideal circumstances (e.g., if he were rational or fully 
informed), then it is good for P that X obtains, even if P does not 
actually desire that X28. 
(c) Objections that are neither content-oriented nor rationality-
oriented, e.g., objections which appeal to the idea that we should give 
more weight to those of our desires that are sanctioned by higher-
order desires, or to those of our desires that we know that we have. 
Objections of this third kind are (again) either directed at (UD2) (e.g., 
when it is claimed that all desires that are not sanctioned by higher-
order desires should be regarded as irrelevant, or that it can not be 
good for a person to have a desire fulfilled unless he is aware of the 
occurrence of the object), or against (UD3) (e.g., when it is claimed that 
desires which are known to the desiring subject should be regarded as 
28It should be noted that a certain overlap between (a) and (b) is possible, that an 
objection can be object-oriented and rationality-oriented at the same time, but 
only if there are desires that are rational or irrational in virtue of their content. We 
might also add that if this is so, then there is a sense in which objections against 
(Dl) might be object-oriented. 
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more relevant than desires that are unknown to the subject). 
At this point, it should be rather obvious that the two classifications 
cross each other, e.g., objections of type (b) can be of type (i), but they 
can also be of type (ii) or (iii). The resulting two-dimensional classi­
fication of the objections can be illustrated as follows: 
against (Dl) against (UD2) against (UD3) 
object-oriented ? (cf. note 28) X X 
ratio-oriented X X X 
other kinds - X X 
I have chosen to present the objections "from top to bottom" rather 
than "from left to right". My reason for this is twofold. First, claims like 
(UD2) and (UD3) are rarely criticized in isolation, and it is (for this 
reason) rather problematic to classify the objections on basis of what 
claim they purport to refute. And second, every possible objection 
against (UD2) is a stronger version of some possible objection against 
(UD3), and every possible objection of the latter kind is a weaker ver­
sion of some possible objection of the former kind (cf. note 26), and it 
seems (for this reason) reasonable to put the criticism against (UD2) and 
the criticism against (UD3) together (they are, after all, based on the 
same vague intuitions). And if w e, on top of this, remind ourselves that 
most of these objections are based on the assumption that (Dl) is true, 
we can see that it is not a very good idea to let the presentation of the 
arguments follow the first classification. 
So, this is how the arguments against the unrestricted actual desire 
theory will be presented: First, we will look at some object-oriented 
objections, then at some rationality-oriented objections, and finally at 
some objections that are neither object-oriented nor rationality-
oriented. When we do this, we will, to the extent that it is possible, dis­
tinguish (within each group) between objections against (UD2) and 
objections against (UD3). (The objections against (Dl) will be saved 
until later). The last type of counter-argument that we will look at are 
the evaluative arguments against (UD4), arguments which cannot be 
classified as object-oriented, rationality-oriented, or the like. So, let us 
now look at the counter-arguments themselves. We will start with the 
first group of arguments, viz. the content-oriented (or object-oriented) 
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objections. 
Object-oriented objections to the unrestricted actual desire 
theory 
(i) The first argument is from Parfit (1984), and it is primarily directed 
against (UD2). Parfit writes: 
Suppose that I meet a stranger who has what is believed to be a fatal 
disease. My sympathy is aroused, and I strongly want this stranger 
to be cured. We never meet again. Later, unknown to me, this 
stranger is cured. On the Unrestricted Desire-Fulfilment Theory, this 
event is good for me, and makes my life go better. This is not 
plausible. We should reject this theory (p 494). 
Now, as it stands, this argument does not necessarily hit the thesis of 
unrestrictedness (as we have formulated it). Or more specifically, it is 
possible that the argument works for some other reason, e.g., because 
the benevolent desire in the example is prospective, or because the 
subject does not know that it has been fulfilled. However, it only takes 
a  s l i g h t  m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  e x a m p l e  t o  a c h i e v e  t h e  d e s i r e d  e f f e c t :  " A  
little later, while I still have the (intrinsic) desire, the stranger is cured. 
This does not have nonderivative value for me (not even if I happen to 
find out about it), and we should therefore reject the unrestricted 
desire theory". This is a strong objection to the theory. 
(ii) The first object-oriented argument suggests that benevolent desires 
of a certain type are irrelevant. Isn't it even more certain that certain 
malevolent desires should be regarded as irrelevant29? Suppose that 
Alice has an intrinsic now-for-now desire that Bert suffers. Is it really 
nonderivatively good for Alice to have this desire fulfilled? I think not. 
That is, it is not just that Alice's desire is irrelevant in the "social", or 
"interpersonal" context, e.g., that it can safely be ignored by a social 
choice theorist; it should also (and this is a different thing) be regarded 
as irrelevant in the present "intrapersonal" context. But notice that the 
29This is but a special version of a more general idea, viz. that all immoral desires 
(desires which do not survive moral criticism) should be regarded as irrelevant. 
This is not a very plausible idea, however. For example, if I have an intrinsic desire 
to perform an action that happens to be morally wrong, it is far from certain that 
it is not good for me to perform the action. 
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reason why Alice's desire should be regarded as irrelevant may not be 
the same in the two cases. For example, the reason why it should not 
count in the social context may be that it is "anti-social" (cf. Harsanyi 
(1982), who claims that "all clearly antisocial preferences, such as sadism, 
envy, resentment, and malice" must be "altogether excluded from our 
social-utility function" (p 56)), while the reason why it should not count 
in the present context might have more to do with the fact that it is 
other-regarding30. 
(iii) Suppose that Bert has the following two intrinsic now-for-now 
desires: A global desire to work as a doctor, and a local desire that 
Alice (to whom he is just talking) will take a fancy to him. Suppose also 
that the local desire is stronger. Isn't it, in this case, really better for 
Bert to have the weaker (global) desire fulfilled? Well, I think not, not if 
we have the relevant notion of strength in mind, i.e. place in a 
preference ordering. First, if we have the relevant conception of 
strength in mind, it is highly unlikely that our local desires will be 
stronger than our global ones, and second, even if they are (at times) 
stronger, this is no reason to reject the thesis of intensity. If Bert's 
desire to be liked by Alice is (in the relevant sense) stronger than his 
desire to work as a doctor, we should accept the idea that it is better 
for Bert that Alice likes him. (Better for Bert-at-that-time, that is. What 
is better for Bert-the-next-day is another matter). 
The Success Theory, the experience-oriented Success Theory, and the 
global Success Theory are examples of m odified desire theories which, 
in different ways, respond to objections of the object-oriented type. 
The different object-oriented versions of the desire theory (which need 
not necessarily be restricted, they can also be of a "non-intensity" kind) 
will be discussed in section 5.2.1. 
^The reason why the desire in the example is truly other-regarding is that it does 
not contain any reference at all to Alice. That is, if Alice would (instead) have 
desired that she makes Bert suffer, that he suffers as a result of her actions, the 
desire would not have been other-regarding. 
The idea that all other-regarding desires should be conceived of as irrelevant (in 
this context) has several attractive features, e.g., it would also explain why it is not 
good for Parfit to have the benevolent desire in (i) fulfilled, and it would imply 
that we do not have to bother with questions like "Is it better for me to have my 
benevolent desires fulfilled than to have my malevolent desires fulfilled?". But is 
the idea valid? This will be investigated in section 5.2.1 below. 
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Rationality-oriented objections to the unrestricted actual 
desire theory 
If w e (for the time being) ignore the objections to (Dl), we know that 
the rationality-oriented objections to the unrestricted desire theory are 
of two fundamental kinds, viz. objections that purport to show that it 
has no value whatsoever for a person to have his irrational desires ful­
filled (i.e. arguments against (UD2)), and objections that purport to 
show that it is (roughly speaking) better for a person to have his 
rational desires fulfilled than to have his irrational desires fulfilled (i.e. 
arguments against (UD3)). Or alternatively put, the basic idea is that 
those of our desires which do not survive rational criticism must either 
be regarded as totally irrelevant (their fulfilment does not make us 
better off a t all) or less relevant than those of our desires that survive 
such criticism. 
In this (critical) section, it is not really necessary to know what exactly 
that the rationality (or irrationality) of a desire consists in31. None of the 
objections below presupposes any particular conception of rational 
desire; they all focus on desires that are irrational on several con­
ceptions, e.g., desires which are based on beliefs that are both false and 
irrational, which the subject would not have "if he knew the relevant 
facts, was thinking clearly, and was free from distorting influences", 
and which have (on top of thi s) "the wrong kind of causal history". So, 
here are the objections: 
(i) Suppose that John has an intrinsic desire to spend time with Paul, 
and that this desire is derived from the intrinsic desire to spend time 
with his friends and the false (and irrational) belief that Paul is his 
friend. Is it really nonderivatively good for John to spend time with 
Paul and have his desire fulfilled? Is it as good as it would be if his belief 
were true, and Paul were (in fact) his friend? I think not. 
31However, it is worth noting already at this point that there are at least five 
different conceptions of rational desire, conceptions which give rise to five 
different "senses" in which a desire might be rational (irrational), viz. (i) Hume's 
theory, (ii) the informed theory, (iii) the deliberative theory, (iv) the genetic 
theory, and (v) the intrinsic theory. We will take a closer look at these conceptions 
in section 5.2.2, where we will also discuss what notion of rational desire that is of 
most relevance in this context, i.e. what conception of rational desire that makes a 
rationality-oriented modified desire theory most plausible. 
207 
(ii) Suppose that Bert has a strong intrinsic (now-for-now) desire to 
work for the CIA (MI6, SÄPO, or the like). Suppose also that this desire 
has been produced by watching movies of a certain kind, and that 
there is no way in which it could have been produced "naturally", i.e. 
"by experience with the actual situations which the desire is for". Does 
it, in this case, really have nonderivative value for Bert to work for the 
CIA? I think not. 
(iii) Suppose that Bert's intrinsic desire to be loved and admired by 
Alice is much stronger than his intrinsic desire to keep his job, and that 
the reason for this is that the former desire is derived from an ab­
normally strong desire to be admired and/or "loved" by "everyone". 
Suppose also that this more fundamental desire was produced by "an 
early and prolonged deprivation of something wanted". Can the actual 
desire theorist, in this case, really be certain that it is nonderivatively 
better for Bert to have the stronger desire fulfilled, i.e. that it is better 
for Bert that Alice loves and admires him than that he keeps his job? 
(Notice that this is an argument against (UD3) rather than against 
(UD2)). 
(iv) Suppose that Alice intrinsically prefers living alone (as a single) to 
living a family life. Suppose also that this preference is either adaptive or 
counteradaptive, i.e. that it is either a result of "adaptive preference 
formation" (it is caused by "the drive to reduce the tension or frustra­
tion that one feels in having wants that one cannot possibly satisfy"), or 
a result of "counteradaptive preference formation" (Alice lives a family 
life and believes that "the grass is always greener on the other side of 
the fence"). Is it, in both these cases, nonderivatively better for Alice to 
live as a single? I'm not quite sure that it is, especially not if we have the 
relevant notion of s trength in mind, i.e. rank in a preference ordering 
(The argument would surely be more convincing if we had felt intensity 
in mind; cf. the next argument below). 
(v) The following well-known argument is another version of the idea 
that our adaptive preferences should be regarded as irrelevant. Let us 
start from the idea that non-adaptive (e.g., autonomous) desires should 
(in the context of interpersonal comparisons, e.g., in the context of social 
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justice) have more weight than adaptive desires. Both Nussbaum (1990) 
and Sen (1985) have argued that actual desire is (in this area) "a 
malleable and unreliable guide to the human good" (Nussbaum (1990), p 
213)32. Their main reason seems to be that our actual desires are often 
adaptive desires, and that these desires are of little or no relevance in 
this context. This criticism is very similar to Elster's (1983) criticism of the 
"actual preference utilitarian" (who regards individual want satisfaction 
as "the criterion of ju stice and social choice"). He writes: 
[W]hy should the choice between feasible options only take account 
of i ndividual preferences if people tend to adjust their aspirations to 
their possibilities? For the [preference] utilitarian, there would be no 
welfare loss if the fox were excluded from consumption of the 
grapes, since he thought them sour anyway. But of course the cause 
of his holding them to be sour was his conviction that he would be 
excluded from consuming them, and then it is difficult to justify the 
allocation by invoking his preferences (p 109). 
This is Nussbaum's (1990) objection to the idea that what is good for 
people is (in this interpersonal context) "a function of the satisfaction of 
desires or preferences that people happen, as things are, to have": 
The central difficulty with this proposal is I... I that desire is a 
malleable and unreliable guide to the human good, on almost any 
seriously defensible conception of good. Desires are formed in 
relation to habits and ways of lif e. At one extreme, people who have 
lived in opulence feel dissatisfied when they are deprived of the 
goods of opulence. At the other extreme, people who have lived in 
severe deprivation frequently do not feel desire for a different way, 
or dissatisfaction with their way. Human beings adapt to what they 
have. In some cases, they come to believe that it is right that things 
should be so with them; in other cases, they are not even aware of 
32But what is this supposed to mean? Well, if we let PI and P2 be two desiring 
subjects, I think there are at least two different interpretations of this claim, viz. (i) 
"The increment of Pi's well-being that 'results from' having a certain actual desire 
D1 fulfilled may well be larger than the increment of P2's well-being that 'results 
from' having a certain desire D2 fulfilled, even if D2 is stronger than Dl" (This is 
based on the dubious assumption that the strength of Dl is comparable to the 
strength of D2); and (ii) "PI may be better off than P2, even if there is more actual 
desire-fulfilment in P2's life than in Pi's life". This claim seems more like an 
objection to (UD4), however, or to the desire theory as a whole. 
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alternatives. Circumstances have confined their imaginations. So if we 
aim at satisfaction of th e desires and preferences that they happen, as 
things are, to have, our distributions will frequently succeed only in 
shoring up the status quo (p 213). 
This is how Sen (1985) formulates the same argument (notice that he 
explicitly has the context of interpersonal comparisons in mind): 
Comparative intensities of desire /.../ are influenced by many 
contingent circumstances that are arbitrary for well-being compa­
risons. Our reading of what is feasible in our situation and station 
may be crucial to the intensities of our desires, and may even affect 
what we dare to desire. Desires reflect compromises with reality, and 
reality is harsher to some than to others. The hopeless destitute 
desiring merely to survive, the landless laborer concentrating his 
efforts on securing the next meal, the round-the-clock domestic 
servant seeking a few hours of respite, the subjugated housewife 
struggling for a little individuality, may all have learned to keep their 
desires in line with their respective predicaments. Their deprivations 
are gagged and muffled in the interpersonal metric of desire ful­
fillment. In some lives small mercies have to count big (pp 190-191). 
So, is this a good argument? Or more specifically: (a) Is it a good argu­
ment in the context in which it "really belongs", i.e. in "the context of 
interpersonal comparisons"? And (b) if it is, does it also show (as 
Nussbaum seems to think) that adaptive desires are less relevant than 
autonomous desires in the present (intrapersonal) context as well? Let 
us start with the second question: 
(b) No, I don't think so. The alleged fact that the actual desire theory 
is no good in the context of in terpersonal comparisons33 does not allow 
us to conclude that it is also bad qua theory of prudential value (cf. pp 
198-200 above). 
(a) In order to find out whether the argument is good if v iewed in its 
proper context, we need to proceed with care, viz. for the following 
reason: The notion of strength which is presupposed in Nussbaum's 
33The alleged fact can be more precisely formulated as follows: "Even if social 
justice would be a question of how final goods should be distributed, it would 
certainly not be defensible to accept the actual desire theorist's view on what has 
final value. And even if it were true that it is utility that we ought to maximize, it 
would certainly not be utility in this sense". 
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and Sen's formulations of the argument is certainly not rank in a cool 
preference ordering, but felt intensity {or perhaps motivational force); a 
person's intrinsic preference ordering is not that easily affected by his 
judgements of probability, e.g., by his beliefs about how likely he is to 
succeed if h e tries to fulfil a certain desire. So the question arises: Does 
the argument work if we have the proper notion of s trength in mind? 
Well, I think it does. How strongly a person wants something in the 
relevant sense is also (to a certain extent) causally dependent on his 
beliefs about his own possibilities34, and this suggests that we should 
reject the idea that it is actual desire-fulfilment that should be maximized 
or justly (e.g., equally) distributed. 
(vi) Suppose that Bert intrinsically desires to be betrayed, manipulated, 
slandered, deceived, and to suffer great pain. Is it really nonderi-
vatively good for him to have these desires fulfilled? It can be argued 
that it is not good for him, for the simple reason that the objects of 
these desires are not only (in some relevant sense) "in no respect worth 
desiring", but also "worth avoiding", e.g., because wanting these things 
is (in some sense) "against human nature"35. 
This ends the section on rationality-oriented objections to the un­
restricted desire theory. If any of these objections are valid, the actual 
desire theorist should accept some kind of rationality-oriented modified 
desire theory. 
Other types of objections to the unrestricted actual desire 
theory (objections that are neither object-oriented nor 
rationality-oriented) 
As I see it, there are two types of interesting objections which belong to 
this category. First, there are the objections which appeal to the idea 
that we should give more weight to those of a person's desires that are 
34The fact that I adjust my aspirations to my perceived possibilities need not have 
any effect on my preference ordering at all, however. For example, the fact that I 
believe that it is impossible for me to get rich and therefore lower my 
expectations does not necessarily make the situation "I am rich" drop on my 
preference ordering. 
35It is worth noting that even though this objection is (strictly speaking) object-
oriented, I prefer to regard it as rationality-oriented. 
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sanctioned by his higher-order desires, evaluations, or ideals than to 
those of his desires that are not sanctioned by his higher-order desires 
(etc.), e.g., that we should give little or "no weight to the desires that 
someone wishes that he did not have" (cf. Parfit (1984), p 119)36. And 
second, there are also the "knowledge-oriented" objections, some of 
which appeal to the idea that we should give less or no weight to those 
of a person's desires of which he is unaware37; while others appeal to 
the idea that it can not be good for a person to have a desire fulfilled 
unless he is aware of th e occurrence of its object (or of t he fact that it is 
fulfilled)38. 
So, here are a couple of objections of the first kind. The first argu­
ment is primarily directed against (UD2): 
(i) Suppose that Alice intrinsically desires to smoke a cigarette. Suppose 
also that she wants to be a non-smoker, or more specifically, that she 
desires that she does not have the first-order desire to smoke39. It 
might be argued that in a case like this, it is not nonderivatively good 
for Alice to smoke the cigarette. 
(ii) The next objection is directed against (UD3): Suppose that Bert has 
the following two intrinsic desires, viz. to go trekking in Nepal, and to 
do some heavy partying in Greece. Suppose also that the two desires 
are equally strong (in the relevant sense), but that the former desire is 
to a higher extent sanctioned by his appropriate higher-order desires, 
evaluations, or ideals than the latter (we can assume that Bert has a 
strong desire to be a sporty type of person, and we can also, for the 
sake of the argument, assume that this desire is rational). Isn't it, in this 
36That is, if P wishes that he did not have a certain first-order desire D, then D is 
not sanctioned by P's higher-order desires. But this is only a partial answer to the 
question of what it is for a first-order desire to be sanctioned (or not sanctioned) 
by higher-order desires. I will try to give a more complete answer in section 5.2.3. 
3
'That we do not always know what we want is a possibility that every plausible 
conception of desire (functional or not) allows for (cf. section 4.1). 
38That a person's desires can be fulfilled without him knowing it follows from the 
notion of fulfilment that was "adopted" in section 4.3. 
39We can also assume that the second-order desire is rational (Or can we? Cf. note 
109 on p 264). It is hardly intrinsic, however; this would be too odd to be realistic. 
And as far as the relative strengths of the two desires are concerned, I don't think 
it is necessary to make any assumptions at all: On my view, it has no significance 
whatsoever which desire is stronger, the second-order desire or the first-order 
desire. 
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case, better for Bert to go trekking in Nepal? 
Are these good arguments? Well, I am not quite sure about this. It 
might be suspected that both objections presuppose the wrong notion 
of desire, viz. the phenomenological conception, as well as the wrong 
notion of strength, viz. strength as felt intensity. Or alternatively put, if 
we have the relevant (non-phenomenological) notions of desire and 
strength in mind, objections of th is kind may no longer be valid. Let me 
explain more in detail: On the relevant notion of desire, someone 
desires that X if and only if he prefers X to some situation to which he is 
neutral, and on the relevant notion of strength, someone's desire that X 
is stronger than his desire that Y if and only if he prefers X to Y (where 
preference should not be understood in terms of fel t intensity). That is, 
on the relevant (non-phenomenological) notions of desire and strength, 
both notions are understood in terms of (rankings on) preference 
orderings. However, the ranking of a certain "first-order situation" 
(the object of a first-order desire or aversion) in a person's cool pre­
ference ordering is necessarily affected by his higher-order desires and 
ideals in a way that the felt intensities of his first-order desires are not. 
For example, the fact that someone wants to be a certain type of person 
is highly likely to have a certain effect on his "first-order preferences". 
So we may ask ourselves: Isn't it sufficient that our higher-order 
desires are already "incorporated" into our "first-order preference 
orderings" in this way? Isn't there something arbitrary about "counting 
our higher-order desires twice"? 
Let us now take a second look at the two objections above. If A lice's 
intrinsic desire to smoke is a desire in the relevant sense, then she 
actually prefers smoking a cigarette to some situation to which she is 
neutral (and she prefers smoking to non-smoking), in spite of the fact 
that she wishes that she does not have the first-order desire to smoke. 
Isn't it, in this case, good for Alice to have a smoke? Or consider the 
case of B ert. If we have the relevant notion of s trength in mind, Bert is 
indifferent between going trekking in Nepal and partying heavily in 
Greece, in spite of the fact that he strongly prefers to be an outdoor 
type of person to being a "party animal". Can we, in this case, really 
conclude that it is nonderivatively better for Bert to go trekking in 
Nepal? Is it really plausible to count Bert's ideal twice? 
Let us now look at an objection of the second kind. The argument is 
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directed against (UD2): 
(iii) Suppose that Bert has a strong intrinsic desire to be admired by 
Alice, but that he does not know (or believe) that he has the desire. 
Suppose also that Alice does (in fact) regard Bert with esteem, but that 
he has no awareness whatsoever of this fact. Is it, in this case, really 
nonderivatively good for Bert to have the desire fulfilled? I think not. 
But why is this? For example, is it because he does not know (believe) 
that he has the desire, or is it because he does not know (believe) that it 
has been fulfilled, i.e. that the desired situation obtains? Well, this 
remains to be seen. 
We will return to these issues in section 5.2.3. In that section, we will 
also take a look at Kekes' version of the desire theory, which is a good 
example of a theory that responds to objections of the first type 
(regarded as valid). 
Evaluative objections to (UD4) 
As we already know, (UD4) is a claim about how a person's overall 
level of well-being should be determined. How well off a person is (on 
the whole) is, on this view, a function of how many of his intrinsic now-
for-now desires and aversions that are fulfilled, and of how strong 
these desires and aversions are: The more desire-fulfilment there is in 
his life, the better-for-him, and the more aversion-fulfilment there is in 
his life, the worse-for-him. We have also seen (on p 158 above) that 
there are at least two possible specifications of this idea, viz. "the 
difference thesis" and "the ratio thesis". 
Now, in order to isolate the evaluative criticism of (UD4) from the 
methodological criticism of the same claim, and from the objections to 
(D1)-(UD3), it is necessary to make certain assumptions: (i) First, we 
have to assume that the claim is methodologically sound, i.e. that it is 
possible to formulate it in a meaningful and intelligible way (which 
means that we have to assume that it is possible to get hold of the two 
sums L (df) and £ (af) on p 156 above, that it is meaningful to perform 
arithmetic operations on these sums, and so forth), (ii) We also have to 
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assume that (D1)-(UD3) are valid claims40. 
Here are a few arguments which are (or seem to be) of this type: 
(i) If all the necessary assumptions are made, (UD4) implies that a 
person can improve the quality of his life simply by wanting 
(intrinsically) what happens to happen, or by eliminating intrinsic aver­
sions to what is actually the case41. This is counter-intuitive, however: 
Bert can not improve the prudential value of his life by intrinsically 
desiring that the sun rises in the morning or that it sets at night. 
As I see it, this is a good argument against the unrestricted desire 
theory, but we may ask what component of the theory that it hits. It is 
fruitful to view (UD4) as a combination of two separate ideas, viz. 
(UD2), the thesis of unrestrictedness, and (UD4'), the version of evalu­
ative atomism which conceives of a person's overall level of well-being 
as a function of h ow much good desire-fulfilment and how much bad 
aversion-fulfilment there is in his life, i.e. as a function of how many of 
his relevant desires and aversions that are fulfilled, and of how strong 
these desires and aversions are (cf. p 39). Now, once we become aware 
of this, I think it is pretty clear that the objection above hits (UD2) 
rather than (UD4'). All the argument shows is that we should give no 
weight to the desire that the sun rises in the morning: it does not give 
us any reason to assume that the value of a person's existence as a 
whole is not a function of the values of its parts. That is, if (Dl) and 
(UD3') are valid claims, and if we make the appropriate restrictions (this 
is to ensure that we are dealing with valuable desire-fulfilments), then 
there is no reason to believe that (UD4') is false. 
(ii) On my view, the same thing holds for the next argument against 
40So, what the evaluative objections to (UD4) should purport to show is that it is 
an implausible evaluative claim, even if it is intelligible, and even z/(Dl)-(UD3) are 
valid. This makes it rather doubtful whether there are any plausible arguments of 
this kind, i.e. arguments which are directed exclusively against (UD4) (or against 
(H6), for that matter!). As we will soon see, the primary target of the arguments 
below need not be (and might not be) (UD4). 
41It is important to notice that (UD4) does not imply that we can improve our lives 
by not wanting what we are unlikely to get, e.g., by eliminating desires which are 
difficult to satisfy, or whose satisfaction is uncertain. The reason for this is simple: 
A plausible desire theory does not claim that it is bad for a person not to have his 
desires fulfilled. 
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(UD4). The argument is from Parfit (1984): 
Consider this example. Knowing that you accept a Summative theory, 
I tell you that I am about to make your life go better. I shall inject you 
with an addictive drug. From now on, you will wake each morning 
with an extremely strong desire to have another injection of this 
drug. Having this desire will be in itself neither pleasant nor painful, 
but if the desire is not fulfilled within an hour it will then become very 
painful. This is no cause for concern, since I shall give you ample 
supplies of the drug. Every morning, you will be able at once to fulfil 
this desire. The injection, and its after-effects, would also be neither 
pleasant nor painful. You will spend the rest of y our days as you do 
now. 
I... I We can plausibly suppose that you would not welcome my 
proposal. I... I But it is likely that your initial desire not to become 
addicted, and your later regrets that you did, would not be as 
strong as the desires you have each morning for another injection. 
Given the facts as I describe them, your reason to prefer not to 
become addicted would not be very strong. /... / 
On the Summative Theories, if I make you an addict, I will be 
increasing the sum-total of your desire-fulfilment. /.../ On the 
Summative Theories, by making you an addict, I will be benefiting 
you - making your life go better. 
This conclusion is not plausible. Having these desires, and having 
them fulfilled, are neither pleasant nor painful. We need not be 
Hedonists to believe, more plausibly, that it is in no way better for 
you to have and to fulfil this series of strong desires (p 497). 
Now, as I see it, this is a good argument, i.e. it seems pretty obvious 
that living as a successful addict is not better for the person than having 
a drug-free life. But in this case too, it seems that the argument does 
not really hit (UD4'), as Parfit seems to believe, but (UD2). As Parfit 
himself points out, the "Summative Theorist" can always respond to the 
objection by claiming that there is some feature of the addictive desires 
which makes them irrelevant, e.g., by suggesting that these desires "can 
be ignored because they are desires that you would prefer not to 
have" (cf. ibid., pp 497-98). Parfit rejects this idea, however, but his 
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argument for this (on p 498) is defective42, he does not show that it is 
good for the person to have his addictive desires fulfilled, and it is (on 
top of this) likely that he does not have the relevant notions of desire 
and strength in mind. Moreover, Parfit's case against (UD4') gets even 
weaker if w e see how Parfit himself tries to improve it. His own "solu­
tion" to the "addiction objection" is to appeal to a so-called Global ver­
sion of the desire theory, i.e. to regard people's local desires as irrele­
vant. But even if we (implausibly) assume that we can exclude all local 
desires in this way, this is hardly anything that counts against (UD4'). 
And the problem of aggregation still remains, viz. in the following form: 
If w e know how many of a person's global desires and aversions that 
are fulfilled, and how strong these (fulfilled) desires and aversions are, 
how do we use this information in order to determine how well off he 
is? If we reject (UD4'), it is doubtful whether there is anything with 
which it can be replaced. Or is there? 
If w e assume that there is a better alternative to (UD4'), what would 
such an alternative notion of aggregation look like? Well, here it might 
be useful to take a look at Griffin's (1986) more holistic view of aggre­
gation. According to Griffin (who is himself a desire theorist), "the rele­
vant notion of aggregation cannot be simply that of summing up small 
utilities from local satisfactions" (p 15); "[o]ne does not most satisfy 
someone's desires simply by satisfying as many as possible, or as large a 
proportion [as possible]" (ibid., p 15). That is, he rejects the atomistic 
idea that the value of a person's life is a function of the values of the 
42This is my reconstruction of the argument: 
(1) The relational theory of p leasantness is true, i.e. an experience is unpleasant if 
and only if the subject has aversion A to having the experience (and so on). 
(2) The aversion to suffering is (for this reason) a second-order desire: If a person 
has an aversion to displeasure, this implies that he has an aversion to A. 
(3) On the suggestion in question (i.e. the idea that a desire should not count if one 
would prefer not to have it), A must be regarded as irrelevant, which in turn 
implies (according to Parfit) that 
(4) unpleasant experiences cannot be bad for us. But this is absurd, and we should 
therefore reject the idea that a desire should not count if one would prefer not to 
have it. 
The main reason why the argument is defective is that (2) does not follow from 
(1): If a person has an aversion to a certain displeasure, he has an aversion to 
having an experience to which he has an aversion, but this does not in any way 
imply that the object of his aversion is the first-order aversion to having the 
experience. For this reason, it is doubtful whether the aversion to suffering is 
really a second-order desire. 
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particular desire-fulfilments and aversion-fulfilments in it. But what is his 
alternative? What notion of aggregation is incorporated in his own 
"informed-desire account"? 
Well, the basic feature of G riffin's notion of aggregation is that it is 
somehow based on the idea that our desires have a structure, and that 
this structure "already incorporates, constitutes, aggregation" (ibid., p 
15). But what does he mean by "the structure of de sires"? 
/.../ desires have a structure; they are not all on one level. We have 
local desires (say, for a drink) but also higher-order desires (say, to 
distance oneself from consumers' material desires) and global desires 
(say, to live one's life autonomously) (ibid., p 13). 
In short, the suggestion is that every person's desires form a more or 
less coherent system (consisting of local desires, higher-order desires, 
and global desires), and that we must therefore conceive of our desires 
in a holistic way. We can then say that the more a person's preferences 
(regarded as a whole) are fulfilled, the better his or her life is. 
But what is this supposed to mean? If we assume (plausibly) that the 
fulfilment of someone's preferences-as-a-whole must be in some way 
connected to at least some of the particular fulfilments of h er particular 
desires and aversions, how should the idea be spelled out? Well, here it 
seems that what we thought was a "notion of aggregation" is really a 
modified desire theory that assigns some kind of special status to 
certain kinds of d esires, viz. to global desires and higher-order desires. 
But what exactly does the lower status of our local first-order desires 
consist in? Well, they can of course be excluded altogether, or they can 
be counted as less relevant than our global desires, but there is also a 
third possibility, viz. the idea that our local first-order desires are, on the 
relevant notion of strength, simply weaker than our global desires (cf. p 
206 above). This is consistent with Griffin's idea that "global desires 
provide, in large part, the relevant notion of the strength of desire" 
(ibid., p 15), and it might also explain why he claims that the structure of 
a person's desires "already incorporates, constitutes, aggregation". The 
objects of our global desires are normally much higher ranked on our 
preference orderings than the objects of our local desires, and (we 
should add) our global desires are rarely formed "on the basis of 
having summed local desires", or alternatively, a person's preference 
for one form of life over another is normally "basic", i.e. it is "not based 
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on I... I other quantitative judgments" (cf. ibid., p 15). But if th is is so, 
it seems that all we need in order to preserve Griffin's (and Parfit's) 
intuitions is to conceive of strength as rank in a preference ordering. 
This would allow for the possibility that a global desire might be 
outweighed by a sufficiently large number of local desires, however, 
and it would also imply that it is not really possible to escape the 
problems of t he atomistic view. The question remains: If we know how 
many of a person's relevant desires and aversions that are fulfilled, and 
how strong (in the relevant sense) these desires and aversions are, how 
do we use this information in order to determine how well off he is (on 
the whole)? And if there is no plausible atomistic answer to this 
question (if we cannot find a plausible "atomistic" notion of 
aggregation), then it seems that there is no answer at all. 
In short, it is doubtful whether there are any good evaluative argu­
ments against (UD4'); it seems that all the heavy objections are of a 
methodological kind. 
5.2. How the unrestricted desire theory can be 
modified in order to handle the objections above: 
Different kinds of modified versions of the actual 
desire theory 
As the objections in section 5.1 have shown, the unrestricted actual 
desire theory is a bad version of the actual desire theory. So, how can 
we find a better version of the actual desire theory, a version that 
avoids the weaknesses of the unrestricted theory? How can the un­
restricted actual desire theory be modified in order to handle the 
objections? 
As far as I can see, the most common type of modification of the 
actual desire theory is restriction (or elimination), but there is also 
another ("weaker") way in which the theory may be modified, viz. by 
replacing the thesis of intensity with some claim concerning relative 
weights43. Let us take a closer look at these two types of modifications. 
43It is worth mentioning that there is also a third type of modification of the actual 
desire theory, viz. idealization. But the result of such a modification is not an 
actual desire theory; to adopt such a strategy is rather to give up the actual desire 
theory altogether, i.e. it constitutes a rejection of (Dl). We will, for this reason, 
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(i) Restriction. The unrestricted theory is modified in this way if the 
class of relevant desire is (somehow) restricted, i.e. if certain actual 
(intrinsic, now-for-now) desires and aversions are regarded as irrele­
vant (if t hey are neglected, ignored, excluded, or eliminated). That is, a 
restricted actual desire theory rejects (UD2), and claims (instead) that 
only some kinds of actual (intrinsic, etc.) desires and aversions should 
count as directly relevant (cf. (RD2) on pp 37-38). 
It is fruitful to regard every restriction of the unrestricted actual 
desire theory as corresponding to some objection against the thesis of 
unrestrictedness. This suggests that the restrictions made by desire 
theorists are best classified in the same way as the objections against 
(UD2), i.e. into the following three groups: (a) object-oriented restric­
tions (restrictions to desires with the right kinds of objects, or preposi­
tional contents), (b) rationality-oriented restrictions (which excludes all 
desires that are, on some theory of the rationality of desire, irrational), 
and (c) other kinds of restrictions (e.g., restrictions which excludes all 
desires of which the subject is not aware, or that are not sanctioned by 
his higher-order desires or ideals)44. (A desire theory can, of course, be 
restricted in more than one of these ways, e.g., it can eliminate both 
desires with certain types of propositional contents and desires that are 
irrational)45. 
(ii) The second type of modification of the unrestricted actual theory 
that I have in mind is the type of modification we get if we reject the 
thesis of intensity, i.e. (UD3'), and replace it with some "non-intensity-
oriented" claim concerning relative weights, i.e. a claim that gives 
"special status" to certain kinds of desires, but without eliminating the 
desires that are not given such special status. That is, a desire theory 
that has been modified in this ("non-intensity") way claims that is not 
always better for a desiring subject to have a stronger (relevant) desire 
save this until later. 
^It is worth pointing out that the idea that it can not be good for a person to have 
a desire fulfilled unless he is aware of the occurrence of the object is (strictly 
speaking) not a restriction claim in this sense. However, it will be discussed in this 
context anyway; the idea will (after all) be introduced in order to meet a certain 
type of objection to (UD2), 
45Cf. Scanlon (1993), who makes a distinction between two types of restrictions, 
viz. (a) restrictions to desires with certain kinds of objects, and (b) restrictions to 
preferences with a certain sort of basis. The reason why I do not follow him here is 
that his talk about "basis" is somewhat unclear, and if w e see what he is really 
after, we see that (b) is better replaced with "rationality-oriented restrictions". 
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fulfilled than to have a weaker desire fulfilled; that it might (in some 
cases) be better to have the weaker of two desires fulfilled, e.g., if (and 
because) it is more rational than the stronger desire, or if it is, to a 
higher extent, acknowledged by the subject. 
Modifications of this kind can be classified in the same way as the 
restrictions, viz. they can be divided into (a) object-oriented modi­
fications, (b) rationality-oriented modifications, and (c) o ther kinds of 
modifications. This is nothing but a reflection of the fact that a certain 
distinctions between desires (e.g., the one between rational and ir­
rational desire) may be used in two different ways, namely (i) as a 
means of restriction, or (ii) as a means of determining relative weights. 
This is how the two cases differ: If it is claimed that only rational desires 
are relevant, and that all irrational desires should be regarded as ir­
relevant, then the distinction is used to restrict (eliminate). But if it is 
(instead) claimed that rational desires have more weight than irrational 
desires, the distinction is used to determine, in a way that is not an all-
or-nothing way, how relevant a certain desire is. 
This means that the different types of modifications of the un­
restricted actual desire theory can be represented as follows: 
restriction non-intensity 
object-oriented X X 
rat-oriented X X 
other kinds X X 
That is, there is a close correspondence between this classification of 
modified desire theories and the classification of objections against the 
unrestricted theory presented on pp 200-20446. 
My presentation of the different modifications will (as in the case of 
the objections against the desire theory; cf. p 204 above) be "from top 
46The correspondence becomes even closer if we take idealized desire theories 
into account, i.e. if we do not restrict our attention to actual desire theories. If we 
do this, we get the following classification of modified desire theories: 
idealized restricted non-intensity 
object-oriented ? X X 
rat-oriented X X X 
other kinds - X X 
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to bottom", rather than "from left to right". That is, my discussion of 
the different kinds of modified actual desire theories will have the 
following structure: First, I will focus on some possible object-oriented 
(or content-oriented) modifications on the unrestricted theory, then at 
some rationality-oriented modifications, and finally at some modi­
fications that are neither object-oriented nor rationality-oriented (e.g., 
modifications which appeal to the idea that we should give more weight 
to desires that are sanctioned by higher-order desires, or to desires of 
which the subject is aware). In each of these three cases, the relevant 
modifications will either take the form of rest rictions, where desires that 
are not of "the right kinds" are eliminated altogether from con­
sideration, or they will take the form of "non-intensity" ideas of re lative 
weight, where desires of certain kinds are regarded as ceteris paribus 
more relevant than desires of other kinds47. 
In this context, it is important to keep in mind that the main purpose 
of t his section is to find out what possible version (modification) of t he 
actual desire theory that is intuitively most plausible. (This theory will 
then be criticized later on, along with (Dl)). Or more specifically, our 
questions are: 
(i) How should the class of i ntrinsic now-for-now desires and aver­
sions be restricted? According to what criteria can we determine which 
of a person's (intrinsic, etc.) desires that it is (nonderivatively) good for 
him to have fulfilled, and which of his aversions that it is bad for him to 
have fulfilled?, and 
(ii) How do we determine which of two relevant desires that it is 
better for the desiring subject to have fulfilled? Should we accept 
(UD3') (the idea that the stronger of two relevant desires is also the 
more relevant one), or should we (rather) replace it with some alter­
native view on relative weights? If so, what view? 
With these questions in mind, let us now look at some possible object-
oriented modifications of the unrestricted actual desire theory. 
47At this point, it is worth pointing out that there is a type of modification that has 
yet to be considered, viz. rationality-oriented idealizations (cf. note 46 above), 
where the hypothetical desires that we would have if we were rational are 
regarded as relevant. But we since our present concern is with actual desire 
theories, we will save this until later. 
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5.2.1. Some object-oriented modifications of the 
unrestricted desire theory 
We already know that object-oriented modifications can take two 
forms, viz. (i) restrictions to desires with certain kinds of objects, and 
(ii) non-intensity-oriented claims concerning relative weights. All the 
content-oriented claims that I have come across in the literature are of 
the first kind, however, i.e. restriction claims, and this means that we 
might not have to deal with the second type of cla im at all. (The reason 
why I have taken it into consideration is that it is a weaker kind of 
claim; if a certain restriction claim fails, it may be replaced with a corre­
sponding claim concerning relative weights). 
There are at least three object-oriented restriction claims which are 
worth investigating, viz. the following ones: 
(1) The idea that only those of a person's desires and aversions which 
are, intuitively, about his own life should count as relevant. That is, 
whether those of a person's preferences that are not about his own life 
(that are not "personal" or "self-regarding") are fulfilled or not, this is 
not regarded as having any direct effect on his well-being. This is what 
the Success Theory claims. 
(2) The idea that only those of a person's desires and aversions which 
are about his own experiences should count as relevant. This is what 
the experience-oriented Success Theory claims (this theory has already been 
roughly characterized in section 2.2, on pp 93-95). 
(3) The claim that only global desires (that are about one's own life) 
should count as relevant, i.e. that all local desires should be regarded as 
irrelevant. This is what the Global Success Theory claims. 
(2) and (3) are both stronger restriction claims than (1), i.e. the 
restrictions suggested by the experience-oriented Success Theory and 
the Global Success Theory are both "stronger" than the one suggested 
by the Success Theory. But we should not let this similarity between (2) 
and (3) conceal the fact that there is an enormous difference between 
the two theories. In fact, there are not many desires that are regarded 
as directly relevant by both the experience-oriented Success Theory 
and the Global Success Theory. The reason for this is simple: Almost all 
now-for-now experiential desires are desires to have (or not to have) a 
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certain experience, i.e. they are local desires48. 
Let us now take a closer look at these three restriction claims. 
The Success Theory 
On this theory, it can never be nonderivatively good for a person to 
have a desire fulfilled unless it is a desire about his own life. Now, in 
order to determine whether or not this is a plausible version of the 
desire theory, we must first have a more precise idea of h ow those of a 
person's desires that are about his own life should be distinguished 
from those that are not. Where do we ("intuitively") draw the line 
between the two kinds of d esires? 
If we assume that a person's desire that X ob tains is about his own 
life if and only if X (the desired situation) is a part of his life, we can also 
formulate this question as follows: How do we determine (for a certain 
person) whether a certain situation (fact) is "part of his life" or not? 
Where do we draw the line between a person's life and "the rest", and 
how do we draw this line? 
In most cases, it is pretty easy to determine whether a certain desire 
is "a desire about the subject's own life", i.e. whether a certain situation 
is "part of a certain person's life". As an illustration of this, here are 
some examples of desire-types that are clearly about one's own life: The 
desire to do something, or to get something done (e.g., to produce 
something); the desire to stand in a certain relation to a certain person, 
or to be with a certain person; the desires to experience certain things, 
or to have certain experiences; the desire to be a certain kind of person, 
or to live one's life in a certain way; the desire to know certain things; 
the desire to have certain opportunities, or to live under certain circum­
stances; and the desire to own certain things49. 
48A possible exception to this "rule" is (of course) the global desire to lead a 
pleasant life, e.g., that all one's experiences have a certain quality. In any case, the 
fact that most people have a strong global desire to lead a life that is happy (in the 
experiential sense) suggests that it is rather unlikely that the two theories will 
make radically different evaluations of concrete lives. 
49This means that in this context, the term "life" is used in a rather broad sense. 
However, it is worth pointing out that there is also a more narrow sense of the 
term, and it is on this narrow usage of "life" that lives can be distinguished from (i) 
the persons who live these lives, (ii) the circumstances under which they are lived, 
and (iii) the livings (or "leadings") of them, how (in what way) they are lived. To 
understand the term "life" in its broadest sense, on the other hand, is to conceive 
of a person's life as including (i)-(iii) as well. 
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There are also a number of pr oblematic cases, however, i.e. situations 
that are not so easily classified into the categories "part of a person's 
life" and "not part of a person's life". The existence of these problematic 
cases means that there are several possible ways in which the line 
between "desires about one's own life" and "desires which are not 
about one's own life" may be drawn. And for every such possible dis­
tinction between situations that belong to a person's life and situations 
that do not, we get another version of the Success Theory. Now, what 
we want to find is not the "true version" of theory (there is no such 
thing), but the most plausible one. That is, what we want to find is the 
line which is most plausible in the context of well-being50. This seems to 
imply that as far as the problematic cases are concerned, it is rather pointless 
to try to keep the two questions (i) " Is the situation X part of person 
P's life?" and (ii) "Does it have nonderivative value for P to have his 
desire that X occurs fulfilled?" fully separate. 
There are two general types of difficulties that arise when we try to 
draw a sharp line between situations that are part of a person's life and 
situations that are not, viz. (a) problems concerning how to draw the 
line "in the diachronic", and (b) problems concerning how to draw the 
line "in the synchronic". This means that the problematic cases I have in 
mind can be also be divided into two groups, viz. cases that are 
problematic because they give rise to problems of type (a), and cases 
that are problematic because they give rise to problems of type (b). Let 
us take a closer look at these two types of problematic cases. 
Richard Wollheim's (1984) notion of a life is a good example of a narrow notion 
of a life. This is how he distinguishes between persons, lives, and the leading (or 
living) of lives: "There are persons, they exist; persons lead lives, they live; and as 
a result, in consequence - in consequence, that is, of t he way they do it - there are 
lives, of which those who lead them may, for instance, be proud, or feel ashamed. 
So there is a thing, and there is a process, and there is a product. The thing, which 
is a person, is extended in space, and it persists through time. Being spatial, it has 
spatial parts, but it does not have temporal parts. The product, which is a person's 
life, is extended in time, and it can be traced through space. Being temporal, it has 
temporal parts, but it does not have spatial parts. The process, which is the leading 
of a life, occurs in, though not necessarily inside, the person, and it issues in his 
life" (p 2). 
50However, this does not mean that we can draw the line anywhere. There are (as 
we have seen) clear cases, and it is these cases which set limits to how much we 
are allowed to stretch the meaning of the phrase "to be part of someone's life". 
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About the temporal boundaries of a life 
The central questions concerning the temporal boundaries of a person's 
life are "Should a person's own death be regarded as a part of h is life?" 
and "Are there any post-mortem events (i.e. events which occur after a 
person's biological death) which should be regarded as parts of his 
life?" (Similar questions can of c ourse be asked about a person's birth, 
about the conception, and about events which occurred before these 
events). 
To start with the second question, I think it is rather counter-intuitive 
to regard any post-mortem events (including autopsies and the like) as 
part of a person's life. It is, after all, natural to conceive of a person's 
biological death as the end of his or her life, isn't it?51 We should also 
remember that it has already been established (in section 4.3) that all 
post-mortem events can safely be ignored in a context of w ell-being: If 
all value-for-P is value-for-P-aM, then things that occur after a person's 
death can not have any effect ("retroactive" or not) on the quality of 
his life. And if we also, on top of this, remind ourselves that it can never 
have nonderivative value for a person to have a prospective desire ful­
filled (cf. pp 176-177), we can safely conclude that the most plausible 
version of the Success Theory regards (unlike the version put forward 
by Parfit (1984)) all desires for post-mortem occurrences as irrelevant: it 
rejects ideas like "it is good for a person to have her last wish 
respected", or "it is bad for a person if the post-mortem reputation that 
she worked so hard to establish is totally destroyed". Or alternatively 
put, we should (in this context) not regard desires of this type as 
desires about one's own life52. 
As far as our own deaths are concerned, it is hard to tell on purely 
semantic grounds whether they should be regarded as parts of our life 
or not (and whether we should think of the desire to die, or the aver­
sion to one's own death, as preferences about one's own life). This 
suggests that the issue is really evaluative: the central question is how 
51Here, it is important not to be misled by the fact that someone's "biographical 
life" - i.e. what his biography is about - often includes certain pre-natal (or "pre­
conception") events (e.g., parts of the family history) as well as certain post­
mortem events (e.g., what happened to his reputation, or to the cause he was 
working for). This does not mean that we should regard these pre-natal and post­
mortem events as parts of his life, however. 
52This is not to deny that desires of this type are often of normative relevance, 
however, e.g., because it is good-period that they are fulfilled. 
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we should conceive of death in the context of well-being, or more spe­
cifically, in the context of the desire theory. Can it, for example, ever be 
nonderivatively good for a person to have his desire to die fulfilled? On 
my own "Epicurean view" (cf. appendix C and pp 129-132), it is neither 
good nor bad for a person to die53. (This follows (but only "roughly 
so") from the combination of two ideas, viz. "all value-for-P is value-
for-P-at-f" and "only things which occur at t can have nonderivative 
value-for-P-at-f ). But even if s omeone does not accept this idea as it 
stands, it should not be too difficult to accept the idea that the issue of 
death is irrelevant in the context of we ll-being: Who would claim that a 
person's death makes him worse off (when he is not there anymore), or 
that it makes his life worse (when there is no life there anymore that can 
have a value)? Moreover, the desire to die and the aversion to one's 
own death are always prospective, and for this reason irrelevant. For 
these reasons, we can conclude that it can never have value for a 
person to have his desire (or aversion) to die fulfilled (It may be good 
for a person to have his now-for-now desire to continue living fulfilled, 
however; cf. note 53). This means that the most plausible version of the 
Success Theory regards the aversion to death (or the desire to die) as 
irrelevant, i.e. that it does not conceive of a person's desire (or 
aversion) to die as a preference about his own life. 
The gist of this section is really the idea that a person P's desire that X 
can not be a desire about his own life unless X and P are simultaneous 
(which does not mean that desires about one's own life can not be pro­
spective, however). This idea does not contain anything that isn't al­
ready contained in the synchronistic idea that P's desire that X can not 
be relevant unless X and the desire are simultaneous, however. This 
brings us to the next difficulty, viz. how we should - "in the synchronic" 
- draw the line between situations that are part of a person's life and 
situations that are not, or alternatively, how we should distinguish 
those now-for-now desires which are about one's own life from those 
which are not. 
53On this view, it doesn't even make sense to say that it is good (or bad) for a 
person to die. It makes perfectly good sense, however, to say that it is good (or 
bad) for a person that his life continues, just as it makes perfectly good sense to 
say that it is good-period (or bad-period) that he dies. 
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About the "atemporal" boundaries of a life 
As I see it, there are two general "areas" where the "synchronic boun­
daries" of a life are rather difficult to determine, viz. (i) in relation to the 
lives of others (especially so-called "significant others"), and (ii) in rela­
tion to the "lives" of the wholes (presumably social wholes) with which 
a person identifies, or to which he belongs. 
My life and the lives of (significant) others 
I have already claimed that a person's relationships are parts of his or 
her life, or more specifically, that the fact that P and Q are related to 
each other in a certain way is a part of both P's and Q's lives. That is, 
the desire to be related to a certain person (or anyone) in a certain way 
should be regarded as a desire about one's own life, and so should (I 
think) the desire to do something together with someone else, or the 
desire to have children (or grandchildren), or the desire to occupy a 
certain position in other people's minds. So the question arises: Is this all 
the "overlap" there is between people's lives, or does the overlap in 
question extend beyond the relational facts just mentioned? For 
example, are other people's actions, experiences, achievements, suffe­
rings, or interactions ever to be regarded as parts of my life? And can 
truly other-regarding desires54 ever be regarded as being "about one's 
own life"? For example, is the other-regarding desire that some 
"Significant Other" (e.g., a child, husband, wife, lover, friend, or 
relative) is happy a desire "about one's own life"? 
Intuitively, the answer is (with the possible exception of one's own 
children; cf. below) "no", and this is not changed by the fact that it 
sometimes makes sense to say that someone is an essential part of 
another person's life, nor by the fact that the suffering of a loved one 
may diminish one's own well-being. What happens to significant others 
is (typically) not part of one's own life, and the desire that something 
happens to someone one loves or cares about (e.g., that she will make a 
successful career in her field) is not a desire about one's own life. 
54Where a desire is truly other-regarding if a nd only if its propositional content 
does not include any essential reference to the desiring subject. For example, P's 
desire that Q is doing well is not other-regarding in this sense if what P really 
wants is that Q is doing well as a result of his (i.e. P's) actions, and P's desire that 
his children are happy is other-regarding in this sense if "his children" can be 
replaced by some expression which do not contain any reference to him (i.e. to P). 
Cf. also note 30 on p 206. 
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Moreover, it would be implausible to claim that it has nonderivative 
value for a person to have such other-regarding desires fulfilled. 
Suppose Î have a strong intrinsic desire that my lover will not suffer, 
but that she is (e.g., unknown to me) in great pain. Is this non-
derivatively bad for me? I think not. The suffering of a loved one never 
affects one's well-being directly; if my well-being is affected by the fact 
that someone else is in pain, it is always indirectly, e.g., because it makes 
me suffer. This means that every plausible version of the Success 
Theory has to accept the idea that in the field of experience, there is no 
overlap between lives. 
Does this hold in the case of one's own children as well, or should we 
sometimes regard desires that certain things happen (or does not 
happen) to one's children as desires about one's own life? For example, 
can it ever have nonderivative value for a parent that his intrinsic desire 
that his children's lives go well is fulfilled? According to Parfit (1984), 
the answer is "yes"; it can be bad for someone that his children's lives 
fail, viz. if he has a strong desire to be a successful parent, and if the 
children's lives fail as a result of mistakes he made as their parent (cf. p 
495). I share Parfit's intuition, but I don't think it shows that it is the 
children's' failure per se that is bad for the parent. What is bad for the 
parent is rather the complex fact that the children's lives fail and this 
failure was caused by mistakes he made as their parent. And it is not 
really the desire that the children are successful that is a desire about 
the parent's own life, and that it is good for the parent to have fulfilled, 
but the desire to be a successful parent, i.e. to be a kind of person that 
(among other things) does not, and did not, make certain kinds of 
mistakes. 
So, as far as I can see, there is really no reason why we should (in this 
context) treat children differently from other significant others, or from 
other people in general. No truly other-regarding desire should be re­
garded as a desire about one's own life, and we should never attribute 
prudential value to the fact that someone has such a desire fulfilled. It is 
true that if a person is intimately related to other people, there is a tight 
link between his well-being and theirs. But with the possible exception 
of certain relational facts, the link is psychological rather than "logical", 
"conceptual", or "direct". This means that the most plausible version of 
the Success Theory regards all other-regarding desires as irrelevant, 
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regardless who the other person (or creature) is55. 
My life and the "lives" of the wholes with which I identify, or to 
which I belong 
The fact that a certain person is part of a c ertain whole (e.g., that he is a 
member of a certain club) is clearly a part of t his person's life, and the 
desire to be part of a certain whole is clearly a desire about one's own 
life. This does not imply that things which happen to the whole with 
which I identify also happen to me, however, or that the desire that the 
whole to which I belong is doing well is a desire about my own life. But 
we may always ask whether it is. How sharp is the line between the life 
of a person and the "life" of a whole to which he belongs? Consider the 
desires that my tea m will win the series, that the company that I work 
for will make a big profit, or that the organization of which I am a 
member will grow and become more influential. It can hardly be 
doubted that desires like these are most often self-centered, but are 
they also "desires about my own life"? 
In most cases of this type, the intuitive answer is "no", e.g., the fact 
that my company made a bigger profit this year than last year is hardly 
a part of m y life. However, I think it hard to show on purely "semantic 
grounds" that facts about "significant social wholes" are never part of 
my life. It is not really necessary to settle the issue in this non-evaluative 
way, however. What we are after is the most plausible version of the 
Success Theory, and this means that when our linguistic intuitions do 
not take us any further, we might as well restrict our attention to the 
strictly evaluative side of the issue, and ask: Does it ever have non-
derivative value for a person to have his (intrinsic) desires about "signi­
ficant social wholes" fulfilled? Well, I think not. If a soccer player has a 
strong intrinsic desire that his team wins the series, and if t he desire is 
fulfilled, the mere fact that it is fulfilled does hardly have nonderivative 
value for him56. Now, it is true that if a person identifies with a certain 
55This does not mean that all intrinsic (etc.) self-regarding desires are relevant, 
however. Suppose that P desires that his friends are happy, and that the 
propositional content of this desire includes an essential reference to him (e.g., 
suppose he wants his friends to be happy because they are his friends, no matter 
who they happen to be). It is hardly nonderivatively good for P to have this 
desire fulfilled. 
56Especially not if the desire is fulfilled without him knowing it, e.g., because he is 
in the hospital recovering from a serious injury. It is also doubtful whether he 
230 
social whole, and if he has a strong desire that this "significant social 
whole" is doing well, then it is likely that his own well-being is (in part) 
dependent on the "well-being" of the whole. But the connection 
between the well-being of the person and the well-being of the whole is 
not "logical" or "conceptual", but "causal" (in this case "psychological"): 
The fact that a certain significant whole is successful can only affect a 
person's well-being indirectly, e.g., via his beliefs and emotions. In 
short, the most plausible version of the Success Theory regards all 
desires about "significant social wholes" as irrelevant57. 
This concludes our formulation of the Success Theory. So, is this a 
plausible version of the desire theory? Well, all we can say at this point 
is that it is far more plausible than the unrestricted theory. The reason 
for this is that it is far more in line with our evaluative intuitions, and 
this should not surprise us: We have, after all, been making use of these 
very intuitions when formulating the theory! However, it remains to be 
seen whether the Success Theory (as it has been formulated here) is the 
most plausible object-oriented modification of the desire theory. To see 
whether it is, we have to compare it with the alternatives, the first of 
which is the experience-oriented Success Theory. 
The experience-oriented Success Theory 
The experience-oriented Success Theory is the kind of desire theory 
that we get if we restrict "the class of preferences to be considered" to 
desires and aversions about one's own experiences. On this view, all 
relevant preferences are preferences "for states of affairs which are 
// presently within the experience of the person having the prefe­
rence" (cf. Hare (1981), p 104). All desires that are not about one's own 
experiences are regarded as irrelevant, e.g., if a person has an intrinsic 
desire to do something, then it can not have nonderivative value for 
him to have this desire fulfilled. This means that the experience-oriented 
himself would accept the idea that what is good for the team is also good for him, 
even if he were to remain ignorant about what befalls the team. 
57I am aware that this might well be an expression of Modern Western 
Individualism, but so is the whole issue of individual well-being. The fact that 
there are people who "identify" with certain social wholes, and who care more 
about the well-being of these wholes than their own individual well-being (or the 
well-being of other individuals), does not mean that the individual well-being of 
these people is conceptually dependent on the well-being of the whole. All it 
means is that the issue of individual well-being is not very important to them. 
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Success Theory makes a much stronger restriction claim than the 
original Success Theory (cf. p 223 above). As Parfit (1984) puts it: "The 
Success Theory appeals to all of our preferences about our own lives. A 
Preference-Hedonist [experience-oriented Success Theorist] appeals 
only to preferences about those features of our lives that are intro-
spectively discernible" (p 494; cf. also pp 93-95 above). 
Is this a plausible theory? Or more importantly in this context, is it 
more plausible than the original "unrestricted" Success Theory? Well, 
the fact that the experience-oriented Success Theory claims that a 
person's well-being cannot be directly affected by things of which he is 
not aware may seem to speak in favour of this theory. This is (as we 
will see on p 266 ff.) not really the case, however: The idea that a 
person's welfare cannot be directly affected by things that he does not 
know anything about does not imply that it depends solely on his states 
of mind, i.e. it is also compatible with certain "state of the world" 
theories. There is a strong reason for regarding the original Success 
Theory as the more plausible theory, however, viz. the one that was 
given on p 128-129 (under (b)). To recapitulate: Within the framework 
of the desire theory, it is arbitrary to focus exclusively on a person's 
experiences. If the subject is regarded as sovereign in the field of his 
own experience, why not regard him as sovereign in his life as a whole? 
There is really no reason why we should attribute prudential value to 
the fulfilment of experiential desires only58. 
The Global Success Theory 
This theory "appeals only to global rather than local desires and pre­
ferences" (Parfit (1984), p 497). On this view, only global desires about 
one's own life should count as relevant, i.e. if a desire is not "about 
some part of one's life considered as a whole, or is about one's whole 
life" (ibid., p 497), it should be regarded as irrelevant. Well-being is not 
a matter of local desire-fulfilment; how well off a person is at a certain 
time is (rather) a function of h ow satisfied he is with the life he has at 
58At this point, it is worth noting that an unrestricted desire theorist can criticize 
the Success Theory in the same fashion, viz. by asking the Success Theorist what is 
so special about desires about one's own life that we should restrict our attention 
to these desires only. However, the Success Theorist can easily defend himself 
against this criticism by appealing to different kinds of intuitions (cf. pp 196-197 
above). 
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that time (considered as a whole), or with its major parts59. 
The difference between global and local desires (about a person's 
own life-at-a-certain-time) is obviously a difference in "the relative size" 
of their respective objects, i.e. the difference in question is really a 
matter of degree. So where do we draw the line between the two 
kinds of desires? How "large" must the object of a desire be if this 
desire is to be counted as global? Well, I guess all we can do is to try to 
draw the line by means of examples. The desire to live a certain kind of 
life (e.g., a life full of pleasure) and the desire to live one's life in a 
certain way (e.g., in an autonomous way) are as global as they can get. 
The desires to have a family, to work as a doctor, or to be a brave 
person, are not as global, but they are (it seems) global enough to 
qualify as global. Examples of desires and preferences (about one's own 
life) that are clearly local are the desire to drink a beer, or to get rid of 
the anxiety that one is currently experiencing, or the preference for 
going to the beach rather than sitting indoors writing. (This explication 
of the distinction between global and local desires may not be very 
satisfactory, but I hope it will be sufficient for our purposes). 
So, is the global Success Theory a more plausible version of the desire 
theory than the original "unrestricted" Success Theory? I think not, and 
there are several reasons for this. 
Before we look at the major reasons for regarding the original 
Success Theory as superior to the global Success Theory, let us first 
note that there is really nothing that speaks for thé latter theory. For 
example, Parfit's reason for introducing the global version of the 
Success Theory, and for preferring it to the unrestricted version, is (as 
we have already seen on pp 216-217 above) a bad reason (and this 
seems to apply in Griffin's case too). First, we do not really have to 
reject (UD4'), i.e. "the thesis of Additivity" (the "addiction objection" 
presented on p 216 does not really hit the idea in question), and 
second, even if t he idea of additivity were false, this would not give us 
any reason to accept a global theory: It is simply wrong to view global 
59Sumner (1996) sometimes seems to take it for granted that this is a feature 
shared by all subjectivist theories of welfare, at least all plausible theories of this 
type. In his terminology, a subjectivist theory is a theory which makes a person's 
level of well-being depend (at least in part) on his attitudes towards things like 
"the conditions (or circumstances) of his life", "his life as a whole", "his lifestyle", or 
"the significant parts (or ingredients) of his life". 
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theories as alternatives to "summative theories" (i.e. theories that accept 
(UD4')), and to believe that a global theory can somehow escape the 
problems that all "summative theories" have to face; at least if we 
assume that there are several global desires (cf. pp 217-219). This 
strongly suggests that there is really no need to introduce any global 
theory in the first place. 
Moreover, the theory is intuitively plausible only as long as we regard 
it as a theory about how to determine how well off s omeone is on the 
whole, viz. as a theory which claims that the more someone wants his 
life to be the way it is, the better off he is. (Notice that if the theory is 
regarded in this simplistic way, it can really be regarded as an alter­
native to (UD4')). However, if we look at what the theory has to say 
about what is good and bad for a person, it entirely loses its appeal. 
Why is this? Well, it is simply implausible to regard all local desires as 
irrelevant, and the reason for this is not just that many of our local 
desires are connected to our global desires in such a way as to make 
their fulfilment important. Even if a certain local desire is not connected 
to some global desire in this way, it may still be good for the desiring 
subject to have it fulfilled. Suppose I have an intrinsic desire to drink a 
beer, or to get a massage, or to get rid of the pain I am in. Isn't it both 
absurd and arbitrary to claim that it does not have value for me to have 
these desires fulfilled just because they happen to be local? The idea 
that all local desires should be eliminated becomes even more absurd if 
we consider the fact that the difference between global and local 
desires is a matter of degree: Why should we eliminate a local desire 
that is "almost global", but not a global desire that is "almost local"? 
It is not just the restriction claim made by the global Success Theory 
that is implausible, but also the corresponding claim concerning relative 
weights, i.e. the claim that global desires are, because of their 
"globality", more relevant than local desires. It is true that our global 
desires are normally more relevant than our local desires, but the 
reason for this is not that they are global, but that they are (in the rele­
vant sense) stronger (cf. pp 206 and 218-219). For example, global situa­
tions such as "being happily married" or "being successful in one's 
work" are most often ranked much higher on people's preference 
orderings than more local situations such as "getting in time for the 
bus" or "having time to take a shower before the appointment", even 
though such local desires may, at times, be more intensely felt. In short, 
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if we have the relevant notion of strength in mind, it is unlikely that our 
local desires are stronger than our global ones, but even if they are (at 
times) stronger, this is no reason to reject the thesis of intensity60. 
This means that the global Success Theory is simply not plausible, not 
even if it regarded as a theory about how to determine how well off 
someone is on the whole, and this is not changed by the fact that it is a 
relatively useful theory61. Consider this person who tends to get caught 
up in details, whose many local desires are almost as strong (in the rele­
vant sense) as his global desires. Now, assume that this person is locally 
frustrated but globally satisfied, that he is dissatisfied with all the details 
and minor events in his life, but satisfied with his life as a whole. In my 
opinion, it would be utterly implausible to claim that he is as well off as 
he can be. To conclude, we should regard the global Success Theory as 
far less plausible than the "unrestricted" Success Theory. 
We have now shown (assuming that we have not overlooked any 
plausible alternatives, that is) that the Success Theory is more plausible 
than all its object-oriented competitors, i.e. we can conclude that the 
restriction claim it makes is the most plausible object-oriented restriction 
claim there is. The theory is hardly the most plausible version of the 
desire theory, however, and the reason for this is that it is vulnerable 
to the rationality-oriented objections on p 207 ff., and perhaps also to 
the objections on pp 211-214. These objections must be taken into 
account, however, and this suggests that in order to arrive at the most 
plausible version of the desire theory, we must modify our theory 
further, viz. (among other things) in a rationality-oriented way. But we 
will keep the idea that only desires that are about one's own life can be 
relevant, i.e. we will assume that the best version of the desire theory is 
60This suggests that we need not invoke the global Success Theory in order to 
explain why we tend to view global satisfaction with one's own life as a necessary 
condition for having a good life. If we combine the fact that our strongest desires 
about our own lives are often global desires with the thesis of intensity, we get an 
equally good explanation. 
61The reason for this is twofold: First, the fact that the theory does not take so 
many desires into account makes it easier to use in practice. (One way in which 
this can be done is this: A number of life ar eas (or domains) are determined, and 
the subject can then assess his own level of satisfaction in these domains). Second, 
the fact that our global desires are almost always much stronger (in the relevant 
sense) than our local desires makes it likely that the comparisons of well-being 
that are based on the global Success Theory will often coincide with the 
comparisons that are based on the original Success Theory. 
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a modification of the Success Theory. So let us now look at how this 
theory can be further modified. 
5.2.2. Rationality-oriented modifications of the 
Success Theory^ 
So, I will assume that at least some of the rationality-oriented objections 
in section 5.1.2. are valid, and that the most plausible version of the 
desire theory is (for this reason) a rationality-oriented modification of 
the Success Theory. There are many possible rationality-oriented ways 
in which the Success Theory may be modified, however, and it is far 
from obvious which of these possible modifications we should prefer. 
To clarify the problem of which modification (or modifications) that 
should be selected, we can divide it into two interrelated questions: 
(1) If there is at least one valid rationality-oriented objection to the 
unrestricted desire theory, then there is at least some rationality-
oriented claim concerning relative weights which has to be accepted as 
valid. That is, we have to accept that those of a person's desires which 
are (in the relevant sense) rational are more relevant than those which 
are irrational, or alternatively put, that it is ceteris paribus better for a 
person to have a rational desire fulfilled than to have an irrational 
desire fulfilled. So the question arises: Should we also accept the corre­
sponding restriction claim, i.e. should we conceive of all desires that are 
irrational (in the same relevant sense) as totally irrelevant?63 
(2) Every rationality-oriented desire theory is (obviously) based on 
62It is important to keep in mind that in what follows, we will take the Success 
Theory for granted. We should also remind ourselves that the aim of the 
investigation is still to find the most plausible version of t he desire theory, i.e. we 
will not yet put (Dl) into question. 
63Here, we might remind ourselves that there is also a third kind of r ationality-
oriented modification, viz. the idealization (where the hypothetical desires that we 
would have if we were rational are also regarded as relevant). All idealizations are 
rejections of (Dl), however, and they do therefore not belong in this context (cf. 
also note 43). It is also worth mentioning that all the rationality-oriented 
modifications I have come across in the literature are either restrictions or 
idealizations (which are both "all-or-nothing claims"): I have never come across 
any rationality-oriented claims concerning relative weights. My reason for 
including claims of this kind is that they are weaker than the corresponding 
restriction claims; e.g., if a certain restriction claim fails, it may be replaced with a 
corresponding claim concerning relative weights. 
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some idea of what it is for a desire to be rational (or irrational), i.e. of 
what the rationality (or irrationality) of a desire consists in64. Now, 
there are (as far as I can see) at least five different conceptions of 
rational desire, conceptions which give rise to five different "senses" in 
which a desire might be rational or irrational. These conceptions can be 
(roughly) characterized as follows: 
(i) On Hume's theory, a derived desire is rational if and only if it is 
based on true beliefs (our underived desires are, on this view, 
neither rational nor irrational). 
(ii) The informed theory claims that a desire is rational if and only if it is 
informed, where a desire is informed if and only if it is "formed by 
appreciation of the nature of its object" (cf. Griffin (1986), p 14)65. 
(iii) The deliberative theory claims that a person's actual desire is rational 
if and only if i t would survive a process of ideal deliberation, e.g., if 
he would still desire it "if he knew the relevant facts, was thinking 
clearly, and was free from distorting influences" (cf. Parfit (1984), p 
118). 
(iv) On the genetic theory, a desire is rational if and only if i t has the 
right kind of causal history, e.g., if it has not been shaped by 
64That is, the focus is on the rationality of particular desires and aversions 
(considered more or less in isolation), and not how we should determine whether 
a certain set (or system) of preferences is rational or irrational (where it is 
assumed that such a set can be irrational, even if t he desires in the set are not in 
themselves irrational, e.g., because they are inconsistent with each other). 
However, this does not mean that a desire theorist can ignore the question of 
how to determine whether a certain set of preferences is rational or irrational; 
first, he could use an answer to this question to modify (UD41) in a more holistic 
direction, and second, he might (for some reason) try to capture the rationality of 
particular desires in terms of the rationality of sets of desires (e.g., because he 
believes that a particular desire can not be fully rational unless it is an element in a 
rational set). 
65It is worth noting that this theory is my own construction, i.e. as far as I know, 
there is no one who has claimed that a desire is rational in virtue of being 
informed. So, what are my reasons for constructing such a theory? Well, first, Î 
think it is fruitful to regard Griffin's informed desire theory as a type of 
rationality-oriented desire theory, and second, the informed theory (regarded as a 
conception of rational desire) is a kind of modern Humean theory, and it can be 
seen as a kind of natural step on the way to the deliberative theory. (It may also 
be added that I used to believe that the informed theory contained nothing that 
wasn't already contained in the other four conceptions, but that I have changed 
my mind on this point). 
237 
"irrelevant causal processes" (e.g., by manipulation). 
(v) On the intrinsic theory, there are desires that are intrinsically 
rational and irrational, where an intrinsically rational desire is a desire 
that is rational because of i ts content, e.g., in virtue of t he fact that its 
object is (in some objective sense) worth desiring66. 
Now, the fact that there are several different conceptions of rational 
desire means that we must ask ourselves which of these conceptions 
that is of most interest in this particular context. Which conception of 
rational desire gives, if incorporated into a rationality-oriented desire 
theory, rise to the most plausible theory67? 
The problem can also be formulated in a somewhat different (and 
perhaps simpler) way, viz. as follows: Every rationality-oriented modi­
fication of the Success Theory either takes the form of a restriction claim 
or a claim concerning relative weights, and there are (moreover) five 
conceptions of rational desire on which such claims can be "based". This 
means that there are ten possible modifications of this type. These 
possibilities can be schematically represented as follows: 
restriction claim claim conc. rel. weights 
Hume's theory X X 
the informed theory X X 
the deliberative theory X X 
the genetic theory X X 
the intrinsic theory X X 
Now, our question is simply which of these ten possible modifications 
that are (I assume that it might be more than one) plausible. 
The investigation will (as usual) proceed "from top to bottom" rather 
than "from left to right", i.e. we will consider one conception of rational 
desire at the time, and in connection with each conception, we will try 
66There are (of c ourse) alternative (and perhaps also better) classifications, but I 
think the present classification is good enough for our purposes. 
67That is, the question is not which of the conceptions that is true, but what 
conception of r ational desire that makes a rationality-oriented desire theory most 
plausible. However, the fact that our focus is on the issue of evaluative relevance 
(or plausibility) does not mean that we have no interest in things like which (if 
any) conception that is most "descriptively relevant" (e.g., most in line with 
ordinary speech). 
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to find out whether any of the two modifications which are based on 
this conception is plausible. That is, for each conception of rational 
desire, two questions will be asked, viz. (i) Is the restriction claim that is 
based on this conception plausible, i.e. should we regard all desires that 
are (on this conception) irrational as irrelevant?, and (ii) If not, should 
we (at least) accept the corresponding claim concerning relative 
weights, i.e. should we conceive of desires that are (on this conception) 
rational as more relevant than desires that are not? If a certain desire 
D1 is rational (in this sense) while another desire D2 is not, can it (then) 
be better for the desiring subject to have D1 fulfilled, even if D2 is 
stronger?68 
Let us start with Hume's theory. 
Rationality-oriented modifications based on Hume's theory 
So, is it reasonable to regard all desires that are irrational in the 
Humean sense as irrelevant? If not, should we regard those desires 
which are (on Hume's theory) rational as more relevant than those 
which are not? 
To get in a better position to answer these questions, let us first take 
a closer look at Hume's (1739-40) conception of rational desire. This 
conception consists of two central claims, viz. (a) the idea that only 
derived desires that can be classified as rational or irrational, and (b) 
the idea that a derived desire is irrational if a nd only if i t is based on 
one or several false beliefs, and rational if and only if it is based on true 
beliefs69. This is Hume's own famous formulation of the theory: 
Where a passion [desire, preference] is neither founded on false sup­
positions, nor chuses means insufficient for the end, the under­
standing can neither justify nor condemn it. 'Tis not contrary to 
reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching 
of my finger. 'Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total 
ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly 
unknown to me. 'Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my 
own acknowledge'd lesser good to my greater, and have a more 
68I will, in each case, start with the restriction claim. My reason for this is twofold; 
it is stronger, and it is the type of claim we find in the literature. 
69In this context, Hume does not distinguish between true and rational (e.g., 
justified) beliefs, or between false and irrational beliefs. 
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ardent affection for the former than the latter. /.../ In short, a 
passion must be accompany'd with some false judgement, in order to 
its being unreasonable; and even then 'tis not the passion, properly 
speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment70 (Book II, part 
III, section III, p 463). 
The "false suppositions" (or "judgements") which Hume himself had in 
mind are of two different kinds, viz. "supposition[s] of t he existence of 
objects, which really do not exist" and false "judgements of causes and 
effects" (ibid., p 463). This suggests that there is, on Hume's view, only 
one way in which an intrinsic desire may be irrational, viz. if it is "foun­
ded on the supposition of the existence of objects, which really do not 
exist". But here, we can (in the Humean spirit) add that this is not the 
only type of false belief that can make an intrinsic desire irrational, e.g., 
an intrinsic desire may also be irrational if it is based on a false belief of 
the subsumption type, or perhaps of the part-whole type (cf. p 184 
above), or if it is based on a mistaken attribution of properties to a 
certain thing71. 
But how should phrases like "based on", "founded on", and "accom­
pany'd with" be understood here? If a desire D is based on a belief B, 
what kind of relation is it that holds between D and B? For example, 
70That is, it is (on the Humean view) really only beliefs which can be criticized on 
rational grounds. However, this does not mean that Hume's conception of 
rational desire is a "universalist conception": The fact that "if m y belief that X is 
true, so is yours" does not have any implications for the rationality of our desires. 
In fact, Hume's theory allows for the possibility that my desire that X is rational 
while yours is not. 
71It can hardly be doubted that our intrinsic desires-that can be based on false 
beliefs (e.g., the intrinsic desire to own a certain thing can be based on false beliefs 
about the intrinsic properties of the thing). However, it is worth asking whether 
our intrinsic desires-that can ever be based on false beliefs about their objects 
(assuming that the objects of our intrinsic desires-that are really situations-under-
"intrinsic"-descriptions (cf. pp 165-166 above) rather than situations per se, and that 
we can (for this reason) not really distinguish a situation (qua object of desire, that 
is) from its descriptions). Well, I think they can, at least as long as we do not 
incorporate the belief on which an intrinsic desire is based into the prepositional 
content of t he desire. Suppose that P intrinsically desires to go jogging because he 
believes that it is relaxing. On my view, the object of this desire is the fact that P is 
jogging (period), and not that he engages in this jogging-^wa-relaxing-activity. 
And it surely makes sense to say that the desire to jogging (period) is based on 
the false belief that jogging is relaxing (but it does not necessarily make sense to 
say that the desire to go jogging-qwa-relaxing-activity is, in this case, based on a 
false belief). 
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should "based on" be understood as "derivable from" or "(in fact) 
derived from", i.e. is the relation between D and B purely logical, or is it 
only partly logical (and partly causal)? 
Now, it is hardly plausible to claim that a certain desire of P's is ir­
rational in virtue of being derivable from some false belief that P has. So, 
is it more plausible to claim that a desire is irrational if and only if it is 
actually derived from some false belief? Well, there is a problem with this 
view too: What if I have this desire which is actually derived from some 
false belief, but which is derivable from my true beliefs (it is, after all, 
possible to arrive at the right answer in the wrong way); should we 
really regard this desire as irrational? I am not quite sure about this, but 
I think not. On my view, the most plausible Humean view is a kind of 
compromise between the two views, and it can be formulated as 
follows: A person P's desire is irrational if a nd only if (i) it is actually 
derived from false beliefs, and (ii) it is not derivable from P's (actual) 
true beliefs. That is, if we regard all desires that are not irrational as 
rational, this would imply that those of a person's desires which are 
derivable from his (actual) true beliefs are all rational. 
To return to the question of relevance: Should we regard all (intrinsic) 
desires that are irrational in this sense as irrelevant, or does it some­
times have nonderivative value for a person to have such a desire ful­
filled? Suppose that John has an intrinsic Hume-irrational desire to 
spend time with Paul. Suppose also, to put all hedonistic and other 
instrumental considerations aside, that it does not make him feel good 
(or that it is useful for him) to have the desire fulfilled. Can it, in this 
case, be good for him to have the desire fulfilled? Well, I think so. 
Consider the following case: John's desire to spend time with Paul is 
actually derived from false beliefs (e.g., the belief that Paul is a funny 
bloke), and it is not derivable from the true beliefs that John actually 
has. However, Paul is an interesting person, and he thinks that John is a 
great guy, and if John would come to believe this, he would still want 
to spend time with Paul, regardless of whether Paul is funny or not. 
This suggests that we should reject the rationality-oriented restriction 
claim which is based on Hume's conception. What matters is not 
whether our desires are derivable from the true beliefs we actually 
hold, but whether they are (so to speak) "derivable from the truth", i.e. 
whether we would have them if w e were informed about the relevant 
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facts72. 
Let us now turn to Griffin's informed desire theory/ which is (if 
viewed as a rationality-oriented modification) based on a modern 
"version" of Hume's theory, viz. the informed theory. 
Griffin's informed desire theory 
On this theory, "'utility' is the fulfilment of informed desires, the 
stronger the desires, the greater the utility" (Griffin (1986), p 14). That 
is, only informed desires are counted as relevant73. Is this a plausible 
view: can it never have nonderivative value for a person to have an 
uninformed desire fulfilled? 
So, what is it (on Griffin's view) for a desire to be informed (or un-
72Where the assumption is that our underived desires would not change if we 
would become more informed. That is, the whole focus is still on derivability 
(which is a logical relation): the fact that some of our underived desires are 
causally dependent on what we believe (and that confrontation with facts and 
logic can also, for this reason, have a causal effect on what we desire) has not yet 
been taken into account. 
73This means that Griffin's informed desire theory is (at least in part) a restricted 
theory. Is it also an idealized (or ideal) theory, i.e. does it also regard as relevant 
the desires people would have if th ey were rational or informed? Scanlon (1993) 
seems to think so, when he attributes to Griffin the idea that "the quality of 
people's lives depend only on the fulfilment of those desires that theywould have if 
they 'appreciated the true nature' of the objects of those desires" (p 187, my 
italics). Now, this interpretation is clearly consistent with some of the things 
Griffin (1986) writes - e.g., with the claim that "what must matter for utility will 
have to be, not persons' actual desires, but their desires in some way improved" 
(p 10) - but it is, nonetheless, wrong. To see why we should conceive of Griffin's 
informed desire theory as a restricted theory rather than as an idealized (or ideal) 
theory, consider the following passage from Griffin (1986): "At this point, an 
obvious move is to say that desires count towards utility only if 'rational' or 
'informed'. 'Utility', we might try saying, is the fulfilment of d esires that persons 
would have if they appreciated the true nature of their objects. But we shall have to 
tone this definition down a b it. Although 'utility' cannot be equated with actual 
desires, it will not do, either, simply to equate it with informed desires. It is doubtless 
true that if I fully appreciated the nature of all possible objects of desire, I should 
change much of what I wanted. But if I do not go through that daunting 
improvement, yet the objects of m y potentially perfected desires are given to me, 
I might well not be glad to have them; the education, after all, may be necessary 
for my getting anything out of t hem. This is true, for instance, of a cquired tastes 
/.../. Utility must, it seems, be tied at least to desires tha t are actual when satisfied. 
(Even then we should have to stretch meanings here a bit: I might get something I 
find that I like but did not want before because I did not know about it, nor in a 
sense want now simply because I already have it; or I might, through being upset 
or confused, go on resisting something that, in some deep sense, I really want.)" 
(p 11, my italics). 
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informed)? Well, first, an informed desire can be characterized nega­
tively as a desire that is not faulty, or defective, in any of t he following 
three ways: (i) I t does not rest on mistakes of fact74, (ii) nor on logical 
mistakes (like "confused, irrelevant, or question-begging" reasoning). 
(iii) The third, "conceptual", defect is harder to grasp, and the reason 
for this is (I think) that it is not attributed to individual desires, but to 
whole sets of desires. This is suggested in the following passage: 
Sometimes desires are defective because we have not got enough, or 
the right, concepts. Theories need building which will supply new or 
better concepts, including value concepts. For instance, it is easy to 
concentrate on desires to possess this or that object, at the cost of 
more elusive, difficult-to-formulate, desires to live a certain sort of life 
(ibid., p 12-13). 
(iv) Informed desire is also positively characterized, as a desire "formed 
by appreciation of the nature of its object"75, and we are also told that 
informed desires are based on an understanding of "what properties 
things and states of affairs have, and we must put our desires through 
a lot of criticism and refinement to reach this understanding" (ibid., p 
14). 
In order to make this conception of i nformed desire precise enough, 
we need to know at least two things, viz. (a) whether "the appreciation 
of the nature of the object" to which Griffin refers includes correct 
value judgements or not, and (b) when it is claimed that informed 
desires do not rest on mistakes of fa ct (etc.), or that an informed desire 
is formed by appreciation of the nature of its object, what do the 
phrases like "rest on" and "formed by" mean here; should they be 
interpreted as "derivable from", "derived from", "caused by", or some 
combination of these? (cf. pp 240-241 above). Here, I will simply assume 
(a) that the "appreciation" referred to is value-free76, and (b) that the 
74I take this to mean that all desires that are irrational in the Humean sense are 
also uninformed. The reverse is not true, however. 
75At this point, Griffin continues by saying that an informed desire "includes 
anything necessary to achieve it [the object]". Isn't this a very odd idea? And what 
does "the object" refer to here? Well, it is most probably not the object of the 
desire (i.e. some situation), but some component in the situation (i.e. some thing). 
76This would imply that Griffin's informed desire theory is a "relativist" rather 
than "universalist" conception of rational desire. However, it is not just that the 
fact that I have an informed desire that X does not imply that your desire that X is 
informed too; the theory also seems to allow for the possibility that I have an 
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phrases "based on" and "formed by" should not be understood in a 
strictly causal sense; the idea that a desire can be irrational in virtue of 
being caused by (or causally dependent on) false beliefs is an essential 
part of the deliberative theory, and it will therefore be discussed in 
connection with this theory. So, should "rest on" be interpreted as 
"derivable from" or "derived from"? Well, it seems clear that Griffin 
has the latter alternative in mind, i.e. I take (i) and (ii) to mean that a 
desire can not be informed unless it is actually derived from actual true 
beliefs, and I take (iv) to require that these true beliefs are about "the 
object", and that there are no relevant facts about the object of which 
the subject is ignorant77. 
So, now that we have some idea of what it is that makes a desire 
informed (uninformed): Is it plausible to regard all desires that are un­
informed in Griffin's sense as irrelevant? Or alternatively put 
(considering that there are several different ways in which a desire can 
be uninformed): (i) Are all desires which are derived from "mistakes of 
fact" (i.e. from false beliefs) irrelevant? (ii) Does the fact that a desire is 
causally dependent on logical mistakes (like "confused, irrelevant, or 
question-begging" reasoning) make it irrelevant? (iii) Does the fact that 
a desire is "conceptually defective" give us a reason for regarding it as 
irrelevant (or less relevant)? (iv) Does the fact that a desire is not 
formed by an "appreciation of the nature of its object" make it 
irrelevant? 
We have already seen (in connection with the Humean theory) that 
the answers to (i) and (ii) are both "no". The fact that a desire is 
actually derived from false beliefs, or that it has actually been arrived at 
in a faulty manner, does not make it irrelevant; it is, after all, possible to 
arrive at the right answer in the wrong way. What matters is whether a 
desire is (properly) derivable from more fundamental desires and "the 
truth", (iii) is probably (in this context, that is) an unintelligible question, 
and it can therefore be ignored78. And as far as (iv) is concerned, it is 
informed desire that X while you have an informed aversion to "the same thing". 
77This suggests that all informed desires would survive a confrontation with all 
facts about their respective "objects". However, this does not mean that every 
informed desire would survive a confrontation with all facts: we cannot conclude 
that if a desire is informed, it is also deliberatively rational. 
78To be more precise: Griffin's conceptual idea is (because of its holistic character) 
irrelevant in relation to the questions like "what desires is it good for a person to 
have fulfilled?" (but only on the assumption that the rationality of a particular 
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far too strong. The fact that a desire is derivable from more funda­
mental desires and "the whole truth about its object" is sufficient to 
make it relevant. 
To conclude, it seems that we still stand on the same point we stood 
on after our discussion of H ume's theory. That is, the only rationality-
oriented restriction we have arrived at so far is the idea that a derived 
desire is irrelevant if it is not derivable from more fundamental desires 
and "the whole truth about its object" (which implies that the desire 
could not have existed were it not for false beliefs, faulty reasoning, or 
ignorance79). 
Rationality-oriented modifications based on the 
deliberative theory 
Let us now ask ourselves whether it is plausible to regard all "delibera-
tively irrational" desires as irrelevant, and if it is not, whether we 
should (at least) accept the weaker claim that desires that are rational in 
the deliberative sense are more relevant than desires that are not. 
To be able to answer these questions, we need a better under­
standing of the deliberative theory of r ational desire. On this theory, a 
person's desire that X is deliberatively rational if and only if he woul d 
desire that X after having had undergone a process of ideal delibe­
ration, and a person's desire is deliberatively irrational if and only if he 
would not have it under these ideal circumstances. If we restrict our­
selves to a person's actual desires, we get: A person's actual desire is 
deliberatively rational if and only if it would survive a process of ideal 
deliberation, and it is deliberatively irrational if and only if it would not 
desire is independent of the rationality of the set of which it is an element). 
However, Griffin's idea may well be of relevance in relation to the more holistic 
"how do we determine how well of a certain person is?". (But how? If t he idea is 
simply that some people do not want all the things they "should want", it can be 
expressed in a much simpler way, e.g., by referring to things that are (in some 
objective sense) "worth desiring"). It is also worth noting that the idea in question 
is much more in line with idealized desire theories than with actual desire theories 
(it is not clear whether it can be used to criticize (Dl), however). 
79This is the most interesting difference between Griffin's theory and Hume's: 
Where Hume is focusing solely on false beliefs, Griffin gives just as much weight 
to ignorance. But isn't ignorance just a special case of false belief? No, it isn't (it 
seems possible to not have any beliefs at all about certain things), but the reverse 
is of course true. 
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survive such a process80. 
So, what is this "process of ideal deliberation" to which the delibe­
rative theory refers? Well, if we look at how this "process" has been 
characterized by different writers, we will see that it can (roughly) be 
viewed as a kind of mixture between cognitive activities and cognitive 
states: the idea seems to be that what it is rational for a person to 
desire is what he would desire if he would be in a certain cognitive 
state and if h e would engage in a certain kind of cognitive activity. The 
relevant cognitive state (or states) has been described in several diffe­
rent ways, e.g., as "knowing the facts" (Parfit), "having all the relevant 
factual information" (Harsanyi), and "being correctly or fully informed 
about one's circumstances" (Gauthier)81. And the relevant cognitive 
activity has been described as e.g., "reasoning with the greatest pos­
sible care" (Harsanyi), "thinking clearly, [in a way that is] free from 
distorting influences" (Parfit), and "full and careful reflection" 
(Gauthier)82. 
In order to get an even better grasp of the deliberative theory, it may 
be fruitful to take a closer look at the perhaps most well-reasoned ver­
sion of this theory, viz. the one developed by Brandt (1979). He writes: 
I shall call a person's desire, aversion, or pleasure 'rational' if it would 
survive or be produced by careful 'cognitive psychotherapy' for that 
person. I shall call a desire 'irrational' if it cannot survive compatibly 
with clear and repeated judgements about established facts. What 
this means is that rational desire (etc.) can confront, or will even be 
produced by, awareness of the truth; irrational desire cannot (p 113). 
80That is, a desire is (on this view) always rational or irrational relative to some 
individual or other. This means that if w e assume (plausibly) that people would 
remain different even after having had undergone a process of ideal deliberation, 
we can conclude that the deliberative theory allows for the possibility that it is 
rational for one person to desire a certain thing, but irrational for another person 
to desire the same thing. In short, the theory must be conceived of as a "relativist" 
conception of rational desire. 
81Here, we may also add Griffin's "appreciating the true nature of t he object" and 
"realizing fully what is at stake". However, we can (in this context) ignore 
Nussbaum's (1990) talk about what someone would desire if her "education and 
knowledge of alternatives were above the threshold of what is required for 
practical reason and choice" (note 32, p 245); there is, after all, nothing ideal about 
this cognitive state. 
82This might not be a complete characterization of the "ideal process", however, 
i.e. it might be necessary to add a third element, e.g., that the relevant information 
is presented in an "ideally vivid way" (cf. below). 
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So what is this cognitive psychotherapy to which Brandt refers? Well, it 
can be characterized as a 
process of confronting desires with relevant information, by repea­
tedly representing it, in an ideally vivid way, and at an appropriate 
time. /.../ [T]he process relies simply upon reflection on available 
information / ../• It is value-free reflection (ibid., p 113). 
That is, the idea is that a person's desire is rational if and only if he 
would have it if his "total motivational machinery were fully suffused by 
available information", i.e. 
if relevant available information registered fully, that is, if /... / [he] 
repeatedly presented to /.../ [himself], in an ideally vivid way, and 
at an appropriate time, the available information which is relevant in 
the sense that it would make a difference to desires and aversions if 
/.../ [he] thought of it (ibid., p 111). 
This means that the deliberative theory can be regarded as a special 
version of the general view that a desire is rational if it has been influ­
enced by facts and logic as much as possible (cf. ibid., p 113). That is, 
the theory is (just like the other two theories above) based on the idea 
that our desires can be influenced by our beliefs. But where these 
theories restrict their attention to one kind of influence only, viz. to a 
type of "derivation" which involves logical dependence, the deliberative 
theory also attaches great weight to the idea that our desires may also 
be "purely" causally dependent on our beliefs. And the beliefs on which 
a certain desire is causally dependent need not be beliefs about its 
object, it may also be beliefs about other things (e.g., the beliefs the 
subject has about himself). In fact, the deliberative theory is (in a way) 
based on this "insight", or more specifically, the insight that the desires 
which are causally dependent on careful (value-free) reflection on rele­
vant information are (as a rule) superior to the desires which are causally 
dependent on false beliefs and/or confused reasoning. But it is impor­
tant to note that the theory does not claim that every single desire which 
is, in fact, causally dependent on false beliefs and /or confused reaso­
ning is therefore irrational; what matters is (as we have seen) whether 
it would survive a confrontation with clear and repeated judgements 
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about established facts83. 
The perhaps most problematic feature of the deliberative theory is 
that it does not offer a satisfactory account of what it is that makes a 
certain desire rational (or irrational). For example, it may well be true 
that a desire is irrational if and only if it w ould not survive a process of 
ideal deliberation, but it is hardly the case that a desire is irrational in 
virtue of the mere fact that it would not survive such a process. So, what 
is it that makes a deliberatively irrational desire irrational? Well, it seems 
clear that if a desire would extinguish in cognitive psychotherapy, it 
would do so because of some other property that it has, e.g., because it 
is dependent on false beliefs (or ignorance about certain things). So 
why don't we simply regard all properties of th is kind as "irrationality-
making properties"? On this view, there are a number of "irrationality-
making" features of desires such that every deliberatively irrational 
desire is irrational in virtue of p ossessing some such feature, and such 
that if a certain desire has such a feature, it is likely (but not certain) 
that it would (for this particular reason) not survive a thorough con­
frontation with facts and logic. But what properties of desires can 
reasonably be regarded as "irrationality-making" in this sense? 
Even though Brandt does not give any explicit answer to this ques­
tion, he gives several examples of (kinds of) desires and aversions that 
would most probably not survive cognitive psychotherapy, and this 
may give us some fruitful ideas of why certain desires would extinguish 
in such a process. 
What some of the desires and aversions that are (on Brandt's view) 
"unfit" to survive cognitive psychotherapy have in common is (roughly) 
that they have originated in the "wrong ways"84. Examples of such 
desires are (1) desires and aversions that have developed from genera­
lization from untypical examples, i.e. "from familiarity with samples of 
liked/disliked situations but from untypical samples, or in an untypical 
83And since it would be absurd to claim that only desires which are derived (or 
derivable) from true beliefs would survive such a confrontation, we can see why 
the deliberative theory has to reject the Humean idea that only derived desires 
can be classified as rational or irrational. However, it may well be the case that all 
(or most) intrinsic desires that are irrational in the Humean sense are also 
deliberatively irrational. 
84This shows that there is an intimate connection between the deliberative theory 
and the genetic theory. This connection will be further discussed on pp 255-256 
below. 
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context" (ibid., p 120); and (2) exaggerated desires and aversions pro­
duced by "an early and prolonged deprivation of something wanted -
enough for discomfort and anxiety to be involved", e.g., abnormally 
high and perhaps insatiable desires for attention, commendation, 
admiration, or company (cf. ibid., p 123)85. 
It is probably true that desires which have been shaped in any of 
these ways would, in many cases, not survive cognitive psychotherapy, 
but this is merely an empirical fact, and it does not allow us to conclude 
that any of these desires would be extinguished in virtue of having been 
shaped "in the wrong way". Moreover, desires with the wrong kind of 
causal history could well survive cognitive psychotherapy, and the idea 
that a desire may be "deliberatively irrational" in virtue of its causal 
history should therefore be rejected. Instead, we should accept the 
more plausible view that desires which are shaped in certain ways will 
often get (as a result of t his) certain other defects, and it is in virtue of 
these defects that they would not survive a confrontation with facts 
and logic. 
So, if we disregard the desires which have been shaped "in the 
wrong way", what other examples of kinds of de sires which are "unfit" 
to survive cognitive psychotherapy can we find in Brandt (1979)? 
(1) Well, first, there are the desires (and aversions) which Brandt calls 
artificial. These are the desires and aversions that "could not have been 
produced naturally", that "could not have been brought about by expe­
rience with actual situations which the desires are for and the aversions 
against" (p 117)86. As far as I can see, there is no reason why we should 
not regard the property of "artificiality" as an "irrationality-making" 
feature87. 
(2) There is (of co urse) also the idea that desires can be unfit to sur­
vive in virtue of being causally dependent on false beliefs (or "igno­
rances"). Now, if the phrase "causally dependent" is interpreted as 
85But is it really so unlikely that desires of this kind would survive cognitive 
psychotherapy? Well, this is what Brandt believes. "[I]f a person brought to 
consciousness the connection of early deprivation with his intense desire 
(=insight), the abnormally strong desire would [on his view] abate" (ibid., p 124). 
86Brandt also adds that most of these desires are (in fact) produced by 
"observation of the attitudes and values of ot her persons - parents, teachers, or 
peers, not to mention films and television" (ibid., p 116). However, it is important 
to note that this is not what makes them artificial. 
87The idea that desires that are artificial (in this sense) would extinguish is not very 
informative, however; it may even be tautological. 
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"maintained by" rather than as "produced by", it is not just plausible to 
assume that those of a person's desires that are causally dependent on 
false beliefs would extinguish in cognitive psychotherapy, but also that 
they would do so because the person has continued to have them 
because of certain false beliefs (or "ignorances"), e.g., about the object 
of the desire, or about himself. That is, it seems that the property of 
being causally dependent on (maintained by) false beliefs is a truly 
"irrationality-making" feature88. 
So, are there any possible irrationality-making features that we have 
overlooked? Well, the only property I can think of is the property of 
being intrinsically irrational in a certain way, viz. of being directed 
towards an object that is (in some objective sense) "in no respect worth 
desiring", or even "worth avoiding". A deliberative theorist would 
deny that there are such desires, however, and they can therefore be 
ignored in this context. Suffice it to say that it is not unlikely that most 
of the desires that an intrinsic theorist classifies as intrinsically irrational 
would extinguish in cognitive psychotherapy, but this is not to say that 
they would do so because of their alleged intrinsic irrationality 
(especially not if there is no such thing). 
This concludes our exposition of t he deliberative theory. Let us now 
return to the issue of r elevance, and ask whether we should accept any 
of the two possible modifications (of the Success Theory) which are 
based on this conception. The first question was: Should we regard all 
(intrinsic) desires that would not survive a process of ideal deliberation 
as irrelevant? 
Suppose that John has a strong, intrinsic desire to write a book. 
Suppose also that this desire would not survive a confrontation with 
facts and logic. Does this allow us to conclude that it would not have 
nonderivative value for John, as the person he is now, to write the 
88So, what does Brandt have to say on what kinds of (intrinsic) desires that would 
be likely to survive or be produced by cognitive psychotherapy? Not much: The 
only kind of desires and aversions that he is reasonably sure would be accepted as 
rational are desires for what is natively liked (e.g., dozing when tired, eliminating, 
eating good food, having novel stimuli, and tasting something sweet), and 
aversions for what is natively disliked (e.g., being in pain, being too cold or too 
hot, being unable to breathe, having to stay awake when sleepy, being bored, 
stubbing one's toe, and receiving an electric shock); cf. ibid., pp 130-131. This does 
mean that only "baby-wants" can be rational, however, e.g., Brandt would most 
probably accept the view that those of our wants which are autonomous, or 
natural, or informed, are also "fit to survive". 
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book and have the desire fulfilled? I think not, but neither can we 
conclude that it would be good for John to write the book. We simply 
don't have enough information to answer the question. In order to 
determine whether John's desire is relevant or not, it is not enough to 
know that it would not survive cognitive psychotherapy, we also need 
to know why it would not survive. The more general point I want to 
make can be expressed as follows: The mere fact that a desire would 
not survive cognitive psychotherapy does not make it irrelevant (or less 
relevant). If a certain deliberatively irrational desire happens to be 
irrelevant, it is not in virtue of its deliberative irrationality, but for some 
other reason, i.e. because of s ome other property that it has89. That is, 
the connection between irrelevance and deliberative irrationality is 
contingent rather than necessary. 
So, if a deliberatively irrational desire happens to be irrelevant, in 
virtue of w hat is it irrelevant? Well, I think it can be assumed that the 
reason why a certain irrelevant deliberatively irrational desire is irrele­
vant tends to coincide with the reason why it is deliberatively irrational 
(why it would not survive cognitive psychotherapy). Or alternatively 
put, I believe that if a certain deliberatively irrational desire happens to 
be irrelevant, then the property which makes it irrelevant is most pro­
bably the same property which makes it "unfit" to survive cognitive 
psychotherapy. This does not imply that all "irrationality-making" 
properties are also all "irrelevance-making" properties, however, but 
only that the properties which make deliberatively irrational desires 
irrelevant are to be found among the properties which make these 
desires deliberatively irrational in the first place. In fact, it seems plau­
sible to assume that there are "irrationality-making" properties which 
are not (at the same time) "irrelevance-making". A possible example of 
such a feature is the property of being causally dependent on false 
beliefs (or ignorance) about one's own history. A desire which possess 
this property would probably not survive a confrontation with 
(psychological) facts about how it originated, but it is doubtful whether 
we should regard it as irrelevant. 
So, which of the irrationality-making properties mentioned above can 
(and should) also be regarded as "irrelevance-making"? Well, the only 
89This idea must be carefully distinguished from the (similar) idea that every 
deliberatively irrational desire is irrational in virtue of some "irrationality-making" 
property that it has. 
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serious candidates I can think of are (1) the property of artificiality, and 
(2) the property of being causally dependent on false beliefs (or 
ignorances). 
(1) So, should we regard all artificial desires as irrelevant? Does the 
fact that a certain desire "could not have been produced naturally" 
make it irrelevant? Well, it seems clear that most (or all) derived artificial 
desires have to be regarded as irrelevant: This seems to follow from the 
restriction claim which has already been adopted, viz. the idea that a 
desire is irrelevant if it is not (in a strict sense) derivable from more 
fundamental desires and the whole truth about "its object" (i.e. the 
actual situation which the desire is for). But what if we h ave underived 
desires in mind? Well, in this case, the artificiality of a desire seems to 
consist in its causal dependence on false beliefs or ignorance, and the 
idea that such desires should be regarded as irrelevant can therefore be 
discussed under (2). 
(2) So, should we accept the idea that if a desire is causally dependent 
on false beliefs (or ignorance), then it can never have nonderivative 
value for the desiring subject to have the desire fulfilled? Let us return 
to John's desire to write a book, and let us assume that the reason why 
this desire would not survive cognitive psychotherapy is that it is 
causally dependent on false beliefs. Does this mean that it would not be 
good for John to have the desire fulfilled? Well, this may well depend 
on what the false beliefs are about. If John's desire is dependent on 
false beliefs about the activity of writing, or about his own ability to 
write, it is (I think) irrelevant, but what if it is dependent on his igno­
rance about how the desire came into existence in the first place? Would 
this make it not-good for John to have the desire fulfilled? I think not. 
My tentative view can be formulated as follows: The fact that a 
person's desire is causally dependent on some false belief (or state of 
ignorance) can make it irrelevant, but only if (i) the desire is underived 
(if it is derived, it is the restriction claim above which holds), and (ii) the 
false belief (or ignorance) is (intuitively) "about the object", e.g., if the 
person desires that X because he is ignorant about Z, then Z is 
(somehow) a part of the situation X. 
If we, on top of this, conceive of all underived desires which are 
dependent on the relevant kinds of f alse beliefs as irrelevant (and not 
just those which are also deliberatively irrational), we will move even 
further away from the deliberative idea. (This follows from the fact that 
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it is highly unlikely that all desires which possess this feature would 
extinguish in cognitive psychotherapy; some desires may simply be too 
deeply rooted). 
To conclude: The "deliberative" version of the restricted rationality-
oriented desire theory should not be accepted, i.e. it may well have 
nonderivative value for a person to have a certain desire fulfilled, even 
if this desire would not survive cognitive psychotherapy. Instead, we 
should accept the following claim: An underived desire is irrelevant if 
(and because) it is causally dependent on (maintained by) certain kinds 
of false beliefs (or "ignorances"), viz. on beliefs (etc.) that are 
(intuitively) about the relevant kinds of objects90. 
Rationality-oriented modifications based on the genetic 
theory 
So, is it plausible to regard all "genetically irrational" desires as ir­
relevant? If not, should we (at least) accept the weaker claim that it is 
ceteris paribus better for a person to have his genetically rational desires 
fulfilled than to have his genetically irrational desires fulfilled?91 
To get in a better position to answer these questions, let us first take 
a closer look at what the genetic theory is all about. On this theory, the 
difference between rational and irrational desires is a difference in 
causal history. A desire is rational if and only if (and because) it has 
been shaped "in the right way", and a desire is irrational if and only if 
(and because) it has been shaped "in the wrong way". This is how 
Elster (1983) formulates this idea: 
My suggestion is that we should evaluate the broad rationality of 
beliefs and desires by looking at the way in which they are shaped. A 
belief may be consistent and even true, a desire consistent and even 
conformable to morals - and yet we may hesitate to call them rational 
90But it may still be objected: "Why should we regard all underived desires of t his 
kind as irrelevant? How do you argue for the view that it is not good for a person 
to have such desires fulfilled?". Well, it seems that all I can do is to appeal to the 
intuitive plausibility of the idea. 
91One may also ask whether it matters (in this context) in what way a desire is 
genetically irrational, e.g., what distorting mechanism that has generated it. Is it, 
for example, only certain kinds of genetically irrational desires (e.g., adaptive 
preferences) which should be regarded as irrelevant? It is not necessary to deal 
with these questions here, however. 
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if they have been shaped by irrelevant causal factors, by a blind 
psychic causality operating 'behind the back' of the person. The 
stress here should be on 'irrelevant' and 'blind', not on causality as 
such. I am not arguing that beliefs and desires are made irrational by 
virtue of having a causal origin. All desires and beliefs have a 
(sufficient) causal origin, but some of them have the wrong sort of 
causal history and hence are irrational (pp 15-16). 
On Elster's version of the genetic theory, a desire is irrational if and 
only if ( and because) it has been "shaped by irrelevant causal factors". 
A desire is rational, on the other hand, if and only if (and because) it is 
autonomous. It is not easy to tell what the autonomy of a desire consists 
in, however. According to Elster, it "appears insuperably hard to say 
what it means for a desire to have been formed 'in the right way', i.e. 
not distorted by irrelevant causal processes" (ibid., p 20), and he admits 
that he can "offer no satisfactory definition of a utonomy" (ibid., p 21). 
Instead, he characterizes it in a negative way; "autonomy will have to 
be understood as a mere residual, as what is left after we have elimi­
nated the desires that have been shaped by one of the mechanisms on 
the short list for irrational preference-formation" (ibid., p 24)92. 
The distorting mechanisms to which Elster refers can be either cogni­
tive or affective in character: desires may be irrational "due either to 
faulty cognitive processes or to undue influence from some affective 
drive" (ibid., p 24). An example of the former (cognitive, or "cold") 
kind of distorting mechanism is preference change by framing, which 
"occurs when the relative attractiveness of options changes when the 
choice situation is reframed in a way that rationally should make no 
difference" (ibid., p 25). An example of the latter (affective, moti­
vational, or "hot") kind of di storting mechanism is adaptive preference 
formation. This is "the adjustment of wants to possibilities - not the deli­
berate adaptation favoured by character planners, but a causal process 
occurring non-consciously. Behind this adaptation there is the drive to 
reduce the tension or frustration that one feels in having wants that 
one cannot possibly satisfy" (ibid., p 25). Preferences shaped in this way 
92It is worth noting that in the case of belief, it might be easier to characterize (or 
define) "genetic rationality" in positive terms, e.g., there is always the view that a 
belief is rational if it has been shaped by a process which is good at generating 
true beliefs. What makes the case of desire so problematic is (I think) the fact that 
there is no counterpart to "truth". 
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are called adaptive preferences (or "sour grapes"), and they are by far the 
most prominent kind of non-autonomous (irrational) preferences. Other 
important examples of heteronomous preference formation mentioned 
by Elster are "conformism, i.e. the adaptation of one's preferences to 
those of other people"93, "sheer inertia", "counteradaptive preference 
formation" (which generates counteradaptive preferences like "the 
grass is always greener on the other side of the fence" or "forbidden 
fruit is sweet"), "anti-conformism", and "the obsession with novelty" 
(cf. ibid., p 22). 
If we compare the genetic theory with the deliberative theory, we will 
see that the rationality conditions of the former theory are (most pro­
bably) "stronger" than the rationality conditions of the latter. It is 
highly likely that all autonomous desires would survive cognitive 
psychotherapy, but we can hardly assume that all heteronomous 
desires would extinguish in such a process. Suppose that my desire that 
there is peace in the world originated in a heteronomous way (e.g., I 
copied it from my peers), but that it is (so to speak) "maintained" in an 
autonomous way (the reason why I still have it is dependent on some 
"autonomous factor"). It is not likely that this desire would extinguish 
in cognitive psychotherapy94. In short, it seems plausible to assume that 
if a desire is "genetically rational", it is also "deliberatively rational", but 
not vice versa. 
Another interesting difference between the two theories is this: It is 
easy to see how Elster's theory can (in principle) be used to classify 
desires and aversions as rational or irrational, but it is not clear whether 
it can also be used to determine whether it is rational or irrational for a 
person to desire a certain situation to a ce rtain degree. Brandt's theory, 
on the other hand, is as good in this respect as it is to determine 
whether it is rational or irrational to desire a certain situation. The 
reason for this is that Brandt's theory is really a theory about what it is 
for a person's preference-ordering (as a whole) to be rational. Elster's 
theory is not "holistic" in this sense, however, and this means that he 
would have to adopt the following "atomistic" procedure in order to 
determine a person's rational preference-ordering: "Take a person's 
93Cf. what Brandt says about artificial desires in note 86. 
94What I regard as the strongest criticism against the genetic theory is connected 
to this point. The question is: "Is it really plausible to regard heteronomous desires 
of this type as irrational?'' 
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actual preference-ordering, then eliminate every single outcome which is 
not an object of an autonomous desire or aversion, and what you are 
left with is a person's rational (i.e. autonomous) preference-ordering"95. 
Let us now return to the issue of relevance and ask whether it is 
plausible to regard all "genetically irrational" desires as irrelevant. And 
more generally, is it (in the present context of well-being) of any 
interest at all in what way our desires have been shaped? 
Well, it is probably true that many heteronomous desires are best 
regarded as irrelevant, but this does not allow us to conclude that any 
of t hese desires irrelevant in virtue of having been shaped "in the wrong 
way". The idea that the relevance or irrelevance of a desire depends on 
how it has been formed is simply not valid, and should therefore be 
rejected. Instead, we should accept the more plausible view that desires 
which have the wrong kind of causal history will sometimes get (as a 
result of this) certain other defects, and it is in virtue of these defects 
that they are irrelevant. That is, we should regard the connection 
between genetical irrationality and irrelevance as contingent rather than 
necessary, and we should reject the idea that only autonomous desires 
are relevant. To see why it (in this context) doesn't really matter at all 
how a desire was shaped in the first place, consider a desire which was 
formed by adaptive preference formation, but which is maintained "in 
the right way". It is hardly plausible to regard such a desire as ir­
relevant. 
To conclude, the idea that only autonomous desires can be relevant is 
a bad idea, and so is (for roughly the same reason) the idea that our 
heteronomous desires is less relevant than our autonomous desires96. 
95There are (of c ourse) also a number of s imilarities between the two theories, 
e.g., they are both relativist conceptions of rational desire (they both allow for the 
possibility that it is rational for one person to desire a certain thing but irrational 
for another person to desire "the same thing"), and they both reject the Humean 
idea that only derived desires can be criticized on rational grounds. 
%But that the idea should be rejected in the context of well- being does not imply 
that it should also be rejected in other contexts, e.g., in the context of rational 
action (or rational choice). For example, Elster may well be right in assuming that 
only autonomous desires are (fully) relevant in the context of ra tional action, i.e. 
that an action is not fully rational (rational "in the broad sense") unless it is 
rationalized by an autonomous desire (and a rational belief). 
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Rationality-oriented modifications based on the intrinsic 
theory 
Assuming that there are such things as intrinsically irrational desires, is 
it plausible to regard all desires of t his kind as irrelevant? And do we 
have a good reason to regard desires which are intrinsically rational 
(assuming that there are such things) as more relevant than desires 
which are not? 
So, what is it for a desire to be intrinsically rational (or irrational)? 
Well, as a first approximation, we can say that a desire is intrinsically 
rational (irrational) if an d only if it i s rational (irrational) because of its 
content, i.e. no matter who has it. But what exactly does the intrinsic 
rationality (irrationality) of a desire consist in? 
Let us first look at what it is for a desire to be intrinsically rational (or 
"rationally required", as Parfit puts it). In Parfit's (1984) terminology, a 
rationally required desire is a desire that provides good reasons97 for 
acting, and he also claims that one is (in some sense) irrational if one 
does not have it (cf. p 118). I take this to mean that a desire is rationally 
required if i t is rational to act as if one had it (even if one does not, in 
fact, have it), On this view, it is really actions and their reasons that are 
rationally required, rather than desires! Suppose, for example, that the 
desire to act morally (e.g., not to lie) is rationally required in this sense. 
What this means is that we all have a good (conclusive) "reason for 
acting morally", and that we are (therefore) rationally required to act 
morally. And "we have a reason for acting morally, even if we have no 
desire to do so" (ibid., p 121). This is what this part of the intrinsic 
theory melts down to: the claim that there are certain things which all of 
us have good reason to do (which is rational for everyone to do), no 
matter what we want and do not want. What is primarily required is 
that we act in a certain way, not that we have a certain desire98. The 
case of intrinsically irrational desires is (I believe) analogous. These 
desires do not provide good reasons for acting (cf. ibid., p 118), and 
97That is, our desires are seldom our reasons, but they sometimes provide us with 
reasons. "In most cases, someone's reason for acting is one of the features of what 
he wants, or one of the facts that explains and justifies his desire. /... / [M]y reason 
is not my desire but the respect in which my aim is [or better: appears to me as] 
desirable - worth desiring" (Parfit (1984), p 121). 
98That is, if desires are rationally required at all, it is "by implication", i.e. because 
actions are (by definition) manifestations of desires. 
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every person is (therefore) rationally required to act as if he did not 
have it (even if he, in fact, happens to have it). 
This suggests that a person's desire to act in a certain way is intrin­
sically rational if and only if he has an objective reason to act in this 
way. And if person's desire is a desire that a certain situation obtains 
(rather than a desire to act in a certain way), it is intrinsically rational if 
and only if he has an objective reason to (try to) bring the situation 
about, i.e. if i t has objective value in Nagel's sense. This suggests that 
the question "How do we determine whether a certain desire is intrin­
sically rational, intrinsically irrational, or neither?" coincides with funda­
mental ethical questions like "How do we determine whether a certain 
situation is good or bad?" and "How do we determine what we have 
(objective) reason to do?". (It also suggests that many intrinsically 
rational desires are other-regarding, and that they must (for this 
reason) be regarded as irrelevant). 
If w e restrict our attention to now-for-now desires about one's own 
life, it seems plausible to assume that such a desire is intrinsically rational 
if and only if its object (some part of one's life) is worth desiring (if it 
has positive "desirability-value"99), and that it is intrinsically irrational if 
and only if its object is "in no respect worth desiring" or "worth 
avoiding" (if i t has neutral or negative "desirability-value")100. (Here, it 
is important to note that the "desirability-value" of a situation, assuming 
that there is such a thing, is independent of w hat we want and do not 
want, and therefore, in a certain sense, objective. This does not imply 
that there are objective prudential values, however, i.e. that there are 
"The term was suggested to me by Krister Bykvist. 
loOThis is not the only way in which preferences about one's own life can be 
intrinsically irrational, however. According to Parfit, "[the] best examples [of such 
desires] can be found when we turn to our /... / desires about possible pains and 
pleasures. Such desires are irrational if t hey discriminate between equally good 
pleasures, or equally bad pains, in an arbitrary way. It is irrational to care less 
about future pains because they will be felt either on a Tuesday, or more than a 
year in the future. I... I In these cases the concern is not less because of some 
intrinsic difference in the object of concern. The concern is less because of a 
property which is purely positional, and which draws an arbitrary line. These are 
the patterns of concern that are, in the clearest way, irrational. These patterns of 
concern are imaginary. But they are cruder versions of patterns that are common. 
Many people care less about future pains, if they are further in the future. And it is 
often claimed that this is irrational" (ibid., pp 125-126). These preferences are not 
of a "now-for-now" type, however, and they are (therefore) of no interest in the 
present context. 
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situations which are nonderivatively good or bad for us, regardless of 
what our desires and aversions are. Cf. below). 
Let us now return to the issue of relevance, and ask whether we 
should regard all intrinsically irrational now-for-now desires about 
one's own life as irrelevant. Can it ever have nonderivative value for a 
person to have a desire about his own life fulfilled if t he object of this 
desire has negative desirability-value? Well, this seems to depend 
entirely on what kind of desirability-value we have in mind. For 
example, if the object is "desirability-bad" in the aesthetic sense, or if it 
is morally bad, or instrumentally bad-period, it may well be good for 
the desiring subject to have the desire fulfilled. But if the object of a 
desire is desirability-bad in the prudential sense, it is (obviously) not 
good for the subject to have this desire fulfilled. 
On my view, prudential desirability-value is the only type of 
desirability-value that is of i nterest here, i.e. the only restriction claim 
that we have any reason to accept in this context is this: A desire can 
only be relevant if i t is a desire for something that does not have nega­
tive nonderivative desirability-value for the subject. And in a similar 
way, we should regard the desires whose objects have positive 
prudential desirability-value as more relevant than the desires whose 
objects have neutral or negative prudential desirability-value101. It is 
worth noting that both these claims are perfectly consistent with (Dl). 
The big question here is of course whether there are any desires 
which are intrinsically rational (or irrational) in this way. Now, this is 
exactly what one of the weaker forms of "the objective list theory" 
claims, i.e. the question is really whether this theory is plausible or not 
(cf. chapter 7, pp 362-366). 
Conclusion 
To sum up, it seems that we have reason to accept the following 
rationality-oriented restrictions of the Success Theory: 
(i) A ll derived desires that are not (in a strict sense) derivable from 
the truth about "their objects" (and more fundamental desires) are irre­
levant. That is, a derived intrinsic desire is irrelevant if there is no way 
101That is, if X has positive prudential desirability-value while Y has not, then it is 
ceteris paribus nonderivatively better for a person to have the (intrinsic) desire that 
X fulfilled than to have the (intrinsic) desire that Y fulfilled. 
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in which the subject could have derived it correctly from the whole 
truth about "its object" and his more fundamental desires, e.g., if i t is 
(so to speak) logically dependent on mistakes of fact (cf. p 241 above). 
(ii) An underived desire is irrelevant if (and because) it is causally 
dependent on (maintained by) certain kinds of false beliefs or "igno­
rances", viz. on beliefs (etc.) that are (intuitively) about the relevant 
objects. The idea is (roughly) that there must be some conceptual con­
nection between the object of the desire and the object of the 
"irrelevance-making" belief, i.e. that the propositional content of the 
desire and the propositional contents of the relevant beliefs must, to 
some extent, "coincide" (cf. p 253)102. 
(iii) On the assumption that there are situations that are "worth 
avoiding" (in the prudential sense): A desire can only be relevant if it is 
a desire for a situation that is not of this type (cf. p 259). 
We should also accept the following rationality-oriented claim con­
cerning relative weights: On the assumption that there are situations 
that are worth desiring (in the prudential sense): Desires whose objects 
are of t his type are more relevant than desires whose objects are not of 
this type, e.g., desires for situations that are (in the prudential sense) 
"in no respect worth desiring" (cf. p 259). 
This ends the section on the different rationality-oriented ways in 
which the Success Theory may (and should) be modified. So, are these 
all the modifications we need, or are any further modifications 
necessary? Is the rationality-oriented Success Theory we have arrived 
at the most plausible version of the actual desire theory, or is it 
necessary to modify this theory too, i.e. in a way that is neither object-
oriented nor rationality-oriented? 
102Claims (i) and (ii) are both "based on" the distinction between derived and 
underived desires. So what if this distinction cannot be upheld? Well, then it seems 
that we should simply drop (i) and conceive of (ii) as applicable to all desires, i.e. 
not just underived ones. 
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5.2.3, Some other possible modifications of the 
(actual) desire theory 
In this section, I will take a closer look at two types of possible modi­
fications, viz. (1) modifications which "appeal to the agent's values, or 
ideals, or to his moral beliefs" (cf. Parfit (1984), p 119), or, we should 
add, to his higher-order desires, and (2) "knowledge-oriented" modi­
fications. The modifications of the first type can all be regarded as 
versions of the following general claim: "How good it is for a person to 
have a certain desire fulfilled depends (in part) on how compatible it is 
with his own higher-order desires, evaluations, ideals, or moral beliefs. 
Or more specifically, those of a person's desires that are sanctioned by 
his higher-order desires (etc.) should be regarded as more relevant 
than those of his desires that are not". The knowledge-oriented modi­
fications are of two types, viz. (a) the idea that we should give less or 
no weight to those of a person's desires of which he is unaware, and 
(b) the idea that it is ceteris paribus better for a person to have a desire 
fulfilled if he is aware of the occurrence of its object103. 
The appeal to evaluations and higher-order desires 
Modifications of the first type come in several forms, e.g., it might be 
claimed that we should "give no weight to the desires that someone 
wishes that he did not have" (cf. ibid., p 119), or that we should "only 
/.../ pay attention to the preferences we welcome and accept", the 
preferences "we gladly and willingly acknowledge" (cf. Tännsjö 
(forthcoming), p 83). It might also be claimed that we should give more 
weight to the desires with which the subject identifies, or acknowledges 
as (in some important sense) his own (cf. Sumner (1996)), or that "our 
103Apart from the content-oriented and rationality-oriented modifications above, 
these are the only types of modifications to which I will pay any attention. This 
means that there are many possible modifications which will be ignored, e.g., the 
idea that desires with certain kinds of causal histories are more relevant than 
desires with other kinds of histories, or the idea that desires that are in harmony 
with human nature are more relevant than desires that are not, or the idea that 
we should give more weight to those desires that serve our needs than to those 
desires that are in conflict with our needs. The first of these three modifications is 
intuitively implausible and the last two are nothing but clumsy reformulations of 
the rationality-oriented modifications on p 259, so it should hardly surprise us that 
none of these possible modifications can (as far as I know) be found in the 
literature. 
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lives are subjectively good if w e succeed in satisfying our most impor­
tant wants in accordance with appropriate ideals", i.e. that it is a "require­
ment of good lives /.../ that the satisfaction of /.../ [our] most 
important I... I wants must occur in accordance with ideals we correctly 
value" (Kekes (1988), p 19, my italics)104. 
The fact that there are so many possible versions of t he general claim 
suggests that it is not very fruitful to ask whether this claim is plausible 
or not. Instead, we need to be more specific: we have to identify those 
("major") versions of the claim that are intuitively interesting, and then 
ask (for each of these claims) whether it is plausible. 
On my view, there are at least two such "sub-claims" that are worth 
investigating, viz. (i) the idea that we should give less or no weight to 
those of a person's desires and aversions that are not sanctioned by his 
higher-order desires, or by those of his evaluations (moral or not) 
whose objects are (explicitly or implicitly) desires or aversions, and (ii) 
the idea that we should give less or no weight to those of a person's 
desires that are not sanctioned by those of his evaluations (moral or 
not105) whose objects are not desires or aversions106. 
104It is worth noticing that this restriction claim consists of two distinctive parts, 
viz. (i) the idea that a person's desire is not relevant unless it (and/or its 
satisfaction) is in accordance with her ideals, and (ii) the idea that the ideals in 
question must be appropriate. The latter idea is not as central as the first, but there 
will be some discussion of it anyhow. 
We might also add that this claim is but one of several components of Kekes' 
conception of the good life. The other components of his desire theory are: (a) The 
idea that "desires to do" are (somehow) more important than desires with other 
kinds of objects, e.g., as when he says that "[tjhe central idea I propose to advance 
and justify is that good lives depend on doing what we want" (ibid., p 18, my 
italics); (b) the idea that a want can only be relevant if it is both rational and moral, 
i.e. that our desires are not relevant if their objects (what we want to do) are 
"foolish, inconsistent, or immoral things" (ibid., p 18); and (c) the idea that a desire 
can only be relevant if it "matters deeply", if it is not "transitory and superficial", 
and that the more important a desire is (for the desiring subject), the better it is 
for him to have it satisfied (that is, his desire theory is intensity-oriented). 
However, Kekes' theory also contains (d) the objectivist idea there are certain 
things (e.g., intimate personal relationships) that a good life must include, i.e. it is 
not a "pure" desire theory. 
105In this context, it does not really matter whether a person's values and ideals 
are "moral" or not, and "those of a person's desires that are sanctioned by his 
moral beliefs" is (for this reason) not an interesting category. 
106The distinction between evaluations of this type and the evaluations referred to 
in (i) corresponds to the distinction between first-order desires and higher-order 
desires, and we might therefore (somewhat inappropriately) refer to them as 
"first-order evaluations" and "higher-order evaluations", where "pain is a bad 
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It should also be added that both (i) and (ii) come in two forms, i.e. 
they either take the form of restriction claims, where all "non-sanc­
tioned" desires are regarded as totally irrelevant, or of claims con­
cerning relative weights, where "non-sanctioned" desires are given 
some weight, but not as much weight as those desires that are (in the 
relevant sense) "sanctioned". 
So, are (i) or (ii), in any of t heir forms, plausible? Well, to be able to 
answer this question, there are two things we need to know, viz. what 
it is for a person's desire to be sanctioned by his higher-order desires 
(or evaluations), and what it is for a person's desire to be sanctioned by 
his "first-order evaluations". 
In my terminology, a person's desire is minimally sanctioned by his 
higher-order desires if and only if h e does not have an aversion against 
having it, and it is maximally sanctioned by his higher-order desires if 
and only if he (positively) wants to have it. A person's first-order 
desire is in conflict with his higher-order desires if and only if i t is not 
minimally sanctioned by them, i.e. if he prefers not to have it. In a 
similar way, a person's desire is minimally sanctioned by his "higher-
order evaluations" if and only if he does not regard its occurrence as 
bad, and it is maximally sanctioned by his "higher-order evaluations" if 
and only if he regards its occurrence as good (and so on). 
A person's (first-order) desire is minimally sanctioned by his "first-
order evaluations", on the other hand, if and only if he does not evalu­
ate its object (i.e. some situation) in a negative way, and it is maximally 
thing" is an example of a "first-order evaluation", and where "it is good to have 
benevolent desires" is an example of a "second-order evaluation". 
So, what about the idea that we should give less or no weight to those of a 
person's desires that are not sanctioned by his ideals? Isn't this an "intuitively 
interesting" idea? Well, I think it is, but on my view, it doesn't really contain 
anything that isn't already contained in (i) and (ii). What we call "ideals" are most 
often mixtures of desires and evaluations: Ideals normally include certain kinds of 
evaluations - viz. evaluations of the form "an ideal (good, perfect) X (e.g. , a good 
society, an ideal partner, or a perfect family) is an X with the properties P, Q, and 
R" - but full-fledged ideals are more than just evaluations; they are also goals. (An 
evaluative ideal is not a full-fledged ideal of mine, it is not my ideal, unless I am (in 
some way or other) committed to its realization). It is also worth mentioning that 
some of the desires of which the relevant ideals "consist" are higher-order desires. 
For example, the ideals which tend to be of most interest in this context, viz. 
"personal" ideals concerning what kind of person (man, woman, etc.) one wants to 
be, normally involve some reference to what kind of preferences one wishes to 
have (this follows from the fact that the preferences one has is in part constitutive 
of what kind of person one is). 
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sanctioned by his "first-order evaluations" if a nd only if h e regards the 
object of the desire as good. A person's desire is in conflict with his 
"first-order evaluations" if and only if he conceives of its object as bad. 
So, now that we know what it is for a desire to be sanctioned by his 
higher-order desires and/or his evaluations: Are any of the modifi­
cations suggested above plausible? Well, let us first note that it would 
be highly implausible to require that a person's desire is maximally sanc­
tioned by his higher-order desires and/or evaluations in order to count 
as relevant. This suggests that we may, in the "higher-order case", 
restrict our attention to the following questions: (i:a) Should we regard 
those of a person's desires which are minimally sanctioned by his 
higher-order desires (or evaluations) as more relevant than those of h is 
desires which are in conflict with his higher-order desires (etc.)? (i:b) If 
the answer is yes: Should we also regard all first-order desires that are 
in conflict with higher-order desires (or evaluations) as totally irrele­
vant? (i:c) Is it plausible to regard those of a person's desires which are 
maximally sanctioned by his higher-order desires (or evaluations) as 
more relevant than those of h is desires which are only minimally sanc­
tioned by his higher-order desires (etc.)?107 (To complicate the issue 
further, we may also ask (i:d) whether it matters whether the relevant 
(i.e. "sanctioning" or "non-sanctioning") higher-order desires (etc.) are 
intrinsic or instrumental, and (i:e) whether it makes any difference 
whether they are rational or not; and if it does, whether it matters in 
which way they are rational108). 
Let us first look at what seems to be the most central question here, 
viz. (i:b). Suppose that Alice has an intrinsic (first-order) desire to 
smoke, but that she also wishes that she did not have this desire. 
Suppose also (for the sake of argument) that this second-order desire is 
both rational109 and intrinsic, i.e. that it is relevant. Does this allow the 
107And similarly in the "first-order evaluation case", i.e. (ii) can, in a similar way, be 
divided into three sub-questions. 
108In the "first-order evaluation case", the corresponding questions are: (ii:d) Does 
it matter what kinds of evaluations we have in mind, e.g., whether the 
"sanctioning" (or "non-sanctioning") evaluation is intrinsic or instrumental, and 
whether it is aesthetic, moral or prudential? (i:e) Does it make any difference 
whether the relevant evaluations are "appropriate" ("correct") or not (as Kekes 
claims)? 
109The assumption that this second-order desire is rational might be somewhat 
problematic, however, viz. because it may well be incompatible with the 
necessary assumption that the first-order desire (i.e. the desire to smoke) is (in the 
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desire theorist to "conclude" that it does not have nonderivative value 
for Alice to have her first-order desire fulfilled? 
Well, it may seem so, viz. for the following "reason": "If we want to 
determine which of a person's desires that are relevant and which of 
his desires that are not, why don't we just appeal to the Sovereign 
Desiring Subject, and let him decide? After all, this is the restriction 
claim which is most faithful to the subjectivist spirit of the desire 
theory". This is a bad argument, however. First, if w e really want to be 
faithful to the idea of the Sovereign Subject, we should probably not 
restrict at all. Second, we have already admitted (in the spirit of the 
desire theory) that the second-order desire should count as relevant, 
so why should we count it again, by using it as a "criterion of 
relevance"? 
On my view, this is the strongest objection to the idea that only 
desires that are sanctioned by higher-order desires should count as 
relevant: There is really no reason why we should (in this way) give 
special weight to those desires which have other desires as objects. As 
has already been suggested (on p 213): If we understand the notions of 
desire and strength in the relevant way, i.e. in terms of preference 
orderings, we can see that our higher-order desires are already (in a 
certain way) "incorporated" into our first-order preferences (it is highly 
likely that a-person's "first-order preference ordering" is affected by 
his higher-order desires in a way that the felt intensities of his first-
order desires are not). And if w e are aware of this fact, it is hard to see 
why we should also (on top of this) use our higher-order desires as a 
"criterion of relevance". There is simply something arbitrary about 
giving our higher-order desires that much weight, and my tentative 
conclusion is therefore that we should give a negative answer to (i:b)110. 
relevant sense) rational. 
n0But suppose I am wrong here, i.e. that Alice's desire to smoke should (in fact) 
be regarded as irrelevant. We would then have to ask ourselves whether it would 
make any difference if he r higher-order desire to get rid of t he desire to smoke 
were instrumental rather than intrinsic, or if it were irrational rather than rational. 
On my view, it wouldn't really change anything if the second-order desire were 
(instead) instrumental, but it would make a difference if it w ere irrational, e.g., it 
might be argued that irrational higher-order desires should not count, or more 
specifically, that if a certain desire is in conflict with an irrational higher-order 
desire, then this does not make the desire irrelevant, and if a certain desire is 
sanctioned by an irrational higher-order desire, then this does not "add" to its 
relevance at all. 
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Now, it seems that this argument can also be used to show that (i:a), 
(i:c), and (ii:a)-(ii:c) should be answered in the negative. That is, my 
conclusion is that the rationality-oriented Success Theory we have 
arrived at is not in need of any modifications of this type. So, let us now 
see whether it needs to be modified in a "knowledge-oriented" way. 
Knowledge-oriented modifications 
To repeat, there are two kinds of knowledge-oriented modifications of 
the desire theory, viz. (a) the idea that we should give less or no 
weight to those of a person's desires of w hich he is not aware, and (b) 
the idea that it is ceteris paribus better for a person to have a desire ful­
filled if he is aware of the occurrence of i ts object. 
As usual, both (a) and (b) come in two forms, i.e. they either take the 
form of r estriction claims, e.g., where all desires of which the subject is 
unaware are regarded as totally irrelevant, or of claims concerning 
relative weights, e.g., where those desires of w hich the subject is aware 
are given more weight than those desires of which he is not aware. 
So, are (a) or (b), in any of their forms (in particular, the restriction 
claims), plausible? Well, to be able to answer this question, we first need 
to know what it is for a person to be aware of the fact that a certain 
situation obtains (e.g., that he himself has a certain desire).- So, what do 
I mean by "awareness" in this context? Well, suffice it to say that the 
notion of awareness I have in a mind is a broad one: A person is (of 
course) aware of X if he knows that X is the case, but also if he has a 
true belief that X is the case. Moreover, we must (I think) not assume 
that awareness is necessarily propositional, i.e. we should allow for the 
possibility that there is a kind of awareness which has no belief-compo­
nent. However, it seems necessary that the object of such non-propo-
sitional awareness is (somehow) closely related to some proposition or 
other (it is, after all, "awareness of facts" that we are interested in). 
So, now that we some idea of w hat is meant by "awareness" in this 
context: Are any of the modifications suggested above plausible? In 
particular, is any of the following two "restriction claims"111 plausible: 
(a) It can not be nonderivatively good for a person to have a desire 
fulfilled unless he aware of h aving the desire. Or more specifically, if a 
111 Again, it may be pointed out that it is only (a) that is a restriction claim in the 
proper sense. Cf. note 44 on p 220. 
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person has (at t )  an intrinsic desire that X, then it can only have non-
deriva t ive  value  for  P-a t - t  to  have the  des i re  fu l f i l led  (a t  t )  i f  he  is  (a t  t )  
aware of the fact that he desires that X112. 
(b) It can not be nonderivatively good for a person to have a desire 
fulfilled unless he is aware of the occurrence of its object. Or alter­
natively put: On the notion of fulfilment which has most "moral and 
rational significance", a desire is not fulfilled unless the subject is aware 
of the occurrence of the object (cf. p 162 above)113. 
Now, it seems fruitful to deal with both these questions at the same 
time, viz. as follows. Let us first give a schematic representation of the 
possible epistemic situations of a desiring subject. If we let "P" refer to 
the desiring subject, "D" to some desire, and "X" to the object of this 
desire, we can represent the different possibilities in the following 
simple way: 
P is aware of X P is not aware of X 
P is aware of D A B 
P is not aware of D C D 
We can now formulate the problem as follows. If we assume that P has 
an intrinsic now-for-now desire that X, and that this desire is relevant 
in all other respects (e.g., it is about his own life, it is rational in the 
relevant sense, and so on): Under what epistemic circumstances does it 
have nonderivative value for P to have this desire fulfilled? 
It is obvious that it is (on all plausible versions of the desire theory) 
good for P to have the desire fulfilled in situation (A), i.e. if he is aware 
both of the fact that he has the desire and the fact that the object 
obtains114. It is (I think) also obvious that it is not good for P to have the 
112That is, (i) the important thing is that the person is aware of what he desires, i.e. 
it is not necessary that he knows how strong his desires are; and (ii) if t is the time 
when the desire is fulfilled, it is not necessary that P knows before t that he has the 
desire (assuming that it existed before it was fulfilled). 
113This is but a special case of the more general idea that a person's well-being can 
not be directly affected by things he doesn't know anything about, that if a certain 
situation does not (in any way) "enter" or "affect" a person's experience (if the 
person is not aware of its occurrence), it can not have nonderivative value for the 
person that the situation obtains (cf. Sumner (1996), pp 124-128). 
114This suggests (but I am not sure that it implies) that he is also aware of the fact 
that the desire is fulfilled, i.e. of the fact that the occurrence of X constitutes the 
fulfilment of the desire. 
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desire fulfilled in situation (D); cf. argument (iii) on p 214 above. 
(C) is a strange kind of s ituation; it is (I think) doubtful whether it is 
really possible to be aware of a desired situation without being aware 
of it qua desired (what notions of desire and awareness does this pre­
suppose?). But if w e assume that it is possible: Is it good for P to have 
the desire fulfilled in this type of epistemic situation? Well, I think not, 
i.e. I tend to accept restriction claim (a) on pp 266-267. 
So, what about cases of type (B)? If P is aware of having a desire that 
X, and if this desire is, unknown to P, fulfilled115, is this good or not-
good for P? To find an answer to this question, let us look at some 
examples. Suppose that Bert has a strong intrinsic desire to be loved by 
Alice, and that he is aware of this fact. Suppose also that Alice actually 
loves Bert, but that he has no awareness whatsoever of this fact. On 
my (tentative) view, it is doubtful whether it is, in this case, non-
derivatively good for Bert to have the desire fulfilled. Now, consider 
another example: Suppose that Bert has a strong intrinsic desire not to 
be deceived and betrayed by Alice, and that he is aware of this fact. 
Suppose also that he is (in fact) deceived and betrayed by Alice, but 
that he is not aware of this. Is it, in this case, bad or not-bad for Bert to 
have the aversion fulfilled? Well, personally, I tend to regard it as bad-
for-Bert116. But is this really compatible with the idea that it is (in the 
example above) not-good for Bert to be loved by Alice? Well, I think it 
is; either because there is (in this context) an asymmetry between desire 
and aversion, between good and bad, or because being deceived and 
betrayed have negative prudential desirability-value while being loved 
does not have any positive prudential desirability-value. 
My tentative conclusion is that we should accept the following 
"awareness-oriented" modifications of the desire theory: 
(a) If a person has an intrinsic desire that X (or aversion to Y), then it 
can only have nonderivative value (positive or negative) for P to have 
the desire (aversion) fulfilled if he is aware of the fact that he desires 
that X (has an aversion to Y)117. 
115In the traditional sense, that is. 
116Is it hard to say whether this is a plausible idea, though. Some people accept the 
idea that a person's well-being can be directly affected by things he doesn't know 
anything about, and other people reject it, and it is hard to see how the issue could 
be settled in a rational way. As far as I can see, this is one of the truly intractable 
disagreements which prevail in this field. 
117That is, awareness of this kind is necessary for relevance. It is far from 
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(b) It can not be nonderivatively good for a person to have a desire 
fulfilled unless he is aware of t he occurrence of its object. However, it 
can (at times) be nonderivatively bad for a person to have an aversion 
fulfilled, even if he is unaware of th e occurrence of it s object, viz. if this 
object has negative prudential desirability-value. 
At this point, it is worth noting that condition (a) gives rise to at least 
four questions: 
(i) The fact that it makes perfectly good sense to say things like "Now 
I realize that I have always had this desire, a month ago I didn't fully 
realize it, about a year ago I began to realize it, and before that I had 
no idea whatsoever that I had it" suggests that a person can be more 
or less aware of the fact that he has a certain desire. That is, it seems 
that the difference between the desires of which we are aware and the 
desires of which we are not aware is really a matter of degree. So the 
question arises: Does this mean that we have to accept the idea that the 
more aware a person is of the fact that he has a certain (intrinsic) 
desire, the nonderivatively better it is for him to have it fulfilled, e.g., 
should we regard the desires of which we are "semi-aware" as "semi-
relevant"? On my view, we should not. Instead, we should draw an 
"epistemological line" somewhere, and regard all the desires below the 
line as irrelevant. That is, if the degree to which a person realizes that 
he has a certain intrinsic desire is not high enough, then it is not good 
for him to have the desire fulfilled. This means that even though 
awareness is a matter of degree, relevance will (in this area) still be an all-
or-nothing matter. 
(ii) There are several different ways in which we can be aware of our 
desires, and in the special case of k nowledge, there are several ways in 
which we can gain knowledge of our desires, not just about what we 
want but also about how much we want it. In some cases, we have non-
inferential knowledge of what we want118: we know what we want 
directly (through "introspection"), without having to infer this from 
observations of what we do and do not do (or what we experience)119. 
sufficient, however. 
118Do we also, at times, have non-inferential knowledge of how much we want 
something? Perhaps, but it is (I think) not a very common thing. In any case, it is 
important to notice that the fact that we may find out what we want through 
introspection does not (in any way) guarantee that we, in this way, can discover 
how much we want this something. 
119So, how is it possible to have such non-inferential knowledge about one's own 
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In other cases, we have inferential knowledge of our desires, we gain 
knowledge about what we want and how much we want it by infe­
rence from certain kinds of observations, viz. from observations of 
what we do and do not do (what we try to do and not to do), and 
from observations of w hat we perceive, think, feel, dwell on, focus on, 
and so on120. 
Now, the fact that our knowledge about our desires are of different 
kinds gives rise to the following question: Does it matter (in this con­
text) what kind of knowledge the desiring subject has about what he 
wants (and how much he wants it), e.g., whether it is inferential or 
noninferential? For example, if he knows that he has an intrinsic desire 
that X o btains, is it better for him to have the desire fulfilled if his 
knowledge about it is noninferential than if his knowledge is "merely" 
inferential121? I think not. As long as the subject knows that he has a 
certain desire, it does not really matter what kind of k nowledge he has 
of it (and neither does it matter whether he knows that he has the 
desire or merely has a true belief that he has the desire). 
desires? This is (I think) a difficult question, especially for a functional conception 
of desire: How can we know directly that we have a certain disposition? 
120In this context, it is not really necessary to discuss exactly how knowledge of 
our desires can be inferred from knowledge of our actions and experiences. 
Suffice it to say that such inferences are often difficult to make, something which is 
connected to the fact that there are a number of conditions that have to be 
satisfied for such inferences to be possible. For example, it seems that reliable 
inferences from the fact that a person P performs an action A to the alleged fact 
that P has a desire D (with a certain strength) are not really possible unless the 
following conditions are met: (a) We have some knowledge about P's beliefs. 
More specifically, it can not just be assumed that P believes that A is a possible 
way to satisfy D, it can also be assumed that P believes that A is the best possible 
way open to her (or at least a comparatively good way) to satisfy D. And to know 
this, we have to know what actions P believes are open to him (where this can, 
most probably, not be determined in any independent way, i.e. without making 
any assumptions about what P wants), (b) We do not just know what options P 
believes he has, we also know what options are actually open to P, or (in Jeffrey's 
terms) "what propositions it is in his power to make true". That is, we can not infer 
what P wants from what he does (and does not do) unless we have some 
knowledge about what he can and cannot do, e.g., unless we know something 
about what abilities and opportunities he has, what he dares to do and does not 
dare to do, and whether he is akratic ("weak-willed") or not (in the relevant 
respects), (c) We know whether P is a normal person (given her culture, and so 
on) or not. Most importantly, we know whether or not his needs can be regarded 
as "normal human needs". 
121That is, if tw o intrinsic and known desires are of t he same strength, and if o ne 
of them is known "noninferentially" while the other is known "inferentially", is it 
better for the desiring subject to have the former desire fulfilled? 
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(iii) Condition (a) on p 268 says that it can not be nonderivatively 
good for a person to have the (intrinsic) desire that X fulfilled unless he 
is aware of the fact that he desires that X. So the question arises: Must 
he also be aware of the fact that the desire in question is intrinsic, i.e. 
that he desires that X as an end? Frankly, I don't know. 
(iv) What would (and should) a desire theorist say about the follo­
wing type of c ase: Suppose that a person P has this instrumental desire, 
but that he falsely believes that the desire is intrinsic122. Is it, in a case 
like this, nonderivatively good for P to have the desire fulfilled? I think 
not; the desire is (after all) not intrinsic. 
To sum up, it seems that the rationality-oriented Success Theory we 
have arrived at is in need of some further modifications after all, viz. (a) 
and (b) on pp 268-269 above. That is, the most plausible version of the 
actual desire theory is a Success Theory that is both rationality-oriented 
and "awareness"-oriented. This theory can be characterized as follows: 
My conclusion: The most plausible version of the actual 
desire theory 
First, the most plausible version of the desire theory is a restricted 
theory: it claims that only some kinds of intrinsic now-for-now desires 
should be regarded as relevant. More specifically, if a person P has an 
intrinsic (etc.) desire that X, the theory claims that it is nonderivatively 
good for P to have the desire fulfilled (in the traditional sense) if and 
only if the following conditions are satisfied: 
(i) X is a part of P 's life. 
(ii) If the desire is derived: It is derivable from the whole truth about 
"its object" (and more fundamental intrinsic desires). 
122But can such a belief really be mistaken? Well, it seems that if someone believes 
that he desires that X, then it is very unlikely that his belief is false. (The mistakes 
we make about what we do and do not desire are normally of the following kinds: 
We have desires that we not believe (know) that we have, or we have desires that 
we believe that we do not have). But a person may well be mistaken about hozv 
much he wants something, and most importantly in this context, about what he 
does and does not desire intrinsically. (A psychologically interesting type of 
mistake is this: P correctly believes that he desires that X, but he does not know 
that he also desires that not-X (i.e. that he is ambivalent), and neither does he 
know that this unknown desire that not-X is in fact stronger than the desire that 
X). 
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(iii) If the desire is underived: It is not causally dependent on 
(maintained by) certain kinds of false beliefs or "ignorances", viz. on 
beliefs (etc.) whose propositional contents stand in a close enough 
conceptual relation to the propositional content of t he desire. 
(iv) X is not a situation that is "worth avoiding" (in the prudential 
sense). 
(v) P is aware of the fact that X is (in fact) desired by him. 
(vi) P is aware of the fact that X o btains. (But with the following 
proviso: It may sometimes be bad for a person to have an aversion 
fulfilled, even if h e is unaware of the occurrence of it s object, viz. if 
this object has negative prudential desirability-value). 
Next, the theory also makes certain claims about how we should 
determine which of tw o relevant desires that it is better for the desiring 
subject to have fulfilled. The fundamental idea is of course that 
relevance is a function of strength, but there is one possible exception to 
this rule, viz. 
(vii) the idea that desires for situations that are worth desiring (in the 
prudential sense) are more relevant than desires whose objects are 
not (in this sense) worth desiring. 
(iv) and (vii) are both based on the "objectivist" assumption that there 
are situations that are (in the prudential sense) worth desiring, or in no 
respect worth desiring, or worth avoiding. This means that if this 
assumption proves to be false, the most plausible version of t he desire 
theory is a restricted intensity-oriented theory which can be summa­
rized in points (i)-(iii), (v), and (vi). 
It is now time to move on to the second question on p 188, and ask 
whether this theory is a plausible theory of prudential value. 
5.3. Is any version of the actual desire theory 
plausible? 
If any version of the actual desire theory is plausible, it is (of course) the 
most plausible version, i.e. the rationality-oriented (and awareness-
oriented) Success Theory that was presented above. So, is this theory a 
plausible theory of prudential value? Is the best theory of prudential 
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value a kind of desire theory at all?123 
We have already seen that there are good reasons for answering 
these questions in the affirmative. To repeat, the argumentation for our 
modified Success Theory consists of two parts, viz. (i) arguments which 
purport to show (Dl) is valid, i.e. that we have to accept some kind of 
desire theory (cf. pp 193-195), and (ii) arguments which purport to 
show that this particular theory is the most plausible version of the 
desire theory, i.e. that if (Dl) is valid, then this is the version of the 
theory we should accept (cf. pp 205-214 and 223-272). 
The fact that there are good reasons for accepting the modified 
Success Theory does not mean that we should accept it, however; there 
may (after all) be even better reasons for rejecting it. So let us now look 
at the arguments which have been (or can be) directed against the 
theory, to see whether these counter-arguments (or "counter-claims") 
are valid; and to the extent that they are, whether they have more 
weight than the pro-arguments. Here are the arguments that can be 
given for the view that the most plausible version of the desire theory is 
an implausible theory of prudential value: 
(1) Counter-arguments of the first type purport to show that if you 
accept the most plausible version of the actual desire theory (or some 
similar type of restricted rationality-oriented desire theory), then you 
"must", in order to be "consistent", reject (Dl). That is, these argu­
ments are not directed against (Dl) as such, but against (Dl) qua com­
ponent in a certain type of rationality-oriented (actual) desire theory, 
and they can therefore be viewed as "immanent criticisms" (they start 
from the opponent's own beliefs, and then try to use these beliefs to 
defeat him). There are two possible arguments of th is type: 
(a) "The fact that you have accepted the restriction claim that an 
actual desire cannot be relevant unless it is (in a certain sense) informed 
shows that you have realized that information matters. So why don't 
you also accept the corresponding "idealization claim", viz. the idea that 
we should also give some weight to what a person would want if he 
had (in fact) been fully informed? Isn't it rather arbitrary (for a 
rationality-oriented desire theorist) to exclude people's hypothetical 
desires in this way?" 
123The most central question here is (of course) whether (Dl) is a plausible claim, 
but there is (as we will see) more to the issue than this. 
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(b) "You believe that a desire cannot be relevant if it is a desire for 
something that is (in the prudential sense) worth avoiding, and you also 
believe that desires whose objects are (in this sense) worth desiring is 
more relevant than desires with other kinds of objects. Now, this view 
implies that there are situations which can be (in the relevant sense) 
worth desiring, even if th ey are not (in fact) desired. So why don't you 
admit that it can be good for us that such situations obtain, no matter 
what our actual desires are?" 
Both these arguments are (of cou rse) bad. The beliefs referred to are 
all compatible with (Dl), not just in the literal sense but also "in spirit", 
and our actual desire theorist is (for this reason) not in any way incon­
sistent (he may, however, as we will soon see, be forced to reject (Dl) 
for other reasons). Moreover, it is not just that he will reject the views 
that the critic thinks he should accept, it is also likely that he will reject 
them just because they are incompatible with (Dl)124. 
(2) Arguments (or "counter-claims") of the second type are directed 
against (Dl) as such. That is, qua arguments against the satisfaction 
interpretation, they purport to show that there are other things besides 
(actual) desire-fulfilment and aversion-fulfilment that have non-
derivative value for a person, and qua arguments against the object 
interpretation, they purport to show that a situation may well have 
nonderivative value for a person even if it is not desired (i.e. that it is 
not the case that all prudentially good situations are good in virtue of 
being desired)125. There are at least three arguments of this type: 
(a) The first argument appeals to the idea that if a person would 
intrinsically desire that X if he were fully rational (e.g., if he knew the 
relevant facts and were thinking clearly), then it is nonderivatively 
good for this person (as he is now) that X obtains. 
(b) The second argument is based on a different idea, viz. the objec-
tivist idea that there are certain things which are nonderivatively good 
124Once again, we can see that "one person's modus tollens is another person's 
modus ponens" (this saying is attributed to Wlodek Rabinowicz). 
125On my view, it is more appropriate to conceive of these "arguments" as 
"counter-claims" rather than as counter-arguments in the proper sense. The 
reason for this is that most of the "arguments" I have in mind have the following 
structure: They first make some key claim, and they then point out that (Dl) is 
inconsistent with this claim, and that it should therefore be rejected. They do not 
really purport to show us why we should accept the key claim, however; instead, 
we are simply told that we should accept it. 
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and bad for us, regardless of what we want and do not want, and 
regardless of what we would want if we were rational (or informed). 
According to this line of crit icism, the desire theory is defective because 
it fails to recognize that there are certain objective prudential values. 
(c) The third argument is (roughly) a more radical version of the 
second. The second type of criticism is directed specifically against (Dl), 
and it is therefore consistent with the idea that it is often nonderi-
vatively good for us to have our desires fulfilled (it is even consistent 
with (UD2)). The third line of cr iticism, on the other hand, purports to 
show that the desire theory is not even "partly right", i.e. that there is 
no truth at all in the theory. Qua attack on the object interpretation of 
the theory, the argument purports to show that nothing can have non-
derivative value for person in virtue of being desired. If it is good for a 
person P that a desired situation obtains, the reason for this is either 
that it has objective prudential value or that it gives P pleasure: it is 
never good for P because he desires it. If we, instead, view the argu­
ment as an attack on the satisfaction interpretation, it purports to show 
that even though it is sometimes good for us to get what we want, it is 
never the desire-fulfilment in itself that is good for us126. 
Let us now take a closer look at these three types of objections, to 
see if any of them are valid. 
Is there any truth in the idea that hypothetical desires 
should count? 
According to the idealized versions of the desire theory, it is the 
(hypothetical) preferences that we would have under certain ideal 
conditions that should be regarded as relevant. The preferences that it 
is good for a person to have "satisfied" are (on this view) not his actual 
preferences, but the preferences he would have had if he were fully 
rational, fully informed, free of neuroses, assessing the matter "in a cool 
hour", or the like. Or more precisely: A situation X is nonderivatively 
good for a person P (as he is now) if and only if (and because) P would 
126Or more precisely: Suppose that P desires that X and that X obt ains. On the 
view under consideration, it is the mere fact that the desire is fulfilled (i.e. the 
conjunction of the fact that P desires that X and the fact that X obtains) that cannot 
have nonderivative value for P (i.e. X itself m ay well be nonderivatively good for 
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want X to obtain if he were fully rational127 (I assume that all idealized 
desire theories are rationality-oriented). 
So, is this a plausible view? Should we regard a person's "hypothetical 
rational desires" as relevant? Suppose that a person would desire that 
X obtains if he were fully rational: Does this imply that is it good for 
him, as he is now, that X obtains, even if he does not actually desire that 
X? I think not, and for the following reasons: 
Suppose that the actual Bert is an irrational, uninformed, confused, 
and neurotic person. Surely it cannot be good for this actual Bert to get 
something to which he now has an aversion, just because he would 
want it if he were an entirely different person128. Consider the follo­
wing example: Suppose that Bert has this identical twin brother who is 
fully rational (in fact, he is one of t he few persons on this planet who 
has undergone cognitive psychotherapy). Suppose also that if Bert 
were rational, he would be just like his brother, i.e. he would have 
exactly the same desires as the brother now has129. In this case, an idea­
lized desire theorist would claim that "what is good for Bert's brother 
is also good for Bert"130. This is not a plausible view, however. Bert is 
not his brother, and his actual desires may be very different from his 
brother's actual desires. The fact that the brother wants to live a certain 
kind of life does not imply that it would be good for Bert to live the 
same kind of life: If Bert's global desires are very different from his 
127The reason why I have (in this way) taken the object interpretation for granted 
is that satisfaction interpretations of idealized theories do (on my view) not really 
make sense. It does not make sense to attribute prudential value to "the 
circumstance that our hypothetical (intrinsic) desires and preferences be satisfied", 
and the reason for this is that non-existing desires cannot be fulfilled (in any literal 
sense). Suppose that a person P has no (actual) desire that X obtains, but that he 
would desire that X if he were fully rational. Now, if X (in fact) obtains, this is 
hardly a case of desire-fulfilment, since there is no desire there to be fulfilled. Or 
alternatively put, it hardly makes sense to attribute value-for-P to the conjunction 
"P would desire that X if h e were rational and. X obtains". (But it makes perfectly 
good sense to say that if P would desire that X, then it would, be good for P to have 
it fulfilled). In short, it seems that it does not really make sense to give a 
satisfaction interpretation of a desire theory unless it is an actual desire theory. 
128True, it would probably be good for the actual Bert if he would be transformed 
into this hypothetical person (especially if h e has a desire to be rational), but this 
does not show that it would be good for the actual Bert to do what he would want 
to do if he were a different person. 
129Well, not exactly the same: The fact that Bert's brother wants to have friends 
does not imply that Bert wants his brother to have friends, but that he himself 
wants to have friends. 
130Cf. note 129. 
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brother's, it would not be good for Bert to live the kind of life his 
brother wants to live. As Griffin (1986) points out, 
[i]t is doubtless true that if I fully appreciated the nature of all 
possible objects of desire, I should change much of what I wanted. 
But if I do not go through that daunting improvement, yet the 
objects of my potentially perfected desires are given to me, I might 
well not be glad to have them; the education, after all, may be 
necessary for my getting anything out of them. This is true, for 
instance, of ac quired tastes /.../. Utility must, it seems, be tied at least 
to desires that are actual when satisfied (p 11, my italics)131. 
As I see it, this means that the idealized desire theorist has to give up 
his original position, but it doesn't necessarily force him to accept the 
actual desire theory. He can also try to adopt some kind of middle 
position, viz. by weakening his original claim. There are at least two 
ways in which this can be done: 
(i) The idealized desire theorist might restrict his attention to those 
cases where the actual person and the hypothetical (rational) person are 
similar enough to count as "the same person" (in the qualitative sense), 
e.g., cases where the actual person is a little uninformed or slightly con­
fused (in certain respects) rather than thoroughly irrational or extre­
mely neurotic. He may then claim (more modestly) that it is, in cases like 
this, good for a person (as he is now) to do (etc.) what he would want 
to do (etc.) if he were fully informed and thinking clearly. This idea is 
far more plausible than the original idea, but it is still unacceptable. First, 
it is too vague: how should we determine whether a difference 
between the actual person and the hypothetical person is "small 
enough"? Second, it doesn't give us the slightest clue of how we should 
determine what is good for an irrational person. And third, it is likely 
that it has (so to speak) inherited its plausibility from the actual desire 
theory, so why don't we just go all the way and accept the latter 
theory? 
(ii) The idealized desire theorist can also weaken his original position 
by adopting the following view: "What we should take into account is 
not /... / [a] person's ideal preferences for an ideal situation, where he 
or she has them, but for the actual situation, where he or she is not the 
131Note that this passage has been quoted once before, viz. in note 73 on p 242. 
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very refined person that he or she [ideally?] is" (Tännsjö (forthcoming), 
p 88). Is this a plausible view? I think not. Consider the following 
example132: Suppose that the actual Bert has an actual preference for 
pop music, but that he would prefer classical music if he had his prefe­
rences refined. Suppose also that his "ideal preference for the actual 
situation" is that he listens to "more complex I... I pop music, which 
could serve the purpose of educating his /.../ taste [i.e. to make him a 
more refined person]" (ibid., p 88). That is, Bert wants to listen to 
simple pop music, his ideal twin brother wants to listen to classical music, 
and the twin brother (who is deeply concerned about Bert's well-being) 
wants Bert to listen to complex pop music. Is it, in this case, better for 
(the actual) Bert to listen to complex pop music than to listen to more 
simple pop music? Well, it is certainly not nonderivatively better for him, 
but it might be better for him for instrumental reasons, viz. because it 
would make him a more refined person. But why should we assume 
that it is good for the actual Bert to become more refined? On my view, 
it can only be good for Bert to become more refined if he has an actual 
higher-order desire to become more refined, i.e. the fact that Bert's 
brother wants him to become more refined does not give us any reason 
to assume that it is good for Bert to become more refined. 
To conclude, the original version of the idealized desire theory is im­
plausible, and so are the two weaker versions of th e theory. This means 
that argument (2:a) - which is based on the assumption that some idea­
lized desire theory is true - is a bad argument, i.e. it does not constitute 
any threat to the actual desire theory. 
Is there any truth in "the objective list theory"? 
The second argument against (Dl) (as such) is based on the assumption 
that there are "certain things [which] are [nonderivatively] good or bad 
for us, whether or not we want to have the good things, or to avoid 
the bad things" (Parfit (1984), p 493). So, is this a plausible assumption, 
or alternatively, is the so-called "objective list theory" (the objectivist 
form of "non-internalist pluralism") a plausible theory of prudential 
value? Well, it certainly seems implausible to assume that something to 
which I have a strong rational aversion can be good for me, but we 
132The example is originally from Tännsjö (forthcoming), pp 87-88, but has been 
slightly modified by me. 
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should not (at this point) rule out the possibility that there are good 
arguments for the theory. (We will return to this issue in chapter 7). 
Scanlon's argument 
The next argument purports to show that the desire theory should be 
totally rejected. The argument given by Scanlon (1993) is a good 
example of this type of a rgument133, so I quote him at full length (note 
that he seems to take the object interpretation of the desire theory for 
granted): 
/.../ I now believe that desire theories should also be rejected as 
accounts of well-being appropriate to the first-person view. I will 
argue against such theories in the following way. The fact that an 
outcome would improve a person's well-being ('make his or her life 
go better') provides that person with a reason (other things being 
equal) for wanting that outcome to occur. If a desire theory were 
correct as an account of well-being, then, the fact that a certain out­
come would fulfil a person's desire would be a basic reason for that 
person to want that thing to come about. But desires do not provide 
basic reasons of this sort, at least not in non-trivial cases. The fact 
that we prefer a certain outcome can provide us with a serious 
reason for bringing it about 'for our own sake'. But when it does, 
this reason is either a reason of the sort described by a mental state 
view such as hedonism or a reason based on some other notion of 
substantive good rather than a reason grounded simply in the fact of 
desire, in the way that desire theories would require. To see this we 
need to consider each of these cases in a little more detail. 
[Part One] In many cases, the fact that I desire a certain outcome 
provides me with a reason for trying to bring it about because the 
presence of t hat desire indicates that the outcome will be pleasant or 
enjoyable for me. I can have reasons of this kind, for example, for 
ordering fish rather than tortellini, for climbing to the top of t he hill, 
or for wearing a particular necktie. The end sought in these cases is 
the experience or mental state which the object or activity in question 
is expected to produce, and the desire is an indication that this state 
is likely to be forthcoming (as well as, perhaps, a factor in producing 
133Another example is the argument given by Tännsjö (forthcoming), on p 89 ff. 
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it). 
[Part Two] In other cases, my desire that a certain state of affairs 
should obtain reflects my judgement that that state of affairs is 
desirable for some reason other than the mere fact that I prefer it; it 
may reflect, for example, my judgement that [that] state of affairs is 
morally good, or that it is in my overall interest, or that it is a good 
thing of its kind. This represents, I believe, the most common kind of 
case in which preferences are cited as reasons for action; the fact that 
I prefer a certain outcome is a reason for action in such a case, but 
not a fundamental one. My preferences are not the source of reasons 
but reflect conclusions based on reasons of o ther kinds. There are, of 
course, other cases in which I might say that the only reason I have 
for doing or choosing something is simply that T prefer it'. But these 
cases are trivial ones rather than examples of the typical form of 
rational decision-making. 
My conclusion, then, is that when statements of preference or 
desire represent serious reasons for action they can be understood in 
one of the two ways just described: either as stating reasons which 
are at base hedonistic or as stating judgements of desirability reached 
on other grounds. What convinces me of this conclusion is chiefly the 
fact that I am unable to think of any clear cases in which preferences 
provide non-trivial reasons for action which are not of these two 
kinds (pp 191-192). 
This is not a very good argument, however, and there are several 
reasons for this: 
(1) The main reason why we should not accept Scanlon's argument is 
that it takes "the immanent perspective on values" for granted. To see 
what this means, and why it can (and should) not be done, let us first 
reconstruct the argument as follows: 
(PI) The desire theory implies that "the fact that a certain outcome 
would fulfil a person's desire would be a basic reason for that person 
[i.e. from his or her own perspective] to want that thing to come 
about", or to bring it about. 
(P2) This implication is (in all non-trivial cases) false. From the point of 
view of the desiring subject, "serious reasons for action" are almost 
never "grounded simply in the fact of desire", i.e. it is almost never 
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the mere fact that he desires something that gives him a reason to 
bring it about. 
(C) The desire theory is false. 
The reason why the argument does not work is that the first premise is 
false, which means that the second premise (which is true) does not 
really give any support to the conclusion. 
The reason why (PI) is false is not that it is formulated in terms of 
reasons for action, but that it makes the desire theory inconsistent with 
how things appear to us134. That is, the premise could also be formu­
lated in evaluative terms, viz. as follows: "The desire theory implies that 
the mere fact that a certain person desires a certain outcome gives this 
person a good reason to regard this outcome as good for him". A 
desire theorist need not adopt the immanent perspective on value, 
however; he might also accept the idea that "[t]he access to objective 
value is not given in the immanent perspective but in the transcendental 
one - in the perspective of the detached spectator" (Rabinowicz and 
Österberg (1996), p 12)135. 
To get a better grasp on "the immanent mistake", it might be helpful 
to look at Sen's (1985) "version" of the same mistake. This is how Sen 
tries to refute the idea that "desire is prior to (prudential) value", i.e. 
the idea that if a certain situation is nonderivatively good for a certain 
person, then it is good because the person desires that the situation 
holds136: On Sen's view, the role of desire is "evidential" rather than 
134The idea that the desire theory has direct implications for what we have reason 
to do is also rather problematic, however. It may be true in some "objective" sense 
that "[t]he fact that an outcome would improve a person's well-being /.../ 
provides that person with a reason /.../for wanting that outcome to occur", but it 
is hardly true if we adopt the immanent perspective. In this case, the person does 
not have a reason for wanting X to occur unless he (i) believes that X is good for 
him, and (ii) wants to improve his own well-being. 
135It is worth noting that the reflective, transcendent perspective is as consistent 
with "the first-person view" as it is with "the third-person view". If we happen to 
chose the self-interest theory as our normative context, this does not in any way 
force us to view things from the immanent perspective. The idea that a certain 
person has a ("transcendent") reason to fulfil his desire that X is not inconsistent 
with the idea that a person's ("immanent") reason for promoting X is not the fact 
that he has the desire but the respect in which X appears to him as desirable (cf. 
note 97 on p 257). 
136This idea does not just presuppose that the object interpretation of the desire 
theory is correct; it is also an essential component of the-theory-under-this-
interpretation. 
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"value-giving". The "activity of desiring" does not make the objects of 
desire have value; instead, desire "gives evidence - possible evidence - of 
value" (p 189). To support this view, he invites us to compare the 
following two statements: 
(I) I desire x because x is valuable for me. 
(II) x is valuable for me because I desire x137. 
He then continues: 
The former statement is intelligible and cogent in a way the latter 
clearly is not. Valuing something is a good reason for desiring it, but 
desiring something is not an obvious reason for valuing it. /... / [I]t is 
hard to escape the conclusion that the main connection between 
desire and value is the evidential connection in (I) (ibid., p 190). 
However, this argument does not really support the idea that the 
activity of desiring does not have a "value-giving" role. To see why (II) 
might not be so implausible after all, let us first formulate it in the third 
person, i.e. as "X is valuable for P because P desires that X". Once we 
have done this, it is pretty clear that it can be interpreted in two 
different ways, viz. 
(II:a) X is valuable for P (from a transcendent perspective) because P 
desires that X, and 
(II:b) X is valuable for P according to P (from P's perspective) because 
P desires that X. 
(II:b) is, in most cases, a false claim: The mere fact that I intrinsically 
desire something does (from my perspective) not give me a good 
reason for regarding it as valuable for me (not even if t he desire is rele­
vant)138. The following picture is much more plausible: If I have an 
intrinsic relevant desire that something is the case, then this something 
137Where the formula "A because B" should (of c ourse) be understood as "B is a 
good reason for A", and not as "B is the cause of A". 
138But it is not always false, i.e. there are cases where the fact that I intrinsically 
desire that X gives me a conclusive reason to regard X as intrinsically good for me. 
These are, I think, the cases where my desires cannot really be criticized, i.e. what 
we normally call "matters of taste" (this is probably the "trivial cases" which 
Scanlon has in mind). Possible examples of such "value-giving" desires are my 
desire to have a certain experience when I have it, the love of cold showers, or the 
aversion to hearing the sound of squeaking chalk (cf. Parfit (1984), p 123). 
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will (most likely) appear to me as "good" (e.g., as "good for me"), and 
will do so in virtue of some of i ts (intrinsic) features. From my point of 
view, it is the presence of th ese (apparent) features which explains and 
justifies my desire. This suggests that what (II:a) rea lly amounts to is 
that a situation is (or may be) good for a person (from a more objective 
point of view) because it is good for him from his own (subjective) point 
of vi ew, and this claim is far from implausible. In any case, neither Sen 
nor Scanlon gives us any reason for rejecting it: (II:a) does not take P's 
own perspective for granted, and the fact that (II:b) i s often false is 
(therefore) no reason for regarding (II:a) a s false. In short, the argu­
ment does not hit the desire theorist who rejects P's own idea of what 
is going on139 140. 
(2) Another major weakness in Scanlon's reasoning is that it seems to 
presuppose atomism. The positive claim he purports to establish is 
(roughly) that the most plausible theory of prudential value is an 
"objective list theory" (cf. part two) with a hedonistic component (cf. 
part one)141. But how does he argue for this? Well, the intuitions to 
139At this point, the following comparison with pleasure may be fruitful: The 
hedonistic counterpart to (II:a) is (i) "X is (instrumentally) good for P because P 
takes pleasure in X", and the counterpart to (II:b) is (ii) "X is good for P, according 
to P, because P takes pleasure in X". Now, (ii) is often false, since we often take 
pleasure in something because we ourselves regard it as intrinsically valuable. But 
this does not make (i) - the hedonist's claim - false, and the reason for this is (of 
course) that the hedonist does not adopt P's own perspective. 
140It is worth noting that Sen's argument suffers from several other defects as 
well, e.g., the following ones: (a) There is no reason why we should assume that 
there is any evidential connection between P's desires and what has value-for-P. 
(I) is not plausible unless it is interpreted as "I desire X because X appears to me as 
valuable for me", but in this case, desire is hardly "possible" evidence of value-for­
me; and if we consider the fact that there are many other possible reasons for 
desiring something, desire is not even evidence of value-for-me-according-to-me. 
(b) When Sen claims that the fact that P desires that X is not a good reason for 
regarding X as good for P, it is obvious that he has the (object interpretation of) 
the unrestricted actual desire theory in mind (and so has Scanlon). But what if we 
exclude all uninformed desires from the class of relevant desire? Is it really 
implausible to claim that the fact that P has a rational intrinsic desire that X is a 
good reason for regarding X as nonderivatively good for P? I think not. 
141However, he also he admits that "statements of preference or desire" can 
represent (that preferences can provide) "trivial reasons for action", and this 
suggests that he thinks that there is some truth in the desire theory. But it is not 
clear if this means that it can have nonderivative value for a person to have a 
certain desire fulfilled, even if this does not make him any happier, and even if the 
object of the desire is not (in some "objective" sense) nonderivatively good for 
him. 
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which he appeals are both about wholes, wholes which include a desire 
element. If w e translate his "reason-talk" into "value-talk", these intu­
itions can be formulated as follows: In part one, it is suggested that if I 
desire X, if X occur s (if my desire is fulfilled), and if I take pleasure in X, 
then it is good for me that X oc curs, and in part two, it is suggested 
that if I desire X, if X oc curs (the desire is fulfilled), and if X is good for 
me in some objective sense, then it is good for me that X occurs. But the 
fact that these intuitions are both plausible does not support Scanlon's 
positive claim unless we (implausibly) assume that atomism is true. To 
see that this is so, let us take a closer look at the intuition in part one. 
Suppose that it is true that if I desire that X, and if t he occurrence of X 
makes me happier, then it is good for me that X occurs. Suppose also 
(for the sake of the argument) that if X's occurrence would not have 
made me happier, then it would not have been good for me. Now, the 
point is that even if we make all these assumptions, we can not conclude 
that the only good thing about X is that it makes me happier; it is only 
possible to conclude such a thing if one assumes that "the value of the 
whole is just the sum of the value of its parts". But there is no reason 
why we should make this atomistic assumption. There are alternative 
views which seem more plausible, e.g., the following one: "A situation 
cannot be valuable for a person unless its existence makes him happier. 
However, it is nonderivatively better for a person if his happiness is 
based on real desire-fulfilment than if it is based on a false belief that he 
had a desire fulfilled. That is, if t wo wholes contain the same 'amount' 
of pleasure, then the whole which has real desire-fulfilment as a part is 
finally better than the whole which has a false belief that a desire is ful­
filled as a part. Moreover, it is better for a person to take pleasure in 
something which he desires than to take pleasure in something to which 
he has an aversion". (We can apply the same kind of r easoning to show 
that Scanlon's reasoning in part two is defective). 
To conclude: Scanlon has not managed to show that the desire theory 
is a bad theory, and neither has he managed to show that the "objec-
tivist" alternative which he has in mind is a good theory. 
And to summarize section 5.3 as a whole: With the possible exception 
of (2:b) on pp 274-275, it seems that there are no strong arguments 
against the rationality-oriented (and awareness-oriented) Success 
Theory that was presented on pp 271-272 above. There are some good 
arguments for the theory, however, and this suggests that we have 
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reason to accept it, but with the following proviso: It remains to be seen 
whether there are any objective prudential values, i.e. things which are 
nonderivatively good and bad for us, regardless of what we want and 
do not want142 (we will soon turn to this issue). 
142At this point, it is worth noting that if there are such things, then this suggests 
that the connection between desire and value is sometimes "evidential" (as Sen 
claims). That is, the fact that someone intrinsically desires a certain thing may (in 
this case) be an indication of the (objective) fact that this thing is good for him. 
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Chapter Six 
"The objective list theory" I 
A list of possible prudential values 
It is now time to look at the third type of substantive good theory, viz. 
"non-internalist pluralism" (i.e. Parfit's "objective list theory", conceived 
of a s a type of substantive evaluative theory). As we have already seen 
(in section 1.2), theories of this type make the following central claims: 
(1) There are several (universal) prudential values, i.e. the facts that 
have nonderivative value for us are of several types. 
(2) It is not the case that all the facts that have nonderivative value 
for a person are internal to this person1. (This implies that at least 
some of the facts that have nonderivative value for P-at-f are not of 
the type "P feels pleasure at t"). 
(3) At least some of the "non-internal" facts that have nonderivative 
value for P-at-f are not of the type "P has a desire fulfilled at t". 
(2) and (3) tell us that there are other facts besides pleasure-facts and 
desire-fulfilment-facts that are nonderivatively good for us, and if we 
assume that it is the facts themselves that are good for us (i.e. that the 
value of such a fact is independent of how it is related to other facts)2, 
this seems to allow for the possibility that there are facts that are good 
for us, whether or not we want these facts to obtain, and indepen­
dently of what we feel about them (and this is, roughly, what "the 
objectivist" claims). 
The fact that none of the claims above are substantive evaluative 
however, it is rather obvious that every plausible "objective list theory" will 
attribute value-for-P to certain internal facts about P. See below. 
2This is what the pure versions of non-internalist pluralism assume. But as we will 
see in chapter 7, on pp 362-366, there are number of "weaker" interpretations of 
the theory, interpretations which can be invoked if all the strong (pure, "raw") 
versions are refuted. 
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claims implies that "non-internalist pluralism." is not a substantive evalu­
ative theory, but a type of substantive theory. In fact, the different ver­
sions of the "theory" need not ("substantively speaking") have 
anything in common. Or alternatively put, although every concrete 
version of the "theory" makes specific claims about what is nonderi-
vatively good and bad for us, no version of the "theory" makes any 
specific substantive claims qua non-internalist pluralist theory. This 
means that no "objective list theory" can really be assessed as such. It is 
concrete versions of the theory (or better: specific substantive claims 
about what has prudential value), and nothing else, that can be 
assessed3. 
So, in order to find out whether the most plausible theory of p ruden­
tial value is of the non-internalist pluralist type (i.e. whether there are 
any prudential values that fit the description in (l)-(3) above), what we 
need to consider are "concrete" versions of the "theory". Or better: 
We first need to look at what types of r elational or external facts non-
internalist pluralists have actually regarded as prudentially valuable, i.e. 
what items they have actually included in their positive and negative 
"lists"4. We can then ask, for each suggested type of fact, whether it is 
really plausible to attribute prudential goodness (or badness) to facts of 
this type. This is the type of investigation that can give us an idea of 
what (if an y) relational or external facts that have nonderivative value 
for us, i.e. of what the most plausible "list" is like5. 
In this chapter, we will look at some of the substantive evaluative 
claims which have actually been made by various pluralists. The purpose 
of t he chapter is merely to generate a list of possible prudential values, 
i.e. a list of c andidates to the title "non-internal facts which have non-
3In this respect, it differs from hedonism and the satisfaction interpretation of the 
actual desire theory. There are (as we have seen) several versions of two latter 
theories as well, but all these versions share a common substantive content, and it 
is therefore much more appropriate to regard these two theories as real 
substantive theories. 
4It would also be of interest to see how the pluralist would answer the following 
questions, viz. (i) "Can the situation-types to which he attributes prudential value 
be ranked in any way, and if they can, how should they be ranked?" and (ii) 
"What type of c ombination of p rudential values is best for a person?". I haven't 
come across any pluralist who has really tried to answer these questions, 
however. 
5This means that there is really no need to treat (i) "What possible version of the 
theory is most plausible?" and (ii) "Is this theory a plausible theory of p rudential 
value?" separately. 
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derivative value for human beings". In chapter 7, we will turn to the 
question of plausibility, viz. we will ask whether any of the substantive 
claims which non-internalist pluralists have made are (in fact) plausible. 
A central question here is (of course) what kinds of arguments that can 
be given for such claims, e.g., for the idea that it is good for all of us to 
have friends. Can any universal substantive claims of the form "All non-
intrinsic facts of type X6 are nonderivatively good (or bad) for all 
human beings (at all times)" be justified, and if s o, how? In particular, 
what would an acceptable subject-oriented justification of such a claim 
look like, e.g., what is it about us (about our "constitution") that makes 
it nonderivatively good for all of us to have friends, or to be engaged 
in creative activity7? 
A list of possible prudential values 
The list of possible human goods includes such different things as 
"moral goodness, rational activity, the development of one's abilities, 
having children and being a good parent, /... / the awareness of true 
beauty" (Parfit (1984), p 499), "health, mental and physical functioning, 
enjoyment, personal achievement, knowledge or understanding, close 
personal relationships, personal liberty or autonomy, a sense of self-
worth, meaningful work, and leisure or play" (Sumner (1996), p 180)8. 
And prudential badness might be attributed to such things as "being 
betrayed, manipulated, slandered, deceived, being deprived of liberty 
or dignity, and enjoying either sadistic pleasure, or aesthetic pleasure in 
what is in fact ugly" (Parfit (1984), p 499), or to immoral behaviour, 
passivity, loneliness, or being ashamed to appear in public9. 
6Where X is not desire-fulfilment (or aversion-fulfilment). 
7Here, we should (unlike Sumner (1996)) allow for the possibility that a unified 
account of what makes things good and bad for us may not be possible, and that 
the relevant "justifications" may (therefore) vary from case to case. 
8It is important to notice that many of the things on this "positive list" (e.g., 
enjoyment, play, and meaningful work) contain pro-attitudes as constituent parts, 
and that it can (for this reason) be rather trivial to claim that such things are good 
for us. But even these claims have some content; it is, after all, possible to reject 
them. 
9At this point, it is worth noting that every list of prudential values is (at least to a 
certain extent) relative to some world view, and that the world view that seems to 
be presupposed here is (for the most part) "modern, Western, and atheist" (cf. 
Griffin (1996), p 150, note 19). For example, none of the values listed can be 
regarded as "spiritual". 
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Now, there is really no point in striving for completeness here, so I 
what I will do is to restrict my attention to those positive items10 that 
seems (to me) most important. These "intuitively important" items will 
be classified into seven groups, viz. (1) activities and other "agent-
goods", (2) social and relational goods, (3) experiences and other 
mental states11, (4) to be (qua experiencing and thinking subject, or qua 
"patient") in contact with reality, (5) to be a certain kind of person and 
to live one's life in a certain way (to function in a certain way), (6) 
personal development, and (7) freedom and other "potentialities"12. 
(1) Activities and other "agent-goods " 
There are at least four different kinds of claims which can be subsumed 
under this heading, viz.: 
(a) The claim that it has value for us to be active at all, or better, that 
it is (on the whole) nonderivatively better for us to be active than to be 
passive. 
(b) The claim that it is good for us to be engaged in certain kinds of 
activities, or to perform certain kinds of ac tions, rather than others. For 
example, it has been claimed that it is good for us to act morally; to do 
constructive or productive things; to be engaged in play, or meaningful 
work, or contemplation, or political activity; or to exercise our respec­
tive abilities to a high degree. 
(c) The claim that it is important for us how we do what we do, i.e. 
that it is good for us to do what we are doing "in a certain way", e.g., 
10That is, I will (like almost everybody else in this field) have little or nothing to 
say about what situations that are nonderivatively bad for us (and why). But as a 
rule of thumb, we can always assume that the opposites of the good things are bad 
for us, and once we have seen the reasons that can be given for regarding the 
good things as good (assuming that there are such reasons), it will probably be 
easy to see what it is that makes the bad things bad. 
nThe facts which belong to this category are (of course) internal rather than 
relational or external, but they deserve to be included anyway: A pluralist theory 
which excludes such facts altogether from its list is, after all, hardly a plausible 
theory of prudential value (cf. note 1 above). 
12This classification is (of course) not the only possible classification; it is not just 
that different categories may be used, there are also alternative ways in which the 
items can be classified (given a certain set of categories). Moreover, the present 
classification does not purport to be complete, and all the categories used are 
probably not mutually exclusive. What matters is that the classification is good 
enough for my modest purpose, which is to make things a little more systematic 
than they would otherwise have been. 
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in a certain spirit, or with a certain quality, style or attitude. It has, for 
example, been claimed that it is good for us to do things in a rational 
manner, or to be creative, or to perform with "perfection" (i.e. to do 
what one is doing well, or skilfully)13. 
(d) The claim that it is good for us that our actions have certain 
results, or that we "get certain things done". It has, for example, been 
claimed that it is important for us to "make a difference", i.e. that the 
things we do have an effect, an impact beyond themselves (which is 
preferably valuable); or that it is good for a person to "do something 
with his life", or to "accomplish things with his life", in the sense of 
"achieving something valuable" (cf. Griffin (1996), who is somewhat 
more specific when he focuses on "the kind of a chievement that would 
save a life from futility", "the achievement of the kind of value that 
gives life a weight or point" (p 54)). 
(2) Social and relational goods 
Following Aristotle, we can divide the relational goods into two types, 
viz. (a) intimate personal relationships, and (b) social and political 
relations14. 
An example of a claim which can be subsumed under the second 
heading is the Aristotelian idea that it is good for a person to belong to 
a community (to stand in a relation of "civic friendship" to other 
citizens), and to participate actively in the political life of this com­
munity15. 
13In my view, some ways of doing are best viewed as aspects of " (total) ways of 
functioning", where a person's way of (mental) functioning also includes how he 
perceives (e.g., what he notices and does not notice), how he reacts emotionally, 
how he "copes" (what "coping strategies" he uses), how he thinks, how he relates 
to other people, how he makes decisions, and so on. If a certain way of doing is 
best conceived of as one of several aspects of a certain (total) way of functioning 
(e.g., as in the case of autonomous acting, or authentic acting), I will not treat it 
here, but in (5) below. 
14According to Nussbaum (1986), Aristotle claims that there are two kinds of 
relations that are "essential and valuable parts of the good human life", viz. 
"social/political relations and philia" (p 344), and according to Cooper (1980), 
"Aristotle holds not only that active friendships of a close and intimate kind are a 
necessary constituent of the flourishing human life but also that 'civic friendship' 
itself is an essential human good" (p 303). 
15Or as Nussbaum (1986) puts it, "Aristotle believes the political participation of 
the citizen to be itself an intrinsic good or end, without which a human life, 
though flourishing with respect to other excellences, will be incomplete" (ibid., p 
349). However, it is (as I see it) not easy to tell what should count as "political 
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If we turn to the claim that it is good for us to have intimate personal 
relationships to other people, we can see that it comes in several diffe­
rent versions, e.g., it might be claimed that it is good for a (mature, 
adult) person to have children (and to be a good parent), or to have 
friends, or a lover, or a partner with whom a romantic "we" is formed, 
or the like16. The most common claim of t his type is probably the idea 
that when personal relations "become deep, authentic, reciprocal 
relations of fr iendship and love, then they have a value apart from the 
pleasure and benefit they give" (cf. Griffin (1986), pp 67-68). To get a 
deeper understanding of w hat may be involved in a claim of this type, 
we will take a closer look at one of the most important Aristotelian 
prudential values, namely filia (or philia)17. 
The special case of filia; its nature and its forms 
So, what is filia (or "friendship", as it is sometimes translated)? "To be 
friends, /.../ [two persons] must be mutually recognized as bearing 
goodwill and wishing well to each other", says Aristotle (in NE, VIII.2, 
on p 194). Or as Cooper (1980) puts it: "According to /.../ [Aristotle], 
filia, taken most generally, is any relationship characterized by mutual 
liking /.../, that is, by mutual well-wishing and well-doing out of 
concern for one another" (p 302). That is, "without mutuality of 
genuine well-wishing for the other person's own sake the relationship 
will not deserve the title of philia at all" (Nussbaum (1986), p 355). 
Nussbaum also adds independence to the list of requirements for filia; 
"the object of philia must be seen as a being with a separate good, not 
as simply a possession or extension of the philos; and the real philos will 
wish the other well for the sake of that separate good" (ibid., p 355). 
participation" in a modern society like ours. 
16It is also possible to attribute prudential value to certain parts (or aspects) of 
these prudentially valuable relationships, e.g., to some of the attitudes that are 
involved. It can, for example, be claimed that it is good for us to be liked, loved, 
needed, respected, recognized, admired, taken into account, or regarded as 
important by (significant) others, or that it is good for us to love or recognize 
others (even when these attitudes are not mutual). It is possible that honour (a 
central Aristotelian value) is of this type, viz. an attitudinal component in (good) 
"civic friendship". 
17If we want to be more precise and specific, the Aristotelian view on the matter 
can be formulated as follows: (i) It is nonderivatively good for us to have friends 
(to have friends is nonderivatively better than to be alone), and (ii) character-
friendship is the most valuable kind of friendship (it is probably the only form of 
filia that can really be regarded as a necessary constituent of a good human life). 
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This is how she sums up Aristotle's view on filia: 
Philia requires, then, mutuality in affection; it requires separateness; it 
requires mutual well-wishing for the other's own sake and /.../ 
mutual benefiting in action, insofar as this is possible /.../• Aristotle 
completes his general sketch of philia b y adding that there must be 
mutual awareness of these good feelings and good wishes I... I 
(ibid., p 355)18. 
Depending on what it is that attracts and binds the one friend to the 
other (or what type of "reasons" the friends have for wishing each 
other well), there are (on Aristotle's view) three basic kinds of "friend­
ship", viz. advantage-friendship, pleasure-friendship, and virtue-
friendship (or character-friendship). 
Advantage-friendship is the type of friendship which is based on some 
advantage, that the one gets from the other, and advantage-friends are 
characterized as friends "who love each other for their utility" or "in 
virtue of some good they get from each other" (NE, VIII.3, p 195). 
Pleasure-friendships are (instead) "cemented by" the pleasure that the 
one friend gets from the other; pleasure-friends are friends "who love 
for the sake of pleasure", i.e. "for the sake of what is pleasant to 
themselves" (ibid., VIII.3, p 195). 
That is, in both advantage-friendship and pleasure-friendship, "it is 
not as being the man he is that the loved person is loved, but as provi­
ding some good or pleasure" (ibid., VIII.3, p 195). But it should be 
noted that friendships of these kinds are not "wholly self-centered: 
I... / [they] are instead a complex and subtle mixture of self-seeking 
and unself-interested well-wishing and well-doing" (Cooper (1980), p 
305). 
The third type of filia is also (according to Aristotle) the best, and it 
therefore deserves to be characterized in more detail. This is how 
Aristotle himself characterizes the virtue-friendship, or character-friendship 
(as Cooper prefers to call it): 
Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in 
virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are 
18A11 these "mutualities" do not imply equality, however. In fact,/Ü/w-relationships 
need not be equal, even though they often involve equality (cf. NE, VIII.6, p 202). 
This is but one of several reasons why we should regard the Aristotelian notion of 
filia as much wider than our notion of friendship. 
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good in themselves. Now those who wish well to their friends for 
their sake are most truly friends; for they do this by reason of their 
own nature and not incidentally; therefore their friendship lasts as 
l o n g  a s  t h e y  a r e  g o o d  -  a n d  g o o d n e s s  i s  a n  e n d u r i n g  t h i n g  ( N E ,  
VIII.3, p 196). 
That is, this type of friendship is based on the mutual recognition of th e 
other person's goodness (excellent character), and this seems to imply 
that "for their own sake clearly only good men can be friends; for bad 
men do not delight in each other unless some advantage come of the 
relation" (ibid., VIII.4, p 198). According to Cooper (1980), this form of 
filia is not "the exclusive preserve of moral heroes", however: 
Some virtue-friendships might involve the recognition of complete 
and perfect virtue /.../; other friendships of t he same type might be 
based not on the recognition by each of perfect virtue in the other 
but just on the recognition of some morally good qualities that he 
possesses (or is thought to possess) (p 306). 
For this reason, Cooper thinks that "friendship of character" is a more 
appropriate name for this kind of fr iendship than "friendship of v irtue 
(of the good)": "The expression 'character-friendship' brings out accu­
rately that the basis for the relationship is the recognition of good 
qualities of character, without in any way implying that the parties are 
moral heroes" (ibid., p 308). This is how Cooper conceives of the rela­
tion between two character-friends: 
Each, loving the other for his good qualities of c haracter, wishes for 
him whatever is good, for his own sake, precisely in recognition of h is 
goodness of character, and it is mutually known to them that well-
wishing of this kind is reciprocated /.../. They enjoy one another's 
company and are benefited by it /.../ and in consequence spend 
their time together or even live with one another. /.../ [S]uch a 
friendship, once formed, will tend to be continuous and permanent, 
since it is grounded in knowledge of and love for one another's good 
qualities of character, and such traits, once formed, tend to be 
permanent (ibid., pp 308-309). 
A character-friend loves his friend because of properties which 
belong to the friend essentially and not merely incidentally. This 
means that he loves him for what he himself is and not for merely 
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external properties or for relations in which he stands to other 
persons (ibid., p 315). 
And this is how Nussbaum (1986) characterizes the same type of filia: 
The central and best case of love between persons is that of love 
based upon character and conception of th e good. Here each partner 
loves the other for what that other most deeply is in him or herself 
/.../, for those dispositions and those patterns of thought and 
feeling that are so intrinsic to his being himself that a change in them 
would raise questions of identity and persistence (p 356). 
She also adds another requirement for "the best type of l ove", namely 
that the two filoi "must 'live together', sharing activities both intellectual 
and social, sharing the enjoyment, and the mutual recognition of enjoy­
ment, that comes of spending time with someone whom they find both 
wonderful and delightful (ibid., pp 357-358)19. She also points out that 
"Aristotle means by 'living together' something more than regular social 
visiting: if not residence in the same household, then at least a regular, 
even daily association in work and conversation (ibid., p 358). 
This ends the section on filia. 
(3) Experiences and other mental states 
A non-internalist pluralist may of course attribute prudential value to 
things like "pleasures, the perception of beauty, absorption in and 
appreciation of nature - the enjoyment of the day-to-day textures of 
life" (cf. Griffin (1986), p 67). All the claims which can be subsumed 
under this heading do not have this hedonistic flavour, however, e.g., 
there is also the idea that it is nonderivatively good for a person to 
have a sense of self-worth, or to "feel" self-respect. 
(4) To be (qua experiencing and thinking subject) in contact 
with reality 
The general claim here is that it is nonderivatively good for a person to 
be in contact with (internal and external20) reality, or to have "authentic 
19This means that it was char acter-filia that Aristotle had in mind when he wrote 
that "there is nothing so characteristic of fr iends as living together" (NE, VIII.5, p 
200), and that spending one's days together and delighting in each other "are 
thought the greatest marks of friendship" (NE, VIII.6, p 201). 
20The reality that Nozick (1989) has in mind is primarily external reality. He 
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experiences". There are, however, many "versions" of this claim, ver­
sions which correspond to the many ways in which one may be in (or 
out of) touch with reality. Examples of such (more specific) claims are: 
(a) "Simply knowing about oneself and one's world is part of a good 
life. We value, not as an instrument but for itself, being in touch with 
reality, being free from muddle, ignorance, and mistake" (Griffin (1986), 
p 67). That is, it is good for a person to have true beliefs about himself 
and his world (rather than to have false beliefs, or to be ignorant), to 
understand how things work, and how they are connected to each 
other. 
(b) It is good for a person to perceive things "as they are", free from 
illusion and delusion, e.g., to be in an enlightened state. 
(c) A special case of (b) which is often mentioned is this: It is good for 
a person to be aware of true beauty (assuming that there is such a 
thing), i.e. (roughly) to take aesthetic pleasure in what is "in fact beauti­
ful" (rather than in what is "in fact ugly"). 
(d) It is good for a person that his emotions (especially his so-called 
"import-attributing emotions") are appropriate. (As I see it, the idea 
that it is good for a person to have a "sense of proportion" can be 
regarded as an important part (or aspect) of this claim)21. 
(5) The prudential value of being a certain kind of person and/or 
living one's life in a certain way 
There are two general claims which can be subsumed under this 
heading, viz. (a) the idea that it has nonderivative value for a person to 
be a certain kind of p erson, or alternatively, that a person's well-being 
is directly dependent on what kind of person he is, and (b) the idea 
that it is nonderivatively good for a person to live (or "lead") his life in 
a certain way,, or to function in a certain manner22. 
writes: "To focus on external reality, with your beliefs, evaluations, and emotions, 
is valuable in itself, not just as a means to more pleasure or happiness" (p 106). 
21It is worth noting that some of these ways of being in touch with reality, 
especially (b) and (d), can be regarded as "defining characteristics" of the well-
functioning person, and that they could (for this reason) also have been included 
in (5). 
22An example of a philosopher who believes that a person's level of well-being 
depends both on what kind of person he is and how (in what way) he lives his life 
is Nozick (1981). In his view, the value of a person's "existence" (i.e. a person's 
well-being) is not just a function of what kind of life he has, but also of what kind 
of person he is, and how these two are connected to each other, or alternatively, 
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(a) There are two major versions of the first claim, viz. (i) the idea 
that it is nonderivatively good for a person to have a certain kind of 
body, or to possess certain bodily features (e.g., to be healthy, beauti­
ful, or well-built), and (ii) the idea that it is good for a person to have a 
certain kind of mind, i.e. to possess certain character traits, skills, 
abilities, talents, attitudes, dispositions, inclinations, sensitivities, habits, 
motivational features, or the like (e.g., to be courageous, or psycho­
logically well-adjusted, or morally good, or intelligent, or good at what 
one is doing)23. 
(b) Before we take a closer look at the second type of claim, let us 
first say something about what it is for a person to live (or lead24) his 
life in a certain way, or to function in a certain way. We can think of a 
person's living (or functioning) as a "process, which /.../ occurs in, 
though not necessarily inside, the person, and /.../ [which] issues in 
his life" (Wollheim (1984), p 2), a process which is determined by two 
kinds of factors, viz. what kind of p erson he is like (what kind of m ind 
he has), and what his environment is like. It may also be helpful to think 
of livings as ways of living, or ways of functioning, where we can 
(roughly) conceive of a person's overall way of functioning as "the spirit 
in which he approaches life, meets its trials, and decides on goals and 
action" (to borrow a phrase from Griffin (1986)), or perhaps as his "life­
style", "coping-style", or "posture". 
We should also add that the process which is a person's living is best 
regarded as "multi-dimensional". There are many aspects of a person's 
living, e.g., our actings, relatings (or interactings), emotional reactings, 
perceivings, thinkings (reasonings), rememberings, and fantasizings can 
how he lives (or "leads") his life. Or expressed in superlative terms (Nozick has a 
tendency to express himself in this way), a person's existence is (on the most 
general level, that is) the most valuable kind of human existence if and only if (i) 
he has the best kind of life, (ii) he is the most valuable kind of p erson (supposing 
that there are such things as the best kind of life and the best kind of person), and 
(iii) there is a proper interconnection between the kind of person he is and the 
kind of live he lives; the person is "leading the most valuable life, or living it" (p 
413), i.e. having the best kind of l ife stems (in the right way) from being the best 
kind of person (cf. ibid., p 412). 
23With the exception of (l:c), this is where we find almost all so-called 
"perfectionist values" (which can be of relevance in this context, that is). 
24I prefer the term "living" to the term "leading", however, and the reason for this 
is that the latter term suggests that we are (to a considerable extent) in control of 
how our lives are lived, something which is (in many cases) not true. 
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all be regarded as aspects of our total functionings25. 
The general claim that it has nonderivative value for a person to live 
his life (function) in a certain way comes in many forms, e.g., it may be 
claimed that it is good for a person to live autonomously, authentically, 
rationally, creatively, mindfully, self-expressively, decisively, or the like. 
In some of these cases, prudential value is attributed to certain ways of 
living "as wholes" (e.g., to autonomous, rational or authentic living), but 
in other cases, the focus is on one or a few dimensions only, e.g., as 
when value is attributed to creative thinking, self-expressive acting, 
committed relating, or mindful perceiving. 
Now, it seems much more plausible to attribute nonderivative value-
for-P to the fact that P is living (functioning) in a certain way than to the 
fact that he is a certain kind of person. In fact, I don't think there is any 
personal feature (bodily or psychological) that has nonderivative value 
for all the persons who possess it26. The reason why no psychological 
feature has nonderivative value for its "possessor" is that all features of 
this type are mere potentialities, and as such, they can only have deri­
vative value27. My belief that purely bodily features can not have non-
derivative value is based on a different idea, viz. the idea that some­
thing can have nonderivative value only if it somehow involves experi­
ences (or experiencing). We might also point out that "living-oriented" 
conceptions of the human good have always been much more common 
than "person-oriented" conceptions. For example, Aristotle (cf. note 
27), a number of Eastern philosophers (like Taoists and Zen Buddhists), 
and the Existentialists have all been focusing on the living (on what it is 
to live one's life in a good way). 
To get a fuller understanding of what might be involved in "living-
oriented claims", we will now take a closer look at two claims of this 
type, viz. (1) the idea that it is nonderivatively good for a person to live 
his life in an autonomous way, and (2) the Aristotelian idea that it has 
25Cf. note 13 on p 290 above. 
26It is worth noting that this idea is not necessarily inconsistent with the object 
interpretation of the Success Theory, which implies that if I have an intrinsic desire 
to have a certain personal feature, then it is also nonderivatively good for me to 
have this feature. (It is, after all, rather unlikely that there is a feature F such that 
everyone who has F also has an intrinsic desire to have F). 
27Roughly speaking, a potentiality has derivative value if its realization has value; 
cf. the Aristotelian view that what has nonderivative value is not possessing the 
virtues, but exercising them. 
297 
nonderivative value for a person to function in accordance with excel­
lence (virtue, or reason). 
(5:1) Autonomy 
Here, the claim is that it is good for a person that his living is (in some 
strong sense) "his own", where this claim is normally specified as 
follows: It is good for a person to choose his "own course through life, 
making something of it according to /.../ [his] own lights" (Griffin 
(1996), p 29)28, or alternatively, to be the kind of person who does 
(with respect to personal matters, that is) what he himself decides to 
do, and who decides to do what he decides to do because he wills it, 
i.e. because he actually wants to do it (cf. Tännsjö (forthcoming), pp 97-
98). The reason why the claim is specified in this way is that autono­
mous living is regarded primarily as a way of acting (or doing) and a 
way of deciding on goals and action. There may well be more to full 
autonomous functioning than autonomous acting and deciding, how­
ever, e.g., it may also involve autonomous desiring and believing (cf. 
Elster's genetic theory, e.g., on pp 253-255), autonomous thinking, and 
the like29. 
(5:2) Functioning in accordance with excellence 
The Aristotelian idea that it has nonderivative value for a person to 
function in an excellent way, in accordance with "complete virtue", can 
be divided into two parts: (i) I t is good for a person to have an excel­
lent character (to possess ethike arete in the singular) and to function 
accordingly. This claim can also be (roughly) formulated as follows: It is 
good for a person to function in accordance with the excellences of 
character (in the plural) and phronesis (or practical wisdom), (ii) It is 
good for a person to possess an excellent intellect (in the singular), i.e. 
to be a rational person, and to function accordingly, i.e. rationally. Or 
more specifically, it is good for a person to function in accordance with 
the excellences of intellect (in the plural), especially in accordance with 
28In Griffin's view, this kind of living "is at the heart of what it is to lead a human 
existence" (ibid., p 29), where the term "human" should be understood in "the 
special normative sense that / ../ centres on 'agency'" (ibid., pp 29-30). 
29It may also be claimed that full autonomous functioning is nothing but 
autonomous acting and deciding, but that an action or decision is not fully 
autonomous unless it is based on (or caused by) desires and beliefs which are 
themselves autonomous. 
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sophia (or philosophic wisdom)30. 
Now, in order to get a fuller understanding of these two claims, we 
need to know what it is to possess the excellences of character 
(excellences of intellect), and what it is to exercise (function in accor­
dance with) these "virtues"31. 
To function in accordance with ethike arete 
The excellences of character listed by Aristotle - e.g., courage, tempe­
rance, and liberality (generosity) - all belong to the category of he xis: 
they are all states of character, or permanent dispositions, rather than, 
for example, skills or capacities. So, what do the "moral virtues" dispose 
their possessor to? Well, a person who possesses a certain excellence of 
character (e.g., courage) is of c ourse (by definition) disposed (a) to act 
in a certain way (e.g., courageously), but also (b) to react (emotionally) 
in a certain way (e.g., in a courageous manner, viz. to feel fear in an 
appropriate way, and so on)32, and (c) to take pleasure in certain things 
(especially in acting in accordance with the excellence in question) and to 
be annoyed at other things33. (And maybe we can also add that the 
virtues dispose their possessors (d) to perceive things, or to be atten-
30That is, it is not sufficient that one possesses the different excellences (or 
"virtues"); one also has to use (or exercise) them. Aristotle's main reason for 
placing the chief human good in use rather than in possession is that mere 
possession of virtue may (qua "state of mind") "exist without producing any good 
result" (NE, 1.8, p 16), e.g., that it "seems actually compatible with being asleep, or 
with lifelong inactivity, and further, with the greatest sufferings and misfortunes" 
(cf. ibid., 1.5, p 7). 
31That is, we will follow Aristotle's advice, when he says that "[sjince happiness 
[eudaimonia] is an activity of soul in accordance with perfect virtue [arete], we must 
consider the nature of virtue; for perhaps we shall thus see better the nature of 
happiness [eudaimonia]" (NE, 1.13, p 24). 
32That is, virtue is not just a hexis concerning action (praxis), it is also a hexis 
concerning reaction (pathos). The pathos-element in ethike arete (as a whole, in the 
singular) can be characterized in the following way: A person who possesses an 
excellent character does not just act in an appropriate way, he also feels and 
manifests each emotion at a proper time, on proper matters, for the right reason, 
in the right way, and so on. 
33That is, there is (on Aristotle's view) an essential connection between virtue, on 
the one hand, and hedone and lupe (liking and disliking, pleasure and pain), on the 
other. That an agent takes pleasure in acting in accordance with a certain 
excellence (e.g., courage) is a sign that he possesses this excellence, and to enjoy, 
or like, doing virtuous acts (in general) is a sign that the virtuous disposition (as a 
whole, in the singular) has truly been acquired (cf. NE, 1.8, pp 16-17). 
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tive, in certain ways rather than others)34. 
The fact that the moral virtues are exercised in a number of different 
"dimensions" means (roughly) that a person is functioning in accor­
dance with ethike arete if and only if he is acting, reacting (emoting), 
liking and disliking, and perceiving (attending) in accordance with all 
the different excellences of character (in the plural)35. 
To function in accordance with the excellences of intellect 
Of the five excellences of intellect listed by Aristotle, two are clearly 
practical; phronesis (which is regarded as a "true and reasoned state of 
capacity to act with regard to the things that are good and bad for 
man" (NE, VI.5, p 142)), and techne (which is regarded as "a state of 
capacity to make [in contrast to act], involving a true course of reaso­
ning" (ibid., VI.4, p 141)). The major excellence of the theoretical intel­
lect ("the best part of our soul") is sophia, or philosophic wisdom. In 
fact, it seems that sophia should be regarded as identical with the com­
plete excellence of the theoretical intellect; Aristotle says explicitly that it 
is the combination of the remaining two excellences of intellect, i.e. nous 
(or "intuitive reason"), and episteme (or "scientific knowledge"). This 
means that a philosophically wise person is (roughly) a person who 
possesses the truth about the first principles, and who knows what 
follows from these first principles. 
But what kind of thing is sophia (the finest of the excellences of intel­
lect)? Well, it is not a hexis (a state of character or permanent dis­
position), but (rather) a kind of "knowledge". This is supported by 
34There are of course many other things which can be said about the Aristotelian 
conception of the excellent character, e.g., (i) that every "moral virtue" is 
connected to a sphere of human experience "where human choice is both non-
optional and somewhat problematic" (Nussbaum (1988), p 37), or (ii) that every 
excellence of character is a hexis that is "in the mean", or (iii) that the excellences of 
character form a unity, i.e. that the possession of one excellence of character 
presupposes the possession of all the others, or (iv) that overall excellence of 
character (in the singular), as well as every single excellence of character, 
presupposes phronesis (practical wisdom), and vice versa. None of these features 
of the Aristotelian conception is of any importance in this context, however. 
35And since all functioning in accordance with "complete virtue" also involves the 
exercise of phronesis, we might also add that all excellent functioning is (on 
Aristotle's view) rational functioning, e.g., it is not just good activity but "good 
activity according to, shaped by, the work of reason" (cf. Nussbaum (1986), p 376). 
That is, we can also say that person is functioning in accordance with ethike arete if 
and only if he is acting, reacting (etc.) in a rational way. 
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some of the things that Aristotle says about it, e.g. that it is "the most 
finished of the forms of knowledge", and that it has objects (viz. the 
highest objects). Perhaps it may also be regarded as a capacity, but I'm 
not really sure about this. 
Now that we have some idea of what it is to possess the excellences of 
intellect; what is it to function (e.g., to be active) in accordance with 
these excellences? Well, to function in accordance with the excellences of 
the "practical intellect" (with phronesis and techne) is to put these capaci­
ties to use, i.e. to act in a rational way (in accordance with the excel­
lences of character) and to make (produce) things in a rational manner. 
But what is it to be active in accordance with sophia, i.e. how is sophia 
"exercised" or "actualized"? It is clear that sophia is typically manifested 
in the activity of theoria, or pure intellectual contemplation of the highest 
objects (eternal truths), but it is less clear whether there is any other 
way in which sophia can be actualized. 
To sum up, it seems that the idea that it has nonderivative value for a 
person to function in accordance with the Aristotelian excellences 
("moral" and intellectual) can be spelled out as follows: It is non-
derivatively good for a person (1) to act in accordance with the excel­
lences of character (and phronesis), e.g., courageously (for its own sake); 
(2) to react emotionally in accordance with the excellences of character, 
e.g. (in the case of courage), to feel and manifest fear in appropriate 
ways; (3) to feel pleasure and displeasure (like and dislike) in accor­
dance with the excellences of character, e.g. (in the case of generosity), 
to take pleasure in giving; (4) to perceive (focus, be attentive) in accor­
dance with the excellences of character, e.g. (in the case of generosity), 
to be attentive to other people's needs; (5) to produce things in accor­
dance with techne, i.e. in a rational manner; and (6) to think or reason in 
accordance with sophia, e.g., to engage in theoria. 
(6) Personal development 
It might also be claimed that it is good for a person to "realize himself", 
or his "potential", e.g., to realize his talents or develop his abilities, to 
become a morally better person, to become a more well-functioning 
person (in the Aristotelian sense), or to become more autonomous36. 
36It is worth noting that this idea can only be regarded as different from (5) if t he 
prudential value of "becoming better" is (in some way, and to some extent) 
independent of the value of "being good", i.e. if "the process" does not inherit all its 
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(7) Freedom ond other "potentialities" 
According to Sen (1992), there are also prudential values in the "realm 
of the possible". In his view, a person's "achieved well-being" does not 
just depend on how he actually lives, it is also (directly) dependent on 
his "capability to function", viz. on how large his "capability set" is: 
Choosing may itself be a valuable part of living, and a life of genuine 
choice with serious options may be seen to be - for that reason -
richer. In this view, at least some types of capabilities contribute 
directly to well-being, making one's life richer with the opportunity of 
reflective choice (p 41). 
If one takes a closer look at what Sen actually says, one can see that 
what he really regards as prudentially valuable is not certain isolated 
capabilities (in the plural), but "choosing", "being able to choose", and 
"freedom". As Sen himself puts it, "[ajcting freely and being able to 
choose are /.../ directly conducive to well-being, not just because 
more freedom makes more alternatives available" (ibid., p 51)37. 
This concludes our list of p ossible prudential values. However, in what 
follows, we will have to restrict ourselves to a few of these values. The 
values I have chosen are: Achievement, filia and other intimate relation­
ships, contact with reality, autonomy, functioning well (in the 
Aristotelian sense), and freedom. My reason for including these parti­
cular values is either that they are intuitively plausible, or that it has 
been possible to find interesting arguments for regarding these things 
as prudentially valuable. So, let us now turn to the questions of 
plausibility. 
value from "the product" (or "result"). 
37Cf. Nozick (1989), who suggests that one of bad-making features of e xperience 
machine living is that "once on the machine a person would not make any choices, 
and certainly would not choose anything freely. One portion of what we want to 
be actual is our actually (and freely) choosing, not merely the appearance of t hat" 
(p 108). 
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Chapter Seven 
"The objective list theory" II 
A critical discussion of the different 
non-internalist pluralist claims 
The main purpose of this chapter is to find out whether any theory of 
the non-internalist pluralist type is a justified (or well-founded) theory 
of prudential value, i.e. whether there are good reasons for regarding 
any such theory as plausible. Or more specifically, we want to find out 
whether any of the substantive claims which non-internalist pluralists 
have made are plausible. For example, is it plausible to claim that it has 
nonderivative value for all of us to achieve things, or to have filia-
relationships with other people, or to be in contact with reality, or to 
live our lives autonomously, or to function well (in the Aristotelian 
sense), or to be free (able to choose)? Is it possible to justify (or refute) 
universal evaluative claims of this type? If it is, how can they be justified 
(refuted)? 
To be able to answer questions like these, we have to look at a 
number of arguments that have been (or can be) given for and against 
such claims, and then ask ourselves whether these arguments are good 
arguments. We will start with the counter-arguments. 
Arguments against the "theory" 
There are two types of arguments against non-internalist pluralist 
theories, viz. general arguments which are directed against all theories 
of this type, and more specific arguments which are directed at some 
specific non-internalist claim, where most of the arguments we will look 
at are of the former type, i.e. they purport to show that no claim of the 
relevant type is valid. It is also worth noting that all the arguments 
against non-internalist pluralism which we will look at are also argu­
ments for some alternative theory, either for hedonism or for the desire 
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theory; these arguments are (so to speak) either coming from the direc­
tion of hedonism or from the direction of the desire theory (which is 
not to say that they presuppose the truth of any alternative theory, 
however). Let us now look at the arguments themselves: 
(1) "As we have already seen (on p 286 above), all pure non-internalist 
pluralist theories seem to allow for the possibility that there are situa­
tions which are good for us, regardless of whether we want these situ­
ations to obtain, and regardless of how of we feel about them. For 
example, such a theory might allow for the possibility that it is good for 
a person to live autonomously, even if he doesn't have the slightest 
desire to do so, and even if he suffers from it. This is not a plausible 
view, however, and this has nothing to do with autonomy in particular. 
It doesn't really matter if we exchange autonomy for some other 
alleged prudential value (like friendship or achievement); the implau-
sibility of the view is not affected by such a substitution. This strongly 
suggests that there are no universal prudential values besides pleasure 
and desire-fulfilment"1. 
So, is this a good argument? Well, the non-internalist pluralist can (of 
course) object to the argument as follows: "It is true that if a person has 
no desire whatsoever to live autonomously, and if h e (in addition) suf­
fers from it, then it is, on the whole, not good for him to live his life in this 
way. But this does not imply that there is no respect in which it is good 
for him to live autonomously; in fact, it is good for him in one particular 
respect, viz. with regard to autonomy!". I don't really know how to 
respond to this reply. Suffice it to say that in my view, (1) is both valid 
and relevant2 (but the argument against (1) is not bad either). 
(2) The "theory" also seems to allow for the possibility that a person's 
well-being can be directly affected by things he doesn't know anything 
about3. As an illustration of th is, consider Nozick's (1981) claim that it is 
ceteris paribus better for a person to be moral than to be immoral, or 
alternatively, that "there is a cost to immoral behavior", viz. a value 
1This argument can be regarded as a mixture of pro-argument (2) for hedonism 
on p 109 and the second pro-argument for the desire theory on p 195. 
2However, if someone would not agree with me on this point, there is really 
nothing more I can say. 
3Cf. the discussion on pp 266-269 above. 
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cost, or "value sanction" (cf. p 409). In Nozick's view, this "value sanc­
tion" does not depend on whether the agent cares about value (and 
morality) or not: 
The immoral person thinks he is getting away with something, he 
thinks his immoral behavior costs him nothing. But that is not true; he 
pays the cost of having a less valuable existence. He pays that 
penalty, though he doesn't feel it or care about it. Not all penalties 
are felt. 
I... I [H]is not caring about value is also part of the cost he is 
paying: not caring about value is itself something that diminishes his 
value. Even as he skips happily away, he pays the penalty. The im­
moral person is not getting away with anything; his getaway attempt 
itself has a value cost. There is a penalty even if h e doesn't realize it 
or care (ibid., pp 409-410). 
Now (so the argument goes), to claim that a person's well-being can (in 
this way) be directly affected by situations which do not in any way 
"enter" or "affect" his experience, this is not plausible. 
Is this a good argument? Well, this depends on what it purports to 
show. If it is directed against certain specific non-internalist claims, it is 
not a bad argument, but it is not an argument which hits all claims of 
this type, and it does not seem to hit the most plausible claims of this 
type. For example, it is hardly possible to be totally unaware of the fact 
that one is autonomous, or that one is functioning well, or that one has 
friends4. 
(3) A plausible conception of prudential value must be flexible enough to 
allow for the fact that good lives come in a variety of forms. Non-inter­
nalist pluralist theories are not flexible enough, however, and should 
therefore be rejected5. 
Again, this is an argument which hits some specific non-internalist 
claims, but it doesn't really refute the most plausible claims of this type. 
It is true that the most plausible non-internalist pluralist theories are not 
as flexible as the desire theory, but they all have a certain degree of 
4However, it is not just possible, but also pretty common, to be unaware of the 
fact that one is not autonomous, or that one is functioning badly, or that one 
doesn't have any real friends. 
5Cf. the first argument for the desire theory on pp 193-195. 
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flexibility. Or more specifically, the most plausible rion-internalist claims 
are all consistent with "the fact that the best lives for different people 
may [on a more specific level] contain quite different ingredients", and 
the reason for this is that they are all formulated on a high level of 
generality. For example, /z'Zza-relationships come in several different 
forms, and autonomous lives may be very different from each other. 
But the question still remains: Are the most plausible theories of this 
type flexible enough? Well, if one accepts Sumner's criterion of flexibility 
(cf. p 194 above), they are not flexible enough, but I can't see why we 
should accept such a strong requirement (especially the idea that a 
theory of welfare can not be "descriptively adequate" if it favours 
companionship over solitude; cf. Sumner (1996), p 18). 
(4) It is also possible to argue against non-internalist pluralist theories in 
a subject-oriented way, i.e. by trying to show that there is no way in 
which the relevant claims can be supported by a plausible conception of 
human nature6, or by trying to show that if we really understand what 
it is to be human, we will see that no such claims are valid7. We will not 
look at arguments of this type until later, however, viz. when we look 
at the subject-oriented arguments which has (or can) be given for 
theories of this type. In connection with that, we will not only conduct a 
critical examination of these attempts at justification, we will also see 
whether reflections on human nature may even weaken the universalist 
pluralist's case. 
To conclude, there is (as I see it) at least one strong argument against all 
6Where I assume that the relevant evaluative claims are not constituent parts of 
such a conception. 
7Or as Sumner (1996) would put it: A list of "intrinsic sources of welfare" (i.e. 
prudential values) is not a theory of welfare. A plausible theory of welfare must also 
give us "a formal account of what it is for something to be such a source", or 
alternatively put, a (subject-oriented) account of why certain things should be 
regarded as prudential values. And this is a requirement which no non-internalist 
pluralist theory can (according to Sumner, that is) satisfy. 
Now, it is important to point out that the "objective list theorist" does not have 
to accept this requirement. Instead, he can adopt the following position: "Why 
should I have to justify anything? As I see it, my claims are too fundamental to 
allow for any justification at all. In fact, it seems that Sumner's requirement is 
really a kind of persuasive definition of the phrase 'theory of w elfare', and that it 
is (just like his requirement of flexibility) especially designed in order to give 
support to subjectivism". (I owe this observation to Mats Furberg). 
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non-iriternalist claims, viz. (1). In my view, this argument constitutes a 
serious threat against all non-internalist pluralist theories, serious 
enough to place the burden of proof on the pluralist. 
The challenge which the non-internalist pluralist has to meet can be 
described as follows: He has to show us why we should (so to speak) 
ignore the heavy objection presented above, or in other words, why 
we should (in the light of this objection) regard things like autonomy, 
achievement, or filia as universal prudential values. That is, he has to 
find a way to justify a number of claims of the form "All non-intrinsic 
facts of type X h ave nonderivative value for all human beings at all 
times (where X is not desire-fulfilment)"8. In particular, he has to come 
up with a satisfactory subject-oriented justification of such claims (cf. e.g., 
pp 110-112), i.e. he has to show us what it is about us (our human 
nature, our constitution) that makes things like autonomy or friendship 
nonderivatively good for us. Or as Sumner (1996) puts it, he has to give 
us a formal account of what it is for something to be an "intrinsic source 
of welfare"9. So, let us now look at how the non-internalist pluralist 
tries to deal with this "problem of ju stification". 
Arguments for the "theory" 
These arguments can be divided into two categories, viz. subject-
oriented arguments, i.e. arguments which purports to justify the 
"theory" in a subject-oriented way, and other kinds of arguments 
(some of which can be regarded as object-oriented). The most impor­
tant arguments are of the former type, but we will start with the latter 
type of arguments. 
8This is the type of claim that a pure "objective list theorist" has to justify. 
However, it is worth noting that there are also weaker versions of the "theory"; cf. 
pp 362-366 below. 
9Cf. note 7 above. Sumner seems to take it for granted that such an account has to 
be unified, but there is (as I see it) no reason why we should share this 
assumption. Instead, we should (at least for the time being) allow for the 
possibility that the relevant (subject-oriented) justifications may vary from case to 
case (cf. note 7 on p 288). 
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"Non-subject-oriented" arguments 
There are at least three arguments of this type, viz. (1) the idea that 
theories of the non-internalist pluralist type have, as a rule, more "criti­
cal power" than its competitors, or alternatively, that the theories of 
prudential value which are best suited for criticizing the prevailing social 
conditions are all of this type; (2) a number of "atomist arguments"; and 
(3) Griffin's mixture of "definitional" and "radical" deliberation. 
The appeal to the critical power of the "theory" 
Theories of prudential value can be used in many different ways, but 
one of the most important functions is "the critical function"; we want 
such theories to be useful for criticizing social and cultural arrange­
ments, traditions, practices, and the like. Now, non-internalist pluralist 
theories are (of c ourse) not the only theories which meet this require­
ment; hedonism and the desire theory have a certain critical potential as 
well. It can be argued, however, that this critical potential is not as 
powerful as in the case of c ertain kinds of pluralist theories. Consider 
the case of slavery. Suppose that we think that slavery is a detestable 
social practice, and that the reason for this is (in part) that it is bad for 
certain people, viz. the slaves. The question then arises: Why is it bad 
for (actual and hypothetical) people to be slaves: which theory of 
prudential value gives us the best explanation of why slavery should be 
condemned? All the hedonist and the desire theorist can do is this: 
They can point to the fact that there are (actual) unhappy slaves (or 
slaves who would prefer to be free), and they can argue that it will be 
better for future generations (especially for the would-be, hypothetical 
slaves) to grow up in a society free from slavery. But they can not claim 
that it would be good for a "happy slave", i.e. a slave who is happy 
with his lot, and who desires to stay where he is, to be set free. This is 
something that a non-internalist pluralist can do, however, e.g., he can 
also appeal to the idea that it may be nonderivatively better for us to 
live autonomously than to live heterenomously, even if the autonomous 
life is somewhat unhappier. Therefore, his theory has (in this context) 
more "critical power" than the hedonistic theory or the desire theory. 
So, is this a good "argument"? Well, not if it is regarded as an attempt 
at objective justification (it is really a "source of appeal" rather than a 
proper argument), but it may well convince certain kinds of "critical 
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people" that some kind of no n-internalist pluralist theory is best suited 
for their purposes, and therefore has to be accepted. 
Some "atomist" arguments 
As an example of a n argument of this type, consider Sen's (1992) argu­
ment for the view that acting freely and being able to choose have 
nonderivative value for us: "It is, in general, better for a person to do X 
and choose it (where choice implies the existence of alternatives) than to 
do X w ithout having a choice (assuming that "doing X" can be dis­
tinguished from "choosing X and doing it"; cf. p 52)10. Therefore, being 
able to choose is directly conducive to well-being". 
Is this a good argument? Well, it seems plausible to claim that it is 
better for a person to do X and choose it than to do X without having a 
choice, at least if we assume that doing X is a valuable "functioning", or 
that it is (on a more global level) better for a person to live a certain life 
if o ther options are available than it is to live "roughly the same life" 
where these other options are not available. But even if this is so, we 
can not conclude that choosing or freedom has intrinsic prudential 
value. First, the alleged fact that doing X and choosing it is better than 
just doing it does not imply that it is intrinsically better. And even if 
doing X and choosing it is (in fact) intrinsically better than just doing it, 
this does not permit us to conclude that choosing is intrinsically valu­
able. Such a thing can only be concluded if it is assumed that the 
prudential value of a whole is just the sum of the (prudential) values of 
its parts: "If the value of the whole 'doing X and choosing it' is bigger 
than the value of just doing it, then the extra value must be located in 
the extra part, i.e. in the choosing". This assumption is false, however 
(cf. p 109 above), and we should therefore reject the argument11. But 
10Sen (1992) also tries to convince us of this "principle" (i.e. the idea that doing X 
and choosing it is better than just doing it) by appealing to the idea that fasting is 
better than starving. This is a bad argument, however, and the reason for this is 
that Sen is wrong about what the most important differences between fasting and 
starving consist in. It is true that fasting may be regarded as "choosing to starve 
when one does have other options" (p 52), while starving implies that one does 
not have any other alternatives. But it is also likely that (i) while a starving person 
wants to eat, a fasting person does not want to eat, and wants to not eat, and (ii) 
that fasting persons suffer less from their not-eating than starving persons (who 
wants to eat). And it is mainly because of these two differences that fasting is 
better (or less bad) than starving. 
11 And since there are, as far as I know, no other arguments for the view that 
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we may still accept the idea that it is (intrinsically) better to act freely 
than to act without having a choice, and that a person's level of well-
being is (in some way, and to some extent) a function of how free he is. 
Sen's argument is not the only argument which is based on the 
dubious atomistic assumption that the value of a whole is the sum of the 
values of its parts. Here are two other examples: 
Suppose that I am happy because I believe the woman with whom I 
am love is also in love with me. In this case, it is nonderivatively better 
for me if my belief is true than if it is illusory, i.e. if she is actually in love 
with me. But this does not allow us to conclude (there are two possible 
conclusions here) that it is either nonderivatively good for me to be in 
contact with reality (that my belief is true), or that actual mutual love is 
good for me. 
It is better to have one's desire for a love affair fulfilled than to have 
one's desire for degradation fulfilled, even if t he latter desire happens 
to be stronger. But this does not allow us to conclude that it is non­
derivatively better for a person to have a love affair than to be 
degraded. 
Griffin's mixture of "definitional" ond "radical" deliberation 
Let us first note that Griffin's (1986) (and (1996)) attempt to justify his 
own list of universal prudential values - viz. accomplishment, active (or 
autonomous) living, understanding, enjoyment, and deep personal 
relations - is both object-oriented and subject-oriented. Here, we will 
restrict our attention to the object-oriented part, however; the subject-
oriented part (which is a kind of "human nature account") will be 
discussed at a later point. 
Griffin's object-oriented argument can be characterized as follows: 
First, he gives us an account of "prudential deliberation", or (roughly) 
of how we should deliberate in order to determine what has prudential 
value. This "general method" can then be used to criticize and assess a 
number of specific claims about prudential value. The idea is (of course) 
that if a "candidate for value status" survives this type of criticism (such 
a process of deliberation), it can be considered a universal prudential 
value, and the claim that the thing in question has nonderivative value 
choosing (or freedom, or the like) has intrinsic value, we should also reject this 
view. 
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for us can be regarded as justified. 
So, what sort of deliberation goes on (and should go on) in deciding 
the ends of life? How can (and should) claims about them be criticized 
and assessed? (cf. Griffin (1986), p 64) Well, Griffin himself conceives of 
the proper kind of deliberation as a kind of mixture between "defi­
nitional" and "radical" deliberation. The definitional deliberation gives 
rise to proposals of the type "enjoyment is a universal prudential 
value", and if these proposals are not effectively challenged by radical 
deliberation, we have a good reason to believe that the proposal is 
correct. 
The definitional part of the deliberation follows naturally from his 
"informed desire theory" (cf. pp 242-244), i.e. from the idea that 
"[v]alues are, on the most plausible account of their link to desire, what 
one would want if one properly appreciated the object of desire" 
(Griffin (1996), p 35) To see whether a certain object is really good for 
us, one must have a proper understanding of the nature of the object, 
and this understanding is (to a considerable extent) "definitional". This 
definitional part of the deliberation is said to consist of two parts: 
First, I should have to bring into focus the candidate for value status, 
largely by distinguishing it from other values and from the valueless. 
Then I should have to decide whether [this possible prudential value] 
/.../, finally seen plainly, is indeed valuable. This exercise looks like, 
and in some sense is, a process of discovery, and it looks as if the 
value discovered is valuable quite apart from my personal desires and 
inclinations - indeed, is valuable for humans generally (ibid., p 20). 
To get a more precise idea of h ow this "definitional exercise" is suppo­
sed to work, let us see how Griffin tries to justify the idea that 
accomplishment is good for us12. His reason for picking out accomplish­
ment as a candidate value in the first place is that the "rough, intuitive 
case for it is plain. We all want to do something with our lives, to act in a 
way that gives them some point or substance" (Griffin (1986), p 64, my 
italics). That is, his starting point seems to be subjective. But once the 
candidate for value status has been picked out in this "rough" way, the 
question arises: What sort of accomplishment is it that would have this 
12In what follows, the two parts of Griffin's argument - the formulation of the 
"method of deliberation" and the idea that accomplishment is a value which 
survives the test in question - will not be kept separate. 
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status? (cf. ibid., p 64). This is where the definitional deliberation really 
begins. The first step is to distinguish accomplishment "from other 
values and from the valueless". Here, Griffin claims that accomplishment 
has to be kept distinct from things like simply wanting one's life to be 
valuable, bare achievement (to reach the goals one sets Oneself), the 
development and exercise of skills, and the winning of respect and 
admiration. He also gives a rough (positive) characterization of the 
valuable kind of accomplishment, e.g., he claims that it is valuable in­
dependently of its consequences, that it need not be of something 
lasting, or of something of wide or public importance. The outcome of 
this first step of definitional reasoning is that the candidate value (in this 
case, accomplishment) is "seen plainly". "It [this definitional kind of 
reasoning] whittles away what only looks like, or is confused with, the 
end itself. After whittling away, there might be nothing left; or there 
might be no new value, only an old one now separated from confusing 
appearances" (ibid., p 65). This is where the second step must be taken, 
i.e. one then has to "decide whether accomplishment, finally seen 
plainly, is indeed valuable". Griffin writes: 
But why, once a candidate value is tolerably well defined, accept it as 
a value? Well, all that one can do to show that it is not a value is to 
keep whittling away - to show that what makes a candidate value 
look attractive is something else with which it is confused, or is some­
thing meretricious, which when isolated and seen plain is no longer 
attractive. But once all whittling is done, one must just make up one's 
mind: is accomplishment, now that it is separated off and seen plain, 
worth going for? (ibid., p 66). 
But, as Griffin points out, "[i]t is not that this is the end to all possible 
argument. It is just that, once the whittling is done, the argument has to 
become more radical" (ibid., p 66). An example of such a radical argu­
ment is the idea that everything is pointless, that nothing is really 
worthwhile. If a candidate value cannot survive this type of radical 
challenge, it cannot be considered a universal prudential value. (And it 
goes without saying that Griffin believes that the prudential values on 
his own list would survive such criticism as well)13. 
13We should also add that there is (on Griffin's view) more to prudential 
deliberation than what has just been described. A full account of prudential 
deliberation should, he thinks, also include an account of what the deliberating 
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So, is this a good argument? Well, in my view, the "general method of 
deliberation" he proposes is plausible enough, but I am not sure 
whether the method (when applied) "selects" (or generates) the list of 
prudential values that Griffin thinks it does. For example, a hedonist 
who is "whittling away" in his own way (rather than in Griffin's way) 
will probably end up with what he considers a justification of hedonism. 
And even if the argument happens to give some support to some non-
internalist pluralist theories, I doubt that it can counterbalance the 
"whittling away" that was done in counter-argument (l)14. 
To sum up, none of the three "non-subject-oriented arguments" above 
is good enough to give us any reason to accept a non-internalist plura­
list theory15. So, let us now turn to the attempts which have (or can) be 
made to justify the "theory" in a subject-oriented way. 
The subject-oriented arguments 
There are at least three subject-oriented ways in which the non-
internalist pluralist can try to justify his claims. The three types of 
subject-oriented justifications are16: 
(1) Subjectivist justification. Here, an attempt is made to justify the 
relevant universal claims by referring to certain actual attitudes which 
we all share, e.g., to our intrinsic desires or evaluations. That is, justi­
fications of this type are all "based on" the object interpretation of some 
actual desire theory, regarded as a theory of (subject-oriented) justi­
fication. 
(2) Quasi-subjectivist justifications are (instead) based on some idea-
subject must be like for this type of deliberation to be successful (cf. Griffin (1996), 
p 58). For example, the deliberating subject must have a well-developed 
conceptual apparatus that allows him to think about these issues, and he must be 
sensitive to prudential value. On Griffin's view, this sensitivity is "more 
judgement-like than perception-like", and an "account of the conditions for the 
successful working" of this sensitivity will regard these conditions as "akin to 
conditions such as good light, good eyes, and good position for successful seeing". 
14We should also add that in the case of accomplishment, counter-argument (2) is 
also applicable, and the reason for this is that accomplishment is the kind of thing 
of which one need not be aware. 
15But cf. the second part of note 7 on p 306 above. 
16It is important to note that the first two of these "possible justifications" are 
(probably) my constructions: As far as I know, there have been no actual attempts 
to justify non-internalist pluralism in any of these ways. 
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lized version of the desire theory, i.e. they are attempts to justify the 
relevant claims by referring to what we would want or value under 
ideal circumstances, e.g., if we were fully rational. 
(3) Objectivist justification. The objectivist non-internalist pluralist (or 
"objective list theorist", in the proper sense of the term) rejects the idea 
that things have prudential value in virtue of our attitudes (actual or 
hypothetical). This means that he can not justify the relevant universal 
claims by referring to what we want or value, or to what we would 
want or value under more ideal circumstances. Instead, he has to appeal 
to something in us which can not be regarded as an attitude or concern, 
e.g., to a common human potential, or to a set of universal human 
needs. 
Let us now take a closer look at these subject-oriented attempts at 
justification, to see if any of them are successful. 
Subjectivist justification 
According to pure subjectivism, the relevant universal claims can (and 
must) be justified by referring to (intrinsic) desires or evaluations which 
we all share. As an illustration of this type of j ustification, consider how 
a subjectivist would try to justify the idea that it has nonderivative 
value for ail human beings (at all times) to have/z'Zza-relationships with 
other people. In this case, he would claim that the reason why it is 
always nonderivatively good for all of us to have friends is that we all 
have an intrinsic desire to have friends (or that each of u s believes that 
it is good for him or her to have friends). This argument has the follo­
wing structure17: 
(PI; the factual premise): We all have an intrinsic desire for friendship 
(or every human being believes that it is good for him or her to have 
friends; or it is "H-evident" to each of us that it is good for him or 
her to have friends). 
(P2; the principle of justification): If we all have an intrinsic desire 
(etc.) for a certain type of situation, then it has nonderivative value 
for all of us that situations of this type obtains (this principle can be 
deduced from the object interpretation of the actual desire theory). 
Conclusion: It is nonderivatively good for all of us to have friends, 
17Cf. pp 113-118 above. 
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i.e. friendship is a universal prudential value. 
So, is this a good argument? No, it is not, and the main reason for this 
is that the factual premise is false, not just in the case of filia, but also 
(and "even more so") if we have alleged values like autonomy, or 
contact with reality, in mind. We want different things, and this makes 
it impossible to justify universal claims in this way. Or alternatively put, 
the main reason why we can not accept the conclusion is that (P2) rests 
on the object interpretation of the desire theory, a theory which (when 
combined with the idea that we want different things) implies rela­
tivism. This suggests that the best the subjectivist can do is to generate 
what Sumner (1996) would call "a list of standard intrinsic sources of 
welfare". 
But this is not the only reason why we should reject all subjectivist 
attempts to justify universal claims. Suppose (for the sake of argument) 
that both (PI) and (P2) are valid. Now, if (P2) is valid, we can safely 
assume that the reason for this is that the object interpretation of the 
desire theory is valid. But if this is so, it is rather pointless to look for 
universal prudential values at all, isn't it? In this case, we could just say 
that it is good for me to have friends because I desire to have friends, 
i.e. we could just ignore the issue of whether it is also good for every­
body else to have friends18. 
Quasi-subjectivist justification 
The quasi-subjectivist universalist tries to justify the relevant claims by 
referring to what we would want or value under ideal circumstances, 
e.g., if we were fully rational19. For example, he could try to justify the 
idea that it has nonderivative value for all human beings to function 
18To see how silly it would be for a subjectivist to accept the universalist idea that 
nothing can be good for me unless it is also good for everybody else (or for a 
universalist to accept subjectivism), consider the following argument: Suppose 
that I have two intrinsic desires, viz. the desire for friendship (which is universal), 
and the desire to be in touch with reality (which is not). In this case, a universalist 
subjectivist would claim that it is good for me to have friends, but not to be in 
touch with reality, i.e. he would suggest that what is good for me depends (in 
part) on what other people want. But this is absurd; what is good and bad for us 
cannot be determined by consensus decisions (or majority decisions either, for 
that matter). 
19Where valuing is, in this case, a special case of desiring, viz. if w e assume that a 
fully rational person will not desire anything he regards as bad, and that he will 
desire everything which he regards as good. 
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autonomously by referring to the "fact" that if w e were fully rational, 
then we would all regard autonomous living as a prudential value (at 
least in one's own case). This argument can be structured as follows: 
(PI; the factual premise): If we were fully rational, we would all have 
an intrinsic desire for autonomous living. Or alternatively put, every 
fully rational person desires (as an end) to function in an autonomous 
way. 
(P2; the principle of justification): If all rational people have an intrinsic 
desire for a certain type of s ituation, then it is nonderivatively good 
for all of us that situations of this type obtains (this principle can be 
deduced from the idealized desire theory). 
Conclusion: It has nonderivative value for every human being that he 
or she is functioning in an autonomous way, i.e. autonomous living is 
a universal prudential value. 
So, is this a good argument, i.e. can universal claims about prudential 
value be justified in this way? For example, is the idealized desire 
theory on which the second premise is based compatible with the idea 
that there are universal prudential values, or does it imply relativism? 
Well, this depends on whether the conception of r ational desire that is 
adopted is "universalist" or "relativist", i.e. whether or not it is implies 
that "if it is rational for me to desire a certain thing, then it is also ratio­
nal for you, and vice versa". 
If some relativist conception of rational desire is adopted (e.g., the 
deliberative theory), then the same type of argument that was given 
against the possibility of subject-oriented justification (of universal 
claims) can also be given here. That is, (PI) is false, or alternatively, the 
version of the idealized desire theory (or quasi-subjectivism) on which 
(P2) is based implies (when combined with the idea that fully rational 
persons may want different things) relativism. 
So, what if some universalist conception of rational desire is (instead) 
adopted, e.g., the intrinsic theory? Well, in this case, the argument is no 
longer open to the objection above, but this does not mean that it is a 
good argument. First, there are good reasons for believing that all idea­
lized desire theories should be rejected (cf. pp 275-278 above), and 
second, even if we (for the sake of argument) assume that (P2) is valid, 
it is simply not "fundamental enough" (or "complete enough") to be 
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satisfactory in this context. Suppose we were to find out that if we 
were rational, we would all desire to function autonomously. This 
"fact" would probably give some support to the idea that it is good for 
us to live our lives in an autonomous way, but it would still be appro­
priate to ask why we would have this desire if we were rational, i.e. 
what it is about us human beings that explains this alleged fact20 (cf. pp 
119-120). And if t his something is not actual desire (e.g., of a very deep 
kind), we have to look in the direction of objectivism. 
Objectivist justification 
So, it seems that the non-internalist pluralist can not justify his universal 
claims by referring to what we want or value, or to what we would 
want or value under more ideal circumstances. That is, it seems that he 
has to justify his claims "objectively" after all, i.e. by referring to some 
aspect of the our nature, other than our subjectivity, some aspect which 
is not of an "attitudinal" nature. But how can this be done? 
The problem can also be characterized as follows: The objectivist non-
internalist pluralist (or objective list theorist) claims that there are certain 
things which are good or bad for us, "whether or not we want to have 
the good things, or avoid the bad things" (cf. Parfit (1984), p 499), i.e. 
that "something can be (directly and immediately) good for me though I 
do not regard it favourably, and [that] my life can be going well despite 
my failing to have any positive attitude toward it" (Sumner (1996), p 
38). But if "personal concerns play no role in determining why some­
thing (anything) counts as a good for /.../ [us], or why one thing 
counts as a greater good than another" (cf. ibid., p 215), and if our 
well-being does not depend on our attitudes or concerns (actual or 
hypothetical), then how can we determine what is nonderivatively 
good and bad for us? And how can claims like "it is good for all of us 
to achieve things (or to have /z/za-relationships with other people, or to 
be in contact with reality, or to live our lives autonomously)" be 
justified? Or as Sumner (1996) puts it: What is it that "makes something 
(anything) a source of our welfare - what gains it a place on the list - if 
this does not depend on our attitudes and concerns"? (p 46). This is the 
challenge that the objectivist non-internalist pluralist (objective list 
20Assuming that it can be explained, that is. Cf. also note 7, the second part. 
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theorist) has to meet21. 
So, let us now look at some of the ways in which objectivists have 
actually tried to meet this challenge, to see if a ny of these attempts are 
good enough to merit our approval (i.e. to see whether it is possible to 
justify the relevant universal claims objectively, and if so how)22. 
21 At this point, it is important to point out that even though universalism seems 
to presuppose objectivism, the reverse is not true, i.e. there are objectivist theories 
which imply relativism (with respect to what has nonderivative value for us); and 
just as universal claims of the form "facts of t ype X is good for all of us" can be 
given objectivist justifications, so can relativist claims of the form "facts of type X is 
good for me, but not for you (where X is not an instance of anything which is 
nonderivatively good for everyone)". 
An objectivist (subject-oriented) justification of such a relativist claim, e.g., the 
claim that it has nonderivative value for me to be engaged in physical activity, but 
not for you, will appeal to some "non-attitudinal" difference between us. Or 
alternatively put, an "objectivist relativist justification" of the claim that situations 
of type X a re good for a person P is a justification which will refer to aspects 
(features) of P which are neither shared by all human beings (they may even be 
unique to P), nor part of P 's "subjectivity", e.g., to P's (individual) needs, talents, 
abilities, callings, vocations, or the like. 
Now, it might be argued that the objectivist views on which these justifications 
are based - e.g., the idea that it is good for a person to have his (individual) needs 
satisfied, or to act in accordance with his vocation - are really universalist views, 
and that they (for this reason) do not really imply relativism (with respect to what 
has prudential value) after all. For example, consider the view that it is good for all 
human beings to act in accordance with their vocation. Isn't this ä universalist 
view? Well, in a sense, it is, but this does not mean that it implies that the same 
types of things have nonderivative value for all of us. The reason for this can be 
formulated as follows: Just as there are two possible interpretations of the idea 
that it is good for us to have our desires fulfilled (viz. the object interpretation and 
the satisfaction interpretation), so there are two possible interpretations of the 
view that it is nonderivatively good for a person to act in accordance with his 
vocation. On the first interpretation (which corresponds to the satisfaction 
interpretation of the desire theory), prudential value is attributed to the 
circumstance that someone acts in accordance with his vocation; and on the 
second interpretation (or the object interpretation), value is (instead) attributed to 
the object of a person's vocation, i.e. to the very activity to which he is "called". 
Now, it is only the first (and less plausible) interpretation (where the idea is 
understood as a substantive evaluative claim) which implies universalism. On the 
second interpretation (which is also the more plausible), the idea that it is good for 
all human beings to live in accordance with their vocation is a formal theory about 
how we should determine what has value for a person, and if we assume that 
vocations are something that vary from person to person, it is clear that this 
theory implies relativism. 
22And just as it is possible that none of t hese attempts are successful, we should 
also allow for the possibility that several attempts are successful. That is, it is 
(again) important to note (cf. note 7 on p 288 and note 9 on p 307) that "the best 
objectivist justification" of the relevant universal claims may differ from case to 
case, and that there may be no (satisfactory) unified objectivist account of what 
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As far as I can tell, these objectivist attempts are all attempts to justify 
the relevant universal claims by appealing to a common human nature: 
they can all be regarded as "human nature accounts". Or alternatively, 
all objectivist attempts at subject-oriented justification can (it seems) be 
regarded as instances of the following formula: "The reason why it is 
nonderivatively good for all human beings to have friends (or to func­
tion autonomously, or the like) is that having friends (etc.) is in accor­
dance with human nature (or 'good human nature')". 
The differences between objectivists are (roughly) differences with 
regard to what "non-attitudinal" aspect (or part) of our common 
human nature they appeal to, and what type of a ppeal it is (i.e. "how" 
they appeal to human nature). For example, some objectivist accounts of 
well-being can be regarded as perfectionist while other must be regar­
ded as "non-perfectionist", some objective accounts appeal to needs 
while other accounts appeal to the human potential, and so on. 
In my view, the most fundamental (and fruitful) distinction between 
different human nature accounts is the distinction between perfectionist 
and non-perfectionist accounts. So, how do these two types of accounts 
differ from each other? What is it that makes a human nature account 
perfectionist? 
Perfectionist accounts (justifications) 
Perfectionist justifications are (roughly) justifications which appeal to the 
human potential or to "human flourishing". So, what kinds of universal 
evaluative claims is it possible to justify in this way? Well, it seems that 
there are no claims which can not (in principle) be given perfectionist 
justifications, but as I see it, it is primarily claims of the form "F is the 
best (or perfect) way for a human to function (or live, or be)" which 
can be justified in this way. That is, if other kinds of value-for-claims are 
to be given perfectionist justifications, this has to be done indirectly, via 
some perfectionist account of human functioning. 
So, this is how a claim of the form "F is the best (or perfect) way for a 
human to function" (e.g., "the best way for a human to function is to 
function autonomously") can be "justified" in a perfectionist way: "The 
reason why F is the best way for a human to function is that it is the 
way of functioning in which human nature flourishes and reaches per-
makes things good and bad for us. 
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fection to the highest degree" (cf. Griffin (1986), p 56)23. Or in terms of 
the human potential: "F is the best way for a human to function because 
it constitutes a realization of the human potential"24. 
"Justifications" of this type is based on the view that there is such a 
thing as a "perfect way for a human to function - the spirit in which to 
approach life, meet its trials, decide on goals and action" (ibid., p 63), a 
way of functioning "in which human nature flourishes and reaches per­
fection", or which can be regarded as a realization of the human poten­
tial25. Now, it is important to see that this idea does not imply that it has 
nonderivative value for us to function in this way. (If thi s is to follow, we 
have to add the assumption that it has nonderivative value for us to 
function in a perfect way, and this assumption is not entirely unpro-
blematic). 
But more importantly, as it stands, this perfectionist account of good 
human functioning cannot be used to justify any other claims of 
prudential value (i.e. besides the claim that it has nonderivative value 
for us to function in a perfect way). So the question arises: If the per­
fectionist account of human functioning is to be used to determine what 
it is besides perfect human functioning that has universal prudential 
value, then how should this be done? For example, what extra assump­
tions have to be made? 
Well, let us first note that if the relevant universal claims (e.g., the 
claim that it is good for all of us to have friends) are to be justified in a 
perfectionist way, we have to regard the perfectionist account above as 
more that just a substantive account of ideal human functioning, viz. we 
23But is this really a type of justification? Isn't the idea better expressed as "F is the 
best way for a human to function if and only if it is the way of functioning in which 
human nature flourishes (etc.)"? Well, on my view, the idea is best expressed as "F 
is the best way for a human to function if and only if (and because) it is the way of 
functioning in which human nature flourishes (etc.)", and it is the presence of the 
term "because" that makes it appropriate to conceive of the idea as some kind of 
"justification". 
24It worth pointing out that this type of perfectionism need not be monist: one 
may also be a pluralist in this area, and claim that Fl is one of several perfect ways 
for a human to function because it is one of the ways "in which human nature 
flourishes and reaches perfection". Such an idea is probably based on the 
assumption that there are several different "kinds of human nature" (e.g., innate 
personality types, or the like), each of which can be more or less "flourishing". 
25This view may also (but need not) include the idea that the level of well-
functioning "for any person is in direct proportion to how near that person's life 
gets to this ideal". 
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also have to regard it as an essential part of a "formal account of the 
modes of approach that will fix on" what (if a nything) that has non-
derivative value for all human beings (cf. ibid., p 63). This is an example 
of w hat such a formal account might look like: "If we would all 'have' 
or 'achieve' situations of type X if we were functioning in way F under 
standard (or acceptable) circumstances, then situations of type X a re 
good for all of us; and the reason why X is g ood for us is that X is an 
essential part of the kind of l ife that we would have if we were func­
tioning in the way F under normal circumstances"26, where we should 
add (i) that F is the best way for a human to function, and that the 
reason for this is that F is the way of functioning in which human nature 
flourishes and reaches perfection to the highest degree; (ii) that there is 
no reference to X in the specification of F; and (iii) that the notion of 
standard or acceptable circumstances is also specified independently of 
X. 
Now, formal accounts of this type are obviously problematic, and it is, 
for this reason, unlikely that they can be used to justify any other uni­
versal claims of prudential value besides the claim that it has non-
derivative value for us to function in a perfect way27. My tentative 
26The reason why I put it this way is that I think it would be too strong to claim 
that X is good for us if and only if (and because) we would all "achieve" X if we 
were functioning in way F under normal circumstances. 
It is important that this "appeal to the well-functioning person" is distinguished 
from another (similar) idea, viz. the idea that we can determine what is good for 
us by way of the attitudes of the well-functioning person (or "good man"). To see 
why this idea has no relevance whatsoever in the present context of justification, 
consider the following two ways of making it more precise: (i) "X is good for us if 
and only if (and because) well-functioning persons desire, like, or value X", and (ii) 
"Well-functioning persons like (etc.) what is good for them, and they like these 
things because they are good for them, and we can therefore use the attitudes of 
the well-functioning man as an indication of what is good for all of us". Now, (i) is 
clearly a justificatory idea, but if we do not view it as just another formulation of 
quasi-subjectivism, it is surely an absurd claim (it is absurd to claim that 
something is good for me - who is not well-functioning - because someone else 
values it; cf. note 18). And while (ii) is a more plausible idea, it is totally irrelevant 
in the context of justification. But to see why (ii) is probably implausible too, 
consider some of the assumptions on which it is based, viz. (a) that there is such a 
thing as "what the good man values (etc.)"; (b) the universalist view that what is 
good and bad for one person (e.g., a "good man") is also good or bad for all of us; 
and (iii) that the reason why the good man is correct about what is good and bad 
for him (and everybody else) is that he is (because of his goodness) more in touch 
with our common human nature than the rest of us. 
27There are several reasons why these accounts have to be regarded as 
problematic, e.g., (i) it seems implausible to assume that we can specify both good 
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conclusion is therefore that a universal claim of p rudential value cannot 
be given a perfectionist justification unless it is of the form "it has non-
derivative value for all of us to function in way F (e.g., autonomously)". 
The only perfectionist argument that we will take a closer look at, viz. 
Aristotle's famous ergon argument, is of this type, i.e. it is an attempt to 
justify the claim that it has nonderivative value for all of us to function 
in a certain way, viz. "in accordance with excellence" (cf. pp 298-301 
above). The argument appeals to the ergon of man (which plays an 
essential role in Aristotle's teleological view on human nature), and it 
has (roughly) the following structure: "It is good for all human beings 
to function in accordance with excellence because this is what it is the 
business of a human being to do; this is our characteristic 'activity', this 
is what makes us human". 
"Non-perfectionist" human nature accounts (justifications) 
On the non-perfectionist views, it is of no importance what (if anything) 
makes human nature flourish and reach perfection to the highest 
degree, or what (if anything) constitutes a realization of the human 
potential; a non-perfectionist may even reject the assumption that there 
is such a thing as "reaching perfection to the highest degree", or 
"realizing the human potential". Instead of appealing to these (possibly 
empty) notions, non-perfectionists appeal to other aspects of our 
common human nature, and they do it in a very different way. 
The non-perfectionist objectivist justifications which we will look at 
are of three different kinds, and so are (of course) the human nature 
accounts on which these justifications are based: 
(1) The basic need account. Here, the relevant universal claims are justi­
fied in terms of universal human needs, i.e. in terms of what we need 
qua human beings. These justifications have the following form: "The 
reason why X is a universal prudential value is that X is something we 
functioning and good-enough circumstances independently of any (substantive) 
conception of prudential value, and (ii) it also seems implausible to assume that 
"good functioning under good-enough circumstances" will, in all cases, give rise to 
lives which are similar in content. Now, (ii) suggests that we could improve our 
case if we exchange the universalist account above for the following kind of 
relativist account: "The reason why X is good for a person P is that X is an essential 
part of the kind of life that P would have if he were functioning in the way F, 
where F is the perfect way for a human to function (or for him to function), and so 
on". It is doubtful whether this account can escape objection (i), however. 
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all need and this need is a basic human need". 
It seems that all kinds of universal claims can (in principle) be justified 
in this way, but it surely sounds more odd to talk about a basic need 
for autonomous living than to talk about the need for friendship or 
love. 
(2) The appeal to what is and what is not "recognizably human". 
Justifications of this type have the following form: "The reason why X is 
a universal prudential value is that a life (or existence) which does not 
contain X is not recognizably human". A good example of such an 
argument is the Aristotelian idea that it is good for all human beings to 
have friends because human beings are social beings, or "political crea­
tures" (where it is assumed that it is not part of the ergon of man to be a 
social being). 
It seems that all kinds of prudential values can (in principle) be 
"grounded" in this way, but it is important to note that the kinds of 
universal claims that are best justified in this way are claims to the effect 
that it is good for us to have a certain minimal amount of certain goods, 
e.g., ideas like "the more autonomous a person is, the better" can 
hardly be justified in this way. 
(3) Griffin's human nature account, where an appeal is made to a 
number of different "aims" and "interests" which are (supposedly) 
embedded in human nature. 
This concludes our brief list of possible objective (subject-oriented) 
justifications. So, let us now take a closer look at some of these alleged 
justifications (and the views on which they are based), to see if any of 
them are plausible enough to give us a good reason to accept some non-
internalist pluralist theory. To repeat, the accounts which will be discus­
sed are: (1) Aristotle's ergon argument; (2) the basic need account; (3) 
one of several possible appeals to what is and what is not "recognizably 
human", viz. the Aristotelian attempt to justify the idea that it is good 
for all human beings to have friends by referring to the "fact" that 
human beings are social beings, or "political creatures"; and (4) Griffin's 
appeal to "aims" and "interests" which are embedded in human nature. 
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A critical discussion of four different human nature 
accounts 
The first Aristotelian appeal to Human Nature: the ergon 
argument 
The general assumption on which the ergon argument is based is the 
idea that "[f]or all things that have a function or activity [ergon], the 
g o o d  a n d  t h e  ' w e l l '  i s  t h o u g h t  t o  r e s i d e  i n  t h e  f u n c t i o n  [ e r g o n ] "  ( N E ,  
1.7, p 13). Or in Nagel's (1972) terms, "if something has an ergon, that 
thing's good is a function of its ergon", or alternatively, "when some­
thing has an ergon, that thing's good is specified by it" (p 8). That is, if 
we know what a thing's ergon is, then we can draw certain evaluative 
conclusions. But what kind of evaluative statements is it possible to 
derive from ergon-statements? 
To find an answer to this question, we must first know more about 
what the ergon of a (kind of) thing is. According to McDowell (1980), 
the ergon of F is "what it is the business of an F to do"; according to 
Nagel (1972), "[t]he ergon of a thing, in general, is what it does that 
makes it what it is" (p 8); and according to Wilkes (1978), 
[t]he ergon of any X is t he function that it has; or, if it is the kind of 
thing that cannot readily be said to have a function, it is its charac­
teristic activity. It is definitionally assigned; it is what X d oes that 
makes it just what it is, and if for any reason X b ecomes unable to 
perform its ergon, it is then no longer genuinely an X at all (p 343). 
Now, this suggests that if we know what the ergon of K (a kind of 
thing) is, then what we can conclude is what a good (or excellent) K is. 
And if we know what a good K is, we can also determine whether a 
particular thing X (of the kind K) is a good of its kind, i.e. whether it is, as 
a K, good. That is, the conclusion of an "ergon argument" is (it seems) 
always of the form "a good K is a K which is constituted in this-or-that 
way", and not (as e.g. Nagel seems to suggest) "this is what is good for 
a K " .  
To see what kind (or form) of goodness that is involved in conclu­
sions of e rgon arguments, we have to consider the fact that in this con­
text, goodness is attributed to things which are what they are in virtue 
of having certain functions or characteristic activities. This suggests that 
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the forms of goodness that a thing has in virtue of its ergon is either 
instrumental goodness or technical goodness (the terminology is from von 
Wright (1963)). If X is an instrument or a tool (e.g., a knife), then its 
ergon is some function that it has which makes it what it is (i.e. some 
purpose which is "essentially associated with the kind" to which it 
belongs), and we can say that it is (instrumentally) good if it serves this 
purpose well. And if X is, for example, a chess-player, then his ergon 
(qua chess-player) is the activity of playing chess, and we can say that 
he is a (technically) good chess-player if he is good at this activity. If this 
is correct, we can (it seems) conclude that the conclusion of an ergon 
argument is either of the form "an instrumentally good K is a K which 
serves this-or-that purpose well", or of t he form "a technically good K 
is a K who is good at this-or-that activity". 
Now, if we turn to the ergon argument itself, the first thing that 
strikes us here is that the conclusion of this argument is not a claim 
about what the good (or well-functioning) man is like, but a claim about 
what is good for man (or what "the good life for man" consists in). Or 
more specifically, the conclusion of the argument is the idea that it is 
(nonderivatively) good for us to function in accordance with excel­
lence28, and this conclusion is (somehow) thought to follow from a 
statement about what the ergon of man is. 
So, what is the ergon of man? What is it "the business of a human 
being to do", and what is it that makes him a human being rather than 
something else? On Aristotle's view, the ergon of man is "an activity of 
soul which follows or implies a rational principle" (NE, 1.7, p 13), or 
"activity of the psuche in accordance with a rational principle". To grasp 
the meaning of this idea, we have to take his distinction between two 
major forms of rationality (which is based on the way in which he 
divides the soul) into account, viz. the distinction between practical 
wisdom (phronesis) and philosophic wisdom (sophia). So, as Wilkes (1978) 
points out, "man's ergon may be the activity of the psuche in accor­
dance with either or both of these" (p 343). In short, the ergon of man 
consists in rational activity, or functioning in accordance with theoretical 
28But it is important to note that what Aristotle really argues for is a much 
stronger claim, viz. the view that eudaimonia (or "the good life for man") consists in 
"activity in accordance with excellence". On this view, functioning in accordance 
with excellence is the "chief human good", and not merely one of several 
prudential values. 
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and/or practical reason29. 
Now, it is clear that all that can be concluded from 
(PI) The ergon of man (assuming that there is such a thing) consists in 
rational activity (functioning) 
and the fundamental assumption that 
(P2) For all things that have an ergon, the good and the 'well' (i.e. its 
technical or instrumental goodness) is thought to reside in the ergon" 
is the following "lemma": 
(LI) To be a good man, to function well as a human being, is to 
function in a rational way. 
But if we assume that Aristotle's list of excellences (of intellect and of 
character) is a good specification of what it is to function in a rational 
way, i.e. that 
(P3) Rational living consists in activity in accordance with the 
excellences 
then we can also conclude that 
(L2) To be a good (well-functioning) man is to function in accordance 
with the excellences, i.e. good human functioning consists in activity in 
accordance with the excellences30. 
What we can not yet conclude is what Aristotle wants us to conclude, 
29Some commentators, e.g., Wilkes (1978), wants to include more than rational 
activity in the ergon of man. Wilkes writes: "Man is a hybrid and two-sided 
creature, who shares properties with both gods and animals. The ergon offered 
by Aristotle highlights the side of rationality at the expense of animality and thus 
oversimplifies the nature of man. With this oversimplification the gap between 
the life of a good man and the good life for a man appears to widen yet further" 
(p 345). The problem with this interpretation is that it fails to take into account that 
the ergon of man is only one part (or aspect) of human nature. As we will see 
below (on pp 340-345), Aristotle does take our "animality" into account, but in a 
different context, and this means that we need not agree with Nagel (1972), when 
he claims that reason is (qua ergon idion of man) what human life is about, and 
that the intellect should (therefore) be included in the account of what a human 
being is, while the bodily functions which we share with animals and plants (e.g., 
nutrition) can be excluded. 
30On this view, a good man is someone who is good at liv ing in accordance with 
reason, and the goodness of the good man should therefore be regarded as a kind 
of technical goodness. 
326 
viz. that 
(C) It has nonderivative value for us to function in accordance with 
excellence. 
For this claim to follow, we also have to add yet another assumption, 
viz. 
(P4) It is nonderivatively good for us to function well31. 
To determine whether this is a good argument, we should take a closer 
look at its weakest point, viz. (PI)32. So, is (PI) a plausible assumption? 
Well, I think not. First, it is doubtful whether there is such a thing as the 
ergon (idion) of m an, i.e. whether there is a kind of activity or function 
in virtue of which we are human. (To doubt that there is an ergon of 
man is not necessarily to doubt that there is a human nature, however; 
it is only to doubt that this nature can be defined in terms of activity or 
function). And second, even if t here happens to be such a thing as the 
ergon of man, it may be doubted that it consists in rational activity (e.g., 
it may be argued that the ergon of man is, instead, play or creative 
activity). So in my view, we have little or no reason to believe both that 
there is an ergon of man and that it consists in rational activity, and we 
should therefore reject the ergon argument as a whole33. 
31If we have Aristotle's "original" conclusion in mind (cf. note 28), this premise can 
be (roughly) formulated as follows: "The good life for man is the same thing as 
the life of the good man". It is probably this idea that Sumner (1996) has in mind 
when he criticizes Aristotle for "reducing" prudential value to perfectionist value 
(or for "conflating" the two values with each other). 
32That is, I assume that the conclusion follows from the premises, and that (P2), 
(P3), and (P4) are all more plausible than (PI). This does not mean that the other 
three assumptions are plausible, however. For example, many philosophers 
would probably reject (P4), an assumption which I personally happen to regard as 
quite plausible (I can't see how one could argue for or against this assumption, 
however). 
33It can also be doubted whether it is really possible to conduct value-free 
investigations into the ergon of man, and whether claims about erga are 
descriptive claims (especially in the case of living organisms). That is, it may well 
be the case that even if t he ergon argument were sound, it would not constitute 
any bridge between "the is" and "the good". 
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The basic need account 
To find out whether the relevant value-for-claims can be justified in 
terms of basic human needs34, we must first know what a basic need is. 
So, what kind of human needs are basic needs, and how do basic needs 
differ from other human needs of the same genus? My answer to this 
question can be formulated as follows: (i) Basic needs are "teleological 
needs" rather than "tension-needs"; (ii) basic human needs are 
(typically) universal needs, i.e. they are shared by all human beings, and 
the reason for this is that (iii) basic needs are (at least in part) rooted in 
some objective (i.e. non-attitudinal) aspect of our common human 
nature: basic needs are never dependent on desires, they are never 
derived from our attitudes and concerns (this is of course the feature of 
the basic need account that makes it objective); (iv) the goal of a basic 
need is always valuable, but any kind of valuable situation does not 
count as a goal of basic need; only a limited number of v aluable situa­
tions may count as goals of basic need; (v) it is (by definition) good for 
us to have our basic needs satisfied, and it is (typically) bad for us not 
to have our basic needs satisfied (this point is of course closely related 
to the fact that the goals of our basic needs are always valuable). 
Let us now take a closer look at these points. 
(i) Basic needs are teleological needs 
When we attribute needs to people, we either have "tension-needs" or 
"teleological needs" in mind. A tension-need is a state of tension (or dis-
equlibrium) that an organism may be in - a state that functions as a 
motivating force -, and the object of such a tension-need is the thing 
that the tension forces the individual towards. Liss (1990) defines 
"tension-need" as follows: "P has a [tension-] need I... I for X if and 
34It is important to note that such justifications might, but need not, be based on 
the "pure basic need account", i.e. on the view that a person's well-being is a 
function of to what extent his basic needs are satisfied. (Cf. Griffin (1986), 
according to whom the basic need account is the view that "well-being is the level 
to which basic needs are met so long as they retain importance" (p 52)). A basic 
need account need not be pure, however, i.e. it may well allow for the possibility 
that there are prudential values which are not good for us in virtue of being 
needed, and it may (as far as I can see) also allow for the possibility that there are 
basic needs whose satisfaction does not contribute directly to the well-being of the 
"needing subject". 
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only if, a) P has a tension, and b) that tension disposes P to X" (p 58)35. 
Now, it is rather obvious that such tension-needs are best conceived of 
as desires; to have a tension-need for something is very much like 
having a craving for it, and cravings are properly regarded as desires 
(in this case, desires-for rather than desires-that). That is, all attempts to 
justify goodness-for-statements in terms of tension-needs are (for this 
reason) subjectivist rather than objectivist, and we can therefore (in this 
"context of objectivist justification") do without the notion of tension-
need altogether. 
In this context, the relevant notion of need is teleological need-, needs of 
this kind are not desires, and they may have an essential role to play in 
objectivist justifications of g oodness-for-statements. Now, as I see it, it 
is (in this context) not really necessary to know what a teleological need 
is (e.g., what kind of t hing it is); it is sufficient to restrict our attention 
to statements of need (to their structure, truth conditions, and the like). 
All need-statements are of the form (or can, at least, be expressed in 
the form) "a subject S (in this case some individual human being) needs 
an object X in order to achieve the goal Y (under the circumstances C)", 
where the object of need is (typically, but not always) necessary for the 
goal of n eed36. 
There seem to be few restrictions on what the goal of human need 
can be, and even less restrictions on what can be needed; a person may 
need cool nerves to plant bombs, for example, or a certain education in 
order to be get a certain job. But because of the nature of the "in-
order-to"-relation, the object of need is always (to a considerable 
extent) determined by the goal of need, and this means that if a certain 
goal is given, this puts strong restrictions on what the object of need 
can be. 
35The problem with this definition is that it presupposes that the object of need is 
a piece of behaviour, or an activity; for example, we can (on this definition) say 
that a thirsty person has a tension-need for drinking, but not that he has a 
tension-need for water (a person can hardly be disposed to water). On my view, 
the definition would be improved if (b) were replaced by (b') "that tension 
disposes P to strive for (search for, or the like) X". 
36Now, statements of basic need are normally of the form "we all have a need for 
X" or "we all need X" (e.g., "we all need food"), and it may therefore seem as if basic 
needs do not have goals. Statements of this form are always elliptical, however. 
Basic needs always have goals (e.g., humans need food in order to survive); it is just 
that these goals are often taken for granted, and the phrase "in order to Y" i s 
(therefore) not filled in. 
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All that has been said about the "in-order-to"-relation (the relation 
between the object of need and the goal of need) this far is that the 
object of need is (typically) necessary for the goal of n eed. Now, there 
are at least two different ways in which the object (X) can be necessary 
for the goal (Y): X is either causally necessary for Y37, or it is a neces­
sary constituent part of Y. Th at is, if X is necessary for Y, then the rela­
tion that holds between X and Y is either a causal relation (a kind of 
means-end relation) or a part-whole relation (a kind of intrinsic relation, 
e.g., as when we say that human beings need satisfying human relations 
in order to have a good life). 
This is not the whole truth about the "in-order-to"-relation, however. 
Consider the following example: Let us assume that we have a need for 
personal growth (as Allardt (1993) claims), and that the goal of this 
need is "living well". Does this imply that personal development is 
necessary for living well? I think not. On my view, all Allardt's idea im­
plies is the more modest claim that personal development is something 
which (normally) contributes to a good life, or which helps to bring a 
good life about (where the contribution is of a part-whole type rather 
than of a means-end type). That is, it seems perfectly consistent to 
accept the idea that we need personal development in order to live well 
and (at the same time) reject the idea personal growth is necessary for 
living well (i.e. that it is a necessary constituent part of a good life). 
If this is correct, the relation that holds between the object of need 
and the goal of need may be of four different kinds: The object may be 
causally necessary for the goal; it may be a necessary constituent part of 
the goal; but it may also give a causal contribution to the goal (be a non-
necessary means to Y, e.g., help make Y possible); or it may be a 
"contributive constituent part" of the goal. That is, both the part-whole 
model and the means-end model have to be stretched to include 
relations that are not "being-necessary-for"-relations38. 
Another important feature of t eleological need is this: The objects of 
such needs are always situations rather than things (and this holds for 
37Notice that a very long time may pass between "the cause" and "the effect", e.g., 
as in "all humans need a lot of parental love as infants in order to function well as 
adults". 
38Cf. Griffin's (1986) idea that "the means-end model has to be stretched beyond 
simple cause-effect relations to fit all the cases to which it is usually applied" (note 
7, p 327). 
330 
the goals of teleological need as well). The reason why "the situation-
view" is superior to "the thing-view" is twofold: First, all the different 
relations which may hold between the object of need and the goal of 
need (i.e. all four "in-order-to"-relations) are relations which hold 
between situations rather than between "things" (e.g., things can not 
be causally necessary conditions, but situations (facts) can). And 
second, the idea that needs can be satisfied, and that we can under­
stand what it is for a need to be satisfied (as well as determine whether 
a certain need is satisfied or not), seems to presuppose "the situation-
view". It is always a situation (rather than a thing) which constitutes the 
satisfaction of a need, i.e. if w e think of n eeds as "situation-needs", we 
always know what it is for a need to be satisfied (since the object of t he 
need is, in this case, identical with the situation which would constitute 
its satisfaction). We do not always understand what it is for a thing-
need to be satisfied, however. In fact, it is only possible to determine 
whether a "thing-need" is satisfied if th e need in question corresponds 
to one or several "situation-needs". For these reasons, we should 
accept the idea that when a person needs something, what he really 
needs is that something is the case (cf. also pp 165-169 above). 
This ends our characterization of w hat it is to need something in the 
teleological sense39. 
39But it might still be asked what a teleological need really is. We know that it is 
not (like tension-need or desire) a state that the needing organism is in. Neither is 
the need itself identical with the object of need (even though the term "need" is 
sometimes used to refer to the object of n eed). So what is it? Liss (1990) suggests 
that a need is constituted by the difference between the actual state that the 
subject is in and the goal of need (i.e. in relation to the goal, the needing subject 
can be said to be in a state of lack or deficiency). This is how Liss defines 
teleological need (on p 52): "P has a [teleological] need [or "difference-need"] /.../ 
for X in situation S at T if, and only if, a) there is a difference between an actual 
state of P in S at T and a goal G in S at T, and b) X in S at T is a necessary condition 
for G". (He also adds, a little later, that the actual state and the goal must be 
"commensurable"). The problem with this definition is that it implies that all needs 
are unsatisfied, an idea that I find (especially in an evaluative and justificatory 
context like this) unacceptable; to have a need is not necessarily to be in need. So, 
what is my own view on the issue? Well, either we can say that there are no such 
things as needs, or we can say that if there are needs, then they must be regarded 
as complex relational phenomena that are structured just like need-statements. On 
this latter view, needs are 3-ary relations, and to be "in need" of something is a 4-
ary relation (which also includes, as an element, the actual state that the subject is 
in). 
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(ii) Basic hu mari needs are (typically) universal needs 
That a human need is universal means (roughly) that its object is some­
thing which is needed by all human beings, and that the reason for this 
is (in part) that the goal of the need is (so to speak) shared by every­
one. So, are our basic needs universal in this sense? Well, it is quite clear 
that the goals of my basic needs (e.g., survival) are identical with the 
goals of your basic needs, but this does not imply that the objects of 
our basic needs are the same. Or more specifically: To the extent that 
we are alike in our personal characteristics (and live under similar 
circumstances), so are the objects of our basic needs, e.g., we all need 
(in virtue of our shared biological make-up) nutrition in order to sur­
vive, and sleep in order to function properly. But if w e are different in 
some relevant respect, this means that the objects of our basic needs 
may also be different40. A person who is paralysed from the waist 
down, for example, needs (because of h is deviation from the biological 
norm) a wheel chair in order to move around on his own. That is, if we 
count his need for a wheel chair as basic (as I think we should), then we 
must conclude that the object of a basic need need not be universal 
after all. However, the basic needs which are of interest to us in this 
context of justification are (as we will see) all universal. 
(Hi) Basic needs are needs which "flow" from human nature 
Many human needs are needs we have because of the ends we happen 
to choose: it is often the case that when a person needs something, he 
needs it in order to satisfy some desire that he has (in which case the 
goal of the need is identical with the object of the desire). Now, basic 
needs are never dependent on desires in this way, they do not, "like 
hypothetical imperatives, depend upon the adoption of s ome purpose 
/... / [,] they do not depend upon ends that we just happen to adopt" 
(Griffin (1986), p 42). This is why we have to regard the basic need 
account as objective; it "makes well-being independent of desires" 
(ibid., p 32), its "standard rests on aims flowing from human nature and 
not on any flowing from a person's particular tastes, attitudes, or 
interests" (ibid., p 53). 
40This (the fact that we are different and live under different circumstances) is but 
one reason why we need different things. Another reason (which is not applicable 
to basic needs) why our objects of need may be different is (of course) that our 
goals of need may be different, e.g., because we want different things. 
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That is, the reason why basic needs are "objectively given" is that 
they "flow" from human nature: basic needs are needs we have in 
virtue of being human. But what is this supposed to mean? Well,, it 
hardly means that the possible goals of our basic needs (e.g., survival, 
health, proper functioning, or good living) are "derived" from human 
nature. This suggests that it is the objects of our basic needs which 
"flow" from human nature. Is this a plausible claim? Well, we already 
know that the objects of a person's needs are determined by at least 
two kinds of things, viz. (i) the goals of need and (ii) the personal 
characteristics of the needing subject (and the circumstances under 
which he lives). Now, this suggests that if the goals of need are given, 
then the objects of need can be derived from (a correct conception of) 
human nature, but only if we have universal needs in mind. For 
example, the fact that we all need nutrition, air, and water in order to 
survive can be regarded as dependent on our human nature, and so 
can the fact that we need rest in order to be healthy, and that we need 
human relationships in order to avoid misery. 
This does not mean that the line between basic and non-basic needs 
can be fixed solely in terms of human nature, however. In fact, it seems 
that the objects of our basic needs are not just determined by human 
nature, but also by convention. For example, the fact that we seem to 
need things like availability of medical aid, formal education, interesting 
work, relationships with work-mates, and opportunities for leisure-time 
activities in order to achieve some vaguely formulated goal like "living 
well" is not dependent merely on human nature, but also on the fact 
that we live in a certain kind of society. But just how is the line between 
basic and non-basic needs dependent on convention, i.e. where exactly 
does convention enter the picture? Well, it seems to me that it is mainly 
the goals of basic need, and/or the specification of these goals41, that 
are (to some extent) determined by convention; once these goals are 
given, it doesn't seem that we have to appeal to convention in order to 
determine what the objects of basic need are. But regardless of where 
exactly convention enters the picture; it is worth noting that the mere 
fact that "the line between basic and non-basic needs may change as 
society changes" (cf. ibid., p 44) seems to make basic needs (partially, 
41Cf. Griffin's idea that key terms like "health", "proper functioning", and "harm" 
"have to be given fresh interpretations in each social setting" (ibid., p 45). 
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and in some way) dependent on "attitudes and concerns", and this 
might be sufficient to constitute a threat to the objectivity of the basic 
need account. 
(iv) The goals of our basic needs are always valuable 
What are the possible goals of our basic needs? Well, the fact that the 
objects of o ur basic needs are (to a considerable extent) determined by 
these goals suggests that we can start from a list of basic needs, and 
then infer (from this list) what the goals of our basic needs must be. So, 
what do we need in this basic way, and in order to what? These are 
some of the objects of basic need that have been suggested: The most 
indisputable kind of basic needs are the elementary biological needs, 
e.g., the need for food (or nutrition), air, water, and sleep (or rest). But 
"basic need theorists" are never content with this: they always tend to 
include a number of "psychological" or "social" needs on their lists of 
basic needs, like the need for warm human relationships, meaningful 
activity, or variation in life. To see how different the objects of basic 
need may be, consider Allardt's (1993) claim that things like availability 
of medical aid, formal education, relationships with work-mates, 
attachment to family and kin, and opportunities for leisure-time activi­
ties are all objects of basic need (cf. pp 89-91). He also regards "the 
need to relate to other people and to form social identities", "the need 
for personal growth", and "the need for integration into society and to 
live in harmony with nature" as basic needs. So, what are the goals that 
"correspond to" these objects of basic need? Well, some of the objects 
(like nutrition, air, and water) are things we need in order to survive; 
other things (like rest) we need in order to be healthy, or to function 
properly; and other things we need in order to "avoid misery, relate to other 
people, and avoid alienation" (ibid., p 89, my italics). It has also been 
suggested that a life in accordance with our good nature, the fulfilment 
of one's plan of life, the realization of one's vital goals, a decent state of 
living, self-realization, a meaningful and individualized life, and good 
living are possible goals of basic need42. 
42At this point, we can note that even if survival and health are necessary (i.e. in 
this sense "needed") for a good or meaningful life, it sounds rather odd to say that 
we need to survive or that we need to be healthy. This suggests that the goals of 
basic need are types of situations which can not (in turn) be regarded as objects of 
need. Almost all the candidates listed above share this feature, with the possible 
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In short, it seems that all the possible goals of basic need can either be 
regarded as achievements of something (positively) g ood, or as avoidances of 
something bad, or as both43. In short, all goals of basic need are (it seems) 
valuable for us44, but they need not have nonderivative value for us. 
Now, the question is whether all the candidates listed should be 
regarded as goals of basic need, or whether only some of them should. 
It has been suggested that the goal of our basic needs is always the 
avoidance of h arm, or more specifically, that a need is basic if a nd only if 
its object is necessary (etc.) in order to avoid harm, e.g., if it is (as 
Sumner (1996) puts it) a need for something the lack of which will 
damage or impair one's life45. 
Now, this is not an implausible idea, but I still think it is "too strong". 
It is true that the best candidates to the title "a goal of basic need" 
(e.g., survival, health, proper functioning, and the avoidance of misery) 
can all be regarded as "avoidances of harm", but this does not mean 
that whenever the goal of a certain need is the avoidance of h arm, then 
this need should be regarded as basic, and neither does it mean that 
the goal of every single basic need can be regarded as some kind of 
avoidance of harm. For example, it is doubtful whether the fact that 
exception of "relating to other people" (which is probably not sufficiently general). 
43For example, survival is the same thing as the "avoidance" of death, having a 
decent life may be regarded as the same thing as avoiding a bad life, and health 
may also be regarded as a "privative notion". 
44This follows from the fact that the absence of something which is bad for a 
person is always good for this person, or more specifically, that the absence of the 
bad is always derivatively (e.g., instrumentally) good in that it makes a number of 
good things possible. The absence of the good is not necessarily bad, however, i.e. 
there is a certain "asymmetry" between good and bad. However, if we restrict our 
attention to nonderivative value, we can see that there is a symmetry between good 
and bad: Here, it is both the case that (i) the absence of a nonderivatively good 
state is not necessarily nonderivatively bad (but it is necessarily worse), and (ii) 
the absence of a nonderivatively bad state is not necessarily nonderivatively good 
(but it is necessarily better). The reason for this is that between the 
nonderivatively good and the nonderivatively bad, there is the "nonderivatively 
neutral"; or alternatively put, the terms "good" and "bad" are (in this case) 
contraries rather than contradictories. 
45It is worth noting that this view is almost identical with an idea which has been 
put forward by von Wright (e.g., in von Wright (1986), Ch. XII, section 6) and 
others, viz. the idea that a (basic) need is something that it is (by definition) bad 
for a person not to have satisfied (cf. also pp 336-338 below). If my need for X is 
basic, then this idea implies that not-X is bad for me, and a good explanation of 
this is that X is necessary (etc.) for the avoidance of harm, and that harm is (by 
definition) always bad for me. That is, the reason why it is bad for me not to have 
a (basic) need for X satisfied is that without X, I will be harmed. 
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some of us need a lot of nicotine (or coffee, or alcohol) in order to 
avoid misery makes these needs basic46, and it is also doubtful whether 
the fact that the goal of a certain universal need is a good or meaningful 
life implies that this need is not really basic. 
In short, I tend to reject the idea that the goal of every basic need is 
the avoidance of harm47. Instead, I propose the more liberal view that 
there are several possible goals of basic need, some of which can be 
regarded as the achievement of something positively good. (But as a 
rule of thumb, we can say that if t he goal of a certain need can not be 
conceived of as the avoidance of h arm, then it is likely that the need in 
question is not a basic need). To make an exact specification of what the 
goal of a need must be like if this need is to count as basic would not be 
true to a phenomenon that is best left a little open. There are tough 
cases, which we can not get rid of by making stipulations. The following 
questions (formulated by Griffin (1986)) can serve as an example of how 
difficult it is to determine whether something is a basic need or not: "Is 
interesting work a basic need? Well, without it, alienation, a kind of 
social pathology, results. Is education a basic need? Without it, one's 
intellect will atrophy. And how much education?" (p 43)48. 
(v) The value of basic need satisfaction 
Now that we have some idea about what a basic need is, we can see 
how empty the claim that it is good for us to have our basic needs 
satisfied really is49. The notion of basic need is a value-laden notion, and 
46This is of course an objection which the "avoidance-of-harm" theorist can meet 
by stipulating what is meant by "harm" in this context, and how much harm that 
should be avoided (and in what way) if this avoidance is to be counted as the 
satisfaction of a basic need. 
47This means that I also tend to reject the idea in note 45, viz. the idea that a (basic) 
need is something that it is (by definition) bad for a person not to have satisfied. 
48If someone happens to believe that the answers to these questions are 
obviously "no", it is likely that he has failed to appreciate that questions of basic 
need are (in part) political questions. 
49Here, one may ask exactly how the claim that it is good for a person to have his 
basic needs satisfied should be understood. Is it the circumstance that a basic need 
is satisfied that is good for the needing person, or is it the object of the need? Well, 
the latter interpretation (i.e. "the object interpretation") is (I think) the more 
common one, and it is also better than the former interpretation (i.e. "the 
satisfaction interpretation"). The reason for this is twofold: First, we tend to think 
of need accounts as pluralist theories of prudential value, and this is only possible 
if the object interpretation is adopted. And secondly, the object interpretation is 
more in line with the type of objectivist justifications that we are interested in 
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the reason for this is (of course) that the goal of a basic need is (by 
definition) good for the needing subject (cf. pp 335-336 above). So, 
what does this imply about the value of basic need satisfaction? 
Well, we know that the object of a basic need is either a means to the 
goal of the need (necessary or "contributive")/ or it is a constitutive 
part of the goal (necessary or "contributive"). Now, if the object of 
need is a means to the goal of need, it is (obviously) good for the 
needing subject to have the need satisfied, but only derivatively good. 
The reason why this is so is that in cases like this, the object of need 
(qua object of need) derives its value from the value of t he goal of need. 
But what if the object of n eed is (instead) a constitutive part of the goal 
of ne ed? Well, in cases like this i t seems that the object of nee d (qua 
object of need) need not derive its value from the value of the goal of 
need. For example, if having friends is a constitutive part of a good life, 
and if it is also intrinsically (rather than "contributively") good, then it is 
(it seems) the value of the whole which is (in part) derived from (in the 
sense "a function of") the value of having friends, rather than vice 
versa. In any case, it seems plausible to make the following assumption: 
If the object of need is a part of the goal of need, and if the goal of 
need is merely instrumentally good, then the object of need is also 
instrumentally good. But if the goal of n eed is intrinsically good for the 
needing subject, then the object of need is (on the assumption that it is a 
constituent part of the goal of need) either intrinsically good or 
"contributively good" for this subject. 
The first conclusion we can draw from all this is that it is always good 
for us to have our basic needs satisfied. However, it can not be conclu­
ded that it is always bad for us to not have our basic needs satisfied50. 
here, i.e. justifications of the form "this is good for him because he has a basic need 
for it". 
50This follows from the fact that the absence of something good is not necessarily 
bad (cf. note 45 above). It might be noted, however, that in most cases, it is both 
good to have a certain basic need satisfied and bad not to have it satisfied. If we 
restrict our attention to these cases, we can see that several combinations are 
possible: (i) It may be nonderivatively bad for me not to have a certain need 
satisfied, but only instrumentally good to have it satisfied (e.g., "the need to form 
social identities"); (ii) it may be nonderivatively good for me to have a certain 
need satisfied, and nonderivatively bad not to have it satisfied (e.g., the need for 
warm human relationships); and (iii) it may be instrumentally bad for me not to 
have a certain need satisfied, and instrumentally good to have it satisfied (e.g. the 
need for a certain minimal level of i ncome). However, I don't think that there are 
any needs which it would be nonderivatively good to have satisfied but "only" 
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Another conclusion that can be drawn is this: It can only be non-
derivatively good for a person to have a basic need satisfied (qua need) 
if the following two conditions are met: 
(i) The goal of the need has final value for the person. That is, if the 
goal of a basic need is merely instrumentally good, then the object of 
the need can not (qua object of need51) have final value for the needing 
person. 
(ii) The object of the need is a constitutive part of the goal of the 
need, i.e. the relation between the object of need and the goal of need 
is a part-whole relation. That is, if the object of the need is merely a 
means to the goal of need, then it can never (qua ob ject of instrumental 
need) have final value for the needing subject. 
All this suggests that as far as basic needs are concerned, to know 
what we need is to know what is good and bad for us. However, this 
does not imply that we have to know what has nonderivative value for 
us in order to know what we need (in the basic sense). First, the goals 
of o ur basic needs do not always have final value for us (e.g., as in the 
case of s urvival and health). And second, there are (I think) a number 
of t hings which (like Rawls' "primary goods") can be classified as "all-
purpose means", e.g., self-respect. These things are most probably 
objects of basic need, since they are (most likely) means to (or consti­
tutive parts of) several goals of b asic need at the same time. For these 
reasons, it is not really necessary to know what is prudentially valuable 
in order to find out what one needs. (It is also possible to have com­
plete knowledge about what has nonderivative value for us and, due to 
ignorance about human nature, still not know very much about what 
we need). 
Criticism of the basic need account 
So, now that we are familiar with what a basic need is, we have to ask 
ourselves whether it is ever possible to justify claims about what has 
nonderivative value for us in terms of basic needs: Can claims of the 
form "situations of type X are nonderivatively good for all human 
beings" ever be justified by referring to the alleged fact that X is an 
instrumentally bad not to have satisfied. 
51 Suppose, for example, that we need to be happy in order to be healthy. 
Happiness may well have final value, but qua object of b asic need it is merely a 
means to health, i.e. something instrumentally valuable. 
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object of basic need? Is it ever plausible to claim that something is non-
derivatively good for all of us because it (or something of w hich it is an 
instance) is an object of some basic need? 
Well, for this to be at all possible, we have to restrict our attention to 
those basic needs which it is nonderivatively good for us to have satis­
fied, i.e. to those needs which meet conditions (i) and (ii) on p 338. Let 
us (for the sake of argument) assume that the need for warm human 
relationships is such a need, i.e. that it has nonderivative value for us to 
be related to other humans in this way. Is it, in this case, plausible to 
claim that warm human relationships are nonderivatively good for us 
because this is something we all need (in the basic sense)? I think not. 
Even if the object of a certain basic need happens to be nonderivatively 
good for a person, it cannot be concluded that it is good for him because 
he has a basic need for it. It is (rather) the other way around: in order 
to determine what the relevant basic needs are (where a need cannot be 
relevant unless it satisfies conditions (i) and (ii)), we must already know 
what has nonderivative value for us, and we can not get this know­
ledge by thinking about what we need. If we have the relevant notion 
of need in mind, we can say (somewhat figuratively) that it is not need 
that is prior to value; it is rather value that is prior to need. Or in 
somewhat different terms (I think the argument is really the same): 
Claims about universal prudential value can (as condition (i) shows) only 
be justified in terms of a certain need on the assumption that the goal of 
this need has final value for us. However, whether this goal is (in fact) 
good for us is not anything which can be determined by appealing to 
the notion of need. This point can also be expressed as follows: Suppose 
that it makes perfectly good sense to claim that X is good for P because P 
needs X, and that P needs X because X is conducive to something else (Y) 
that is good for P. In this case, it is the fact that Y is good for P which 
can not be explained in terms of needs. In particular, it seems impossible 
to determine whether it is nonderivatively good to have a basic need 
satisfied (and how good it is) without knowing how it affects the 
overall quality of life. That is, the notion of "intrinsic basic need" is not, 
as the basic need account requires it to be, "independent of our general 
conception of prudential value" (cf. Griffin (1986), p 52). And there is 
(moreover) no way in which such an account can convince us that there 
are certain things which are nonderivatively good or bad for us, 
"whether or not we would want to have the good things, or to avoid 
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the bad things". In short, the notion of need does not have any "justi­
ficatory force" at all, and it can therefore be eliminated altogether from 
this investigation52. 
The second Aristotelian appeal to Human Nature: On why 
filia is nonderivatively good for us 
The Aristotelian argument that I have in mind is not really (at least not 
explicitly) an attempt to justify the idea that it has nonderivative value for 
a person to have friends. The conclusion of the argument is, rather, that 
the happy man (or the "supremely happy man"; the makarios) needs 
friends (filoi). On Aristotle's view, "it seems strange, when one assigns 
all good things to the happy man, not to assign friends, who are 
thought the greatest of external goods" (NE, IX.9, p 238). And a little 
later, he presents the famous argument: 
Surely it is strange /... / to make the supremely happy man a solitary; 
for no one would choose the whole world on condition of being 
alone, since man is a political creature and one whose nature is to live 
with others (NE, XI.9, p 238). 
Or, if we turn from Ross' translation to Nussbaum's: 
And surely it is peculiar to make the makarios a solitary; for nobody 
would choose to have all the good things in the world all by himself. 
For the human being is a political creature and naturally disposed to 
living-with (Nussbaum (1986), p 350). 
52However, it might still be objected: "Think of the relation between rights and 
duties. Right-statements are often extensionally equivalent to duty-statements 
(e.g., it may well be the case that a certain person has a right to live if and only if it 
is prohibited for everybody else to kill him). However, this is perfectly consistent 
with the plausible idea that duties can be explained in terms of rights, viz. because 
rights can be conceived of as legitimate claims, i.e. as something which are 
attributed to the patient rather than to the agent. Now, isn't this exactly how 
(certain relevant) needs and prudential values are related to each other? And isn't 
it plausible to assume that prudential value can (for this reason) be explained in 
terms of need, and that the reason for this is that needs are (like rights) attributed 
to people in a way that prudential value is not?". This is a bad objection, however, 
viz. because it is based on the false assumption that to need something (in the 
relevant sense) is to be in a certain state. But just as the structure of prudential 
value is relational, so is the structure of need (with the difference that while the 
former relation is merely binary, the latter is 3-ary, or maybe even 4-ary; cf. note 
39 on p 331). 
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Let us follow Nussbaum (1986) and assume that what Aristotle pur­
ports to show here is that filia (and membership in a political commu­
nity) are intrinsically valuable for us. Can this claim be supported by 
appealing to our "political nature", and if so, how? Exactly how does an 
appeal of this type work (if it works) in this type of evaluative context? 
The structure of the argument can be represented as follows: 
(1) Human beings are (by nature) social beings (political creatures) 
who are naturally disposed to "living-with". 
(2) The solitary life is not a "recognizably human life". 
(3) The solitary life is a bad life. 
(4) Filia (and/or membership in a political community53) is non-
derivatively good for us54. 
The first question that this gives rise to is how (1) should be under­
stood, i.e. what it means to say that "the political" is a part of human 
nature. For example, is it a descriptive or an evaluative (or normative) 
claim? 
Nussbaum (1986) clearly regards (1) as evaluative, there are even 
reasons to believe that she regards it as equivalent with (3), or even 
with (4). On her view, "[t]he claim that the political is part of our nature 
appears to be equivalent to the claim that a life without it [i.e. a solitary 
life] is lacking in an important good, is seriously frustrated or incom­
plete" (p 350, my italics), and she also seems to think that this claim (i.e. 
(1)) "is not a separate point from the point about intrinsic worth or value. 
/.../ It is just another way of putting the point that a life without philia 
is radically lacking in essential human values" (ibid., p 367, my italics). 
This is how she expounds (in more detail) the idea that "the human 
being is a political creature and naturally disposed to living-with". This 
is not an appeal to 
some separate realm of natural fact, [she writes,] but to our deepest 
judgments of value: the solitary life is insufficient for eudaimonia 
53In the following, I will restrict my attention to filia only. 
54Where (1) is a premise (in the proper sense), where (2) and (3) are "bridging 
principles" (or "intermediary steps"), and where (4) is the conclusion. My reason 
for representing the argument in this way (rather than in terms of premises and 
conclusion) is that it is more "faithful" to the discussion. 
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because we would not find such a life choiceworthy or sufficient for 
us. The solitary view of eudaimonia is at odds with the choices we 
make and the beliefs that we share. If eudaimonia is to include every 
value without which a life would be judged incomplete, it must 
include the political as an end in its own right. The sentence about our 
political nature indicates to us, furthermore, that political choices and 
concerns lie so deep that they are a part of what we are. The solitary 
life would not only be less than perfect; it would also be lacking in 
something so fundamental that we could hardly call it a human life at 
all. The appeal to nature thus underlines the depth and importance of 
the element in question. Without it we are not even ourselves (ibid., p 
350)55. 
Now, Nussbaum may well be right about all this, but if she is, the 
conclusion is already embedded in the premises56, and the argument 
must (for this reason) be rejected. For the argument to work, it seems 
that we have to understand (1) as a descriptive claim. 
Now, this is exactly what Cooper (1980) seems to do. Or more speci­
fically, he either takes (1) to mean that we are not "psychologically suf­
ficient", or he regards it as grounded in this fact. On my view, the 
second interpretation is more plausible, i.e. we should regard the 
(natural) fact that we "suffer from" a certain kind of vulnerability or 
weakness as an explanation of the fact that we are "naturally disposed 
to living-with"57. Cooper writes: 
55Now, it seems possible to give this a preferentialist (desire theoretical) 
interpretation: "That we are political creatures means that we regard the solitary 
life as incomplete (in a value-laden way), i.e. as bad for us, and that this negative 
evaluation is "deep", or part of our "human identity". And solitary lives are 
incomplete, or bad for us because we think so (in this deep way)". This 
interpretation is not accurate, however: The use of p referentialist language does 
not make the argument preferentialist (cf. how Nozick expresses himself when he 
formulates his experience machine argument), and it should also be noted that 
Nussbaum does not say that Aristotle appeals to the fact that we evaluate the 
solitary life in a negative way, but to the evaluation itself (whatever that means). 
56As David Charles points out (in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, on p 55): "On 
occasion, Aristotle seems to found his account of the good life on background 
assumptions about human nature, but elsewhere bases his account of human 
nature on what it is good for humans to achieve". 
57This is something that Nussbaum too would agree with. At this point, it is also 
worth noting that the explanation in question is (most probably) evolutionary 
rather than straight-forwardly psychological (e.g., phenomenological), i.e. it 
seems fully compatible with the fact that the desire for "living-with" is (from the 
point of view of the desiring subject) a "given". 
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If h uman nature were differently constituted, we might very well be 
immune to the uncertainties and doubts about ourselves which, 
according to Aristotle, make friendship such an important thing for a 
human being. /... / [W]e need each other because as individuals we 
are not sufficient - psychologically sufficient - to sustain our own lives 
(p 331). 
To argue thus the need of human beings for friendship from the 
deficiencies in our psychological makeup both illuminates the nature of 
friendship and gives what I think is an entirely accurate account of its 
status in human affairs. Properly understood, there is nothing in this 
that should be construed as undermining or detracting from the 
intrinsic goodness, for human beings, of friendly relations with 
others. For Aristotle's point is that the deficiencies that make 
friendship such a necessary and valuable thing are inherent in human 
nature itself (ibid., p 331). 
Now, all this may well be true, and it may also explain why we tend to 
evaluate the solitary life in such a negative way, but is it a good 
(objectivist) justification of (3), i.e. the evaluative claim that it is bad for 
us to live solitary lives? I think not. What Cooper says does not give 
any support to the idea that the happy solitary life is a bad life; what he 
shows is (at best) that such a life is impossible (or at least very unlikely). 
So, if the argument does not work unless we understand (1) as a des­
criptive claim, and if we can not understand it as a claim about our 
psychological insufficiency, how should it be understood? Well, this is 
one possibility: (1) can be regarded as equivalent with (2), which is (in 
turn) understood as a descriptive claim. Now, we have already seen 
that 
(2) The solitary life is not "recognizably human" 
can be interpreted in an evaluative way, i.e. as in Nussbaum's 
(2') The solitary life is "radically lacking in essential human values". 
To see what a descriptive interpretation of (2) would look like, consider 
the following statements: 
(i) A life without suffering is not a recognizably human life, and 
343 
(ii) An eternal life is not a recognizably human life58. 
Now, it seems rather obvious that (i) does not (at least not in itself) 
constitute a good reason for regarding a life free from suffering as a 
bad (human) life, and in a similar way, (ii) does not give us a reason to 
believe that an eternal life is a bad life59. This suggests that if statements 
of the form "a life without X is not recognizably human" are interpreted 
in this non-evaluative way60, they can not be used as reasons for state­
ments of the form "a life without X is bad". (And if w e accept the idea 
that mortality is a part of human nature, we can also conclude that 
there are parts of human nature which are (in this context) irrelevant, 
i.e. that there are "human-making features" which are not "good-
making features"; we will return to this point on p 349 ff.). It also allows 
for the possibility that it is better for a person to live a life that is not 
recognizably human (in this sense) than to live a life that is recognizably 
human. 
This seems to mean that if t he idea that the solitary life is not recogni­
zably human is understood in the non-evaluative sense above, then it 
can not constitute a reason for accepting the idea that the solitary life is 
bad. Now, this strongly suggests that (3) can not be justified in terms of 
(2) unless it is assumed that it is good for us to have relationships with 
other human beings, and this is not anything that can be established by 
appealing to what is human and not. Or more generally: Statements of 
the form "X is good for all human beings" can not be justified in terms 
of human nature (in this "second Aristotelian way") unless it is assumed 
that the part of human nature to which one refers is a relevant part61, 
and whether a part of human nature is relevant or not is not anything 
58It is (I think) plausible to assume that both statements are true. This would mean 
that if our mortality is a part of our human nature (if i t is a "human-making 
characteristic"), while our suffering is not, then (ii) is a conceptual truth, while (i) is 
a universal empirical truth. 
59There are other reasons for regarding an eternal life as bad, though. 
60This does not imply that (i) and (ii) are descriptive, however. On my view, they 
are (in a certain non-statistical sense) normative; a person who never suffers 
deviates from "the norm", i.e. he is (at least in this respect) not normal. But to say 
about someone that he is not normal in this sense is not necessarily to make an 
evaluative claim, and it allows for the possibility that non-normal people are 
better (or better off) than normal people. 
61To require that it is a "good part" would be too much. In general, it seems that 
all talk about "good human nature" and "neutral (or bad) human nature" is (at 
least in this context) clearly nonsensical. 
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that can be determined by appealing to the notion of human nature 
itself (cf. note 56). 
However, it is not just the step from (2) to (3) that is problematic, but 
also the step from (3) to (4). That the solitary life is bad does not imply 
that filia is good. What it implies is that a life can be good only on con­
dition that it is non-solitary, i.e. if the person who lives it has relation­
ships with other human beings. But this is, in itself, no argument for the 
thesis that filia is a necessary constituent part of a good life. However, 
if it assumed that filia is the best kind of human relationship (and that 
this can be shown in some way), then (4) (or something like it) follows 
from (3). We would then get the following inference: 
(PI) The solitary life is a bad life, i.e. some form of human relation­
ships is an essential part of the good life. 
(P2) Filia is the best kind of human relationship. 
(C) Filia is an essential part of the best life, and therefore good62. 
To conclude, the argument does not work: the idea that filia i s non-
derivatively good for us cannot be (objectively) justified in terms of t he 
alleged fact that human beings are (by nature) political creatures who 
are naturally disposed to "living-with". 
Griffin's human nature account 
As we have already seen (on p 310), Griffin's (1986) (and (1996)) 
attempt to justify his own list of prudential values - i.e. accomplishment, 
active living, understanding, enjoyment, and deep personal relations - is 
both object-oriented and subject-oriented. Now, the subject-oriented 
part of Griffin's justification is clearly a kind of "human nature account". 
For example, he claims that all the prudential values listed by him "rest 
on general features of human nature; for example, autonomy is central 
to living a human existence, and we all value our humanity" (Griffin 
(1986), p 70), and that "some such values are clear enough features of 
human nature that to deny them would be a quite plain error" (Griffin 
(1996), p 53). 
62But does this show that filia is nonderivatively good for us? Well, not if the notion 
of contributory value is intelligible and something can have contributory value 
without having nonderivative (or final) value. It is not likely that both these 
conditions are satisfied, however. 
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The claim that certain prudential values are features of human nature -
and not just based on such features - makes one wonder how Griffin 
conceives of human nature. What is (on his view) the stuff that human 
nature is composed of? Well, the answer seems to be aims and interests 
(where prudential values are regarded as that which meet basic human 
interests). For example, he claims that "certain biological aims - for food, 
health, protection of our capabilities - and certain psycho-biological aims 
- for company, affection, reproduction" are "particularly deeply embed­
ded in us" (ibid., pp 53-54, my italics), and he also claims that certain 
"non-biological interests, such as accomplishment and deep personal 
relations, are as firmly embedded in human nature as biological ones 
are" (ibid., pp 54-55, my italics). In connection with our biological 
nature, he also talks in terms of needs, e.g., when he states that some 
prudential judgements are "based on biological needs" (ibid., p 53, my 
italics). 
So, how do we know what "interests" (or "aims") that are embedded 
in human nature? Let us first consider our biological in terests (or needs), 
e.g., nourishment and nurture. In virtue of what are things like nou­
rishment and nurture interests, and why should they be regarded as 
parts of human nature? Griffin's answer to this question is that they are 
human interests in virtue of "their link to the avoidance of ailment, pain, 
or malfunction" (ibid., p 53). Moreover, "[nourishment and nurture are 
valuable because they are particular forms of avoiding those core-
disvalues" (ibid., p 53). (Cf. the idea (on pp 335-336 above) that we 
have a need for something if and only if it is necessary for the 
avoidance of harm). 
If w e turn from our biological interests to our non-biological interests 
(which is of more interest in this context, considering that all the 
prudential values on Griffin's list are of this type), we can see that 
Griffin's view is fundamentally the same. In this case too, something is 
an interest, and a part of human nature, in virtue of it s link to the avoi­
dance of certain kinds of harm; or more specifically, because it is a form 
of avoiding certain kinds of suffering, ailment, or malfunction. There are 
certain differences between biological and non-biological interests, 
however. As Griffin puts it ("roughly"), "biological ones are embedded 
in our animal nature and non-biological ones in our rational nature" 
(ibid., p 55). But more importantly, "the shift from biological to non-
biological interests brings with it /.../ a shift from predominantly 
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experiential sorts of harm such as pain and ailment, which are fairly 
easily identified, to non-experiential sorts of harm" (ibid., p 55). For 
example, "humans are by nature sociable; they aim at love, affection, or 
at least company, and lack of these produces its own sorts of pain and 
malfunction" (ibid., p 52, my italics). The pain which is characteristically 
produced by a lack of d eep personal relations is, moreover, "less expe­
riential" than physical pain: "Without deep personal relations an adult 
will suffer, but it is an altogether less experiential, more contentious 
sense of 'suffering'63 than the gross ailment and malfunction in the case 
of a baby deprived of nurturing" (ibid., p 53)64. 
As it stands, this argument gives rise to at least two sets of questions: 
(1) How are we to identify the "core-disvalues" that Griffin talks 
about? Are these disvalues are embedded in human nature too? It 
seems not65, i.e. they probably have to be identified in some other way, 
but how? Well, it doesn't seem too hard to identify the relevant kinds 
of "experiential" harm (pain, ailment, and suffering); here, we can (at 
least in part) rely on our "hedonistic evaluations". But how are we to 
identify the relevant kinds of "non-experiential" harm (malfunction, 
ailment, and suffering66)? And how are we to determine whether the 
relevant kinds of harms (experiential or non-experiential) are non-
derivatively bad for us, or whether they are "merely" instrumentally 
bad for us? (2) How exactly are the relevant human interests linked to 
the avoidance of h arm? And more importantly, how exactly is the posi­
tive value of h aving an interest met connected to the positive value of 
avoiding harm, and how it is connected to the negative value of the 
harm avoided? For example, is the positive value of ha ving deep perso­
nal relations derived from the negative value of the harm which is charac­
teristically produced by the lack of such relations? Is it good to have 
this interest met because a certain type of harm is (thereby) avoided? 
These are difficult questions, but I tend to believe that at least some 
63It is worth noting that in the present context, the term "suffering" is not used in 
the same way as it has been used so far. For example, it seems possible to suffer 
(in Griffin's less experiential sense) without knowing it. 
64And "[a]s rational beings, we have an interest in accomplishment; without it life 
is empty in certain ways" (ibid., p 59), and so on. This suggests that all the different 
prudential values (i.e. their lack) correspond to different kinds of harm. 
65Cf. the idea that it is the objects, and not the goals, of basic need that "flow from 
human nature". 
66Cf. note 63 above. 
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of the "core-disvalues" are "merely" instrumentally bad (e.g., certain 
kinds of malfunction), and (more importantly) I think we can safely 
assume (i) that it can not be nonderivatively good for a person to have 
an interest met if the harm avoided is only instrumentally bad, and (ii) 
even if the harm avoided is nonderivatively bad, this does not imply 
that the "particular forms of avoiding" this harm are nonderivatively 
good. This suggests that Griffin's argument does not really show us 
that things like accomplishment and deep personal relations have non-
derivative value. (In fact, if we ignore the bit about non-experiential 
harm, a hedonist may well agree with all that he says). However, on my 
view, the argument succeeds in justifying that deep personal relations 
(etc.) are good for us (but only on the assumption that the corre­
sponding forms of harm are bad for us, and this is not anything which 
can be established by appealing to human nature). 
To sum up, none of the four objectivist accounts which we have 
looked at so far has been able to meet the challenge on p 317, i.e. we 
have not yet come across any plausible objectivist justification of the 
relevant universal claims. 
So, what can we learn from all this? Well, there are at least good 
reasons to suspect that all that a theory of human nature can show us is 
(at best) that certain things are good and bad for us, and that it can 
only do so given certain evaluative assumptions that are not themselves 
derived from such a theory. That is, the suspicion is that no theory of 
human nature can (in itself) show us what has nonderivative value for us, 
and that no such theory can be used to identify such things as "core-
disvalues" or "goals of basic need". 
So, is this (general) suspicion well-founded or not? Is there any 
reason to believe that there is some (any) human nature account that 
can provide an objectivist justification of the relevant universal claims? 
And what would such an account have to be like? In order to find out 
about these things, we have to conduct a more general discussion of 
conceptions of human nature and their possible evaluative relevance. 
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A genera! discussion about Human Nature and its 
evaluative relevance 
So, what evaluative conclusions (if any) can we draw from a correct 
conception of human nature (assuming that there is such a thing)? In 
particular, is it possible to justify a non-internalist pluralist theory of 
prudential value in terms of a conception of human nature? Can claims 
about human nature ever function as reasons for the relevant universal 
claims about prudential value? 
In order to find answers to these questions, we have to know what a 
conception (or theory) of human nature is, e.g., what kind of theory it 
is, and how it differs from a broader theory of man. For example, what 
questions does a theory of human nature purport to answer, and how 
does it try to answer these questions? And most importantly, what 
types of claims about human beings does such a theory make? 
In my terminology, a theory of human nature is (roughly) a theory 
which purports to tell us what it is essentially to be human, and what it is 
essentially to live a human life, i.e. what it is that makes human beings 
(and their lives) human. Or in semantic terms (assuming that it is appro­
priate to treat our essential "human-making" characteristics as defining 
characteristics): A theory of h uman nature is a theory which purports 
to give a correct definition (or demarcation) of th e concept "human" (or 
the concept of man), i.e. which purports to tell us what human charac­
teristics that should be regarded as defining characteristics67. This 
67It is worth pointing out that there are at least three major ways in which this 
central question can be interpreted: (i) The traditional ("narrow") interpretation of 
the question is based on two assumptions, viz. (a) that the definition of a word 
properly consists of expressions naming the genus to which something belongs 
and its differentia specifica, or distinguishing features, and (b) that the genus of man 
is animal (or mammal). If we combine these assumptions, we get the idea that all 
our human-making features are features which distinguishes us from other 
animals, and the question "what is it essentially to be a human?" is understood as a 
question about how humans differ (essentially) from other animals, (ii) The 
"broad" interpretation of the question is based on the assumption that a human 
characteristic (e.g., a need or an ability) should count as essential (or human-
making) if it has "an important influence" on what it is like to live a human life (cf. 
Furberg (1975), p 133). This allows for the possibility that features like bodily 
needs and mortality are essentially human, i.e. a human feature need not (on this 
view) be a distinguishing feature in order to count as human-making, (iii) The 
third interpretation (which may be extensionally equivalent with the broad 
interpretation) assumes (like the traditional view) that defining features are 
distinguishing features, but it rejects the view that the only interesting features are 
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suggests that theories of human nature are metaphysical (or semantic) 
rather than "straight-forwardly empirical". Such theories are not totally 
devoid of empirical content, however, and it might also be added that 
they may well make evaluative claims, or claims about what is normal 
and abnormal (or "odd")68. 
For the sake of the argument, I will assume that there is such a thing 
as an objectively true conception of human nature, and that it is (in 
principle) possible to determine what our human nature consists in. It is 
worth noting that these are problematic assumptions, however, e.g., for 
the following two reasons: 
(i) Any theorist of human nature must (so to speak) make up his mind 
about the following issue (formulated by Michael Ruse in The Oxford 
Companion to Philosophy, p 376): 
Must human nature be defined with respect to the new-born infant, 
in which case it would seem to be a bundle of potentialities, or is it to 
be defined with respect to the full-grown adult, in which case does 
one consider training something crucial to the development of human 
nature or is it rather something which takes our nature from its true 
state? 
Now, the mere fact that such a decision has to be made suggests that 
there are no such thing as the objectively true conception of human 
nature69. And if w e, on top of t his, assume that human nature is "to be 
defined with respect to the full-grown adult" (this is an assumption that 
the features which distinguishes us from other animals. On this view, the concept of 
man should not just be distinguished (demarcated) from concepts like "ape" and 
"dog", but also from concepts like "angel", "ghost", "advanced computer", 
"android", and "god". This can also be conceived of as an expansion of the 
traditional genus of man: the genus of man is no longer animal (or mammal), but 
real or fictional "living" creature. That is, on this view, the question is not just a 
question of how we differ from other animals, but also how we differ from 
angels, gods, and the like, and this suggests that the number of human-making 
features may be pretty large. (It is worth noting that as it has been described here, 
this is not a very fruitful approach. For example, it can hardly be assumed that 
every single difference between humans and some other creature should be 
regarded as human-making. So, how do we determine what differences that are 
of significance? Well, here it seems natural to turn to (ii)). In short, it is highly 
likely that (ii) is (in this context) the best interpretation. 
68I suspect that theories about masculinity and femininity share at least some of 
these features with theories of human nature, especially the last one. 
69Isn't there something odd about trying to find the essence of something which 
changes so much over time as a human being? 
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is almost always made in this particular context), it can be argued that it 
is even less likely that there is such a thing as the correct conception of 
human nature; especially if tr aining (which is a cultural thing) is regar­
ded as "crucial to the development of human nature"70. 
(ii) On the assumption that it is at all possible to determine what our 
human nature consists in: How do we do this? Or alternatively, how 
are we to determine whether a certain theory of human nature is good 
or not, and whether one of t wo competing theories of human nature is 
better than the other? Well, it is possible that some of the claims made 
by such theories can be verified or falsified by "observation" (in a wide 
sense of the term), e.g., by facts about how people are (and were) 
living, what people actually like and value, and so on. But it is also clear 
that there are many claims about human nature which can neither be 
verified nor falsified by observation. (For example, the fact that hermits 
exist does not falsify the claim that human beings are social beings, and 
the fact that some people are utterly irrational does not falsify the claim 
that human beings are rational beings). But if we cannot appeal to 
observation, and if we are (in this context of justification) required to 
remain value-neutral71, what can we do? 
Let us now turn to the feature of "human nature accounts" which is 
(in this context) most important, viz. their content. The question is: 
What kinds of statements are typically included in a theory of human 
nature? What kinds of different claims about human nature are there 
(apart from the claims with which we are already familiar, e.g., claims 
about universal human needs, or claims about what the ergon of man 
consists in)? And above all, do any of these claims have any "justi­
ficatory power"? 
Here are some examples of types of claims which are (intuitively) 
70At this point, some "anti-essentialists" ("constructivists", or "historicists") would 
probably appeal to the mere fact that there is an enormous cultural and historical 
diversity. This fact does not constitute any serious threat to the idea of a c ommon 
human nature, however (e.g., to the idea that there are a number of basic 
biological and non-biological needs); at least as long as we allow enough room for 
human plasticity. It can also be argued that the training given in some cultures is 
better than the training given in other cultures, viz. because it is more conducive 
to the development of human nature! (cf. note 124 on p 274 above). 
71Now, as we will soon see, this may well be too strong a requirement: Perhaps 
the important thing is not that we are value-neutral, but that we are value-neutral 
in the right way (or ways), e.g., that we do not appeal to intuitions about what is 
good and bad for us. 
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about human nature: 
(1) Claims about what is innate, as opposed to what is "culturally 
acquired", e.g., "human nature is inherently good", "human beings are 
by nature aggressive and disposed to conflict (or curious)". 
(2) Claims about what is normal and abnormal (and not just in a 
statistical sense), e.g., "homosexuality is against human nature"72. 
(3) Certain types of claims about what is distinctively human, e.g., 
"Homo sapiens is the only species which is capable of play (art, religion, 
science, war, torture, stamp-collecting, or ice-hockey)". 
(4) Different kinds of claims about human motivation, e.g., "ultimately, 
we do what we do in order to achieve pleasure and avoid suffering" 
(psychological hedonism) or "human beings are lazy (or curious) by 
nature". 
(5) Claims about how we are "shaped" or "formed", e.g., "human 
beings are, to a considerable extent, victims of circumstance and coinci­
dence, i.e. they are shaped by circumstances which are (were) not 
under their control"; and claims about how "shapable" we are, e.g., 
"human nature is characterized by a high degree of plasticity" (an idea 
that is typically invoked in order to explain why human life can take so 
many different forms). 
Now, it is clear that none of t hese claims can be used to justify (in an 
objectivist way) the relevant universal claims about prudential value. 
For example, the alleged fact that there is something odd about a 
person whose sexual desires are directed towards members of his own 
sex does not give us a reason for believing that it is bad for particular 
homosexuals to engage in homosexual behaviour (and neither does the 
alleged "fact" that homosexuality is, in the individual case, wrong). The 
only claim above which have some justificatory power is psychological 
hedonism, and the reason for this is that it contains the idea that we all 
have a desire to feel pleasure and an aversion to pain and suffering. But 
this is a subjectivist idea, and it is (as such) of no help to the objectivist. 
However, it should not surprise us that none of these claims have any 
justificatory power. After all, the theories of human nature of which 
these claims are constituent parts are all (with the exception of psycho­
logical hedonism) constructed for "non-evaluative purposes". This 
72This particular claim can also be interpreted in other ways, e.g., as a normative 
claim, i.e. as "homosexuality is wrong". 
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suggests that we should instead focus our attention on theories of 
human nature which are explicitly constructed for evaluative (or other 
ethical) purposes. A good example of such a theory (a theory which is, 
so to speak, broader than the theories we have already looked at, and 
therefore "more illustrative") is Nussbaum's (1990) "thick vague con­
ception of the human being"73. 
According to this "Aristotelian" theory about "what it is to be situated 
in the world as human", there are 11 features which should be regar­
ded as "part of any life that we count as a human life" and "constitutive 
of [our] humanness", viz. the following ones: 
(1) Mortality. "All human beings face death and, after a certain age, 
know they face it. This fact shapes more or less every element of human 
life. Moreover, all human beings have an aversion to death" (p 219). 
(2) The Human Body. "We live our entire lives in bodies of a certain 
sort, whose possibilities and vulnerabilities do not as such belong to one 
human society rather than another", and these bodies constitute a 
"deep demarcation" of our possibilities. The following human-making 
features are, on Nussbaum's view, the most important aspects of our 
"bodiliness": (a) "Hunger and thirst; the need for food and drink"; all 
human beings need food and drink in order to live, and "all human 
beings have appetites that are indices of need"; (b) "Need for shelter"; 
which is based on our "relative fragility and susceptibility to heat, cold, 
the elements in general"; (c) "Sexual desire"; and (d) "Mobility"; human 
life is "in part constituted by the ability to move from place to place in a 
certain way", and "human beings like moving about, and dislike being 
deprived of mobility" (ibid., pp 220-221). 
(3) Capacity for Ple asure and Pain. "Experiences of pain and pleasure 
73It is important to note that this theory is not primarily constructed for the 
purpose of justifying a theory of prudential value, but for "political purposes". On 
her political view, it is the task of the government (the legislator) to promote the 
good of human beings, and the kind of go od that should primarily be promoted 
is "basic human functional capabilities" (cf. p 225). (That is, "it is capabilities, not 
actual functionings, that should be in the legislator's goal" (ibid., p 224)). This is 
where the theory of human nature (or "Level A" of "the thick vague conception") 
enters the picture; it is used to specify a list of b asic functionings "that should, as 
constitutive of human life, concern us" (this is the second stage of "the thick vague 
conception"), which is then (in turn) used to "derive" a list of 11 basic human 
functional capabilities (which Nussbaum regards as "a minimal theory of good" 
(ibid., p 225)). 
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are common to all human life. /.../ Moreover, the aversion to pain as a 
fundamental evil is a primitive and, apparently, unlearned part of being 
a human animal" (ibid., p 221). 
(4) Cognitive Capability: Perceiving, Imagining, Thinking. "All human 
beings have sense-perception, the ability to imagine, and the ability to 
think, making distinctions and, as Aristotle famously says, 'reach(ing) 
out for understanding'. And these abilities are regarded as valuable" 
(ibid., p 221). 
(5) Early Infant Development. "All human beings begin as hungry 
babies, aware of their own helplessness, experiencing their alternating 
closeness to and distance from that, and those, on which they depend. 
This common structure to early life /.../ gives rise to a great deal of 
/.../ experience that is of great importance for the formation of 
emotions and desires" (ibid., p 221). 
(6) Practical Reason. "All human beings participate (or try to) in the 
planning and managing of their own lives, asking and answering ques­
tions about what is good and how one should live. Moreover, they 
wish to enact their thought in their lives - to be able to choose and 
evaluate, and to function accordingly" (ibid., p 222). 
(7) Affiliation with Other Human Beings. "[A]ll human beings recognize 
and feel a sense of affiliation and concern for other human beings. /.../ 
Moreover, we value the form of life that is constituted by these recog­
nitions and affiliations - we live to [sic] and with others, and regard a 
life not lived in affiliation with others to be a life not worth living" (ibid., 
P 222). 
(8) Relatedness to Other Species and to Nature. "Human beings recognize 
/.../ that they are animals living alongside other animals, and also 
alongside plants, in a universe that, as a complex interlocking order, 
both supports and limits them. We are dependent upon that order in 
countless ways; and we also sense that we owe that order some 
respect and concern" (ibid., p 222). 
(9) Humour and Play. We are "the animals who laugh", "[ijnability to 
play or laugh is taken, correctly, as a sign of deep disturbance in an 
individual child", and an "entire society that lacked this ability would 
seem to us both terribly strange and terribly frightening". Nussbaum 
concludes by claiming that we "certainly do not want a life that leaves 
this element out" (ibid., p 223). 
(10) Separateness. "However much we live for and to others, we are, 
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each of us, 'one in number', proceeding on a separate path through the 
world from birth to death. Each person feels only his or her own pain 
and not anyone else's. Each person dies alone". And if "f usion is made 
the goal [of human interaction], the result is bound to be bitter dis­
appointment" (ibid., p 223). 
(11) Strong Separateness. "Because of separateness, each human life 
has, so to speak, its own peculiar context and surroundings - objects, 
places, a history, particular friendships, locations, sexual ties - that are 
not the same as those of a nyone else, and in terms of which the person 
to some extent identifies herself. /... / [T]here is no life /... / that really 
does fail to say the words 'mine' and 'not-mine' in some idiosyncratic 
and non-shared way" (ibid., pp 223-224)74. 
After having presented this list, Nussbaum points out that it is both 
open-ended and evaluative. The reason why it is open-ended is that 
"[o]ne could subtract some items and/or add others", and it is 
evaluative because "it singles out some items, rather than others, as the 
most important items, the ones in terms of which we identify ourselves" 
(ibid., p 224). But notice that this does not mean that the claims listed 
are, in themselves, evaluative. For example, the claim that "all human 
beings participate (or try to) in the planning and managing of their own 
lives" is not, in itself, an evaluative claim; it is (rather) the claim that this 
is a human-making fact which is (in a certain, presumably harmless, 
sense) evaluative. 
So, what types of cl aims does Nussbaum's theory contain? According to 
Nussbaum herself, "the list is composed of t wo different sorts of items: 
limits and capabilities" (ibid., p 224, my italics), i.e. "limits against which 
we press and powers through which we aspire" (ibid., p 219). This idea 
is only partly correct, however. It is true that the list is, in part, com­
posed of these types of items, but there are also a number of items 
which can not be subsumed under these categories. But before we look 
at these other items, let us first look at those items that can, in fact, be 
classified as limits or capabilities. 
(i) The only claims that can be classified as claims about limits are (1) 
"mortality", (2) "the human body", (8) "relatedness to other species 
74Much of what Nussbaum says can (of course) be questioned, but it is not really 
necessary for my purposes. 
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and to nature", (10) "separateness", and perhaps (11) "strong separa-
teness". Some of these limits (e.g., the limits that "flow" from our bodi-
liness) are needs, but there are also other types of i ndividual limits on 
the list, e.g., our mortality, our vulnerability, and our separateness. The 
fact that we are dependent on the natural order in a certain way is an 
"external limit" and should (I think) therefore be regarded a part of t he 
human condition rather than a part of h uman nature (which may only 
include internal limits75). (Another reason for excluding our dependency 
on the natural order from the list is that it is a collective rather than an 
individual limit). 
(ii) The only claims which can possibly be categorized as claims about 
capabilities (or abilities) are (2:d) "mobility", (3) "capacity for pleasure 
and pain", (4) "cognitive capability", (6) "practical reason", and (9) 
"humour and play". On Nussbaum's view, human beings have essen­
tially the ability to move about, to feel pain, to perceive things, to ima­
gine things, to make distinctions, to manage their own lives, to laugh 
and play, and so on. But if w e take a closer look at these items, we can 
see that some of them include more than just capabilities. For example, it 
is misleading to subsume facts like "there is no painless human life" and 
"human beings have an aversion to pain" under the heading "the 
capacity for pleasure and pain", and item (9) is (it seems) really a claim 
about what is normal and abnormal. 
But as has been indicated, apart from the claims about limits and 
capabilities, the list also contains other types of items. Here are some 
examples of such items: 
(iii) Claims about desires and aversions. Nussbaum seems to regard it as 
essentially human to have an aversion to things like death, not being able 
to move about, pain, and a life without humour and play, and to desire 
(or like) things like food and drink, sex, moving about, and participation 
in the planning and managing of one's own life. 
(iv) Closely related to this type of claims are the claims about what we 
value. We regard our cognitive capabilities as valuable, she says, and we 
regard a solitary life as a life "not worth living". 
(v) Claims about ivhat is normal and abnormal (or "disturbed"). A child 
(person) who is unable to laugh and play is considered abnormal, and 
75Our awareness of external limits can (to the extent that this awareness is itself a 
limit) be regarded as internal, however. 
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so is (it seems) someone who does not "feel a sense of affiliation and 
concern for other human beings". (This latter item could also be sub­
sumed under the category "claims about feelings"). 
(vi) Claims about our individual history, about how we have (as indi­
viduals) become what we are. We all begin as helpless babies, she says, 
and this is something which is of "importance for the formation of [our] 
emotions and desires". 
Now that we have seen what types of claims that are included in 
Nussbaum's theory of human nature ("level A of t he thick vague con­
ception"), the question arises: Can any claims of any of these types ever 
be used to justify any claims about what is good and bad for us? In 
order to find an answer to this question, we will go through the diffe­
rent types of claims, one by one, to see whether any of them has any 
justificatory power. 
(i) Claims about limits (e.g., claims about our needs, our mortality, our 
vulnerability, or our separateness) have little or no justificatory power, 
especially not in this context. For example, the idea that it is bad for us 
to die (before a certain age) can neither be justified in terms of the fact 
that we will in fact die (which is a limit), nor in terms of our awareness 
of this fact; and the idea that it is good for us to live our lives in an 
autonomous way does not get any support whatsoever from the fact 
that we cannot fuse with other people (a limit), or from the fact that we 
die alone. In short, it seems that claims about what is impossible for us 
can never function as justifications for claims about what is good or bad 
for us76. 
(ii) So, what about claims about capabilities (" human-making" or not); 
can such claims ever justify claims about what is good or bad for us? I 
think not. For example, the hedonistic idea that pleasure is good and 
pain bad for us can most certainly not be justified in terms of our capa­
city for pleasure and pain; and the alleged fact that the ability to think is 
essentially human does not (in itself) give any support to the idea that it 
76The only reason for regarding knowledge about limits as relevant at all is that 
we have to take our limits into account when we live our lives (e.g., when we set 
our goals, and when we try to realize these goals), and sometimes we are also (as 
in the case of death) forced to "relate" to them in some way or other. (What this 
means is that claims of this type do not just belong to conceptions of human 
nature, but also to conceptions of the human condition, which are, to a considerable 
extent, conceptions about what is possible and impossible (with some emphasis 
on the latter)). 
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is good for us to think. More generally, claims about capabilities can 
only be used to justify claims about prudential value on the assumption 
that it may (at least under certain conditions) have nonderivative value 
for a person to exercise and/or develop his capabilities. But this 
assumption is (in most cases) a rather dubious assumption, and if the 
capabilities we have in mind are of t he universal and "human-making" 
type, it is even more implausible. 
(iii)-(iv) Claims about our desires and aversions, and claims about what we 
value, can (it seems) be used to justify claims about what is good and 
bad for us. For example, it seems that the fact (if i t is a fact) that it is 
essentially human to have an aversion to premature death, or to pain, is 
not a bad reason for regarding premature death, or pain, as bad for us. 
But if the idea is that it is nonderivatively bad for us to feel pain, then it 
must (I think) be based on the claim that it is essentially human to have 
an intrinsic aversion to pain, and this idea is not as intuitively plausible 
as the idea that the aversion to pain (intrinsic or not) is essentially 
human. In any case, justifications of this type are all subjectivist77, and 
they can therefore be ignored in this "objectivist context". 
(v) So, can claims about what is normal and abnormal (or "dist urbed") be 
used to justify claims about what is good and bad for us? I think not78. 
For example, the idea that a good life contains some laughing, playing, 
and recreational activities can not be justified by appealing to the idea 
that a child who is unable to laugh and play is deeply disturbed. First, 
that something counts as a disturbance in a child does not imply that it 
should count as a disturbance in an adult. And second, even if a certain 
abnormal activity (or character trait) is bad for us, this does not imply 
that it is the fact that it is abnormal that makes it bad. Instead, it may 
well be the other way around, i.e. it may well be the case that certain 
activities or traits that have been classified as abnormal because they are 
bad for the agent or for other people. (Cf. also the discussion of (i) and 
(ii) on p 344). 
77But it should be noted that these justifications differ from the subjectivist 
justifications on pp 314-315 above: There, a reference is made to what we all (in 
fact) desire, but here, a reference is (instead) made to what it is essentially human 
to desire. 
78At least not in this particular context. However, in chapter 3,1 suggested that 
intuitions about what is normal and abnormal might be of relevance in a 
hedonistic context (cf. (ii) on p 146). So the question arises: Are these two 
suggestions really compatible? 
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(vi) Claims about our individual history, about how we have become 
what we are, can (of course) not be used to justify claims about what is 
good and bad for adults. For example, the idea that it is good for us 
(qua adults) to have attachments to things and persons outside our­
selves, e.g., to (be able to) love those who love and care for us, can 
(obviously) not be justified in terms of what it was like to be an infant. 
(For some reason, it seems that no statement about what is good for 
adult human beings can be justified in this way)79. 
To conclude, it does not seem possible to provide an objectivist justi­
fication of the relevant evaluative claims in terms of human nature. With 
the possible exception of claims about desires and aversions (which 
belongs in a subjectivist context), there are (it seems) no "factual" claims 
about human nature which have the requisite justificatory power. 
Moreover, even if it were possible to justify some of th e relevant univer­
sal claims in terms of human nature, it would hardly be possible to jus­
tify a complete theory of prudential value in this way. Examples of plau­
sible non-internalist claims about prudential value which can obviously 
not be derived from claims about human nature are the idea that it is 
good for us to live autonomously, and the idea that it is 
(nonderivatively) good for us to be in contact with reality80. 
79But what it was like to be a child may well be something that a person should 
(qua facticity) take into account when he is leading his life. Moreover, 
developmental claims may also (on the assumption that it is good to be a normal 
adult) be used to justify claims about what is (instrumentally) good for infants and 
other children. 
80Suppose that there are a number of plausible claims about prudential value (e.g., 
that autonomous living and contact with reality are good for us) which do not get 
any support whatsoever from the correct theory of human nature. If this is 
correct, there are things that are good for us, but not in virtue of our common 
nature. However, this is not inconsistent with the idea that if something is good 
for us, then it must (in part) be good for us because of what we are: After all, we 
are more than just nature. This may open up for some cultural relativism, 
however, viz. in the following way: "If something is good for us, then it must, to 
some extent, be good for us in virtue of what we are. This means that if 
something is not good for us in virtue of our common nature, it must be good for 
us in virtue of the 'cultural element' within us. And since we live in different 
cultures, this suggests that different things are good and bad for us". Now, 
suppose that this idea is correct. Does this imply that some claims about 
prudential value can (and must) be justified in cultural terms? What would such a 
justification look like? For example, can the claim that autonomous living is good 
for Westerners be justified by referring to the fact that autonomy is of great 
importance in the Western Culture? Well, perhaps it can, but only on the 
assumption that these values are so deeply embedded in us that they can be 
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But does this allow us to conclude that the correct theory of human 
nature (assuming that there is such a thing) is totally lacking in evalu­
ative relevance? I think not. More specifically, I think there is at least 
one way in which a correct conception of human nature can be of rele­
vance in this context, viz. by providing a set of minimal requirements 
that every plausible theory of the good life must meet. As Kekes (1988) 
suggests, 
[m]oderate naturalism [i.e. Kekes' own theory of human nature] 
influences theories of good lives by setting for them a minimum 
standard of adequacy; any adequate theory must do justice to the 
relevant physiological, psychological, and social facts. The reason for 
this is that since theories of good lives are concerned with human 
welfare, and since these facts establish the minimum requirements for 
the welfare of any human being, theories of good lives either take 
these facts into account or they cannot be adequate (pp 40-41). 
But what is meant by saying that an adequate theory of the good life 
must "do justice to" the correct theory of h uman nature, or that it must 
take it "into account", "incorporate" it, or "recognize" it? What exactly 
is it for a theory of prudential value to do justice to the correct theory 
of human nature? Consider the following example: Assume that it is 
essentially human to be an agent, and to be a social creature. In this 
case, a theory of prudential value which claims that it is positively bad 
for us to be active, or to have friends, clearly fails to do justice to the 
correct theory of human nature. 
Let us now consider the hedonistic theory. Like the desire theory, 
this theory allows for the possibility that totally passive lives or solitary 
lives are good lives. Does this mean that hedonism fails to do justice to 
our rudimentary theory of human nature? Well, it is clear that hedonism 
as such does not "do justice to", or take it "into account", that we are 
agents and social beings. In fact, it i s not likely that a hedonist (qua 
hedonist) takes human nature into account at all. The only part of 
human nature that a hedonist has to take into account is our capacity 
for pleasure and pain, and he may also consider the fact that we all 
have (for the most part) an aversion to pain and a desire to feel plea-
correctly conceived of as a kind of "second nature", or part of o ur "identity". But 
even if th is is so, it is doubtful whether it is really possible to justify the relevant 
evaluative claims in terms of such "deep cultural facts". 
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sure. (However, it is very likely that "in practice", a hedonist will also 
take our rudimentary theory into account, viz. because he wants to be 
informed about what it is that tends to make us happy or unhappy). 
But is this something that can be held against hedonism (as Rachels 
(1986) seems to think)? I think not. Consider the following dis­
agreement: The pluralist claims that friendship has nonderivative value 
for us, while the hedonist claims that it is "merely" instrumentally good. 
Now, it is hardly possible to settle this disagreement by appealing to the 
fact that it is essentially human to have friends, and this suggests that 
the hedonistic theory is not really inconsistent with the idea that human 
beings are (by nature) social beings. 
Here is another example. Assume that human beings are more than 
"body-minds", that we are also spiritual beings. (I don't really know 
what our spirituality is supposed to consist in, but I assume that it 
makes sense to talk about spiritual needs, a spiritual potential, spiritual 
development, spiritual awakening, and so forth). Does this constitute a 
threat to all "secular" theories of prudential value, i.e. theories which do 
not acknowledge any "spiritual prudential values"81, i.e. things that are 
good and bad for us in virtue of our spirituality, or qua spiritual beings? 
Does the fact that all secular theories of prudential value82 allow for the 
possibility that spiritually poor lives are good lives imply that these 
theories fail to do justice to the fact that we are essentially spiritual, and 
that they should (for this reason) be rejected? I think not. If we are 
essentially spiritual, then this is something that we must somehow take 
into account, but there are (as we have seen) several ways in which this 
can be done. For example, "spiritually good living" need not be regar­
ded as something nonderivatively valuable (or as a necessary part of 
the good life); it may also be regarded as instrumentally valuable (or as 
a necessary condition for good lives)83. 
81I hesitate to call these values prudential, though; the term "prudential" somehow 
belongs to the framework of prudence, and prudence may be incompatible with 
"true spirituality". 
82This includes all the substantive theories of prudential value with which we are 
familiar. 
83As an illustration of the extent to which most theories of prudential value is 
based on "secular" assumptions, it can be enlightening to consider the sheer 
possibility that a life can be successful and pleasant, and full of creative activity and 
intimate relationships, and still (because of its spiritual poverty) bad, or that a life 
full of suffering is (because of its spiritual richness) good. (Cf. Matt. 16.26: "For 
what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?"). 
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To conclude, it seems that it is possible for a theory of prudential 
value to fail to do justice to the correct theory of human nature, but the 
requirement that a theory of prudential value should do justice to 
human nature cannot (if it is plausibly interpreted) be used to exclude 
any of the traditional theories of prudential value. 
This concludes the general discussion of conceptions of human nature 
and their possible evaluative relevance. To sum up, it seems highly un­
likely that there is any human nature account that can provide an objec-
tivist justification of the relevant non-internalist claims. And since the 
subjectivist and quasi-subjectivist attempts to justify these claims also 
failed, as did the "non-subject-oriented" arguments, we can conclude 
that we have little or no reason to accept any of the relevant 
(universalist and non-internalist) claims. And since the counter­
arguments against the non-internalist pluralist theories are stronger 
(strong enough to place the burden of proof on the pluralists), we 
should (I think) reject all such theories84. 
Weaker versions of "the objective list theory" 
At this point, the non-internalist pluralist might concede that it is not 
very plausible to claim that it is good for all of us to have intimate 
relationships or to live our lives autonomously, regardless of whether 
we regard these things favourably or unfavourably. Or alternatively, 
he might reject the "tough-minded" (literal, or strong) interpretation of 
the idea that there are objective (and universal) prudential values; and 
he might reject the corresponding strong (pure, simple, extreme, or 
raw) version of "the objective list theory", according to which "being 
well-off is simply a matter of one's having the various objective goods" 
(cf. Kagan (1992), p 170), and according to which "we can measure 
changes in a person's well-being just by the amount that he realizes 
objective values" (cf. Griffin (1986), p 54)85. 
But he might still insist that there is a certain grain of truth in the 
84It is worth noting that this conclusion depends entirely on the assumption that 
(1) is a good argument against all theories of this type. But what if this assumption 
is not valid? Well, this would suggest that there are no good arguments neither 
for nor against the "theory". 
85Cf. p 286 above, including note 2. It is also worth pointing out that the Nozick 
passage quoted on p 305 is a good example of this type of view. 
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"theory", or more specifically, that there are certain intuitions which 
gave rise the different non-internalist theories in the first place, and that 
it might be possible to save these intuitions by introducing weaker ver­
sions of these theories; or alternatively, by making "weaker interpre­
tations" of the idea that there are objective prudential values, and of 
the idea that friendship and autonomy are such values. As I see it, there 
are at least three ways in which this can be done, viz. the following 
ones: 
The first two alternative interpretations of " the objective list theory" 
both regard the theory as a theory about "contributory value" rather 
than as a theory of "intrinsic value". The idea is that the presence of a n 
"objective prudential value" (e.g., friendship) makes certain wholes more 
"intrinsically valuable" than they would otherwise have been. 
Depending on what kind of whole one has in mind, there are two 
versions of this idea: 
(1) The first contributory view is based on the idea that an "objective 
list theory" cannot be plausible unless it is, in some way, combined with 
hedonism, the desire theory, or both. On this type of view, there are 
two ways in which the claim that it is "objectively prudentially valuable" 
for us to have friends can be understood: 
(a) If frie ndship is "objectively prudentially good" and solitude is not, 
then it is nonderivatively better for a person to take pleasure in having 
friends than to take pleasure in living in isolation. That is, having friends 
may be contributorily valuable by making the whole "P has friends and 
takes pleasure in this" nonderivatively better than "P has no friends 
and takes pleasure in this". 
(b) If friendship is "objectively prudentially good" and solitude is not, 
then it is nonderivatively better for a person to have his desire to have 
friends satisfied than to have his desire for isolation satisfied. That is, 
having friends may also be contributorily valuable by making the whole 
"P intrinsically wants to have friends and has friends" nonderivatively 
better than "P intrinsically wants to live in isolation and lives in 
isolation". 
To give "objective prudential values" this kind of ro le is to regard all 
"objective list theories" as "servants" to ("modifiers" of, or 
"complements" to) hedonism or the desire theory. That is, an "objective 
list" is (on this view) nothing but a set of criteria according to which we 
can determine what pleasures (and what desire-fulfilments) that are 
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best for us. This suggests that "the objective list theory" can be regar­
ded both as a theory about what is objectively pleasant (unpleasant), or 
what is worth taking pleasure (or displeasure) in, and as a theory about 
what it is worth desiring (or avoiding) "in the prudential sense". That 
is, all objective list theories can be formulated both in a hedonistic idiom 
and in a desire theoretical idiom. But this should not come as a surprise 
to us, since it has (in fact) already been done. (Cf. for example (R2) on p 
145, and (iv) and (vii) on p 272). 
It is also worth mentioning that if the different non-internalist pluralist 
theories are interpreted in this (weak) way, they do not get hit by the 
argument which refuted all the pure versions of the "theory", viz. (1) 
on p 304. Moreover, the weak versions of the relevant non-internalist 
theories are also highly consistent with the intuitions on which the 
atomist arguments on pp 309-310 are based86, e.g., with the idea that it 
is (nonderivatively) better for a person to do X and choose it than to 
do X w ithout having a choice, or with the idea that it is better for a 
person to have his desire for a love affair fulfilled than to have his 
desire for degradation fulfilled. 
(2) On the second type of contributory view, "the objective list 
theory" is regarded as a theory about what contributes to the final 
value of a life-at-a-certain-time (considered as a whole). Here, the claim 
that it has "objective prudential value" for us to have friends is either 
understood as (a) "Whatever a person's attitudes towards friendship 
are; his life is better if he has friends than if he does not have any 
friends" (where friendship is not regarded as a necessary component in 
a good life), or as (b) "A life with no friendship in it cannot be a good 
life; friendship is a necessary constituent part of a good life". 
It is hard to tell exactly how strong these interpretations are. For 
example, (b) (which seems stronger than (a)) is clearly consistent with 
(l:a) above, i.e. with modified hedonism (Cf. Nozick's and Mill's argu­
ments on pp 137-141). As I see it, this is one good reason for ignoring 
interpretations of this type. Another reason is that it is not clear 
whether the "theory" can (if interpreted in this way) meet objection (1) 
on p 304. 
(3) It is also possible to regard "the objective list theory" as a (partial) 
86In fact, these "intuitions" are not just consistent with the relevant "weak 
objectivist" claims; they are themselves examples of such claims. 
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conception of what a good, well-functioning, human being is like. Here, 
the idea that it is "objectively prudentially good" for us to have friends 
is taken to mean that it is good for a mature, well-functioning human 
being to have friends. But why is this? Well, a well-functioning person 
(in Aristotle's sense) is a person who recognizes what is objectively 
valuable, e.g., he is the kind of person who recognizes that friendship is 
a good thing, who wants to have friends, and who takes pleasure in 
having friends and in spending time with them. This is how an objective 
list theory might be viewed as a (partial) theory of what a well-
functioning person is like. 
On this interpretation, the theory does not really purport to tell us 
what is good for all human beings: the idea that it is good for us to 
have friends is (on this interpretation) compatible with the idea that it 
may not be good for everyone to have friends (i.e. it does not get hit 
by objection (1) on p 304). For example, it may not be good for a hermit 
(who does not want to have friends, and who would not take pleasure 
in it) to have friends. But since it would be good for all of us to become 
more well-functioning, we could say that even if it would not be good 
for the hermit (as he is now) to have friends, it would be good for him 
to become the type of person who would want to have friends (etc.)87. 
To conclude: There are four possible interpretations of "the objective 
list theory". If the "theory" is interpreted in the first (tough-minded) 
way, it is implausible, and if it is interpreted in the third way (i.e. as part 
of a conception of the good life, considered as a whole), it is too vague. 
The two interpretations of the "theory" on which it is most plausible are 
the second and the fourth. The latter interpretation (where the 
"theory" is regarded as part of a conception of "the good man") is of 
little relevance in this context, however. This suggests that we should 
(in this context) regard "the objective list theory" as a theory of w hat is 
objectively pleasant (unpleasant), and/or as a theory about what is 
worth desiring (or avoiding) "in the prudential sense". So, is it plausible 
to assume that some (any) version of the "theory" (understood in this 
87To regard the objective list theory in this way (as a part of a theory of what a 
well-functioning person is) is not unreasonable. In fact, this interpretation can be 
backed up by the fact that Aristotle's ethical theory is both an objective list theory 
about "the good life for man" and an objectivist theory about "the good man", and 
that he does not really distinguish between "the good life for man" and "the life of 
the good man". The reason why he failed to make the distinction may (after all) be 
that there isn't really much of a distinction to make. 
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sense) is a plausible theory of prudential value? Well, I think some 
version of the "objective list theory" (interpreted in this weak way) is 
an essential part of such a theory, but I am not able to offer any new 
arguments for this view. 
This concludes the chapters on non-internalist pluralism, and it is now 
time to take a look at my own mixed theory. 
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Chapter Eight 
My own mixed theory 
It has already been implied that my own theory is a kind of " combined 
theory", or more specifically, a kind of fusion of the three theories. 
Now, the idea that the most plausible theory is a combined theory is 
not new. For example, both Sumner's (1996) and Nordenfelt's (1991) 
subjectivist theories can be seen as combinations of hedonism and the 
desire theory, and Parfit (1984) suggests that the most plausible theory 
might be a combination of all three theories. He writes: 
What is good for someone is neither just what Hedonist's claim, nor 
just what is claimed by Objective List Theorists. We might believe that 
if w e had either of t hese, without the other, what we had would have 
little or no value. We might claim, for example, that what is good or 
bad for someone is to have knowledge, to be engaged in rational 
activity, to experience mutual love, and to be aware of b eauty, while 
strongly wanting just these things. On this view, each side in this dis­
agreement saw only half of the truth. Each put forward as sufficient 
something that was only necessary. Pleasure with many other kinds 
of object has no value. And, if they are entirely devoid of pleasure, 
there is no value in knowledge, rational activity, love, or the aware­
ness of beauty. What is of v alue, or is good for someone, is to have 
both; to be engaged in these activities, and to be strongly wanting to 
be so engaged (p 502)1. 
My own combined theory is (of course) constructed in such a way so as 
to be able to stand up to all the objections which have been directed 
against the other theories, i.e. it is the only theory which is fully con­
sistent with the intuitions on which these objections are based. But 
lrThis passage has already been quoted on pp 152-153. 
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before I present the theory, let us first recapitulate the most important 
points that have been made in the earlier chapters (these points will, 
after all, constitute the "building blocks" of the theory). In order to 
simplify things, I will restrict my attention solely to the positive values. 
A short recapitulation of the earlier chapters 
In the chapters on hedonism, a number of anti-hedonistic claims were 
made: First, pleasure is not all that matters; there are other things besi­
des pleasure (and experience) which matter to us. Or more specifically, 
how well off a person2 is (on the whole) is not just dependent on how 
pleasant his total mental state is, but also on other things, e.g., how 
much desire-fulfilment there is in his life, and to what extent he lives his 
life autonomously. Moreover (and this is a stronger claim), it seems that 
certain situations have nonderivative value for a person even though 
they do not have any pleasant experiential content at all. And second, 
there are certain pleasures which are not good for us to have, e.g., 
pleasant emotions the intentional objects of which are "objectively un­
pleasant". 
On the positive side, there is (obviously) some truth in the hedonistic 
theory. It is not just that it is almost always nonderivatively good for us 
to feel pleasure; pleasure is also an import ant good (for example, a life 
devoid of pleasure can hardly be regarded as a good life). Moreover, it 
seems plausible to assume that a person's well-being can not be directly 
affected (at least not for the better; cf. pp 268-269 above) by things he 
does not know anything about. 
I have also suggested that the most plausible version of the hedonistic 
theory is a modified version which includes certain "objectivist 
elements", viz. the following ones: 
(R2) If the object of a pleasant emotion is an "objectively unpleasant" 
situation, e.g., a situation that is not worth taking pleasure in "in the 
prudential sense" (e.g., being humiliated, deceived, or dominated); 
then it is not nonderivatively good for the subject to have the 
2An adult and normal human being, that is. If we are interested in how to 
determine how well off an infant is, or a mentally retarded human being, or a 
squirrel, the hedonistic theory may be somewhat more plausible. This suggests 
that it is highly problematic to make interpersonal comparisons of well-being 
between normal adults and infants (etc.). 
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emotion. 
(RW3) If the intentional object of a pleasant emotion El is objectively 
valuable (e.g., in the prudential sense), while the object of another 
pleasant emotion E2 is not, then it is ceteris paribus nonderivatively 
better for the subject to have El than to have E23. 
I have also claimed (RW2) that it is ceteris paribus better to have pleasant 
emotions that are based on true beliefs than to have pleasant emotions 
that are based on false beliefs. That is, the complex situation 
(conjunction) 
P takes pleasure in X4 
P believes that X5  
X obtains  
is better for P than the conjunction 
P takes pleasure in X 
P believes that X 
X does not obtain 
In the chapters on the desire theory, I suggested that it is often, but 
not always, good for us to have our intrinsic desires fulfilled. Or more 
specifically, it is nonderivatively good for a person to have an intrinsic 
desire fulfilled if and only if the desire is relevant (it is about the 
subject's own life, it is rational in the relevant sense, and the subject is 
aware of having it) and the subject is aware of the fact that the object 
obtains (the desired situation "enters" the subject's experience)6. That 
is, it is not just (in the case of relevant desire) that 
3To give "objective prudential values" this kind of role is (as we have seen on pp 
363-364) to regard "the objective list theory" as a theory about what is worth 
taking pleasure (or displeasure) in ("in the prudential sense"), i.e. as a "modifier" of, 
or "complement" to hedonism. 
4Where the fact that P takes pleasure in X does not imply that X obtains, i.e. where 
X is (merely) an intentional object of the pleasant emotion. 
5Where this "belief" need not be propositional. The reason why I have not used 
the phrase "P is aware of X" is that it suggests that X obtains (viz. because we tend 
to regard "being aware of" as a so-called success verb). 
6However, it may be bad for a person to have his aversions fulfilled, even though 
he is not aware of the occurrence of the object (cf. pp 268-269 above). 
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P desires that X 
X obtains 
P believes that X  
is better for P than 
P desires that X 
X obtains 
P does not believe that X 
situations of the latter type do not have any positive nonderivative 
value for P at all7. 
Moreover, desire-fulfilment is not the only thing that is good for us; it 
is also good for us to feel pleasure8. 
I have also suggested that the most plausible version of the desire 
theory is a rationality-oriented (and awareness-oriented) Success 
Theory which contains certain "objectivist elements", viz. the following 
ones: 
(iv) If a person has an intrinsic desire for a situation that is (in the 
prudential sense) "worth avoiding", then it is not good for him to 
have it fulfilled. 
(vii) Desires for situations that are (in the prudential sense) worth 
desiring are more relevant than desires the objects of which are not 
(in this sense) worth desiring9. 
7But cf. note 6. 
8But isn't this inconsistent with the relational idea that an experience is pleasant if 
and only if (and because) the subject has an intrinsic desire to have it when he has 
it? Doesn't this idea imply that all pleasant experiences are desire-fulfilments and 
that desire-fulfilment is (for this reason) the only type of thing that is good for us? 
Yes, it does, but only on the object interpretation of the desire theory; when the 
preference-hedonist attributes prudential value to a pleasant experience he does 
not attribute value to the circumstance that an intrinsic experiential desire is 
fulfilled, but to the object of the desire, viz. the experience itself. But since we have 
adopted the satisfaction interpretation of the desire theory, we must regard 
pleasure and desire-fulfilment as two different types of goods. That is, there is a 
sense in which it is correct to say that desire-fulfilment is all that matters, i.e. the 
following one: Every situation that has nonderivative value for a person is either a 
desire-fulfilment or the object of a desire. 
9To get a better understanding of this type of combination between the desire 
theory and "the objective list theory", it is fruitful to assume the object 
interpretation of t he desire theory, i.e. to regard the desire theory as a "subjective 
list theory", according to which a person's intrinsic preference ordering (subjective 
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That is, 
P desires that X 
X obtains 
P believes that X 
X is on the positive "objective list" 
is better for P than 
P desires that X 
X obtains 
P believes that X 
X is neither on the positive nor on 
the negative "objective list"  
which is (in turn) better for P than 
P desires that X 
X obtains 
P believes that X 
X is on the negative "objective list" 
(which does not have any positive prudential value at all). 
In the chapters on the non-internalist pluralist theories, I claimed that 
there are no objective prudential values such that it is good for all of u s 
to "possess" these things, and such that a person's well-being is a sim­
ple function of how much he possesses of them, regardless of whether 
we regard these "objective goods" favourably or unfavourably. 
However, there are "objective prudential values" such that their pre­
sence make certain wholes more prudentially valuable than they would 
otherwise have been. Or more specifically, there are "objective pruden­
tial values" such that it is ceteris paribus nonderivatively better for a 
person to take pleasure in these things than to take pleasure in things 
which do not belong to this category, and such that it is ceteris paribus 
list) coincides with his "value ordering". We can then see that there are two ways 
in which the existence of "objective prudential values" can affect this value 
ordering, namely (i) it can remove certain items from the positive subjective list, 
viz. the things which are worth avoiding, and (ii) it can improve the relative 
standing of certain items on the list, viz. it can (so to speak) move the things which 
are worth desiring up the list. 
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nonderivatively better for a person to have his desires for these things 
fulfilled than to have his desires for other things fulfilled (cf. pp 368-371 
above)10. 
The theory itself 
So, how should all these claims (and some other relevant claims) be 
combined (or "fused") into a coherent theory? Or more specifically, if 
we accept all these claims, how should our three central questions be 
answered? That is: (I) What kinds of situations are nonderivatively 
good for a person? (II) How do we determine just how (non­
derivatively) valuable a certain (good) situation is for a certain person? 
For example, how do we compare different possible situations with 
respect to their nonderivative value for a certain person? And (III) 
How do we determine just how well off someone is at a certain time? 
For example, how do we compare different possible lives-at-certain-
times with respect to their value for a certain person? 
(I) There are two kinds of situations that are good for a person, viz. (a) 
to have certain kinds of pleasant experiences, and (b) to have his 
relevant intrinsic now-for-now desires fulfilled, but only on the 
assumption that he is aware of the objects of these desires. 
That is, the answer to (I) is in part hedonistic and in part desire theo­
retical. "The objective list theory" enters the picture as follows: First, it 
is not good for a person to take pleasure in something that is on the 
negative objective list, and second, it is not good for a person to have a 
desire fulfilled if its object is on the same negative list. 
(II) So, how do we determine just how good a certain (good) situation 
is for a certain person? 
(a) In the case of valuable pleasures, the value that it has for a person 
to have such an experience is normally a function of how pleasant the 
experience is, e.g., it is better to have a more pleasant experience than 
to have a less pleasant experience. But sometimes, the prudential value 
of a pleasant experience is not just dependent on how pleasant the 
experience is, but also on other things, e.g., on whether it is based on 
10I have not said very much about what these values are, however, i.e. the theory 
is rather incomplete at this point. 
372 
true or false beliefs. In particular, it is ceteris paribus better for a person 
to take pleasure in something that is on the positive objective list than to 
take pleasure in something that is not on this list (cf. pp 368-369 above). 
(b) In the case of valuable desire-fulfilments, the value that it has for a 
person to have a relevant desire fulfilled is normally a function of how 
strong the desire is, e.g., it is better to have a stronger desire fulfilled 
than to have a weaker desire fulfilled. But sometimes, the value that it 
has for a person to have a relevant desire fulfilled does not just depend 
on how strong it is, but also on other things, viz. on whether or not the 
object of the desire is worth desiring (in the prudential sense). In parti­
cular, it is ceteris paribus better for a person to have an intrinsic desire 
fulfilled if its object is on the positive objective list than if it is not (cf. pp 
370-371 above). 
This part of the answer to (II) is in part hedonistic, in part desire 
theoretical, in part a combination between hedonism and "the objective 
list theory", and in part a combination between the desire theory and 
"the objective list theory". But how can (and should) the hedonistic 
theory and the desire theory be combined? 
(c) This is one way in which we can compare the value of having a 
pleasant experience with the value of having a relevant desire fulfilled: 
The relational theory of pleasantness implies that the degree to which a 
pleasant experience is pleasant is a function of how strongly the experi­
ence is intrinsically desired by the experiencing subject. This suggests 
that we can (in principle) compare the value of a pleasant experience 
with the value of a desire-fulfilment, viz. by comparing the strength of 
the relevant desires, but only if the pleasure in question is a pleasure the 
value of which is dependent on its pleasantness alone and the desire-
fulfilment in question is a desire-fulfilment the value of which is depen­
dent solely on the strength of the desire. So, is this a good suggestion? 
Well, it is (in a way) hard to tell, since we do not (it seems) have any 
intuitions against which it can be tested. But on my view, the fact that 
the suggestion is very much in line with the desire theory gives it some 
support. 
(d) There is yet another way in which the two theories can (and 
should) be combined, however: It goes without saying that it is (on this 
mixed theory) better to have a relevant desire fulfilled and to feel good 
about this than to have the desire fulfilled without feeling good about 
it. We can also assume that if a person is happy because he desires that 
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X and believes that X is the case, then it is better for him if X is ac tually 
the case, i.e. then it is better for him if the desire is actually fulfilled than 
if it is not. However, I also want to suggest that (1) the difference in 
prudential value between the whole 
P takes pleasure in X 
P desires that X 
P believes that X11 
X obtains  
and the whole 
P does not take pleasure in X 
P desires that X 
P believes that X 
X does not obtain  
is larger than (2) the difference in prudential value between 
P takes pleasure in X 
P desires that X 
P believes that X 
X does not obtain  
and 
P does not take pleasure in X 
P desires that X 
P believes that X 
X does not obtain  
(a difference which the hedonist regards as crucial) p l u s  (3) the 
difference in prudential value between 
P does not take pleasure in X 
P desires that X 
P believes that X 
X obtains  
and 
"Here, and it what follows, I assume that P takes pleasure in X because he desires 
that X and believes that X. I also assume that the desire is relevant (e.g., that X is 
part of P's life). 
374 
P does not take pleasure in X 
P desires that X 
P believes that X 
X does not obtain  
(a difference which the desire theorist regards as crucial). 
(e) The fact that it is (in all these cases) better for P if X is o n the posi­
tive objective list than if it is not (cf. (II:a) and (II:b) above) suggests 
that all the three theories can (of co urse) be combined in a similar way. 
Or more specifically, (1) the difference in prudential value between 
P takes pleasure in X 
P desires that X 
P believes that X 
X obtains 
X is on the positive "objective list" 
and 
P does not take pleasure in X 
P desires that X 
P believes that X 
X does not obtain 
X is on the positive "objective list" 
is larger than (2) the "hedonistic" difference in prudential value 
between 
P takes pleasure in X 
P desires that X 
P believes that X 
X does not obtain 
X is on the positive "objective list" 
and 
P does not take pleasure in X 
P desires that X 
P believes that X 
X does not obtain 
X is on the positive "objective list" 
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plus (3) the "desire theoretical" difference in prudential value between 
P does not take pleasure in X 
P desires that X 
P believes that X 
X obtains 
X is on the positive "objective list" 
and 
P does not take pleasure in X 
P desires that X 
P believes that X 
X does not obtain 
X is on the positive "objective list" 
In short, it is (roughly speaking) "very good" for a person P if complex 
facts of the following type obtain: 
P takes pleasure in X 
P desires that X 
P believes that X 
X obtains 
X is on the positive "objective list" 
(The view characterized by Parfit (cf. the quotation on p 367) is much 
stronger, though. On this view, it is only situations of this type which 
can have nonderivative value for a person). 
(Ill) So, how does our mixed theory suggest that we determine how 
well off a certain person is (on the whole, and at a certain time)? Well, a 
person's well-being is (roughly) a function of how much valuable 
pleasure and how much valuable desire-fulfilment there is in his life. To 
capture the spirit of this idea, it is fruitful to formulate it (a) in terms of 
satisfaction, and (b) in terms of happiness. 
(a) The term "satisfaction" often refers to the fulfilment of a desire, 
but it can also refer to the pleasure obtained from such fulfilment. If we 
let the term refer to both these things, i.e. to the pleasure obtained 
from the actual (and not just apparent) fulfilment of a desire, we can 
say that a person's level of well-being at a certain time is (roughly) a 
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function of how satisfied he is with his existence at that time. 
(b) The term "happiness" often refers to a pleasant feeling, but the 
phrase "P is happy with X" can also mean that P takes a positive atti­
tude toward X, that he endorses it, or regards it favourably. If we let 
the term refer to both these things, i.e. if we regard happiness as a 
mental state which consists of one affective and one attitudinal compo­
nent (as a pro-attitude accompanied by pleasant emotions), we can say: 
A person's level of well-being is (roughly) a function of how happy he is 
with his existence, but only on the assumption that the affective compo­
nent is based on true beliefs on what his existence is like. 
Now, so far, this is very similar both to Sumner's (1996) subjectivist 
theory of welfare12 and Nordenfelt's (1991) happiness theory of the 
quality of life13. My theory differ from their theories, however, viz. in 
that it recognizes certain "objective prudential values". So, how should 
the idea that a person's well-being is a function of how satisfied (or 
happy) he is with his existence be modified in order to account for this? 
Well, this is one way in which this can be done: The idea that there are 
certain "objective prudential values" suggests that there are a number 
of important dimensions (or domains) in a person's life, and that a list of 
the relevant values can be used to specify these domains (e.g., the social 
dimension). My objectivist idea can now be formulated as follows: A 
person's level of well-being is (roughly) a function of how satisfied he is 
with his existence, but only as long as he takes all th e relevant dimensions 
into account. Or more specifically, the satisfaction which determines how 
well off a person is (on the whole) must (so to speak) "include" how 
satisfied he is in a number of "objectively pre-determined" areas, and a 
person's level of satisfaction in the relevant areas must (roughly spea­
king) be "in line with" the different objective values. 
In short, to be well off is to be happy for the right reason. 
12It is worth mentioning that there is more to this theory than what has been 
indicated this far. Sumner also requires that the endorsement of one's life (the 
attitudinal component of being satisfied with one's life) is authentic, or more 
specifically, that it (the endorsement) is both informed and autonomous. 
13It can be doubted whether there is any genuine desire theoretical element in 
Nordenfelt's theory, however. On his view, there is no necessary connection 
between P's happiness and the fact that P desires are fulfilled; what matters for P's 
happiness is (rather) that P believes that his desires fulfilled. 
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Appendix A 
How goodness-for differs from, and is related to, 
other kinds of value 
The reason why I think it is important to contrast goodness-for (in par­
ticular, nonderivative goodness-for) against other kinds of values is 
mainly pedagogic. I know from experience that many philosophers 
(including moral philosophers) are not very familiar with the notion of 
goodness-for, and that it is (for this reason) not always easy to dis­
tinguish (nonderivative) goodness-for from a number of o ther "pheno­
mena". The phenomena that have to be kept distinct from goodness-for 
(in general) are (a) "subjective value" and (b) agent-relative value, and 
the phenomenon that has to be kept distinct from final goodness-for is 
(c) final value-period. 
There are at least two reasons for discussing how goodness-for is 
related to certain other kinds of values. First, it may contribute to a 
clearer understanding of what kind of goodness goodness-for (in parti­
cular, nonderivative goodness-for) really is, and second, it may throw 
some light on the issue of whether the notion of goodness-for is a nor-
matively relevant notion, and if it is, in what way. The relations that are 
(on my view) most important to gain knowledge about are (d) the rela­
tion between goodness-for (in general) and "value-period" (in general), 
both agent-relative and agent-neutral value-period, and in particular, 
(e) the relation between final (e.g., nonderivative) goodness-for and 
final value-period. 
So, let us now take a closer look at these contrasts and relations. 
Goodness-for vs. subjective value 
When we say that something is good for a certain person, or to a 
certain person, we sometimes mean that it appears to him as good, that 
it is good according to him, that he values it, or the like. Now, it is clear 
that something can be good for a person without appearing to him as 
good, and vice versa, and that it is (for this reason) important to dis­
tinguish between the two. In fact, subjective value (as e.g., Nagel (1986) 
and Hospers (1967) call it), or goodness-from-a-point-of-view (as 
Thomson (1992) calls it), is not really a kind of goodness at all. As 
Thomson points out, "a person's valuing something is an entirely subjec-
379 
tive fact about that person and the thing he or she values, a subjective 
fact whose existence does not in itself imply that the thing valued is it­
self in any way good" (p 98). 
Value-period 
In order to be able to distinguish (nonderivative) value-for from things 
like intrinsic value, final value, and agent-relative value, we must first 
say something about "value-period" (or absolute goodness, or ethical 
goodness, or whatever one may like to call it). The reason why this 
"background work" has to be done is that the distinctions between 
intrinsic and extrinsic value, final and instrumental value, and agent-
relative and agent-neutral value are (at least originally) all distinctions 
that are (so to speak) made within the realm of "value-period". 
A second reason for paying some attention to value-period is this: 
Goodness-period is the kind of goodness that moral philosophers have 
paid most attention to, e.g., it is the kind of value that is considered 
most normatively relevant (it is, supposedly, the kind of goodness that 
utilitarians think we ought to maximize), and it also seems to be the kind 
of value that most of metaethics has been about (many metaethical 
theories of value, e.g., emotivism or internalism, are, on my view, most 
plausible if they are conceived of as theories about value-period)1. 
A third reason for paying attention to value-period is that the diffe­
rent theories of prudential value, e.g., hedonism or the desire-fulfilment 
theory, are normally conceived of as theories of "value-period" (or 
rather: as theories of intrinsic, or final, "value-period"). This makes it 
important to compare the notion of value-for with the notion of value-
period, and to try to find out how the two types of values are con­
nected to each other. 
So, what kind of value is value-period? Or (I think) alternatively put: 
When the utilitarian claims that the right act is the act that maximizes the 
good, what kind of goodness does he have in mind? This is my answer: 
(1) To be good-period is to be good in the "predicative sense", (2) to be 
good-period is to be good "absolutely", or "to make the world a better 
place", (3) value-period is (supposedly) possessed by situations, and (4) 
1 This is not to say that all (or most) "truths" about value are really about value-
period, however. Some truths, e.g., the idea that value is always a matter of 
degree, or the idea that values are supervenient, are supposedly truths about all 
kinds of values. 
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it cannot be ruled out that value-period is really a normative (or quasi-
normative) notion, or that it must be understood in normative terms. 
(1) To be "good period" is to be "just good", or (more precisely) 
good in "the predicative sense". So, what is it to be good in the predi­
cative sense? Geach (1956) made the following distinction between 
predicative and attributive adjectives: "I shall say that in a phrase 'an A 
B' ('A' being an adjective and 'B' being a noun) 'A' is a (logically) predi­
cative adjective if the predication 'is an A B' splits up logically into a pair 
of predications 'is a B' and 'is A'; otherwise I shall say that 'A' is a 
(logically) attributive adjective" (p 33). "Big" is offered as an example of 
an attributive adjective ("x is a big flea" does not split up into "x is a 
flea" and "x is big"), and "red" is an example of a predicative adjective 
(since "x is a red book" logically splits up into "x is a book" and "x is 
red"). 
He then went on to claim that "'good' and 'bad' are always attri­
butive, not predicative, adjectives" (ibid., p 33). But if we look more 
carefully at what he says, we can see that he makes two distinct claims. 
The first claim is that all uses of the term "good" are what Beardsley 
(1981) calls adjunctive, i.e. that the term "good" is always (explicitly or 
implicitly) "adjoined, or affixed, to a noun or noun-phrase" (p 524). Or 
in Geach's own words: "Even when 'good' or 'bad' stands by itself as 
a predicate, and is thus grammatically predicative, some substantive has 
to be understood; there is no such thing as being just good or bad, 
there is only being a good or bad so-and-so" (p 34). The second claim is 
that "good" is always attributive, i.e. that statements of t he form "X is a 
good K" never split up logically into "X is a K" and "X is good". Or in 
Thomson's (1994) terms, what Geach suggested was "that we should 
regard "good" /.../ as /.../ a predicate modifier: what is predicable 
of a thing is not (just) being good but rather being a good K, for some 
kind K", where the kind-term K is (so to speak) modified by the term 
"good" (p 8). 
But there are many philosophers (like Ross and Beardsley) who 
thinks that Geach's claim is too strong. These philosophers claim that 
the term "good" can also appear by itself as a predicate, i.e. that state­
ments of the form "X is good" are sometimes complete, and need not be 
spelled out as statements of the form "X is a good K". Or in Geach's 
own terms, "they allege that there is an essentially /.../ predicative 
/.../ use of the terms ['good' and 'bad', e.g.,] in such utterances as 
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'pleasure is good' and 'preferring inclination to duty is bad'" (p 35). He 
also adds that this (alleged) predicative use of "good" is often regarded 
as the philosophically important use of the term. 
(2) Thomson (1994, 1996) also thinks that there is no such thing as 
being just good, or alternatively, that all statements of the form "X is 
good" are incomplete. But when she claims that there is no such thing 
as "pure, unadulterated goodness", she does not have Geach's view in 
mind. On her view, the adjective "good" is incomplete in a different 
sense than the one Geach had in mind, namely the following one: "[I]f 
Alfred says something of the form "X is good", then either he or the 
context must tell us in what way or ways he is saying the thing is good if 
we are to know what he is saying about it" (Thomson (1994), p 11, my 
italics). That is, when people say that something is good, "what they 
mean is always that the thing in question is good in a w ay, a way that the 
context of utterance, or the speaker, has to supply on pain of our sim­
ply not knowing what he or she does mean" (Thomson (1996), p 128). 
Alternatively put, "all goodness is goodness-in-a-way" (Thomson 
(1994), p 11), and "a thing's being good just is its being good in this or 
that way" (ibid., p 11). 
So the question arises: Is goodness-period a way of being good? 
Well, not according to Thomson (1992) and (1996)2, but she may be not 
be right about this. Consider the following three statements: "Ecological 
diversity is good", "it is better if 300 people die than if 700 people die", 
and "distributive equality is ceteris paribus better than distributive in­
equality". In my view, these are intelligible statements, and it is obvious 
that the kind of goodness (and betterness) that is being referred to in 
these statements is not goodness-for, but goodness-period. This sug­
gests that if all goodness is goodness-in-a-way, and if the three state­
ments are genuine evaluative statements, then we can conclude that 
goodness-period is goodness-in-a-way. (But as we will soon see (in (4)), 
2Goodness-period is, for example, not among the ways of b eing good listed by 
Thomson (1992) and (1996). The ways of being good listed there are (1) the useful, 
or equipment goodness, or what von Wright (1963) calls instrumental goodness 
(to be good for use in doing something, or in achieving a certain purpose), (2) the 
skillful, or activity goodness, or what von Wright calls technical goodness (to be 
good at doing this or that), (3) the enjoyable, or aesthetic goodness, or what von 
Wright calls hedonic goodness (e.g., to be good to look at or listen to, to taste or 
smell good), (4) the beneficial, or goodness-for, and (5) the morally good (e.g., to 
be just, or generous, or tactful, or brave). 
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it may well be the case that goodness-period-claims are normative (or 
quasi-normative) claims rather than pure predications of goodness, and 
if this is so, we may have to reject the idea that being good-period is a 
way of being good)3. 
But suppose that goodness-period is goodness-in-a-way. We then 
have to ask: If s omething is good-period, in what way is it good? Well, 
the kind of goodness I have in mind here seems to be identical with 
what Korsgaard (1983) calls "absolute goodness". That a thing is good 
absolutely means, in her terminology, that "here and now the world is a 
better place because of this thing" (p 169). In other words, to be good-
period is (among other things) to make the world (as a whole) better4. 
But what kind of goodness (betterness) is it that is being attributed to 
the world here? Well, the answer is (of course) goodness-period, and 
this suggests that Korsgaard's idea is not very informative. And since it 
is also possible to attribute value-for to worlds, we can not define 
value-period as the kind of value that can be attributed to worlds 
(actual or possible). 
(3) Many philosophers (including myself) hold the view that value-
period is appropriately attributed to situations (or facts); in this respect, 
there is no difference between value-period and value-for. But there 
are exceptions to the rule. An example of this is Wetterström (1986), 
who claimed that the carriers of value-period are (ultimately) "concrete 
entities" (like things or parts of things, concrete events, or sequences 
and unities of such events) rather than situations. On this "entity-view", 
it makes perfect sense to conceive of t hings like pleasant experiences or 
knowledge as carriers of final value-period. The "situation-view" rejects 
this idea, and claims instead that value-period can (strictly speaking) 
only be attributed to things like the fact that someone has a pleasant 
3It is worth mentioning that all this is based on the assumption that there is a 
certain kind of gap between the normative and the evaluative. For example, 
genuine predications of goodness (badness, or betterness) should, on this view, 
never be regarded as what Thomson (1996) calls directives, i.e. as claims "by the 
assertion of which we predicate of a person that he or she ought or should or 
must or is morally required, or is under a duty or obligation, to do or to refrain 
from doing, a thing" (p 131). There is a more detailed discussion of the 
normative/évalua tive gap in appendix B. 
4One could also say: That a good-period situation obtains is (in a manner of 
speaking) "good for the world", or "good from the point of v iew of the universe, 
or sub specie aeternitatis". This is somewhat misleading, however, since the world is 
(supposedly) not some kind of supersubject with its own perspective! 
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experience, or the fact that someone knows something. Notice that on 
my understanding of the situation-view5, Wetterström's view is really 
the broader of t he two views: Both views claim that concrete situations 
can be carriers of value-period, but Wetterström also claimed that there 
are other kinds of concrete entities that can possess value-period6. 
In the following, it will be assumed that the carriers of v alue-period 
are situations. But what is it for a situation to be good-period? And 
what is it for one situation to be better-period than another one? All we 
know at this point is that a situation is good-period if it makes the 
world better-period than it would otherwise be, and that one situation 
is better-period than another situation if it makes a larger contribution 
to the "goodness-period of t he world". But what else is involved in the 
notion of value-period? 
(4) The only plausible answer to this question is (I think) the idea that 
value-period must somehow be understood "in terms of" what we have 
a reaso n to do (try to achieve) or want or like, or what it is rational to do 
or want, or what we should do or want, or what we ought to do, or the 
like7. We should also add that the reasons (etc.) in question are concei­
ved of as objective, e.g., to say that something is good-period is to say 
that we have a reason to promote it (that it is rational for us to promote 
it, that we ought to promote it, etc.), regardless of what we actually want 
and believe (cf. Nagel (1986)). To be a little more precise (but not suffi­
ciently so): 
5Where particular facts are regarded as concrete entities, rather than as (true) 
propositions, or the like (cf. chapter 1, note 4). Cf. also note 6 below. 
6It can also be argued that value-period can also be carried by types of situations (or 
"propositions"). This does not seem like a plausible view, however, but this does 
not mean that the idea that the carriers of value-period are concrete situations 
(rather than types of situations) is unproblematic. The problem is that the view is 
based on the conception of value as property, but what happens if w e drop this 
view? If the goodness-period is, instead, understood in terms of reasons to 
promote (cf. (4) below), it would seem that all "strict talk" about carriers of value is 
nonsensical. We could even say (in a more figurative sense) that it is types of 
situations that are the prime carriers of value, since what should primarily be 
promoted is that some type of situation is realized. 
7Where "we" does not necessarily mean "everyone": it can also refer to me, or 
you, or some of us. That is, I do not accept the idea that "[a] state of affairs is good 
absolutely if an d only if for all A, other things being equal, A ought to aim at it" 
(cf. Thomson (1992), p 113). Or alternatively put, I want to allow for the possibility 
that there is such a thing as agent-relative value-period (cf. below). (Whether there 
is such a thing as intrinsic agent-relative value-period is (of course) an entirely 
different matter). 
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That a certain situation is good-period either "means" (in a rather loose 
sense of the term) (i) that we have a reason to want it to happen, that it 
is desirable, that it is worth desiring (liking), or the like, or (ii) that we 
have a reason to pursue it, promote it, aim at it, try to achieve it, pro­
duce it, or preserve it, or that it is worth promoting, pursuing, or 
aiming at. 
That a certain situation is bad-period either "means" (i) that we have a 
reason to want it to stop, or that it is rational to want to avoid it, or (ii) 
that we have a reason to try to get rid of it, that it should be got rid of 
or avoided. 
That a certain situation X is better-period than another situation Y either 
"means" (i) that X i s to be preferred to Y, or that it is more desirable 
than Y, (ii) that if t here is an exclusive choice between X and Y, then we 
should choose X. 
Now, it is tempting to understand the reasons to want and like (the 
(i)-clauses) in terms of reasons to do (the (ii)-clauses). The only reason 
why certain things are worth wanting (it might be argued) is that there 
is a conceptual link between desire and action, i.e. if we would never 
act on our desires, we would not have a reason to desire anything. This 
suggests that there can not be a reason to want X unless there is a 
reason to promote X (in action). It would, for example, be implausible to 
claim that X is worth wanting but not worth pursuing8. 
But how should a (vague) expression like "A has a reason to promote 
X" be understood? As I see it, it can either be understood as (A) "it is 
prima facie rational for A to promote X" (i.e. in terms of rationality), or 
as (B) "A has a prima facie (moral) duty to promote X", or "to promote 
X is the morally right thing for A to do" (i.e. in terms of morality)9. In 
this context, there is no need to choose one of the options, however. 
Suffice it to say that to choose (A), as Kagan (1989) seems to do, is to 
analyse the good in terms of the right. Such an analysis makes phrases 
8It is worth noticing that this line of argument treats the cases where the very 
wanting of a certain thing has beneficial effects as negligible. 
9This is why the phrase "prima facie" has to be included: What we have most 
reason to do (e.g., promote) in a particular case ("all things considered") depends 
on what the alternatives are, i.e. we sometimes have a reason to promote the 
lesser of two evils, and we do not always have a reason to promote what is good 
(viz. if there is a possible outcome that is better). That is, we do not always have a 
reason {in this sense) to promote the good, or to try to get rid of the bad; 
therefore "prima facie". There is another way to deal with this problem, however, 
viz. to understand both "good" and "bad" in terms of "better" (cf. appendix B). 
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like "we ought to promote the good" become rather empty, or as 
Kagan himself writes: "to say that there is a pro tanto reason to pro­
mote the good is actually to make a trivial claim" (p 61)10. 
Another source of unclarity is this: How exactly should the idea that 
goodness-period should be "understood" in terms of reasons to pro­
mote (etc.) be understood? For example, should it be understood as (a) 
"The claim that X is good-period has the same meaning as the claim that 
we have a prima facie reason to aim at X", or as (b) "X is good-period if 
and only if we have a prima facie reason to aim at it", or as (c) "If X is 
good-period, then this is (by definition) something we have a prima 
facie reason to aim at, but not vice versa"? Well, on my view, we should 
choose (b) (which is, I think, more intuitively plausible than both (a) and 
(c)). 
Now, if this analysis is correct, then the notion of value-period is not 
merely "extremely normatively relevant"; there is also a good reason to 
regard it as a normative notion, rather than as a genuinely evaluative 
notion (whatever that is). This would not just "explain" why the claim 
that there is a reason to promote the good is a trivial claim; it would 
also imply that we can not really say that we should aim at X because it is 
good-period. 
This point is intimately connected to (or even identical with) another 
point, namely: If th e analysis above is correct, there is reason to believe 
that goodness-period can (or should) not (unlike the other ways of 
being good) be regarded as a property11. Suppose that goodness is 
10It is, however, important to point out that this analysis does not make 
utilitarianism empty. The claim that we always ought to maximize the good is 
much stronger than the claim that we have a prima facie duty to promote the 
good; the utilitarian claim also involves the idea that there are no other duties 
which may override the duty to promote the good. 
nOr more specifically, that intrinsic goodness-period can not be regarded as a 
"property" in the metaphysical sense, i.e. as an "intrinsic property", or as 
"something "in" the object", "possessed by the object", or "carried by the object". 
The term "property" can also be used in a "semantic sense", however, viz. as 
synonymous with "predicate". The semantic term "property" is intimately 
connected to the notion of truth: Here, the statement "X has the property P" is 
regarded as equivalent with the statement "It is true that X is P". That is, to reject 
the idea that goodness is a property in this sense is to reject the idea that value-
statements can be true. But if the idea that goodness is not a property is (instead) 
regarded as a metaphysical claim, then it is compatible with the idea that value-
statements can be true. 
It is also worth noting that the idea that intrinsic goodness-period is not a 
property does not really constitute any threat to the important idea that value-
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conceived of as to-be-pursuedness, badness as to-be-avoidedness, and 
betterness as to-be-preferredness. Now, these are indeed "meta­
physically mysterious", or even "queer" properties (cf. Thomson (1996), 
pp 127-128). So why regard them as properties at all? I think this makes 
it easy to understand why so many philosophers have been attracted to 
metaethical theories like emotivism, prescriptivism, nihilism, and inter-
nalism. That is, if g oodness is regarded as to-be-pursuedness, it is easy 
to understand how one can come to believe that "good" is a commen­
ding word, that sentences of th e form "X is good" lack truth-value, and 
so on12. 
The idea that goodness-period should be understood in terms of 
reasons to promote is rather problematical, however. For example, if 
"ought" (e.g., "having a prima facie reason to promote") implies "can", 
then this analysis seems to imply that unrealizable situations cannot be 
good-period, but this is surely counter-intuitive. Is this an insurmoun­
table problem? Well, not necessarily. First, we need not regard the idea 
that "ought" implies "can" as a conceptual truth, and second, we can 
always incorporate "can" in our analysis: for example, we can always 
claim that X is better-period than Y if and only if it is the case that if 
some agent could realize X instead of Y, he should do so (this is 
Tännsjö's proposal)13. Another problem with the suggested analysis is 
this: As we all know, it is possible to adopt a normative theory that is 
purely deontological, i.e. that does not contain any axiology at all. Now, 
period is supervenient (cf. appendix B). 
'
2To drop the conception of goodness as property has an interesting (and 
desirable) consequence: It becomes much easier to understand why we can 
attribute value to hypothetical situations, e.g., to possible lives, and it becomes 
possible to avoid a number of intricate questions about value and time, e.g., 
questions of the form "when does this-or-that have value?", or questions like "can 
a situation have value before it obtains, or after it stopped obtaining?". 
13But if this manoeuvre is blocked, what should we do? Should we (instead) try to 
analyse value-period in terms of what we have reason to want or like (cf. the (i)-
clauses on p 385 above)? Well, it seems that such an analysis would not be open to 
the objection above; it is, after all, not very plausible to assume that the (i)-clauses 
can be understood in terms of the (ii)-clauses; in particular, it is implausible to 
assume that reasons to like can be "reduced to" reasons to do. However, as it 
stands, this analysis fails to distinguish value-period from other kinds of values, 
e.g., aesthetic value, and it must (therefore) be supplemented by some idea of 
what kind of wanting or liking we have in mind when we say that something is 
good-period if and only if we have a reason to want or like it. This is no easy 
matter, however. Perhaps we have to resort to the "Moore-like" view that value-
period is sui generis and unanalyzable. 
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as I see it, it is quite possible that such a pure deontologist believes that 
certain value-period-statements are true. And if this is the case, doesn't 
this imply that value-period-statements can not be regarded as direc­
tives after all? Or should we (instead) claim that our deontologist does 
not really understand what it means that something has value-period, or 
that he doesn't really believe that there are true value-period-
statements? 
This ends the general characterization of value-period. We are now in 
a much better position to grasp the three distinctions that were men­
tioned above. The first of these distinctions was the one between 
intrinsic and extrinsic value-period. 
Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value-period 
The intrinsic goodness of a thing is (roughly) the value it has "in itself", 
and the extrinsic goodness of a thing is the value it gets (or "derives") 
"from some other source" (cf. e.g., Korsgaard (1983), p 170). On this 
view, the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic value is conceived of 
as a difference in "location" of value, or "source" of value: and to say 
of something that it is intrinsically or extrinsically good is to make a claim 
about the "location" or "source" of its goodness. 
This can be interpreted in at least two different ways. On the first 
interpretation (suggested by Thomson (1992)), something is intrinsically 
good just in case it does not derive its value from somewhere else14, i.e. 
intrinsic goodness is conceived of as nonderivative goodness15. On the 
second interpretation, something is intrinsically good if and only if it is 
good independently of all other "objects", or alternatively: if it is good 
in all possible worlds, or if it is good in virtue of its intrinsic nature, or if 
its goodness supervenes on its intrinsic features, or the like16. 
14From the value of something that is distinct from it, that is. Wholes can have 
intrinsic value (cf. the discussion on p 7). 
15This is probably what Wetterström (1986) had in mind when he said that an 
evaluation is intrinsic in an ethical system only if it is independent of other 
evaluations in this system. 
16This is the notion of i ntrinsic value that Kagan (1992) adopts. That an object has 
intrinsic value means, on his view, that it has value "independently of all other 
objects", and the intrinsic value of a thing is conceived of as "the value it would 
have even if it were the only thing existing in the universe. If anything does 
indeed have value in this sense, then it seems clear that such intrinsic value must 
depend solely upon the intrinsic properties of the object" (p 183). 
It is worth adding that there is a certain "tension" in all this. The idea that the 
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It is not hard to see that these are two different interpretations: To 
say that the goodness of a thing is derivative is (roughly speaking) to 
say that it inherits its goodness from some other good thing, and if we 
keep this in mind, it is pretty obvious that the question of whether a 
thing is good in virtue of its relational properties or not has little or 
nothing to do with the question of whether its goodness is derivative 
or not. In particular, a thing's being good in virtue of its relational 
properties does not imply that its goodness is derivative. So, having 
pointed out the difference between these two senses of "intrinsic 
value", let us reserve the term "nonderivative value" for the first one 
and the term "intrinsic value" for the second one. 
This notion of intrinsic value is based on the idea that the goodness of 
a thing is something that supervenes on so-called natural features 
(intrinsic or relational) of th is thing, or alternatively put, it is (as I see it) 
based on a conception of value as a supervenient property. But as we 
have seen, the conception of goodness as a property is not easy to 
harmonize with the conception of g oodness as to-be-pursuedness. This 
does not mean that the notion of intrinsic to-be-pursuedness is a non­
sensical notion, however (or that it is based on a "category-mistake"). 
To say that a certain situation has "intrinsic to-be-pursuedness" is sim­
ply to say (i) that we have a prima facie reason to promote it, and (ii) 
the reason why we have a reason to promote it is that it has certain 
intrinsic features, and this makes perfectly good sense. 
But the fact that the notion of "intrinsicality" makes sense (even when 
value is understood as to-be-pursuedness) does not imply that it is a 
normatively relevant notion. In fact, I would like to suggest that this 
notion lacks all normative relevance. First, it seems plausible to assume 
that the notion of value-period is normatively relevant only if v alue is 
understood as to-be-pursuedness. But the fact that a certain situation is 
intrinsically good in this sense is (I think) not more normatively relevant 
than the mere fact that it is good. Or alternatively put, it is of no nor-
intrinsic value of X is the value it has in virtue of its intrinsic properties, on the one 
hand, makes most sense if X is a thing rather than a situation. (On my view, it 
makes much more sense to talk about (correct) descriptions of si tuations than to 
talk about properties of a situation. But is a situation really distinct from its 
descriptions? If it isn't, it seems rather superfluous to say about a situation that it 
is good in virtue of its intrinsic properties). The idea that X is intrinsically good if 
and only if it is good in all possible worlds, on the other hand, makes more sense 
if X is a situation (or fact). 
389 
mative interest at all to find out whether a situation that is valuable in 
this sense is also intrinsically valuable in this sense. What a teleological 
moral philosopher needs to know is what kinds of situations we should 
promote, and why, and the idea of i ntrinsicality does not really throw 
any light at all on these questions17. 
Final vs. instrumental value 
Now, this seems to contradict a very common view in moral philosophy, 
namely the view that intrinsic value is the most fundamental kind of 
value, and that it is therefore of utmost importance to find out what 
kinds of situations that have intrinsic value. Frankena (1973) writes: 
/.../ [I]n order to come to a judgement about whether something is 
good on the whole or good in any of the other senses, we must first 
determine what its intrinsic value is, what the intrinsic values of its 
consequences or of the experiences of contemplating it is, or how 
much it contributes to the intrinsically good life. Our task, therefore, 
is to determine the criteria or standards of intrinsic goodness and 
badness (p 83). 
Now, what Frankena has in mind is obviously not intrinsic value in the 
sense it was given above, but rather what Korsgaard (1983) calls "final 
value", or "value as an end", a kind of value that is to be contrasted 
against "instrumental value" or "value as a means". 
On Korsgaard's view, the difference between final and instrumental 
value is a difference between what can be called "ways of actually valu­
ing a thing". To be good as an end is to be "valued for its own sake", 
and to be good as a means is to be "valued for the sake of something 
else" (p 170). But Korsgaard is mistaken in believing that this is a diffe­
rence in value, her distinction is (rather) a distinction between two dif­
ferent ways in which something can be desired (or valued). To get a 
distinction between kinds of (objective) value, we need to replace 
"valued" with "valuable", "worth valuing", or the like. If we do this, 
we get: That something has final value (is valuable as an end) means 
that it is worth valuing (or desiring) for its own sake, or that it de­
serves to be valued (desired) for its own sake (cf. Thomson (1992), p 
17For this reason, I will not bother to investigate how the notion of nonderivative 
goodness-for is related to the notion of intrinsic value. 
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108, and Kagan (1992), pp 183-184)18. 
This suggests that the notion of final value is based on a conception of 
goodness as desirability, rather than (as in the case of intrinsic value) on 
a conception of goodness as property19. (This is one reason why the 
common distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value is, as 
Korsgaard expresses it (on p 170), "misleading, a false contrast"20). This 
follows from the idea that the phrase "final value" has to be under­
stood in terms of " worth desiring for its own sake", which is (in turn) 
"derived" (or "drawn") from the notion of "desiring for its own sake". 
(This would explain why Korsgaard made the mistake she did). 
The fact that the notion of final value is (in this way) based on the 
conception of goodness as desirability means that it makes perfectly 
good sense to talk about final value-period. It also explains why the 
notion of final value is (to the extent that goodness is understood as to-
be-pursuedness) of t he highest normative relevance. If we assume that 
the question of final value-period is really a question about what kinds 
of s ituations that should be pursued as ends, then we can see why it is 
such a fundamental question in normative ethics21. It should also be 
18Anders Tolland has pointed out (in conversation) that the phrase "X is worth 
desiring for its own sake" is ambiguous, viz. that it can also be understood in an 
instrumental sense, i.e. as "If y ou desire X for its own sake, this will have good 
consequences for you". Needless to say, this is not the sense in which the phrase 
should be understood. 
19The notion of final value is not just in harmony with the conception of goodness 
as desirability, however, but also with the conception of goodness as to-be-
pursuedness. (I assume that desirability and to-be-pursuedness are two different 
things; cf. above). All this is very much in line with the fact that it makes more 
sense to attribute final value to situations than to things. 
20The main reason why it may be misleading to make this distinction is (of course) 
that the terms are "drawn" from two different distinctions, viz. the 
final/instrumental and intrinsic/extrinsic distinctions. It is important to keep these 
distinctions separate, however, and the main reason for this is that they may not 
be "extensionally equivalent" with each other. In particular, separating the two 
distinctions makes us see that something may be both extrinsically valuable and 
valuable as an end (cf. Korsgaard (1983), p 172). Or as Kagan (1992) puts it, there 
is, "on the face of it", "no reason to assume that what has /... / value as an end 
/... / must have this value solely by virtue of its intrinsic properties", and being 
valuable as an end does not entail being intrinsically valuable (p 184). One might 
even "consistently hold that absolutely nothing has intrinsic value / ../, while still 
insisting that many things have" final value (p 184). 
21It is (of course) final to-be-pursuedness that most utilitarians thinks we ought to 
maximize. And if we instead believe (more modestly) that we have a "mere" 
prima facie duty to promote certain types of situations, then we must also, in 
order to find out what these situations are, know what is worth promoting as an 
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pointed out that it is very likely that all situations that are nonderivati-
vely good-period are also finally good-period (but not vice versa, since 
it is possible that the final value of a whole is derived from the final 
values of i ts parts; cf. the discussion on p 7 above)22. And since attribu­
tions of nonderivative value are (by definition) "basic" in ethics, we can 
also say that evaluations of the form "situations of type X h ave final 
value-period" (where X is not a whole) are (in a sense) fundamental in 
an ethical theory. 
Agent-neutrol and agent-relative value 
Above, we have looked at two of the different possible senses of the 
phrase "X is good for P", namely "That X holds is in P's interest" and 
"X is valued by P". There is one more interpretation to consider, how­
ever, namely "X has agent-relative value in relation to agent P". 
Like the distinction between final and instrumental value, the distinc­
tion between agent-neutral and agent-relative value only makes sense if 
we conceive of value as to-be-pursuedness or desirability. So, let us 
assume that "X has positive value-period" "means" that one has a 
reason to want X to happen, or that one has a reason to promote X, 
where these reasons are objective, i.e. independent of one's actual 
desires and beliefs. Let us now assume that someone says about some­
thing that it has (objective) value in this sense. It is then legitimate to ask 
who it is that has an objective reason to promote it. Is it anyone, or is it 
just some particular person? It is in relation to this question that Nagel's 
(1986) distinction between agent-neutral (impersonal) and agent-relative 
(personal) objective value should be understood. To say that something 
has agent-neutral value is (roughly) to say that anyone has a prima facie 
reason to promote it (if i t is positive) or try to stop it (if i t is negative), 
and to say that something has agent-relative value is (roughly) to say that 
only some people have a reason to promote it, or more precisely: A 
situation has agent-relative value in relation to agent P if a nd only if P has a 
prima facie objective reason to promote it (if it is positive) or try to stop 
end. The question of the finally good (where goodness is understood as to-be-
pursuedness) is the perhaps most important evaluative question in moral 
philosophy. 
22We could also add that all instrumentally good things are derivatively good, but 
not vice versa (to be good as a means is only one of several ways in which 
something can be derivatively good). 
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it (if it is negative)23. 
It seems that many of t he things that have agent-relative value also 
have agent-neutral value. As an example, consider me being in pain. I 
surely have a prima facie objective reason to avoid my own pain: the 
fact that I am in pain has negative agent-relative value in relation to me. 
But supposedly, anyone has a reason to want any pain to stop, inclu­
ding mine: the fact that I am in pain is also bad in the agent-neutral 
sense. That is, that it has negative agent-neutral value to be in pain 
means that we do not just have a reason to avoid our own pain; we 
also have a reason to relieve the pain of o thers (at least when we are in 
a position to do so). 
This gives rise to the following question: Are there objective values 
that are "merely agent-relative", i.e. which do not correspond to any 
agent-neutral values (reasons)? Nagel (1986) thinks so, and I think he is 
right. The central idea here is that there may well be interests and 
desires which do not generate impersonal values, but which give rise to 
personal values. To borrow an example from Nagel (p 167), suppose 
that someone has a strong desire to climb the top of Kilim anjaro. In this 
case, his reaching the top may well have relative value for him: he may 
have a good (objective) reason to try to get to the top. But other 
people may have very little reason, if any, to care whether he climbs the 
mountain or not. In this case, the fact that he reaches the top has rela­
tive value for him, but there is no corresponding neutral value. And if 
this example is not convincing enough, consider the following one: 
Suppose that someone has a desire that everyone is converted to 
Christianity. It is not implausible to assume that this (altruistic) desire 
gives him an objective reason to try to convert people to Christianity, 
i.e. that it generates a relative value for him. But this relative value 
hardly corresponds to any neutral value. In short, we do not have any 
good reason to assume that all agent-relative values correspond to 
neutral values. 
We are now familiar with the relevant distinctions, and it is time to 
start looking at the rest of the contrasts and relations that were listed in 
the very beginning of this appendix, viz. (b) the contrast between 
goodness-for (in general) and agent-relative value, .(c) the contrast 
between final goodness-for and final value-period, (d) the relation 
23At this point, it might be fruitful to reread note 9 on p 385. 
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between goodness-for (in general) and agent-relative value24, and (e) 
the relation between final goodness-for and final (agent-neutral) value-
period. I will first look at the contrast and relation between goodness-
for (in general) and agent-relative value, and then move on to the more 
central issue: How does final value-for differ from final value-period, 
and how are the two related to each other? 
Vaiue-for and agent-relative value 
So, how is the notion of value-for related to the notion of agent-relative 
value? In particular, does the fact that certain situation has agent-
relative value for a certain person imply that it is in his interest that this 
situation obtains, and vice versa? 
Let us first point out that something may well have agent-relative 
value in relation to a certain person without having value-for-him. That 
everyone is converted to Christianity has relative value for the person 
in the example above, no matter whether this is in his interest or not. Or 
in more general terms, everyone has desires, projects, commitments, 
personal ties, and the like, that give him a reason to act in the pursuit of 
ends that are his own, regardless of whether this is in his interest or 
not. 
So, does the fact that something is in a person's interest imply that it 
has agent-relative value for him? Or more specifically, does the fact that 
a situation X is better for me than another situation Y give me a prima 
facie reason to promote X? I think it does. If something is better for me, 
then I have a reason to choose it when there is a choice (and I have a 
reason to choose because it is better for me). On this view, everyone has 
a relative reason to promote his or her own welfare, but notice that this 
reason may often be overridden by other kinds of c onsiderations, e.g., 
the fact that we also have a neutral reason (or prima facie duty) to 
promote the welfare of a ll sentient beings, or a relative reason to treat 
other people in a decent way, and so on. (The self-interest theory (or 
ethical egoism) only gives us a small part of the truth). 
To sum up, the notion of agent-relative value and the notion of value-
for are two different notions. However, value-for-claims can constitute 
reasons for claims about agent-relative value, but not vice versa. 
24The only interesting "aspect" of the relation between value-for and agent-neutral 
value is the relation between final value-for and final agent-neutral value. 
However, this relation will be discussed in (e). 
394 
Final value-for and final value-period 
Let us first note that the theories of the good life that will be discussed 
in this book (e.g., hedonism or the desire theory) are often conceived 
of a s theories of final value-period25, rather than as theories of pruden­
tial value. To illustrate the difference between the two, let us take 
hedonism as an example. Viewed as a conception of prudential good­
ness, the hedonistic theory claims (roughly) that the only thing that is 
ultimately in our interest is to have pleasant experiences. Viewed as a 
conception of final value-period (to-be-pursuedness), on the other 
hand, hedonism claims that the only thing we (ultimately) have a reason 
to promote is (roughly) that people's lives (or the lives of sentient 
beings) are as pleasant as possible. These are two very different claims, 
but they are intimately connected to each other. But how? 
Or more precisely, how are (valid) statements of the form "It has final 
(e.g., nonderivative) value for a person P that X o btains" related to 
(valid) statements of the form "It has final (e.g., nonderivative) value-
period that X o btains"? For example, are all valid statements of the 
latter type (e.g., "it has final value-period that P feels pleasure") "en­
tailed by" valid statements of the former type (e.g., "it has final value 
for P that he feels pleasure")? 
The first question is this: If it has final value for people that situations 
of a certain type obtain, does this imply that ("other things being 
equal") it has also final value-period that situations of th is type obtain? 
Or are there situations that have final value for people without having 
final value-period? 
In answer to this question, most philosophers would probably claim 
that if all situations of a certain type of have final value-for-people, then 
they also have final value-period. Or alternatively put, final value-period 
is (at least in part) a function of final value-for. On this view, there is no 
situation-type X such that (i) it is in a person's ultimate interest that situ­
ations of type X obtain, and (ii) it does not have final value-period that 
situations of type X obtain. 
Moreover, the fact that a certain situation is good for someone nor­
mally constitutes a reason for regarding it as good-period, but not vice 
25Where value-period is probably conceived of as to-be-pursuedness (this is what 
I will assume in the following), but where it may also be conceived of as 
desirability. 
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versa. For example, if we accept the plausible premise that human wel­
fare has final value-period, it can plausibly be argued that the reason 
why it is finally good that people have pleasant experiences is that it is 
nonderivatively good for people to have pleasant experiences. In this 
way, hedonism qua conception of p rudential goodness can constitute a 
reason for hedonism qua conception of final value-period26. 
But is it really certain that there is no situation-type such that situa­
tions of th is type (i) have final value-for-people, but (ii) lack final value-
period? As far as I can see, it is possible that there exist such situation-
types, and what I have in mind here is desire-fulfilment. Suppose that it 
has final value for a person that his desires are fulfilled. Does this really 
"imply" that there is an "ultimate" reason to aim at the fulfilment of his 
desires? If we take the distinction between agent-relative and agent-
neutral value-period into account, we can see that the following view is 
far from absurd: "The fact that it has final value for a person that his 
desires are fulfilled gives him a reason to try to fulfil his desires, but it 
does not give the rest of us any reason to try to fulfil his desires. We 
have already seen that there are agent-relative values that do not cor­
respond to any agent-neutral values, so why not add that there are 
final relative values that do not correspond to any final neutral values, 
viz. certain kinds of desire-fulfilment? In short, it is not irrational to 
accept preferentialism qua conception of prudential goodness and (at 
the same time) reject preferentialism qua conception of final (agent-
neutral) value-period altogether". 
On this view, there is a situation-type that (i) has final value for 
people, but (ii') lacks final agent-neutral value-period, but there is no 
situation-type that (i) has final value for people, and (ii") lacks final 
agent-relative value-period. This means that the (plausible) idea that 
human welfare should always be promoted is only partly rejected27. 
The second question is this: Is all final value-period value for some­
one, or are there types of situations that have final value-period 
without being (finally) valuable for anyone? Or alternatively put, is 
26However/ hedonism qua conception of final value-period does not folloiv from 
hedonism qua conception of prudential goodness unless what Rabinowicz calls 
axiological individualism is true, i.e. unless all final value is value for someone (cf. 
Rabinowicz and Österberg (1996), p 11). Cf. also below. 
27More precisely, the idea is that preferentialism is plausible qua axiological 
component of egoism, but that it is implausible qua axiological component of 
utilitarianism. 
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"axiological individualism" true or false? There are two different ways 
in which this question can be interpreted: (a) Does every situation that 
has final value-period also have final value for someone (anyone?), e.g., 
for some existing person? (b) Is the final value-period of a certain situ­
ation a function of the final values-for which it "contains"? (As we will 
soon see, it is (b) that is the central question). 
The answer to (a) is obviously "no". A situation may well have posi­
tive value-period without being in anyone's interest: That a certain situ­
ation has final value-period (or that a certain situation is finally better-
period than another) does not imply that there is any particular 
(existing) person for whom it is good (or better). To see this, consider 
the idea that it is better that 100 babies are born than that 50 babies are 
born, or that it is better if 300 people die than if 700 people die. Here, it 
is quite clear that there need not exist any person (or sentient being) P 
such that "better" can be replaced by "better-for-P". 
The central question is rather (b): Is the value-period of a situation a 
function of the values-for which it "contains"? Or alternatively: Are all 
final values-period "personal values", or are there also "impersonal final 
values" (e.g., distributive equality or ecological diversity)? 
The axiological individualist claims that all final values are personal 
values, or more precisely: The value-period of a particular situation is a 
function of the values-for that it "contains", and this suggests that a 
(particular, actual) situation cannot have final value-period unless there 
is someone for whom it has final value. Notice that this view is compa­
tible with the idea that the more people there exist, the better-period. 
The reason for this is that once a person has begun to exist, it is (in the 
vast majority of cases) good for him to continue existing. 
However, axiological individualism rules out the possibility that there 
are truly impersonal values, and this means that if one such impersonal 
value can be found, then this view must be rejected. And if axi ological 
individualism is false, then it might well be plausible to accept hedonism 
(etc.) qua conception of prudential goodness and reject hedonism (etc.) 
qua conception of final value-period. 
So are there any truly impersonal final values, e.g., does ecological 
diversity, or distributive equality, have final value-period? There will be 
no discussion of this question in this book. My primary concern is value-
for rather than value-period, and there will (for this reason) be no 
"direct" discussion of what one, qua utilitarianist, should try to maxi-
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mize. It is true that an answer to this question (i.e. the question of 
value-period) would probably have to include a conception of pruden­
tial value, but such a conception could never constitute a complete an­
swer to the question of final value-period (not even on the assumption 
that axiological individualism is true; we would also have to know how 
the number of welfare subjects which are included in a situation (or 
"distribution") affects the value-period of this distribution)28. 
28Notice that even if t he question of f inal value-period and the question of f inal 
value-for would have (roughly) the same answer, this would not imply that the 
notion of final value-period and the notion of final value-for are identical. Again, 
the fact that situations of a certain type have final value for people can "explain" 
why it has final value-period that situations of this type occur, but not vice versa. 
Or in other words, the reason why it has final value-period that situations of a 
certain type obtain is that it has final value-for-people that situations of t his type 
obtain. 
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Appendix B 
Some further characterization of value-for 
For those who want to gain a fuller understanding of the notion of 
value-for, it is worth looking at three more features that it has (or 
seems to have), viz. the following ones: (i) Even though the notion of 
value-for is a normatively relevant notion, and even though a concep­
tion of v alue-for is action-guiding; value-for is not a normative notion, 
and a conception of value-for is not directly or actually action-guiding; 
(ii) betterness-for is primary to both goodness-for and badness-for, i.e. 
goodness-for is fundamentally comparative; and (iii) value-for is (like all 
value) supervenient, but the way in which it is supervenient is different 
from the way (or ways) in which other kinds of values are super­
venient. 
Normative relevance and "action-guidance" 
In this section, I will make two major claims, one claim about the "nor­
mative status" of value-for, and another claim about to what extent, 
and in what way, conceptions of value-for can be regarded as action-
guiding. 
The first claim is that even though the notion of value-for is a norma­
tively relevant notion, it is not a normative (or quasi-normative) notion. 
Or alternatively, value-for-statements are "evaluatives" rather than 
"directives", and qua evaluatives, they do not in themselves tell us what 
we have reason to promote: to do this, they must be combined with 
some directive or other. In short, the claim is that there is a gap 
between the evaluative and the normative, and that value-for belongs 
on the evaluative side. 
The second claim is that even though conceptions of prudential value 
are (in a sense) "essentially action-guiding", this does not mean that 
they are (in any sense) directly action-guiding, or that they are even 
"actually action-guiding". On the contrary, such conceptions are 
(rather) "indirectly" and "potentially" action-guiding. However, it is 
important to notice that this claim does not invalidate the point that the 
main reason why the question of prudential value is important is that 
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conceptions of prudential value are (essentially) action-guiding1. 
Let us now take a closer look on these two claims. 
The normative relevance of value-for 
The first claim can be divided into two parts; (A) one negative claim, 
viz. the idea that the notion of value-for is not a normative (or quasi-
normative) notion, and (B) o ne positive claim, viz. the idea that the 
notion of value-for is a normatively relevant notion. Let us first look at 
the negative claim. 
(A) As we have already seen (in appendix A), it is problematical but not 
absurd to regard the notion of value-period as a "quasi-normative" 
notion. The idea that claims of t he form "X is good-period" are norma­
tive claims (or what Thomson (1996) calls "directives") rather than 
evaluative claims (or what Thomson calls "evaluatives") may not be 
valid, but it is at least worth taking seriously. 
In Thomson's (1996) terminology, evaluatives are "sentences by the 
assertion of which we predicate goodness in a way, or badness in a 
way, or betterness in a way2". Directives, on the other hand, are 
"sentences by the assertion of which we predicate of a person that he 
or she ought or should or must or is morally required, or is under a 
duty or obligation, to do or to refrain from doing, a thing" (pp 130-
131)3. Now, this seems to mean that if things like "promoting" and 
"trying to bring about" are included in the category "doings", then it is 
1 These are two different claims, but they are (I think) not always clearly 
distinguished from each other. But do we really need to distinguish between the 
claims? Yes, we do, and this is why: The two claims are extensionally equivalent 
only if t he following two statements are true: (i) Norms (or directives) are directly 
action-guiding, i.e. "norm-internalism" is true, and (ii) the only way in which a 
conception of prudential value can be action-guiding is by being normatively 
relevant, or alternatively, nothing but norms is directly action-guiding. But (ii) is 
obviously false (a conception of value-for can also guide our choices in "non-
normative" ways, e.g., by "hooking into" our actual desires), and (i) may well be 
false too (it is far from obvious that norm-internalism is true), and it is (therefore) 
important to keep the two claims above separate. 
2Or, I would like to add, neutral value in a way! 
3Personally, I think the distinction between the evaluative and the normative is 
best regarded as a distinction between different kinds of claims (or judgements, or 
the like) rather than between different kinds of sentences. After all, it seems that 
one and the same sentence (e.g., "this is good" or "this is right") can be used both 
normatively (i.e. to make a normative claim) and evaluatively (i.e. to make an 
evaluative claim). 
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at least not obvious that value-period-claims should not be regarded as 
directives. Value-for-claims, on the other hand, are "pure" evaluatives, 
i.e. there is no way in which they can be regarded as normative claims4. 
The idea that value-for-claims are not directives (which is but a special 
case of the more general idea that there is a conceptual gap between 
the evaluative and the normative5) can be illustrated as follows: The 
(evaluative) claim that something is good for a certain person does not 
imply that anyone (not even the person himself) has a reason to pro­
mote it, e.g., the claim that it is good for John to have pleasant experi­
ences does not imply that John himself or anyone else should try pro­
duce pleasant experiences in John6. However, the fact that something is 
in John's interest surely gives John an objective reason to promote it 
(the reason why he has a reason to promote it is that it is good for him, 
he has a reason to promote it because it is good for him), and sometimes 
it gives other people a reason to promote it too. But the reason why we 
tend to accept this view is that we tend to regard directives like 
"everyone has a reason to promote his own welfare" or "if the costs 
are not too high, everyone has a strong (moral) reason to promote 
other people's welfare" as valid7. As far as goodness-for is concerned, 
there is a gap between "good" and "ought", and this explains why it is 
not empty (or trivial) to say that we ought to promote people's welfare. 
That is, to say that a certain action would benefit a certain person, 
and harm no one else, but that one should refrain from performing it, 
this is not to make an inconsistent claim. Or to stretch the point even 
further, one may even consistently claim that a certain situation ought 
to be pursued just because it is bad for a certain person. But it is impor-
4As I see it, this is not necessarily incompatible with the weak prescriptivist idea 
that good-sentences are often (or normally) used to commend (or recommend); it 
may even be compatible with the stronger thesis that "good" is (in its evaluative 
use, that is) essentially a commending word, i.e. that the evaluative use of 
language is essentially prescriptive. Or am I wrong in this, i.e. does prescriptivism 
entail that the conceptual gap between the evaluative and the normative is 
negligible after all? 
5Cf. Haglund (1989), who writes: "[A] normative concept cannot be defined in 
purely evaluative (and/or descriptive) terms. You simply can't derive an 'ought' 
from an 'is' even if it is an evaluative 'is'" (p 107). 
6However, this is not to deny that second-person-sentences like "this is good for 
you" are normally used prescriptively. 
7This is closely connected to the ("externalist") idea that value-for-beliefs can not 
constitute reasons for action unless they are combined with some normative 
belief or other (or some desire or other; cf. below). 
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tant to notice that for such claims to be intelligible, they must be "based 
on" some malevolent directive, e.g., like "the worse off this person is, 
the better-period it is, the better the world is". Such malevolent direc­
tives may not be very plausible, but they are (and this is the point) both 
consistent and intelligible, e.g., someone may come to accept such a di­
rective because he thinks that the person is evil and deserves to suffer. 
But what if w e (instead) have the "same-person case" in mind? Is it 
really "consistent and intelligible" for me to claim that someone has no 
reason whatsoever to perform a certain action that would benefit him, 
and harm no one else; or to claim that he has a reason to try to bring 
about a certain situation just because it is bad for him? Well, it is 
certainly odd, and it might be suspected that I don't really know what 
"good for" means, but as far as I can see, it is not entirely unintelligible8. 
(B) Bu t to repeat, the fact that value-for-statements are not directives 
does not imply that they lack normative relevance. On the contrary, 
there are a number of possible reasons why we must regard a con­
ception of (nonderivative) value-for as normatively relevant. 
First, it supplies certain normative theories with the axiology they 
need, viz. theories that are (in a wide sense of the word) "teleological", 
i.e. theories that claim that moral Tightness or practical rationality consist 
solely in the maximization of (and/or some distribution of) final value-
for, like the self-interest theory or "interest-utilitarianism" (or, on the 
assumption that axiological individualism is true, utilitarianism). 
And second, even if one does not accept any of these purely teleo­
logical theories, one can hardly deny that human welfare is something 
that an ethical theory needs to take into account: to make such a 
"purely deontological" claim is not merely implausible, there is also 
something inhuman (or "alien") about it. Regardless of what human 
welfare happens to consist in, it is simply something that an ethical 
8This has certain implications for how the questions of prudential value should not 
be understood. For example, the question of prudential goodness should not be 
understood as a (normative) question about what it is rational to promote (or 
what we ought to promote), and the question of t he good life must (in a similar 
way) be kept distinct from normative questions like "What kind of li fe is it most 
rational for a person to want?" or "What kind of life does a person have most 
reason to live?" (It is only if we accept the self-interest theory of r ationality, i.e. if 
we assume that it is rational for a person to promote something if an d only if it is 
good (best) for himself, that the two sets of questions "coincide"). 
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theory must take into account. Or alternatively: There are a number of 
valid prima facie norms that involve a reference to human welfare, e.g., 
the idea that we ought to promote other people's welfare, especially the 
welfare of o ur own children, or that everyone has a reason to promote 
his or her own welfare. And in order to be of any practical use at all, 
these norms need to be combined with a conception of prudential value; 
this is the most important reason why such a conception must be regar­
ded as normatively relevant. (We can also say that such a conception is 
normatively relevant "to the extent that" the most plausible ethical 
theory is a teleological theory). 
To what extent and in what ways, value-for-beliefs are action-
guiding 
The second claim on pp 399-400 can (like the first) be divided into two 
parts; (A) one negative claim, viz. the idea that a conception of value-
for is not directly (and actually) action-guiding, and (B) o ne positive 
claim, viz. the idea that a conception of value-for is (in spite of this) 
"essentially action-guiding", and in a number of w ays. Let us first look 
at the negative claim. 
(A) We know that it is not necessarily implausible to regard the notion 
of value-period as a normative (or quasi-normative) notion, and value-
period-statements as normative statements (or directives). Is it also the 
case that conceptions of value-period are directly action-guiding? Or 
more precisely: Is the belief that a certain situation X is good-period 
internally related to the desire that X ob tains? Is value-period-inter-
nalism true? 
If we modify what Thomson (1996) says about "Spirit-Emotivism" (on 
pp 113-118), we get three alternative formulations of value-period-
internalism, namely 
(1) Motivation Thesis: P's believing that X is good-period by itself 
motivates him to promote X; 
(2) Wants Thesis: P's believing that X i s good-period contains his 
wanting to promote X; and 
(3) Weak Wants Thesis: There cannot be a person who has a fully 
fleshed-out conception of v alue-period like thine and mine but who 
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never wants to promote what he believes is good-period. 
Now, in this context, it is not important to find out whether these three 
theses are true or false9. The point I want to make is (rather) that none 
of these three theses are implausible in any obvious way, and neither 
are emotivist theses like "value-period-sentences have no truth-values" 
or "a person who asserts a value-period-sentence merely displays an 
attitude, pro or con" (cf. Thomson (1996), pp 95-96)10. In short, as long 
as we have value-period in mind, it is far from obvious that views like 
emotivism and internalism are implausible11. 
Now, it is (I think) quite clear that these views are much more plau­
sible than the views we get if we replace "value-period" with "value-
for". For example, value-for-internalism is much less likely to be true 
than value-period-internalism. To see this, consider what value-for-
internalism would be like12. 
There are two cases here that need to be distinguished, viz. the first-
person case and the third-person case. Let us first consider what value-
for-internalism would be like in the third-person case. Here are three 
alternative formulations: 
(1) Motivation Thesis: P's believing that X is good for some other 
person Q by itself motivates him to promote X; 
(2) Wants Thesis: P's believing that X is good for Q contains his 
wanting to promote X; and 
(3) Weak Wants Thesis: There cannot be a person who has a fully 
fleshed-out conception of value-for like thine and mine but who 
never wants to promote what he believes is good for other people. 
Now, (1) and (2) are obviously false. To believe that something is good 
for other people is not to have a motive for promoting it (and so on). 
Personally, I tend to accept (3) but reject (1) and (2); and here it doesn't really 
matter whether we add the assumption that P believes that X is realizable. 
10The fact that all this holds in the normative case too may give some support to 
the idea that value-period is a normative notion (it may at least help explain why 
this idea is attractive). 
nThe same thing holds for prescriptivism: if w e have value-period in mind, it is 
quite plausible to regard "good" as a commending word, and value-utterances as 
recommendations (or "commendations"). 
12Again, what follows is but a slight modification of what Thomson (1996) writes 
on pp 113-118. 
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For example, our believing that it is nonderivatively good for John to 
have pleasant experiences does not by itself motivate us to try to pro­
duce pleasant experiences in John. That is, it is quite possible to believe 
that a certain action would benefit a certain person, and harm no one 
else, and at the same time not be at all motivated to perform it. It is 
even possible to be motivated to promote a certain situation just because 
one believes that it is bad for a certain person (e.g., if one hates the 
person in question). 
On my view, (3) is false too. A person who never wants to promote 
what he believes is good for other people is certainly not like you and 
me in all respects, but his conception of va lue-for may well be "just like 
thine and mine". So, if value-for-internalism is at all plausible, it is only in 
the first-person case. 
So, what would value-for-internalism be like in the first-person case? 
Again, here are three alternative formulations: 
(1) Motivation Thesis: P's believing that X is good for P by itself moti­
vates him to promote X; 
(2) Wants Thesis: P's believing that X i s good for P contains his 
wanting to promote X; and 
(3) Weak Wants Thesis: There cannot be a person who has a fully 
fleshed-out conception of value-for like thine and mine but who 
never wants to promote what he believes is good for himself. 
Are these plausible views? Well, (3) seems plausible. Suppose that there 
is this person who never wants to promote what he believes is good for 
himself. This is a very odd person, and it is very likely that his notion of 
value-for is different from "thine and mine"; it is even possible that he 
does not understand what "value-for" means. (And if a child would 
consistently say that something is good for him, but that he does not 
want to have it, we would probably correct his language). But is his 
notion of value-for necessarily different from our notion? I don't think 
so. Think of a saint who has a strong desire to promote what he 
believes is good for other people, but who does not care about his own 
well-being. This saint may well have the same notion of va lue-for as we 
have (assuming that there was a time when he cared enough about his 
own well-being in order to learn the relevant concepts, that is). 
However, I am prepared to accept the following "combined Weak 
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Wants Thesis": "There cannot be a person who has a fully fleshed-out 
conception of value-for like thine and mine but who never wants to 
promote what he believes is good for himself nor what he believes is 
good for other beings (e.g., other people)"13. 
(1) and (2) are much stronger claims than (3), and far less likely to be 
true. To see why (1) is implausible, consider the following question: 
Does John's believing that it is good for him to have pleasant experi­
ences by itself motivate him to try to get more of these experiences? The 
answer is clearly "no". John's believing that something is in his own 
interest is likely to motivate him to try to promote it, but only indirectly, 
on condition that he cares about his own welfare, or desires to have a 
good life. (And not caring about one's own welfare is not a conceptual 
mistake, but a psychological disturbance; but again, we should think of 
what it takes to learn the relevant concepts). Or alternatively put: 
Value-for-beliefs are not action-guiding "in and by themselves"; to 
become action-guiding, they must be combined with some desire, nor­
mative belief, or the like. 
And if i nternalism with regard to value-for is implausible, then it is 
also likely that certain other metaethical views become untenable if 
applied to value-for, e.g., views like emotivism or prescriptivism. That is, 
it does not seem very plausible to claim that value-for-claims have no 
truth-values, or that value-for-utterances are expressions of attitudes, 
pro or con (or that they are mere recommendations). 
(B) But to deny that value-for-beliefs are directly action-guiding is not to 
deny that they are essentially action-guiding in a more indirect way. In 
fact, this is something that value-for-beliefs have in common with all 
other kinds of evaluative beliefs14. Now, that all kinds of evaluatives are 
action-guiding in some way, and to some extent, should not surprise us. 
After all, the only reason why evaluation is not a pointless activity is 
that we are (essentially) "decision-makers". If human beings weren't 
agents who had to make choices, there would probably be no such 
activity as evaluating. As an example, consider an evaluative statement 
of the form "X is a good hammer". To say that X is a good hammer is, 
13And we may also add that it is (most certainly) impossible to have a fully 
fleshed-out conception of value-for if one has never (at any time) wanted to 
promote what one used to believe was good for oneself. 
14That is, the claim is not that every particular evaluative belief is action-guiding. 
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supposedly, to say that it is good for use in hammering nails, i.e. that it 
is such "as to facilitate hammering nails in well" (Thomson (1996), p 134). 
This suggests that evaluations of ha mmers may well be action-guiding, 
but only if cer tain conditions are met, e.g., if there is someone who has 
this nail that he wants to hammer in. If no one had such wants, it would 
be entirely pointless (or even impossible) to go on evaluating hammers 
in this way. The same thing holds for value-for: The reason why it is 
not pointless to attribute value-for to things is that value-for-statements 
are often action-guiding. But they are (again) action-guiding only if 
certain conditions are met, e.g., if we care about people's well-being 
(and how could we not care about such a thing?15). 
The different ways in which conceptions of prudential value are 
action-guiding, or: Why the questions of prudential value are 
important to us16 
So, although value-for-beliefs are not directly action-guiding, it can 
hardly be denied that conceptions of prudential value are essentially 
action-guiding. This is the main reason why we regard the questions of 
prudential value as important questions, or alternatively put, this is the 
main reason why some of us regard it as important to find the most 
plausible conception of prudential value. 
There are (I think) two major ways in which a conception of va lue-for 
may be (indirectly) action-guiding, viz. either by "hooking into" certain 
normative beliefs, or by "hooking into" certain desires. We will now 
take a closer look at how a conception of valu e-for may "hook into" our 
normative beliefs and/or desires. The most important ways in which a 
conception of p rudential value may guide our choices are (I think) the 
following ones: (i) It guides our actions to the extent that we are self-
interested; (ii) it guides our actions to the extent that we are bene­
volent; and (less importantly) (iii) it guides our actions to the extent that 
15But do we really care about well-being as such? Isn't it rather the case that we all 
have some idea of what a person's well-being consists in, and that it is this that we 
care about? Well, this is often true, but it is certainly possible to be uncertain of 
what it consists in and still care about it, whatever it happens to consist in. And 
moreover, it is not likely that a change in a person's conception of well-being will 
have any major effect on how much this person cares about his own well-being 
(or the well-being of others). 
16It is worth noting that in the following, the emphasis will be on why the central 
question (I) is important, i.e. I will not have very much to say about why (II) and 
(III) are important. 
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we are malevolent. 
Now, I have already claimed that if we regard the question of pru­
dential value as practically important, the main reason for this is that 
conceptions of prudential value are action-guiding. This means that 
there will be a correspondence between the three ways in which con­
ceptions of prudential value are action-guiding and three kinds of 
reasons for regarding the question of p rudential value as an important 
question. Let us now take a closer look at these three ways (three 
kinds of reasons). 
(i) We all care about our own welfare: we are all, at least to some 
extent, self-interested. Qua self-interested (or qua egoists, if egoism is 
regarded as a matter of what one wants rather than what one does), 
we want to be as well off as possible. We also tend to believe that 
everyone has a prima facie reason to promote his or her own welfare, 
and some people (viz. the self-interest theorists) even think that maxi­
mizing one's own welfare is what practical rationality is all about, or (if 
they are also ethical egoists) that everyone "should" (has most reason 
to) act in such a way so as to maximize his own welfare. 
But none of these self-interested desires and norms can guide our 
choices unless we have some idea of what it is that we (qua egoists) 
should want, promote, or maximize; qua self-interested, we need to 
know what our welfare consists in, and this is one way in which this 
question can become important to us17. 
(ii) Most of us are also, at least to some extent, benevolent: we care 
about other people's welfare, especially the welfare of the people to 
whom we are intimately related. Benevolence may take several forms, 
e.g., like love or altruism, and it may be paternalistic or not. To the 
extent that we love, or care about (and for) other people (like our part­
ners, children, friends, or parents), we want them (on the traditional 
definition of lov e) to have good lives, and qua altruists, we give weight 
to the well-being of o ther people; we want them to be well off, and we 
also try (in our conduct) to benefit them. And if our benevolence is of a 
paternalist kind, we want to do what is good for other people, regard­
less of what they themselves think of thi s. 
17It is not just the central question (I) that is important to a self-interested person, 
however. If he wants to be as well off as possible, he also needs an answer to (II), 
i.e. he needs to know how to determine just how valuable different possible 
outcomes are for him. 
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But it is riot just that many of u s are (to some extent) benevolent "in 
our desires", we are also more or less benevolent "in ethical theory". 
Most of us tend to think that everyone has a prima facie reason to 
promote other people's welfare, that it is morally wrong to harm other 
people, and that it is of special moral importance to promote the welfare 
of certain others, e.g., one's own children. Some people (e.g., certain 
kinds of interest-utilitarians) even think (roughly) that we are morally 
required to try to benefit everyone as much as we can (and to harm 
them as little as we can), or (if they are traditional utilitarians) that it is 
our moral duty to (try to) maximize the total amount of w elfare in the 
world, regardless of whose welfare it is. 
But again, none of th ese benevolent desires and norms can guide our 
choices unless we have some idea of w hat it is that we (qua benevolent 
benefactors) should promote or avoid, maximize or minimize; qua bene­
volent, we need to know what other people's welfare consists in, and 
this is the second way in which the question of the good life can become 
of pract ical importance to us18. 
(iii) To the extent that we are malevolent, we aim at what is bad for 
other people. If we are malevolent "in desire", we want certain others 
to be harmed (e.g., because we hate them, or because we are vengeful), 
and if w e are malevolent "in ethical theory", we think we have a good 
moral reason to harm them, e.g., because they have done something 
that deserves some kind of punishment. Here, a conception of what is 
bad for us may come in handy; think of al l the new little punishments 
that could be constructed! 
So, these are (I think) the main reasons why the question of pruden­
tial value may be of importance to us (as we actually are). As they stand, 
these reasons do not tell us why we should regard this question as im­
portant. The fact that people regard a question as important for certain 
reasons does not in any way imply that these reasons are good reasons 
for regarding the question as important. This is rather obvious in the 
case of malevolence. The fact that people may regard the question of 
prudential value as important for malevolent reasons does not in any 
18Or more specifically, the normative belief that we should promote other 
people's welfare makes the central question (I) important, and the belief that we 
should benefit other's as much as we can makes (II) imp ortant. There are also 
normative beliefs that make (III) im portant, however, e.g., the idea that we 
should spend more resources on the people who are worst off. 
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way mean that these reasons are good (or respectable) reasons for 
regarding the question as important. So we have to ask: Why should we 
regard the question of prudential value as important? 
Why we should regard the questions of prudential value as 
important; normative relevance revisited 
As I see it, the most important reason why it is important to find a 
plausible conception of well-being is that such a conception may be 
"properly action-guiding", i.e. that it may help us to make better choices, 
e.g., with respect to one's own future life, the upbringing of one's 
children, or how to vote19. 
To say that a conception of prudential value is properly action-guiding 
is to say that it guides our choices by "hooking into" valid norms 
and/or acceptable desires (i.e. rational desires or morally acceptable 
desires). Suppose we have this idea that we ought to promote the wel­
fare of one race and counteract the welfare of another race. In this 
case, a conception of welfare is not properly action-guiding, since the 
norm with which it is combined is not valid. 
Now, to say that a conception of prudential value may guide our 
choices by "hooking into" valid norms is really the same thing as saying 
that it is normatively relevant. So the question arises: In virtue of w hat 
valid norms is a (plausible) conception of prudential value normatively 
relevant? What valid norms involve a reference to people's welfare? 
As we have seen, there are three fundamental kinds of norms (prima 
facie or not) which involve an essential reference to human welfare; self-
interested norms, benevolent norms, and malevolent norms. Are there 
valid norms of all three kinds? On my view, it is quite clear that there 
are valid norms both of the self-interested type and of the benevolent 
type (e.g., like "we ought to promote other people's welfare, especially 
the welfare of our own children" and "everyone has a prima facie 
reason to promote his or her own welfare"). Can malevolent directives 
also be valid? It is clear that malevolent desires can provide "subjective 
reasons" for acting, but it is far from obvious whether such desires can 
also provide objective reasons for acting (i.e. objectively valid direc-
19However, it is hardly necessary to have a plausible conception of prudential 
value in order to make good decisions. And it is (of course) far from sufficient; in 
order to make good choices, there are so many other things we have to know 
(besides what has final value for us). 
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tives). Do we ever have a good moral reason to harm someone 
(regardless of whether this makes other people better off)? Frankly, I 
don't really know20. 
A comparison with Scartlon's perspectives 
At this point, it might be informative to compare the different ways in 
which the question of prudential value may be of normative relevance 
with what Scanlon (1993) has to say about the different "points of 
view" from which the question of the good life can be asked21. After 
having pointed out that "there are a number of different standpoints 
from which the question of what makes a person's life better /.../ 
might be asked" (p 185), he gives us five examples of such standpoints 
(or alternatively: normative contexts). Scanlon writes: 
It [the question of what makes a person's life good for this person] 
might be asked from the point of view of that person her self, who is 
trying to decide how to live. It might be asked from the point of view 
of a benevolent third party, a friend or parent, who wants to make the 
person's life better. It might be asked, in a more general sense, from 
the point of v iew of a conscientious administrator, whose duty it is to 
act in the interest of some group of people. It might be asked, again 
in this more general sense, by a conscientious voter who is trying to 
decide which policy to vote for and defend in public debate and 
wants to support the policy which will improve the quality of lif e in 
her society. Finally, the question of what makes a person's life better 
also arises in the course of moral argument about what our duties and 
obligations are, since these duties and obligations are surely deter­
mined, at least to some extent, by what is needed to make people's 
lives better or, at least, to prevent them from being made worse 
(ibid., p 185, my italics). 
20At this point, it is worth pointing out that there are also other reasons why we 
should regard it as important to find a plausible conception of well-being. For 
example, a conception of the good life may also be legitimately used to evaluate 
and criticize circumstances, or in particular, to criticize societies (or cultures). This 
kind of social (or cultural) criticism would be of the following form: "Society S (or 
culture C) is bad (should be changed in a certain way) because it (e.g., its 
institutions) makes it difficult or impossible for people (primarily for the citizens in 
S, but also for outsiders) to lead good lives, or good enough lives". 
21In this context, it is of little or no importance to distinguish between the question 
of prudential value and the question of the good life. 
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If we compare this with the different ways in which the question of t he 
good life may be of normative relevance, we see that Scanlon covers 
more ground than I do. The two "general senses" in which the question 
might be asked (i.e. from the point of view of a conscientious adminis­
trator, and by a conscientious voter) have no obvious counterparts on 
my list - my closest point is "the utilitarian angle"- but the other three 
points of view are more or less identical with items on my list. First, to 
say that the question might be asked from the point of view of that 
person herself is (roughly) to say that we might ask it qua self-
interested; second, to say that it might be asked from the point of v iew 
of a benevolent third party is (roughly) to say that we might ask it qua 
loving and caring, or qua altruists; and third, to say that the question 
might arise in the course of moral argument about what our duties and 
obligations are is (roughly) to say that we might also ask it qua moral 
theorists (e.g., qua utilitarians)22. 
So, does this mean that I have to supplement my list by adding that 
the question of t he good life may also be of political relevance, in either 
of t he two ways suggested by Scanlon? I think not. As Scanlon himself 
points out (again on p 185), there are several ways in which the ques­
tion of the good life may be understood, e.g., it may not just be inter­
preted as "What makes a life a good one for the person who lives it?", 
but also as "What kinds of circumstances provide good conditions 
under which to live?". Now, my suggestion is that when the question 
of the good life is asked by conscientious administrator or a conscien­
tious voter, then it must be understood in the second of these two 
senses. The reason for this is that from a (concrete) political perspective, 
it makes much more sense (and it is much more fruitful) to ask what 
kinds of circumstances that provide good conditions under which to 
live than to ask what it is that makes a life have final value for the 
person who lives it. 
To sum up: We have now seen that there is a number of ways in 
which the questions of prudential value are of normative relevance: 
They are important to us qua self-interested, qua benevolent third 
parties (paternalists or not), and qua moral theorists (utilitarians or not), 
and they may also be of some importance to us qua administrators and 
22However, we should not forget that the difference between a moral argument 
and an argument between moral theorists might be considerable. 
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qua voters. 
Is there such a thing as the most plausible answer to the 
questions of prudential value? 
This gives rise to the possibility that there is no such thing as the most 
plausible conception of prudential value (common to all perspectives), 
i.e. that the most plausible answer to the questions of prudential value 
may (instead) vary with the point of view from which these questions 
are being asked. Scanlon warns us of this possibility when he writes 
that "the plausibility of various answers can be strongly influenced by 
the point of view of the question23, and unnoticed shifts in point of 
view can drive us back and forth between different answers" (p 185). 
So we have to ask ourselves whether there is such a thing as the most 
plausible answer to the questions of prudential value24. Or formulated 
in terms of the different ways in which a conception of well-being may 
be normatively relevant: Is the welfare that we have a reason to pro­
mote qua self-interested the same human welfare that we have a reason to 
promote qua benevolent third parties? And are these "welfares" the 
same welfare that the utilitarian thinks we ought to maximize? And so on. 
These are very difficult questions, however, and I will not try to 
answer them in this book. Suffice it to say that if Scanlon's suspicion is 
well-founded, i.e. if "the plausibility of various answers" is (in fact) 
"strongly influenced by the point of view of the question", then this 
implies that the question "What has final value for a person?" must be 
understood in relation to some normative theory (or prima facie norm) 
N, i.e. it must be interpreted as "What conception of prudential value 
makes (if embedded in N) N most plausible?". This seems to imply that 
arguments for and against different conceptions of well-being must be 
(to a considerable extent) normative rather that straight-forwardly 
evaluative. I tend to believe that Scanlon's suspicion is not well-
founded, however, at least not as long as we remain within the intra­
personal domain25. 
23Or more precisely, there may not be such a thing as the question, viz. because 
different points of view give rise to different interpretations of the "question", i.e. 
to different questions. 
24Or whether it is appropriate to talk of the questions of prudential value. Cf. note 
23. 
25It is possible that the theory of welfare which is most "normatively adequate" in 
an intrapersonal context differs from the theory that is most plausible in an 
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The idea that value-for is fundamentally comparative 
Let us now turn to the idea that goodness and badness are "funda­
mentally comparative". How should this idea be understood? Well, the 
idea is that goodness and badness can be defined in terms of better­
ness, or that there is (so to speak) nothing more to goodness than 
betterness26. Is this a plausible claim? Well, not if it is understood as a 
claim about all kinds of goodness (and badness). As Thomson (1994) 
points out, a good K is not (by definition) a K that is better than most 
Ks, e.g., it could well have been the case that all hammers are good 
hammers (p 12). But the fact that the claim is not valid for all kinds of 
goodness does not imply that there are no kinds of goodness for which 
it is valid. So the question arises: Are there kinds of goodness for which 
the claim is valid? In particular, is the claim that there is no more to 
goodness-for than betterness-for a plausible claim? 
Here, we have to ask ourselves what philosophers like Chisholm and 
Sosa (1966) really have in mind when they claim that betterness (or 
more specifically, betterness-period) is fundamental to goodness (and 
badness). What is it that they say about goodness-period and better­
ness-period when they make their claim? Well, the idea seems to be that 
if we knew, for all possible situations, the structure of the betterness 
relation between them (if we knew, for every pair of situations, 
whether one was better than the other), then we would know 
everything there is to know about the goodness of the situations. In 
short, "[a]nything that can be said in terms of the one-place property 
'good' can be said in terms of the two-place betterness relation 'as least 
interpersonal context. For example, it seems that the version of the actual desire 
theory (see section 1.2) that is most plausible in an intrapersonal normative 
context may not fully coincide with the version that is most plausible in an 
interpersonal context (cf. section 5.1.2). 
26That is, the claim is not that the question of what it is that makes one thing better 
(in way W) than another thing can (or must) be answered before the question of 
what is good (in way W), or what it is that makes a thing good (in way W). On the 
contrary, it seems (as we will see below) that it is the other way around, e.g., it 
seems (in the case of p rudential value) that (I) the question of what is good for us 
must be answered before (II) the question of how we should determine whether a 
certain situation is better for a certain person than another situation. This might 
seem inconsistent with the idea that betterness is primary to goodness, but it is 
not. 
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as good as'"27. But does this really agree with the fact that goodness-
period-statements contain something that most betterness-period-
statements do not contain, viz. an implicit reference to a zero point (if 
we are told that a certain situation is good, then we are also told 
(implicitly) that it is better than nothing)? I think it does. Or more speci­
fically, I believe that Chisholm's and Sosa (1966) have shown how 
goodness-period and badness-period can be defined in terms of 
betterness-period, viz. in the following way: We first define "in­
difference" in terms of "betterness": A state of a ffairs X is indifferent if 
its realization has the same value as its non-realization (or better: if its 
presence has the same value as its absence), i.e. if X is not better than 
not-X, and if not-X is not better than X28. "Good" and "bad" can then 
be defined in terms of "better" and "indifferent": "Let us say that a 
state of affairs is good provided it is better than some state of affairs 
that is indifferent, and let us say that a state of affairs is bad provided 
that some state of a ffairs that is indifferent is better than it" (p 246). 
Now, this seems to hold for value-for as well. That is, it seems that 
goodness-for is (like goodness-period) fundamentally comparative, i.e. 
there is (in the above sense) nothing more to goodness-for than 
betterness-for. This may throw some light on (I), but apart from this, it 
has really no relevance for how the central questions of prudential 
value should be understood. For example, we can not conclude that (II) 
is more fundamental than (I). 
There are reasons to believe that particular comparative evaluations 
are of more practical importance than particular non-comparative evalu­
ations, however, viz. because the former are normally more action-gui-
ding (and more normatively relevant) than the latter. For example, if 
someone has to make a choice between two possible situations, what he 
needs to know is not whether these situations are good-period or bad-
period, but which one is better-period (e.g., it is, in a case like this, not 
very informative to be told that they are both good). This seems to 
hold for value-for as well: it seems plausible to assume that particular 
betterness-for-claims are more normatively relevant than particular 
27The formulation is from Broome's The Value of Living (a manuscript written in 
1993), p 30. 
28On the assumption that the value of X and the value of not-X are comparable, 
that is. 
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goodness-for-claims29. Or in the special case of well-being, it is normally 
more normatively important to determine changes in well-being than to 
determine levels of well-being. This does not mean that we can do 
without non-comparative evaluations in ethics., however. For example, it 
is sometimes of normative importance that we can determine whether a 
certain life is "good enough" or not, or whether it is "worth living" or 
not. The notion of "a life worth living" is highly relevant in the debate 
on euthanasia, and the notion of "a good enough life" is (I think) made 
relevant by some normative view like "Only people whose lives are not 
good enough are entitled to certain kinds of s upport from society" or 
"If a person has a good enough life, he does not have a strong reason 
to try to improve his own life further; instead, he should use his energy 
to promote the welfare of o thers who are less fortunate than he is". (If 
no such normative "principle" is valid, the question of the good enough 
life does not really belong in ethics). 
This ends our discussion of the relations between goodness and 
betterness. Let us now turn to the idea that value-for is supervenient in 
a certain way. 
Value-for is supervenient, but in a very special way 
It is often pointed out that no matter what kind of value we have in 
mind, the value of a particular valuable thing always supervenes on the 
natural (or descriptive) features of this thing. In the case of goodness, 
this means that all good things are good in virtue of certain features 
that they have. And since we can say that the features in virtue of 
which something is good make it good, it is natural to refer to these 
features as good-making characteristics. (This is the reason why it is 
always legitimate to ask what it is that makes a good thing good). 
To say that a certain thing is good in virtue of certain features that it 
has is to say that it is good because it has these features, and this means 
that the idea of supervenience can also be formulated in terms of 
reasons: If something is good, then it is good for a reason, and this 
reason is of the form "it has the natural features Fi...Fn". This suggests 
29But again, this does not imply that general betterness-for-claims (e.g., answers 
to (II)) are (in any way) more fundamental than general goodness-for-claims (e.g., 
answers to (I)). The reason for this is that it can (in this context) be plausibly 
assumed that the more there is of a good thing, the better. Cf. the section on 
supervenience below). 
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that reasons for particular evaluations are normally descriptive. A good 
term for the facts that corresponds to such descriptive statements (e.g., 
the facts that corresponds to "X has Fi", "X has F2", and so on) is 
" good-making fact". 
The reason why descriptive sentences can count as reasons for evalu­
ative sentences is that there are so called "standards of goodness (or 
badness)". Such a standard tells us that certain features (qualities or rela­
tional properties) should count as good-making (etc.), and in this way, 
the standard can be seen as "constituting" some kind of "logical" con­
nection between the descriptive reason and the evaluation (but cf. note 
30). Standards of goodness are of many different kinds, and what 
features that are counted as good-making depends on what kind of 
goodness we have in mind, and in the case of attributive goodness, 
what kind of thing the object is (what the class of comparison is). 
Depending on how they "connect" (particular) evaluations with their 
reasons, standards of goodness can be of different kinds. To illustrate 
this, let us restrict our attention to attributive goodness, i.e. to evalua­
tions of the form "X is a good K". Now, as far as I can see, the connec­
tion between such an evaluation and its reason (e.g., "X has Fi...Fn") 
may be of three different kinds: 
(i) For X to be a good K, it is necessary that it has Fi...F„ (or some 
combination of them). In this case, the standard of goodness (which is 
common to all Ks) is of the form "The presence of feature F in a K is 
necessary for it being a good K". 
(ii) That a K has Fi...Fn may also be seen as a sufficient condition of it 
being a good K. In this case, the standard of goodness is of the form 
"The presence of feature F in a K is sufficient for it being a good K"30. 
(iii) But the fact that "X has Fi...Fn" is a reason for "X is a good K" 
does not imply that the presence of Fi...Fn in X is either necessary or 
sufficient for X's being a good K. There is at least one more way in 
which a natural feature of X can make (or help make) X a good K, viz. 
by being what Beardsley (1981) calls a merit. A meritorious feature of 
something contributes to its goodness, but not by being a necessary or 
sufficient condition for goodness (and in a similar way, a defect, or de­
fective feature, of a thing is a feature that detracts from its goodness, 
30It is only when a standard of goodness takes this form that it can connect a 
particular evaluation and a reason in a strictly logical (i.e. deductive) way. 
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or contributes to its badness). That is, a principle about merits and de­
fects (or what Beardsley, in an aesthetic context, calls a Canon) for Ks 
does not give us any necessary or sufficient conditions for goodness or 
badness of Ks. This is how Beardsley himself puts it (for K = poetry): 
Thus if there is a general principle - stated as, "Vague themes are 
always defects in poetry," or, "Grand imagery is always a merit in 
poetry" - this principle does not mean that these features are either 
necessary or sufficient conditions of goodness in poetry, but only that, 
other things being equal, their presence makes it better or worse (pp 
464-465)31. 
What has been said this far can be regarded as "typical supervenience-
talk": (a) It tends to focus on goodness (and badness) rather than 
betterness, (b) goodness is typically conceived of as a property rather 
than as desirability (or to-be-pursuedness), and it is typically attributed 
to things rather than to situations (which explains why it tends to focus 
solely on attributive goodness). So, let us now see what happens to the 
idea of supervenience if we widen our scope a little. 
(a) To say that the betterness relation is a supervenient relation seems 
to make perfectly good sense; it simply means that we can always give 
reasons for our particular comparative evaluative statements: if a parti­
cular thing X is better than a particular thing Y, then it is better for a 
reason. But when we ask ourselves what kind of reason, matters 
becomes tricky. Here, we may not be able to say anything about good­
ness in general: we probably have to consider different kinds of good­
ness separately. So, what if we have "attributive betterness" in mind? 
What does a reason for "X is a better K than Y is" look like? Well, we 
can hardly refer to better-making features, or to the relation between X 
and Y. My guess is that we have to appeal to good- and bad-making 
characteristics in this case too, i.e. if X is a better K than Y, the reason 
for this is that X has (so to speak) "more of" the good-making features 
for Ks, and/or "less of" the bad-making features for Ks. That is, it 
seems that in the case of "attributive value", giving reasons for non-
31 He also adds that it "does not seem that the contribution of each feature of an 
aesthetic object can be considered in an atomic fashion". This seems to suggest 
that a certain feature can be a merit in some Ks and a defect in other Ks, but it is 
doubtful whether such a radical "evaluative holism" (or "particularism") is 
consistent with the idea that other things being equal, the presence of a merit in a 
thing makes this thing better. 
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comparative particular value judgements is (somehow) primary to giving 
reasons for comparative particular value judgements (cf. notes 26 and 
29). (We will soon try to find out whether this holds for value-period 
and value-for as well). 
(b) Even though the idea of supervenience is often "based on" the 
conception of value as property, it seems that is also compatible with the 
conception of va lue as desirability (or to-be-pursuedness). For example, 
to say that value qua to-be-pursuedness is supervenient is simply to say 
that if w e have a reason to promote (e.g., to try to maintain) a certain 
particular situation X32, then there is a reason for this, and the reason is 
that X has certain features (intrinsic or relational)33. But what is it to be 
a feature of a particular, concrete situation? Well, in my view, a feature 
of a particular situation is simply a correct description of it , or it corre­
sponds to such a description, e.g., if a certain situation can be correctly 
described as "Bert has a pleasant experience", then the corresponding 
fact is a feature of th e situation34. 
In a similar way, we can regard betterness-period as supervenient 
too, i.e. we can safely assume that if a particular situation X is better-
period than another particular situation Y, th en there is a reason for 
this. But what kind of reason? My guess is that we have to appeal to 
good- and bad-making characteristics in this case too: if X is better-
period than Y, th e reason for this is that X "c ontains" more good, or 
32It is worth emphasizing that in this context, it is only particular situations that are 
of interest, and for two reasons: First, the carriers of desirability (or to-be-
pursuedness) are situations. Second, the idea of supervenience only makes good 
sense if it is conceived of as an idea about the goodness of particular, concrete 
things. That is, the plausible claim that is hidden in the idea of s upervenience is 
that we can always give reasons for our particular evaluations; the claim is not (or 
should not be) that we can always give reasons for our general evaluations, or 
standards of goodness. Now, this is (of co urse) not to say that it is impossible to 
give reasons for standards of goodness (i.e. for general evaluations of the form 
"all situations of type X have positive final value-period"), but rather: The question 
of whether it is possible or not to give reasons for our standards of goodness has 
nothing to do with the issue of supervenience, and it is (moreover) likely that 
these reasons will be very different from reasons for particular evaluations. 
33This strongly suggests that it is not just attributive goodness that is 
supervenient: Predicative goodness can (and should) be regarded as supervenient 
too, i.e. if some particular situation is good in the predicative sense, then we can 
safely assume it is good for a reason, viz. because it has certain features. 
34This would explain why it doesn't make any sense to talk about features of 
situation-types: no clear distinction can be made between situation-types and 
situation-descriptions. It also gives rise to the suspicion that a concrete situation is 
not really as distinct from its (correct) descriptions as one might believe. 
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less bad, than Y. This suggests that we can make the following general 
claim about giving reasons for particular evaluations: Giving reasons for 
non-comparative particular value judgements is often (perhaps always) primary 
to giving reasons for comparative particular value judgements35. 
Let us now turn to the supervenience of goodness-for (badness-for) 
and betterness-for. Like all other kinds of goodness, goodness-for is 
supervenient, but only in "particular cases". That is, if a certain parti­
cular situation is good for a certain person, then it is (supposedly) good 
for the person in virtue of certain features that it has. Or in terms of 
reasons: If X is good for P, then it is good-for-P for a reason, and this 
reason is of t he form "X has the natural features Fi...Fn". 
But this is only partially true. As we have already seen (e.g., on p 3), 
goodness-for should be conceived of as a relation between an object 
and a subject, and this means that the features of P must also be taken 
into account. So, it is true that if a particular situation X is good for a 
particular person P, then it is good-for-P for a reason, but this reason is 
not of the form "X has the natural features Fi...Fn", but (rather) of the 
form "X has the natural features Fi...Fn, and P has the natural features 
Gi...Gm"36. This is how the supervenience of g oodness-for differs from 
the way (or ways) in which other kinds of goodness are supervenient: 
Whether X has value for P does not just depend on what X is like, but 
also on what P is like37. 
Now, this suggests that we can also give a certain type of reason for 
more general value-for-claims, viz. we can say that all situations of a 
certain type are good for a particular person P in virtue of P's features, 
35The "ultimate" reason for this is (probably) that we tend to think in terms of 
goodness and badness rather than in terms of betterness. In particular, we tend to 
understand "X is a better situation than Y" as "X has more good features (contains 
more good things) and/or less bad features", or alternatively put (as Björn 
Haglund has pointed out), we tend to believe that the betterness-relation is 
intrinsic (rather than extrinsic) in the following sense: It supervenes on the 
features of the objects related, and not on any (natural) relations between the 
objects. 
36Where the features of X may be relational, but hardly (I think) the features of P. 
37This does not mean that other kinds of "goodness-supervenience" are causally 
independent of what we are like, however. For example, the reason why 
sweetness, juiciness, etc. are regarded as merits in strawberries is that we happen 
to have the kind of taste buds we have. It is not unlikely that this goes for all 
standards of goodness (no matter what kind of g oodness we have in mind): the 
fact that we count certain features as good-making and other features as bad-
making can probably be explained in terms of what we are like. 
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and we cari say that all situations of a certain type are good for all of u s 
in virtue of our common human nature (It should be noticed that this 
does not follow from the idea of supervenience, however). At this point, 
I would like to make an even stronger claim, however: No "semi-
general" value-for-statement of the form "all facts of type X have final 
value for a particular person P" can be sufficiently justified unless the 
justification is "subject-oriented", i.e. unless it takes the form "all facts of 
type X a re good for P because P has the natural features Gi,...Gm"38. 
And the same thing holds for fully general value-for-statements of the 
form "all facts of type X have final value for all human beings" (i.e. for 
all answers to the central question (I)): No such claim can be completely 
justified unless it takes the form "all facts of type X a re good for all 
human beings because human beings are constituted in such-and-such a 
way"39. (We will return to this central justificatory principle on a 
number of occasions). 
Now, assume that the general claim about giving reasons for parti­
cular evaluations (on p 420 above) is true, i.e. that reasons for compa­
rative particular value judgements are (so to speak) "parasitic upon" 
reasons for non-comparative particular value judgements. In the case of 
value-for, this would mean that all standards of prudential betterness 
can be derived from standards of prudential goodness, plus the idea 
that if X i s nonderivatively good for P, then the more there is of X, the 
nonderivatively better for P. That is, in order to find an answer to the 
comparative question (II) "How do we determine just how valuable a 
certain possible situation is for a certain person?", we must first find an 
answer to the noncomparative question (I) "What is nonderivatively 
good and bad for a person?" (cf. notes 26, 29, and 35 above). 
38Assuming that X does not contain any essential reference to P's intrinsic 
features, that is. Cf. note 39. 
39This seems to presuppose that X d oes not contain any reference to our intrinsic 
features. For example, it is not easy to see how claims like "It is good for all of us 
to have our desires fulfilled (or to have our basic needs satisfied)" can be justified 
in terms of our intrinsic features. In fact, it is hard to see how they can be justified 
at all. 
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Appendix C 
Well-being, value-for, and time 
In chapter 1, it was assumed that the comparative question of well-
being (i.e. (Ill) "How do we determine just how valuable a person's 
existence is for this person?") can be interpreted in three different 
ways, viz. as (i) "How do we determine just how well off a certain 
person is at a certain time?", or as (ii) "How do we determine just how 
valuable a person's existence (life) over a certain period of time is for 
this person?" (a special case of which is (iii) "How do we determine just 
how valuable a certain life as a whole (from birth to death) is for the 
person who lives it?"). 
Now, it may seem that these three interpretations all make sense, but 
is this really so? For example, it seems intelligible to attribute aesthetic 
value or value-period to whole lives, but does it really make sense to 
attribute final value-for to lives as temporally extended wholes? Or 
more specifically, does it makes sense to talk about (i) the final value-of-
a-life-at-a-certain-time-for-the-person-who-is-living-it, and/or (ii) the 
final value-of-a-life-over-time-for-the-person-who-is-living-it, and / or 
(iii) the final value-of-a-life-as-a-whole-for-the-person-who-is-living-it? 
To be able to answer these questions, we need to make some reflec­
tions on value-for and time. 
When we talk about the value of a life for the person who is living it, 
it is likely that the term "life" refers to the person's particular, concrete 
life (but it may also, at times, refer to some possible future life), and that 
the term "person" refers to some particular, concrete person. That is, it 
seems that the value-for-statements that are of interest in this context 
are either of th e form "the actual particular situation X is (or was) good 
for the particular person P" or "the possible (hypothetical) particular 
situation X would (or will) be good for the particular person P". 
I now want to suggest that statements of these forms can only be 
intelligible and/or plausible on condition that the temporal relation between X 
and P meets certain requirements. 
Let us first establish that X and P both have (in this context) 
"temporal location", i.e. that they are the kinds of en tities that stand in 
temporal relations to other entities. First, all actual and hypothetical 
situations can be thought of a s obtaining at some time or other, i.e. we 
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either have to think of X as X-at-i or as X-betweeri-fj-and-iS1. Second, if 
P is a particular person, then we must (in this context) think of P as 
temporally located too, viz. as P-at-t, where t is either a particular time 
or a variable bound by a quantifier (as in "all situations of type X are 
good for P at any t")2. The reason for this is that when we say that 
something is good for a particular person P, there is always an implicit 
reference to time in the case of P too, i.e. we can (and should) think of 
all goodness-for-P as goodness-for-P-at-£. This means that if a 
goodness-for-statement is fully spelled out, it is of the form "X-
between-f j-and-f2 is (was, or will be) good for P-at-13", where t1, f2 and 
13 may (but need not) be identical. 
It is important to see that the idea that the logical subject of 
goodness-for-people-statements are persons-at-certain-times does not 
have any ontological implications. In particular, it seems compatible with 
the idea that persons are atemporal objects which persist over time, i.e. 
it does not force me to accept the idea that persons are temporally 
extended entities which can be divided into small temporal "slices". (As 
I  s ee  i t ,  a l l  t ha t  "P -a t - t "  r e f e r s  t o  i s  P  a s  he  o r  she  i s  a t  t ) .  
So, what are my reasons for regarding P-at-f as the logical subject of 
value-for-statements? Well, my argument can be divided into two steps. 
First, it makes perfectly good sense to say that a certain situation is 
good for P at one time, but not at another time (e.g., because P has 
changed in the meantime); and it seems plausible to say that it cannot 
have final value for me now that something happened in the past, or 
that it will happen in the future. This suggests that the complete analysis 
of goodness-for-statements has to include another time reference 
(besides the time at which X occurs). There are two options here: either 
we regard P as temporally located (i.e. we think of all goodness-for-P 
as goodness-for-P-at-f), or we regard the value as temporally located 
(we think of all goodness-for-P as goodness-aM-for-P). The second 
step consists in trying to show that we should prefer the former alter­
native to the latter, viz. for the following (simple) reason. If val ue-for is 
1 Where the fact to which "X" refers does not contain any reference to time. It may 
well contain a reference to P, though. 
2However, we can not (in this context, that is) think of a particular person P as 
extended in time, i.e. we can not think of him as P-between-fi-and-f2. It is also 
worth adding that if X-at-f is good for P-at-f, this does not necessarily mean that 
the two occurrences of "f" refer to the same thing: While the "f" in "P-at-f" refers to 
a point in time, the "f" in "X-at-f" may refer to a short period of time. 
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a relation, it seems more attractive to think of the relata as temporally 
localized than to think of the relation itself as temporally localized: in 
particular, isn't it rather odd to regard the relation as temporally loca­
lized if one of the relata is not temporally localized? (This is the main 
reason for regarding all goodness-for-P as goodness-for-P-at-f. It is not 
the only reason, however, e.g., it also seems that the idea has a certain 
"explanatory power"). 
Now, if w e look at statements of the form "X-a t - t j  is (was, or will be) 
good for P-at-f2"/ we can see that there are three possible temporal 
relations between X and P, viz. (i) t\ = f? (X and P are simultaneous), (ii) 
ti is earlier than £2 (X is in P's past, or before P's birth), and (iii) £j is 
later than 12 (X is in P's future, or after P's death). If w e also consider 
statements of the form "X-between-ii-and-f2 is (was, or will be) good 
for P-at-f,3, we can see that there is a fourth possibility, viz. (iv) £3 is later 
than tj but earlier than £2 (i.e. P is, so to speak, in the midst of X)3. 
Let us now consider these possibilities one at the time, to see whether 
they make sense (and whether they are plausible): 
(i) It obviously makes sense to say that it is (was, or will be) good for 
P-at-£ that X ob tains (obtained, or will obtain) at £, e.g., it makes per­
fectly good sense to say that it is good for me-now that I have a plea­
sant experience right now. 
(ii) Does it also make sense to say that it is good for P-now that some 
situation X oc curred in P's past? It is clear that past situations (e.g., a 
happy childhood) can affect P's present situation favourably, and that 
they can (for this reason) have instrumental value for P-now. However, 
it is not likely that past situations can have final value for P-now. Or am 
I mistaken in this? Think of a n old woman who looks back on her life 
and regards it as good. What kind of go odness is it likely that she attri­
butes to her past life? Well, it is not entirely implausible to assume that it 
is (at least in part) goodness-for, and that it is (moreover) not merely 
instrumental goodness-for. This suggests that it might make sense to 
say that it has final value for P-now to have lived the life she has. 
However, it is also possible that evaluations of this kind are all based on 
some "mistake". This is the view I tend to adopt. 
3There is (of co urse) also a fifth and a sixth possibility, viz. (v) £3 = tj (P is, so to 
speak, in the beginning of X), and (vi) £3 = 12 (P is at the end of X). I don 't think 
these possibilities are interesting enough to merit their own discussions, however. 
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(iii) So, what about future situations? Does it make sense to say that it 
is better for me-now if I have 40 years left to live than if I h ave 20 years 
left to live, or that the shorter my future life is, the worse it is for me-
now? Does it make sense to say that it is bad for a person to die (i.e. 
that his future life is limited), or that it is bad for me-now that I will 
loose my job next year? Well, it may seem so4, but this is a tricky matter, 
and for the following reason. Suppose that the longer my future life is, 
the better it is for me-now. We then have to ask "in what way" it is 
supposed to better for me-now. It is hardly nonderivatively better for 
me-now. So, is it (then) derivatively better for me-now? Well, a longer 
life makes more good things possible, and it may therefore seem that it 
is derivatively better for me to live longer. But is it really derivatively 
good for me-now that I-then will have a good life then? I think not. 
(iv) Does it make sense to claim that it is better for me-now if the 
pleasure I experience right now lasts for four hours than if it lasts for 
two hours; or that it is better for a person if he lives for 80 years than if 
he lives for 70 years; or that it is better for a person if his life as a whole 
is organically unified than if i t is not? And are these plausible claims? I 
think not, not if the person is (so to speak) in the midst of the good 
(better, or worse) situation. What I have in mind is this: It may well be 
better for me if I live until I'm 80 than if I live until I'm 70, but if it is, this 
is solely due to the fact that I have 10 years longer left to live in the 
former case. In short, it is only the future that is of interest to me-now. 
Or alternatively, it is better for a person to be 60 and live for 10 more 
years than to be 75 and live for 5 more years. On my view, this 
suggests that it is implausible (it may even be nonsensical) to talk about 
the value-for of a life as a whole, especially if we have final value-for in 
mind. If a person is in the midst of his life, then his life-as-a-whole is 
partly "in the past", partly present, and partly "in the future", and this 
is why it doesn't make sense to talk about the value of such a strange 
entity for the present person 5. 
4 As Sven Danielsson once pointed out (in conversation), it seems that the person 
who has 10 years left to live is in a be tter position than the person who has only 5 
years left to live. 
$But as Björn Haglund has suggested (in conversation), it would perhaps make 
sense to attribute value-for to a life-as-a-whole if the whole life is a future life, e.g., 
when one has (qua potential parent) a choice to "create" several different possible 
lives-as-wholes, or if a person is about to be reborn and has a choice between 
different possible lives-as-wholes. 
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To conclude, if a person P is in the "midst" of his life, it does not seem 
to make any sense to attribute value-for-P (derivative or nonderivative) 
to his life-as-a-whole. However, it clearly makes sense to attribute 
value-for (derivative as well as nonderivative) to a-life-at-a-certain-time, 
e.g., to say that the life that P lives at a certain time has final value for P-
at-that-time. Does it also make sense to attribute value-for to a life-
over-time? Well, it seems intelligible to attribute derivative value-for to 
past lives, but I tend to reject the idea that past lives can have final 
value for present persons. It may also make sense to attribute derivative 
value-for to future lives (e.g., it might make sense to say that it would 
be derivatively good for P-now if hi s life would be good over the next 
five years), but it is surely absurd to attribute nonderivative value-for 
to future lives. In short, the only life that can have final value for P-at-t 
is the life P lives at t. A person's past life can only have derivative value, 
and the same thing holds (at best) for a person's future life6. Which 
suggests that the comparative question of well-being (III) should be 
understood as "How do we determine just how well off a certain 
person is (on the whole) at a certain time?". 
It is worth noting that the idea that all goodness-for-P as goodness-
for-P-at-f and that X cannot be good for P-aM unless it occurs at t has 
several implications (some of which may be hard to swallow). Here are 
two examples: 
(1) As we have already seen, it doesn't seem to make sense to attri­
bute final value-for-P to temporally extended situations, e.g., to lives 
over time. Or alternatively put, all well-being is well-being-at-f. So, what 
if we simply add P's well-being-values at different times: doesn't this 
give us a measure of P's well-being "over time"? Of course we can 
obtain a numerical sum in this way, but since there is no such thing as a 
temporal super-subject P-over-time, this sum does not reflect anything 
6That is, X can only have final value for P-at-f if X obtains at t. Now, as I see it, this 
is compatible with the idea that the value of X-at-f for P-at-f may well be 
dependent on how X is viewed, or described. For example, a certain concrete 
situation may well be more valuable for a certain person if it is r egarded as a part 
of a larger whole (e.g., as part of a project, or a "life plan") than if it is regarded in 
isolation, and the value of a situation may also depend on things like how it has 
originated, or whether it is regarded as a "new beginning". In short, I think my 
"present-oriented" theory of final value-for can account for the fact that we are 
future-oriented as well as "past-oriented", and that this is manifested in (valid) 
evaluations. 
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real7. (This does not mean that the sum lacks normative relevance, 
however). 
(2) We cannot say that death is not an evil for the person who dies, 
nor that it is better for a person to have a longer than a shorter life. 
Now, this is not to deny (a) t hat it is better-period that a person lives 
longer, and that this "value" is (in some sense) localized to (or posses­
sed by) the person, nor (b) that it is rational for a person to try to stay 
alive, i.e. to avoid his own death (That is, value-for should not be 
conceived of as that which it is rational for an egoist to maximize; this 
would be to "normativize" the notion of value-for in an unduly 
manner)8. 
7Cf. the analogy with temperature. It makes perfectly good sense to say that at 
each point in time, this room has a certain temperature (which can be measured 
on an interval scale). There is no such thing as temperature-over-time, however (if 
we add the measures at different times, this sum will not reflect anything real; it is 
possible, however, to use the measures to calculate the average temperature, and 
so forth). I owe this observation to Björn Haglund. 
8Other implications are: It cannot have nonderivative value for a person to have 
his prospective (or retrospective) desires fulfilled; what happens after a person's 
death cannot have value for this person (even if it happens to be the object of his 
last wish); and it is not nonderivatively worse for a person to suffer for a longer 
time than for a shorter time. 
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Appendix D 
Subjectivism and Objectivism 
Some other important questions of well-being 
It has already been pointed out (in chapter 1) that some of the central 
questions in the recent philosophical literature on well-being are not 
included in the central questions of this book. The main purpose of this 
appendix is to make these questions explicit, mainly to get a better 
understanding of what needs to be included in a complete conception 
of well-being (prudential value). 
Most of the modern discussion of prudential value (or "well-being") is 
(it seems) based on Parfit's (1984) distinction between three kinds of 
conceptions of the good life (or, as he prefers to call them: "theories of 
self-interest"), viz. Hedonistic Theories, Desire-Fulfilment Theories, and 
Objective List Theories. This is how Parfit characterizes these theories: 
On Hedonistic Theories, what would be best for someone is what 
would make his life happiest. On Desire-Fulfilment Theories, what 
would be best for someone is what / ../ would best fulfil his desires. 
On Objective List Theories, certain things are good or bad for us, 
whether or not we want to have the good things, or to avoid the 
bad things (p 493). 
Of these three kinds of theory, it is the hedonistic theory that is most 
easy to understand, and the reason for this is first, that it is a substan­
tive evaluative theory, and second, that it is nothing but a substantive 
evaluative theory. That is, it gives us straight-forward answers to the 
substantive evaluative questions of prudential value, i.e. to the central 
questions (I)-(III), and it does not purport to answer any other ques­
tions, least of all any questions of a metaethical nature. 
The other two theories can (obviously) not be regarded in this way. It 
is true that every Objective List Theory makes substantive claims about 
what is nonderivatively good and bad for a person (in this respect, it 
does not differ from hedonism), but this is not all there is to it. Above 
all, the fact that all objective list theories are substantive evaluative 
theories is not what makes them objective, and this suggests that the 
substantive evaluative questions are not the only questions that these 
theories purport to answer. 
If w e look at the Desire-Fulfilment Theory, we see that it differs even 
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more from hedonism.. First, it does not make any substantive evaluative 
claims at all1, and second, it is (like the objective list theory) more than 
just an evaluative theory; it also makes other kinds of claims about the 
connection between value-for and desire (claims which may well be of a 
metaethical nature), and it is in this area that the most central differen­
ces between the desire theories and the objective list theories can be 
found. It is (as we will see) only in this area that the distinction between 
the desire theory and the objective list theory is a real dichotomy, i.e. it 
is not just that they purport to answer the same question (or ques­
tions); their respective answers are also mutually exclusive. 
So the question arises: If th is is so, what question (or questions) are 
the two theories trying to answer? What claims do they make, and 
what is it that they (essentially) disagree about? To find an answer to 
this question, let us first take a further look at how the two theories 
have been characterized in the literature. Here are some examples of 
how the Objective List Theory has been characterized2: 
According to Parfit (1984) (who seems to have invented the name of 
the theory), the central feature of the Objective List Theory is (as we 
have already seen) the idea that "certain things are good or bad for us, 
even if we do not want to have the good things or avoid the bad 
things (p 4)3". 
In Scanlon's (1993) terminology, Objective List Theories (or, as he pre­
fers to call them, Substantive Good Theories) "are theories according to 
which an assessment of a person's well-being involves a substantial 
judgement about what things make life better, a judgement which may 
conflict with that of the person whose well-being is in question" (p 188); 
theories which "unlike desire theories, /.../ are based on substantive 
claims about what goods /.../ make life better" (ibid., p 189). And he 
also points out that on the Substantive Good Theory, a (correct) evalu­
ation of a person's life is "not wholly dependent on" that person's 
xIt is important to note that in the present context (e.g., when I contrast the desire 
theory with the objective list theory), I will (with almost all other writers) have the 
object interpretation of the desire theory in mind. I will also (for the sake of 
simplicity) have so-called actual desire theories in mind. 
2And note that since the distinction between the desire theory and the objective 
list theory is a dichotomy, what follows is also an indirect characterization of the 
desire theory. 
3Which of course implies that some kinds of hedonism (viz. quality hedonism) are 
to be regarded as "objective list theories". 
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"tastes and interests" (ibid., footnote 10, pp 188-189). 
On Kagan's (1992) view, Objective List Theories (or, as he sometimes 
prefers to call them, Objective Theories) are theories which "hold that 
various things are objectively good for a person to have, whether or 
not he realizes it, and whether or not he desires it. Being well-off is 
simply a matter of one's having the various objective goods. These 
might include not only pleasure, but also, for example, friendship, fame, 
knowledge, or wealth. The list of obje ctive goods is, of course, a matter 
of dispute, but there is no obvious reason to think it would be 
restricted to kinds of m ental states" (p 170). 
In Griffin's (1986) terminology, an objective account (of well-being) is 
an account "that makes well-being independent of desires" (p 32): "An 
objective-list approach says that a person's well-being can be affected 
by the presence of certain values (which it lists) even if they are not 
what he wants" (ibid., p 33). When these "objective" values "appear in 
a person's life, then whatever his tastes, attitudes, or interests, his life is 
better" (ibid., p 54). 
Here, it is important to notice that an objective list theorist need not 
claim that the value of a life is wholly independent of desires, i.e. "that 
we can measure changes in a person's well-being just by the amount 
that he realizes objective values" (ibid., p 54), or that "being well-off is 
simply a matter of one's having the various objective goods" (Kagan 
(1992), p 170). An objective theory need not be "pure" or "simple" (in 
this sense): it may (as Scanlon (1993) points out) well allow for the 
possibility that what final value a life has for the person who lives it is in 
part dependent on what his preferences and desires are: 
As I see it, according to a desire theory, when something makes life 
better this is always because that thing satisfies some desire. 
Substantive good theories can allow for the fact that this is sometimes 
the case - it is sometimes a good thing simply to be getting what you 
want - but according to those theories being an object of desire is not 
in general what makes things valuable (p 190, my italics). 
What, then, does all this amount to? Exactly how does the Objective 
List Theory (Substantive Good Theory) differ from the Desire-
Fulfilment Theory (i.e. the object interpretation of the theory), and 
(above all) on what issue (or issues) do the two theories disagree? 
Let us first look at the (actual) desire theory. The central claim of t his 
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theory is the idea that what is nonderivatively good (and bad) for a 
person is "wholly dependent on" what (intrinsic) desires (and aver­
sions) he has. If w e take a close look at the quotations above (and add 
a little extra knowledge), we can see that this central claim can (in the 
case of goodness) be divided into two claims (claims that should not be 
regarded in isolation): 
(Dl)4 A situation X is nonderivatively good for a person P if and only 
if P has an intrinsic desire that X obtains (and this is a necessary 
truth), and 
(D2) If X is nonderivatively good for P, then this is so because P has an 
intrinsic desire that X obtains. That is, the fact that X is an object of 
P's intrinsic desire makes it nonderivatively good for him. 
The objective list theory can (again, in the case of goodness) be charac­
terized as follows: 
(01) It rejects (Dl)5, 
(02) it rejects (D2), and 
(03) it makes (on top of this) substantive claims about what has non-
derivative value for a person6. 
Now, to understand what these theories (really) claim, and what ques­
tions they (really) purport to answer, it is of utmost importance to find 
out what (Dl) and (D2) (really) mean. So, let us start with (Dl): How 
should the phrase "if and only if" be understood here? 
As I see it, the statement "X is nonderivatively good for P if and only if 
4It is important to note that the notation in this appendix differs from the notation 
which is used throughout the rest of the essay. 
5That is, it allows for the possibility that there are things that are good for a 
person P even though they are not wanted by P, and that there are things that are 
wanted by P that are not good for P. However, the objective list theory also 
allows for the possibility that there are persons for whom "the good" and "the 
wanted" happen to coincide. 
6However, this may not be a complete characterization of the objective list 
theory, and for the following reason: There are other versions of the desire 
theory than the actual desire theory (e.g., so-called idealized versions of the 
theory), versions that have exchanged (Dl) and (D2) for other claims. And we do 
not have a complete characterization of the objective list theory until we know 
whether it accepts or rejects these claims. 
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P intrinsically desires that X obtains" can be interpreted in two different 
ways, viz. (i) as a formal criterion of goodness-for, and (ii) as a meta­
physical (or ontological) statement about the nature of value-for. 
(i) First, the statement can be regarded as a (general) statement about 
how it should be determined what it is that has value for a person, i.e. 
as a formal standard by which it can be judged (or decided) whether or 
not something is good for a person. To interpret (Dl) in this way is to 
regard it as an answer to the question "How do we determine what 
has value for a person?" rather than as an answer to the substantive 
"what is nonderivatively good for a person?". 
(ii) But (Dl) might also be regarded as a metaphysical (or ontological) 
statement about the nature of value-for, as a claim about what value-for 
is, rather than as a claim about what it is that has value, or about how 
we should determine what it is that has value. If (Dl) is regarded in this 
way, then what it states is that to be nonderivatively good for P is to 
be the object of s ome of his intrinsic desires, or alternatively, that the 
nonderivative value of a situation X for a person P is somehow 
constituted by the fact that P intrinsically desires that X ho lds. On this 
interpretation, (Dl) is viewed as an answer to the metaphysical (or 
ontological) question "What is it for a thing to have nonderivative value 
for a person?", or alternatively, "If X is nonderivatively good for P, 
then what sort of relation is this, e.g., is it a sui generis relation or not?". 
To understand (Dl) in this way is (I think) to understand it as a ver­
sion of what Bergström (1990) calls ontological naturalism: The 
(evaluative) "property" of having nonderivative value for a certain 
person is regarded as identical with the empirical (or natural) 
"property" of be ing intrinsically desired by this person, and the evalu­
ative fact that a situation X is nonderivatively good for a person P is 
regarded as identical with the empirical (natural) fact that P intrinsically 
desires that X obtains. 
Now, it is quite clear that the ontological interpretation (ii) of (Dl) 
implies the evaluative interpretation (i). But Bergström (1990) also 
suggests (on pp 56-57) something stronger, viz. that (Dl:ii) is identical 
with the conjunction of (DT .i) and (D2)7. Personally, I do not agree with 
7What he really claims in his book is that the following two interpretations of 
utilitarianism are identical with each other, viz. (i) u tilitarianism as a criterion of 
Tightness (what he calls U) plus the idea that an action is right because it has better 
consequences than the alternatives (the counterpart to (D2)), and (ii) utilitarianism 
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Bergström, and for the following reason: As (D2) suggests, there is (on 
the desire theory) an asymmetry between the fact that X is good for P 
and the fact that X is desired by P: X is good for P because P desires X, 
but not vice versa. Therefore, we should not regard the two facts as 
identical8. Bergström claims that this is a bad argument, but as far as I 
can see, he does not give us any reason for accepting this claim9. 
So, if (V) and (ii) a re different interpretations of (Dl), which one is to 
be preferred? I think we should go for (i); i t is more in line with the 
spirit of the desire theory, and it is somehow more in harmony with 
(D2). But remember that (ii) implies (i), so even if we do not interpret 
(Dl) as a formal criterion of nonderivative value-for, it implies such a 
criterion. That is, it is quite clear that it is in virtue of (Dl) that the 
desire theory is (in part) an evaluative theory, viz. a certain kind of 
formal theory10. 
Let us now move on to the second essential difference between the 
two theories, viz. the disagreement about the validity of (D2). As in the 
case of (Dl) and (Ol), it is not entirely clear how (D2) and (02) should 
be understood. The source of the unclarity is this: When it is claimed 
as an ontological thesis (what he calls T*), i.e. the idea that the property Tightness 
of an action is identical with the empirical, natural property to have better 
consequences than the alternatives. 
8Cf. Hare's (1952) criticism of metaethical naturalism. 
9Cf. what Sumner (1996) writes (on p 16): "A theory of the nature of welfare must 
/... / be formal. It must tell us what it is for someone's life to go well or badly, or 
for someone to be benefited or harmed. In order to do so it must provide the 
appropriate relation to complete such formulas as 'x benefits y if a nd only if x 
stands in relation R to y'". This suggests that Sumner is either unaware of the 
difference between (i) and (ii), or he takes it for granted that an answer to "How 
do we determine what has value for a person?" can not be plausible unless it is 
also an answer to the metaphysical (or ontological) "What is the nature of 
prudential value?", i.e. that the former question must (so to speak) be approached 
"through" the latter question. 
10From this, we can conclude that it is (Ol) and (03) that characterize the objective 
list theory qua evaluative theory. This is not very informative, however; all it tells 
us is that the theory is not a formal theory of a certain sort, and that it is (in part) a 
substantive evaluative theory. This does not imply that objective accounts can not 
be formal, however, i.e. to call the objective list theory "the substantive good 
theory" (like Scanlon does) can be rather misleading. In any case, the fact that the 
desire theory is merely formal explains why the two theories may well agree on 
what is good for a certain particular person (cf. also note 5#); what they could 
never agree on is why a certain situation good for a certain person, i.e. on what it 
is that makes it good for this person. 
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that "if something is good for a person, this is always because this thing 
satisfies some desire", or that "being an object of a person's desire is 
what makes something valuable for this person", it is not clear how key 
terms like "because", and "makes", should be interpreted here. So, we 
need to know how these key terms can (and should) be interpreted. 
As I see it, (D2) can (depending on how these key terms are inter­
preted) be interpreted in two different ways, viz. (a) as an ontological 
(or metaphysical) statement about "the source" of prudential value, or 
(b) as a statement about how value-for-claims can (and should) be justi­
fied. 
(a) On the first interpretation, (D2) is regarded as a metaphysical 
(ontological) statement about "the source" of value-for-P. If (D2) is 
viewed in this way, then it is identical with a certain form of su bjec­
tivism, viz. the idea that desire is (ontologically) prior to value-for, or 
alternatively, that value-for-P is ontologically dependent on P's desires 
(e.g., if P would not have any intrinsic desires, then there would be no 
such thing as nonderivative value-for-P)n. 
This would make (02) identical with a certain kind of "o bjectivism", 
viz. with the idea that there are objective prudential values, i.e. facts 
about what is good and bad for a person P which hold independently 
of what P or anyone else thinks or feels about the matter12. (This also 
suggests that certain things could be good or bad for us, even if we 
had no desires at all)13. 
11 It is important to notice that this view is compatible with realism, i.e. that it does 
not claim that value-for-people-statements lack truth-value. What it claims is 
rather that if such statements have truth-values at all, then these truth-values are 
mind-dependent in a certain way, viz. they are dependent on the truth-values of 
statements of the form "X is in trinsically desired by P". Notice that this type of 
subjectivism is similar to, but not identical with the ontological naturalism above. 
It is also similar to, but (again) not identical with, the "projectivist theory of value", 
a theory which claims that the so-called values of things are projections of 
attitudes we take towards them, i.e. that values (if they can be said to exist at all) 
are "products of our minds". (But notice that projectivism is normally regarded as 
a theory about aesthetic value (cf. the well-known "beauty lies in the eye of the 
beholder") or value-period rather than as a theory about value-for). 
12Here, it is important to see that this form of objectivism does not imply that 
what has value for P is independent of wha t P is like, e.g., what is good for P may 
(on the objectivist view) well be dependent on what his needs or abilities are. 
13It might be argued that objectivism in this sense (which is compatible with 
naturalism, i.e. which differs from the view that value-for is a sni generis relational 
property) is identical with realism. But what is "realism" supposed to mean here? 
Well, it can not refer to the idea that value-for-people-statements have truth-
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(b) The second way in which (D2) and (02) can be understood are as 
statements about how (substantive) value-for-statements can (and 
should) be justified. To interpret (D2) and (02) in this way is to regard 
them as answers to the question "How do we justify claims (or beliefs) 
about what has nonderivative value for a person?". Viewed as answers 
to this question, (D2) claims that the validity of the statement "P has an 
intrinsic desire that X" is a good reason for accepting the statement "X 
is nonderivatively good for P" as valid, while (02) denies this. Here, it 
is important to see that (02) is not a rejection of th e (plausible) idea that 
statements of t he form "X is good for a person P" must be justified by 
referring both to what X (the object) is like and to what P (the subject) 
is like. All that is rejected by (02) is the idea that the relevant features 
of t he subject (in this context) is what he intrinsically desires: it allows 
for the possibility that needs, talents, or abilities are more relevant. 
The question of justification (of valu e-for-claims) to which (D2) may 
constitute an answer can be specified as follows: What kind (or kinds) 
of subject-oriented reasons14 can be given for substantive evaluative 
claims of the form "it is nonderivatively good (or bad) for a certain 
particular person that facts of type X obtain"? What constitutes (in this 
context) a good argument? This is the question which a subjectivist 
tends to regard as the real problem of justifi cation. An objectivist, on the 
other hand, tends to regard the question "What kind (or kinds) of 
subject-oriented reasons can be given for substantive evaluative claims 
of th e form "it is nonderivatively good (or bad) for all human beings that 
facts of type X obtain"?" as the real pr oblem of justification. The reason 
why the subjectivist and the objectivist tend to differ in this way is that 
objectivists are more inclined to accept the "universalist" (or 
"generalist") idea that whenever a fact of a certain type has non-
derivative value for a particular person, then this is so because this 
person is a certain type of creature (e.g., a human being), and because 
all facts of this type have nonderivative value for all creatures of the 
type in question. It is important to point out that an objectivist need not 
values (mind-independent or mind-dependent); this type of realism is compatible 
with subjectivism too. So, it seems that objectivism above can only be identical 
with realism if w e define the two positions in the same way, i.e. as the idea that 
value-for is a relational property which is independent of our attitudes and 
concerns. 
14Concerning how the term "subject-oriented" should be understood in this 
context, cf. e.g., appendix B, in the section on supervenience. 
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be a "universalist", however, i.e. that objectivism is compatible with 
"relativism"15. 
But why is this? After all, it seems that the objective list theory im­
plies, in virtue of its objectivist component, a certain kind of "univer-
salism", viz. the idea that what is good for me is also good for you, and 
vice versa, or more specifically, the idea that if a certain situation is 
nonderivatively good for a certain person, then there is a general des­
cription of t his situation such that the claim "Situations of this type are 
nonderivatively good for everyone" is true (Cf. Scanlon (1993), accor­
ding to whom "[t]he term /.../ 'objective' suggests a kind of rigidity 
(as if the same things must be valuable for everyone)" (p 188)). So why 
do I claim that objectivism does not really imply "universalism"? Well, 
this is my reason: The only reason why most objective list theories are 
also "universalist" theories are that they assume that statements of t he 
form "all situations of type X are good for P" must be (in part) justified 
by referring to some feature of P that he shares with all human beings, 
e.g., to some universal human need, or a common human nature. An 
objectivist need not attempt to justify goodness-for-P-statements in this 
"generalist" way, however; instead, he may refer to features of P 
which may well be unique to P (but remember that he must not refer to 
P's desires), e.g., to P's individual potential (talents or abilities), or to his 
individual needs. In short, objectivism is compatible with "relativism"16. 
15Where the term "relativism" refers to the idea that what is good for me may not 
be good for you, and vice versa, or more precisely, to the idea that there are types 
of s ituations which have nonderivative value for some people but not for others, 
even if t hese situations are described on as high a level of generality as possible 
(or required). However, the term "relativism" normally refers to a certain 
ontological view (a view about truth), or to a certain epistemological view (a view 
about justification), and I am (for this reason) somewhat reluctant to use it in this 
way. In fact, the present use of the term isn't even mentioned by Bergström 
(1990), who lists seven different uses of the term (on pp 112-117). 
16It might be argued that all relativist theories of goodness-for (full-fledged or 
moderate) are only apparently relativist, however, that if we look at how they 
justify goodness-for-P-statements, we see that they are ultimately of a universalist 
nature. For example, suppose there is this relativist who claims that it is good for 
P to engage in intellectual activity, but not for Q. Now, if we ask why this is so, we 
will be told that it is because P is different from Q in some relevant respect, e.g., 
because P has some talent that Q does not have. And (so the argument goes), for 
this type of justification to be valid, we have to assume that it is good for 
everyone to actualize his or her potential. Now, the main problem with this 
argument is that the general idea that it is good for us to actualize our respective 
potentials can (as I see it) only be plausible if it is viewed as a formal claim rather 
than as a substantive claim. Or alternatively put, it is not plausible to attribute 
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Before we end the section on what question (or questions) that the 
desire theory and the objective list theory purport to answer, let us 
first say a few words on the issue of "fallibilism". According to some 
philosophers, the objective list theory claims that our value-for-judge-
ments may be mistaken, e.g., Scanlon (1993), who tells us that 
Substantive Good Theories are "theories according to which an assess­
ment of a person's well-being involves a substantive judgement about 
what things make life better, a judgement which may conflict with that of 
the person whose well-being is in question" (p 188, my italics), or Kagan 
(1992), who tells us that Objective Theories "hold that various things 
are objectively good for a person to have, whether or not he realizes it" (p 
170, my italics). Here, it is important to see that they do not just have 
particular evaluations in mind, but also more general evaluations. The 
claim is not just that we all may (on the objective list theory) be mistaken 
about what nonderivative value that a particular situation has for us 
(e.g., whether it is good or bad), or about how well off we are (on the 
whole), but also that we may be mistaken about what types of situa­
tions that are good and bad for us, or about what it is (in general) that 
makes our lives go better or worse. 
But is this something which a desire theorist must deny? As far as I 
can see, a Desire Theorist need not claim that we are infallible as "parti­
cular evaluators", especially not when the object of the particular evalu­
ation is as complex as a whole existence-at-a-certain-time17. So what 
nonderivative value to the circumstance that one's potential is actualized, but it 
may well be plausible to claim that it is nonderivatively good for P to engage in 
intellectual activity because this constitutes the realization of some talent that he 
has. 
Before we leave the issue of relativism vs. universalism, it is worth noting that 
we have (in the above) only been concerned with one type of relativism, viz. 
"person-relativism", i.e. the idea that substantive prudential values may be relative 
to individual persons ("what is good for me may not be good for you"). It is, 
however, important to point out that there are other possible types of relativism, 
e.g., prudential values may also be relative to cultures (personal development 
may be good for "modern people" but not for "traditional" or "primitive" people), 
and they may be "time-relative": If a certain prudential value is relative to a certain 
person, it may either be relative to this person "over time" (if something is good 
for me now, it will also be good for me later, and vice versa), or to this person at a 
certain time (what is good for "me-now" may not be good for "me-then", or vice 
versa). 
17What a Desire-Fulfilment Theorist must claim is (a little oversimplified) that the 
value of a person's life is a function of to what extent his relevant desires are 
fulfilled. But this function may (at least if we have the non-global versions of the 
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about the general case? Must a desire theorist really reject the idea that 
we may be mistaken about what types of situations that have non-
derivative value for us? This is a tricky question. There are (of co urse) 
two obvious senses in which a person can, on the desire theory, be mis­
taken about what is good for him; first, he may not know what his 
intrinsic desires are and/or how strong these desires are (in practice, it 
may be just as difficult to find out what one really wants as it is to dis­
cover the correct list of "objective values"!), and second, he may not 
realize that the desire theory is valid (e.g., he may, from his (immanent) 
perspective, believe that we desire something because it is good for 
him, rather than the other way around). But if we disregard these 
ideas, it seems that the (actual) desire theorist is not much of a 
"fallibilist" about goodness-for. After all, he accepts the idea of "the 
sovereign subject" (cf. section 5.1.1). 
To conclude appendix D: We have seen that the three central questions 
of this essay are not the only important questions of prudential value 
(and well-being). For example, there are also questions like "What is the 
nature of nonderivative goodness-for? What is it for a situation to have 
nonderivative value for a person; what does the relation goodness-for 
consist in?"; "What is the source of nonderivative goodness-for? If 
goodness-for-statements can be true, what is it that makes them true?"; 
"To what extent can we be mistaken about what it is (in general) that 
makes our lives go better or worse?"; and "Are there any universal 
prudential values, i.e. are there any valid substantive claims of the form 
'All facts of type X a re nonderivatively good (or bad) for all human 
beings (at all times)'?". 
But most importantly, there are a number of (substantive) questions 
of justification: questions of how (exactly) value-for-claims can (or 
should) be justified. Depending on what type of value-for-claim we 
have in mind, there are two possible problems of justification, viz. how 
should substantive claims of the forms (1) "All facts of a certain type X 
are nonderivatively good (or bad) for a particular person P", and (2) 
"All facts of a certain type X are nonderivatively good (or bad) for all 
human beings (at all times)" be justified?18 
desire theory in mind) be too complex for some of us to grasp. 
:8The reason why I ignore the question of how particular claims of the form "a 
particular fact X is nonderivatively good (or bad) for a particular person P" should 
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Which of the two problems that is most central depends on whether 
there are universal prudential values, i.e. on whether we can assume 
that there are valid substantive claims of the form "All facts of a certain 
type X a re nonderivatively good (or bad) for all human beings" (and 
that such claims can be justified). 
If it can be assumed that the important prudential values are uni­
versal, the central question is (2): How can (should) claims of the form 
"all facts of a certain type X a re nonderivatively good (or bad) for all 
human beings (at all times)" be justified (or refuted)? What kind (or 
kinds) of reasons can be given for (and against) such claims? What con­
stitutes (in this context) a good argument? Or alternatively, how can a 
general (substantive) conception of prudential value be justified (or 
refuted)? 
If it can not be assumed that the most important prudential values are 
universal, the central question is (instead) (1): How (exactly) can semi-
general substantive claims of the form "All facts of a certain type X are 
nonderivatively good (or bad) for a particular person P" be justified (or 
refuted)? 
Now, I have already assumed (e.g., in chapter 1) that there are uni­
versal prudential values, i.e. in this essay, it is (2) which will be regarded 
as the central problem of justification. This question will not be treated 
separately, however, but only in connection with (I)-(III). 
be justified is that I have made the "generalist" assumption that whenever a 
particular fact X has nonderivative value for a particular person, then there exists 
some description of X such that all other particular facts that fall under the same 
description (that are of the same type) have nonderivative value for P too. 
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Appendix E 
Hedonism and time 
On the issue of duration 
If w e take the duration of our experiences into account, we can attri­
bute the following view to the hedonist (in answer to (II); cf. note 52 on 
P 31): 
(H5') The (positive or negative) value of an experience for the person 
who has it is a function of two things only, viz. (i) how pleasant or 
unpleasant it is, and (ii) how long it lasts (or how long it appears to 
last). That is, the degree to which a pleasant experience is non-
derivatively good for the experiencing subject is a function of its 
degree of pleasantness and its duration, and the degree to which an 
unpleasant experience is nonderivatively bad for the subject is a func­
tion of its degree of un pleasantness and its duration. The function in 
question can be characterized as follows: 
(i) The more pleasant an experience is, the (nonderivatively) better it 
is for an experiencing subject to have it, i.e. the higher is its prudential 
value (and so on; cf. (H5), e.g., in section 1.2). For example, it is 
always better for a person to have a more pleasant experience of a 
certain duration than to have a less pleasant experience of the same 
duration, and it is always worse for a person to have a more un­
pleasant suffering of a certain duration than to have a less unpleasant 
suffering of the same duration. 
(ii) If two pleasant experiences are equally pleasant, but of different 
duration, it is (nonderivatively) better for the subject to have the 
experience that lasts longer, and if two sufferings are equally un­
pleasant, but of d ifferent duration, it is better for the subject to have 
the shorter experience. If w e want to incorporate the idea that it is 
"subjective duration" that matters, we only have to replace "longer" 
("shorter") with "subjectively longer (shorter)" or "appears longer 
(shorter) to the experiencing subject". 
As it stands, this last claim is not very precise. To make it more precise, 
the pure hedonist would most probably appeal to the following -principle 
of m ultiplication: 
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If P„ is a measure of the degree of pleasantness (unpleasantness) of 
an experience En, and if D n is a measure of its duration, then how 
good (or bad) it is for a certain person to have a certain experience £ / 
depends on one thing only, viz. how large the product (Pj x Dj) is. 
For example, if Ei and E2 a re both pleasant, it is nonderivatively 
better for a person to have Ej than to have £2 if and only if the 
product (Pi x D{) is bigger than the product (P2 x D2)1. 
However, in order to make (H5') sufficiently clear and precise, we also 
need to know how the term "duration" should be understood, viz. 
whether it is to be understood in the objective sense or in the subjective 
sense. Which of the two possible senses of the term makes (H5') most 
plausible? Is it objective time (clock time) or subjective time (felt time) 
that matters? Before we turn to this question, let us first look at the 
different ways in which the term "duration" can be understood here. 
Objective duration 
The objective duration of an event (e.g., an experience) is the duration 
that is measured with clocks. That is, an event lasts longer in the objec­
tive sense than another event if and only if it lasts longer according to 
clock time. And if a certain event lasts for two minutes and another 
event lasts for four minutes, then the objective duration of the second 
event is twice as long as the objective duration of the first event. 
Two conceptions of subjective duration: the atomistic-summative 
and the holistic 
The subjective duration of an experience (or experienced event) has to 
do with how long it appears to last (or how long its parts appear to 
last) to the experiencing subject. But what exactly is this supposed to 
mean? Or alternatively, how exactly should we determine which of two 
experienced events that lasts longer in the subjective sense? Well, there 
are at least two major ways in which this question can be answered, 
JIf this kind of multiplication is to make sense in all kinds of cases, it is necessary 
that the duration of an experience and its degree of pleasantness (unpleasantness) 
are both measurable on ratio scales (and this is a dubious assumption indeed). 
Such a high degree of measurability is not required in all cases, however, e.g., it is 
sometimes sufficient that either duration or pleasantness (unpleasantness) is 
measurable on a ratio scale, while the other variable is merely ordinally 
measurable. 
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viz. in an "atomistic way" or in a more "holistic way". Edgeworth2 and 
Tännsjö (forthcoming) are examples of philosophers who adopt the 
atomistic conception of subjective time, and my own proposal is an 
example of a more "holistic" conception of subjective time. 
My own proposal is based on the idea that all appearances are per-
spectival. In the case of space, this means that if a physical object 
appears in a certain way to a certain subject, it always appears to him in 
this way as viewed from some spatial perspective or other. That is, 
when we say that a certain object appears in such-and-such a way to a 
certain subject, what we have in mind is not the subject simpliciter, but 
the subject qua located at a certain spatial position. Now, in the case of 
experienced duration of experienced events, the idea is (rather) that if i t 
appears to a person P that an experienced event E lasts so-and-so long, 
then it always appears this way to P from some temporal perspective or 
other. So, when we say that a certain experienced event appears to last 
so-and-so long to a certain subject, what we have in mind is the subject 
qua temporally located, i.e. the subject-at-a-certain-(objective)-time (or 
P-at-i). But the appearance of duration might vary with the temporal 
perspective of the subject, e.g., a certain event might appear to last 
relatively long when it is going on, but relatively short shortly after­
wards3. 
This is the idea on which my "holistic" proposal is based: How long 
the subjective duration of a certain experienced event is for a person P 
depends on how long it (the event as a whole) appears to last (to P). 
This formulation will not do, however, and for the following reason: 
First, how long a certain event appears to last (to P) might vary with P's 
temporal location (e.g., the event might appear to last longer to P-at-fj 
than to P-at-^), and second, there is no one temporal perspective that 
can be regarded as "privileged". 
If th e basic "holistic" intuition is combined with these "perspectival" 
insights, we might arrive at the following "holistic" and "perspectival" 
conception of subjective duration: Two experienced events have the 
2Edgeworth's view is presented in Tännsjö (forthcoming), on pp 67-69. 
3It is worth pointing out that we tend to "measure" subjective time in minutes, 
hours, days, and so on, e.g., as in "it appears to me that this show has been going 
on for more than three hours". It is also worth noting that judgements of this type 
seem to be influenced by many things, e.g., like feelings of hunger, perceptions of 
light and darkness, and how bored or stimulated we are. 
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same subjective duration for a person P if and only if the re is no point in 
time at which the two events appear (to P) to be of different duration4. 
And an experienced event El lasts longer (in the subjective sense) than 
another experienced event E2 if an d only if th ere is at least some point 
in time at which El appears to last longer, and there is no point in time 
at which E2 appears to last longer5. 
As an illustration of this idea, consider the following two examples: 
(i) Suppose that a certain person is totally absorbed in writing a book, 
or in listening to music. Now, to be absorbed is to be in a kind of time­
less state, and the person would not (at any time) experience any diffe­
rence between being absorbed for three hours and being absorbed for 
yet another hour. If th is is so, we can say that the two experiences have 
the same subjective duration for this person. 
(ii) Suppose that a person goes to a two hour long concert, to listen to 
a symphony that he knows by heart. Now, consider the following two 
cases: In the first case, the person enjoys the concert for two hours and 
believes that he has done so, and in the second case, he enjoys the 
concert for half an hour, has a black-out that lasts for an hour, regains 
consciousness, enjoys the concert for another half hour, and then 
believes that he has enjoyed it for two hours. On the holistic conception 
of subjective time, these two experiences have the same subjective 
duration. 
The atomistic and summative conception of subjective duration is 
"based on" the idea that subjective time can be divided into small units; 
units that can not be further divided. There are different views on 
what this smallest unit is, e.g., it might be the least noticeable difference 
in time (the least difference in time that can be directly discriminated), as 
Edgeworth suggests6, or it might the least sub-noticeable difference in 
time (the least difference that can be indirectly discriminated), as 
Tännsjö (forthcoming) suggests. If we call this unit a "subjective 
4No point in time within a certain interval, that is: the idea is that we can ignore 
those times which occur before the last of the events, as well as those times which 
occur long after the last event. This is about as precise as I can get, and it is worth 
noting that this is but one respect in which my conception of subjective duration is 
very rudimentary and incomplete. 
5This means that if E l appears to last longer at certain times, while E2 appears to 
last longer at other times, then we have an insurmountable problem of 
measurability: How do we, in cases like this, rank experienced events with respect 
to subjective duration? 
6See note 2. 
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second", the atomistic-summative conception of subjective duration can 
be characterized as follows: The subjective duration of an experienced 
event is a matter of how many subjective seconds it lasts (i.e. subjective 
time is, on this view, measurable on a ratio scale)7. For example, that an 
experienced event El lasts longer in the subjective sense than another 
experienced event E2 simply means that the number of subjective 
seconds that passes when El goes on is larger than the number of sub­
jective seconds that passes when E2 goes on. And if El lasts for 100 
subjective seconds while E2 lasts for 50 subjective seconds, then the 
subjective duration of El is twice as long as the subjective duration of 
E2. 
Three different versions of pure hedonism 
We have now seen that there are at least three possible senses of 
"duration", viz. objective duration, subjective duration of the holistic 
kind, and subjective duration of the summative kind. Depending on 
which of t hese senses of "duration" that the hedonist has in mind, there 
are different versions of the hedonistic theory, e.g., of (H5'): 
If th e pure hedonist has objective duration in mind, we get: 
(H5'0) The value of an experience for the person who has it is a 
function of two things only, viz. (i) how pleasant or unpleasant it is, 
and (ii) how long its objective duration is. And since objective dura­
tion is measurable on a ratio scale, we can appeal to the multiplication 
principle, viz. in the following way: If Pn i s a measure of the degree of 
pleasantness of an experience En, and if D n is a measure of i ts objec­
tive duration, then the value that it has for a certain person to have a 
certain experience £3 is proportional to how large the product (Pi x 
D]) is. For example, if t wo pleasant experiences are equally pleasant, 
and if one of them lasts twice as long as the other, we can conclude 
that it is twice as good for the experiencing subject to have the longer 
experience. 
If the hedonist has (instead) the atomistic (and "summative") kind of 
subjective duration in mind, we get: 
7Notice that atomist assumes from the very beginning that subjective time is 
measurable on a ratio scale, i.e. the problem of whether subjective time is 
ordinally measurable is (I think, deliberately) bypassed. 
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(H5'SA) The value of an experience for the person who has it is a 
function of t wo things only, viz. (i) how pleasant or unpleasant it is, 
and (ii) how long its "atomistic-summative subjective duration" is. 
And since this type of subjective duration is (just as objective dura­
tion) measurable on a ratio scale, we can appeal to the multiplication 
principle in exactly the same way as we did under (H5'0) above. 
If the hedonist has the holistic kind of subjective duration in mind, if he 
(instead) incorporates this version of t he idea that "subjective duration 
is what matters" into his theory, we get: 
To the extent that it is possible to determine how valuable it 
is for a certain person to have a certain experience: The value of an 
experience for the person who has it is a function of two things only, 
viz. (i) how pleasant or unpleasant it is, and (ii) how long it appears to 
last, or more precisely, how long its "holistic subjective duration" (in 
the sense this was given above) is. For example, if two pleasant expe­
riences, El and E2, are equally pleasant, then it is nonderivatively 
better for a person to have El than to have E2 if and only if El is 
subjectively longer (in the holistic sense) than E2, i.e. (roughly) if and 
only if it appears (as a whole) longer than E2 to the experiencing 
subject. 
So, the question arises: Which of the se three versions of hedonism is the 
most plausible evaluative theory; (H5'0), (H5'SA), or (H5'SH)? Or 
alternatively put, which of the three possible senses of the term 
"duration" should the hedonist accept? 
Why it is the holistic kind of subjective duration that matters 
Personally, I tend to believe that the most ethically relevant kind of 
duration of experiences is subjective duration of t he holistic type: what 
matters to an experiencing subject is how long his experiences appear to 
last to him. That is, as far as the issue of duration is concerned, the most 
plausible version of pure hedonism is (H5'SH), e.g., if we have objective 
duration or "atomistic and summative subjective duration" in mind, then 
it is not always the case that the longer a pleasant experience lasts, the 
better it is for the experiencing subject, and neither is it always the case 
that the longer a suffering lasts, the worse it is for the experiencing 
subject. These are my "arguments" for this view: 
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(i) The first argument purports to eliminate (H5'SA) from the compe­
tition: The reason why we are interested in subjective duration at all is 
because we suspect that how long a pleasant (or unpleasant) experience 
actually lasts is (in this context) of less significance than how long it 
appears to last. For this reason, a plausible conception of subjective 
duration of experienced events cannot totally ignore how long an 
experienced event (as a whole) appears to last to the experiencing sub­
ject, and neither can it ignore that appearances of duration are perspec-
tival, i.e. that they might vary with the temporal perspective of the 
subject. The atomistic-summative conception ignores both these things, 
however, and it is (therefore) not a plausible conception of s ubjective 
time. In fact, this conception is not really a conception of subjective time 
at all. It is true that the unit is constructed on subjective grounds, but 
once the unit has been constructed, subjective time is regarded in an 
entirely objective manner, i.e. the subject's own perspective is transcen­
ded entirely. In short, what the atomist has constructed is simply a new 
kind of clock; a clock that measures subjective time from an objective 
(impersonal) and atemporal standpoint. And since there is no reason 
whatsoever for believing that the subjective duration measured in this 
way has anything to do with how things appear to us on the macro­
scopic level (the connection between the two kinds of s ubjective dura­
tion might even be weaker than the connection between objective 
duration and felt (macroscopic) duration!), why doesn't the atomist just 
stick to proper objective time? (Especially since there is no reason 
whatsoever to believe that subjective time is an additive quality). In 
short, it seems that the atomistic-summative conception of subjective 
duration is not really an alternative to objective duration, and even if it 
is, I can't see how one would decide which of th e two "durations" that 
is more ethically relevant. 
(ii) So, how are we to decide between (H5'SH) and (H5'0)? Well, we 
have to resort to the kind of p articular cases (real or imagined) that the 
two theories would disagree on, e.g., cases like the following ones: 
(a) "The holistic subjectivist" (H5'SH) claims that if two experiences are 
equally pleasant, and if there is no point in time at which a person 
would experience any difference in duration between two experiences, 
then they are equally good (or bad) for this person. This suggests that 
it does not really matter to a person whether he is totally absorbed in a 
certain activity for four hours or for eight hours (assuming that absorp-
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tion is a kind of "timeless state", and that he would not notice any dif­
ference), "The objectivist" (H5'0) would deny that this is so. Instead, 
he would claim that it is better for a person to be absorbed for eight 
hours than to be absorbed for four hours. He would also claim, on top 
of this, that it is twice as good for the person to be absorbed for eight 
hours than to be absorbed for four hours (this is nothing but an appli­
cation of "the rigid additive thesis with respect to duration"), 
(b) "Holistic subjectivism" (H5'SH) implies (it seems) that it is not non-
derivatively worse for a person to be tortured for two hours and to 
feel as if he has been tortured for two hours than it is for him to be tor­
tured for half an hour, faint, regain consciousness, be tortured for 
another half hour, and then feel as if he has been tortured for two 
hours. "Objectivism" (HS'O), on the other hand, does not just imply 
that the objectively longer experience is worse, but also that it is twice as 
bad a s the shorter experience. 
On my view, (H5'SH) seems more plausible than (H5'0). 
"Objectivism" is not a plausible view: The claim that it does not matter 
at all how long our pleasures and sufferings appear to last is not plau­
sible, and neither is the idea that it is twice as good for a person to be 
absorbed for eight hours than to be absorbed for four hours, even if 
the person himself would not notice any difference between the two 
experiences8. This does not mean that (H5'SH) is a satisfactory view, 
however. As I see it, the whole temporal issue is rather messy (which 
might suggest that it is a fruitful area for future research). 
Does duration (per se) matter at all? 
So, the basic intuition here is that it matters how long our pleasures and 
sufferings appear to last. But does this idea really imply (H5'SH), i.e. 
that the value of an experience is (in part) a function of how long it 
appears to last? Well, not necessarily. There is (it seems) another way in 
which appearances of duration might matter, viz. by being (in a certain 
way) "embedded" in our experiences (and if this is the only way in 
8The objective view seems more plausible if we have value-period (the value of 
the world) in mind, however, e.g., it is neither unintelligible nor implausible to say 
that it is twice as good-period that a certain person is happy for two days than it is 
that he is happy for one day. The reason for this is simple: If it is value-period we 
are concerned with, we should transcend all limited temporal and personal 
perspectives, and instead adopt a more atemporal and impersonal perspective. 
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which temporal appearances matter, duration might not matter at all). 
Consider the following line of reasoning: What duration (objective or 
subjective) a certain experience has is not directly relevant to the question 
of w hat value this experience has for the experiencing subject. It is true 
that in most cases, a longer suffering is worse than a shorter suffering. 
But the explanation for this is that the subjective duration of a n expe­
rience is almost always "built into" this experience. For example, my 
present suffering or enjoyment is (in part) based on thoughts about the 
past and the future. The reason why a two hour long visit to the den­
tist makes me suffer more than a visit that is only one hour long is pro­
bably this: If I suffer longer than a certain limited time, I will most pro­
bably start to think things like "now this has been going on for so-and-
so many minutes; when will it ever end?" and "when this is over, 
everything will be just great", and this will (in turn) tend to increase my 
suffering at that very moment. And if I think "now it will soon be 
over", I may suffer less. But if I d on't get absorbed at all in ideas about 
the past or about the future, what difference will it make how long I 
suffer?9 Or alternatively put, if someone would live entirely in the pre­
sent, if he would have no consciousness of time, would it really be intel­
ligible to say that a longer suffering is nonderivatively worse for him 
than a shorter suffering? That is, duration per se might not (in the con­
text of value-for, that is) matter at all; objective duration might not 
matter unless a sense of it is incorporated into present experience, and 
subjective duration might not matter unless it is incorporated into 
present experience. 
There is another argument that can be given for the idea that as long 
as we have value-for in mind, duration does not really matter, viz. the 
following one: The idea that duration matters can be expressed as 
follows: "If X and Y are two pleasures of d ifferent duration (objective 
or subjective), it is nonderivatively better for a person P to have the 
pleasure that lasts (objectively or subjectively) longer". But is this really 
an intelligible idea? 
It has already been suggested (e.g., in appendix C) that all value-for-P 
is value-for-P-at-f, i.e. that it does not make sense to talk about value 
for P-over-time. Or alternatively put, that if a particular value-for-
9And similarly for pleasure. For example, if I have pleasant dreams every night, is 
it really nonderivatively better for me the longer these dreams last? (Is it good for 
me at all to have pleasant dreams if I forget all about them afterwards?). 
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Statement of the form "X is (was, or will be) good for P" is fully spelled 
out, it will take the form "X-between-fj-and-f? is (was, or will be) good 
for P-at-fa", where t\, 12, and 13 may (but need not) be identical. It has 
also been suggested that whether a certain value-for-statement makes 
sense or not, and whether it is plausible or not, this depends (to a 
certain extent) on the nature of the temporal relation between X and P, 
or more precisely, between the times referred to (i.e. t\, £2, and fj). For 
example, it is obviously both intelligible and plausible to say that it is 
nonderivatively good for P-at- t  that he has a pleasant experience at t,  
but it makes little or no sense to say that it is nonderivatively good for 
P-aW that he had a pleasant experience some time in the past. 
Let us now, in the light of this, return to the claim that it is non­
derivatively better for a person to have a pleasure of longer duration 
than it is to have a pleasure of shorter duration. Is this a plausible idea? 
Does it make any sense at all? The first thing we have to do here is to 
complete the claim, i.e. by spelling out its (implicit) temporal content. 
This is how this might be done: "It is nonderivatively better for P-at-fo 
that he has a pleasant experience that goes on between £? and £3 than 
that he has a pleasant experience that goes on between ti and 12 (where 
t i  occurs before t2, which (in tur n) occurs before £3)". So, how is t 0  
related to tj, t2, and £3? As I see it, there are only two interesting pos­
sibilities here, viz. either (i) to occur s before ti, or (ii) it occurs between 
11 and 12. Let us now see whether any of these two interpretations of 
the "duration claim" makes any sense, and whether it is plausible. 
(i) If th e claim is interpreted in the first way, we get the idea that it is 
nonderivatively better for a person to have a longer pleasure in front of 
him than it is to have a shorter pleasure in front of him. Is this an intel­
ligible and/or plausible idea? Well, it seems sensible to say that I am 
(somehow) "in a better position" if I have a four hour long pleasant 
experience in front of m e than if I only have a two hour long pleasant 
experience in front of m e. But in what way is it supposed to better for 
me-now to have the four hour pleasure in front of me? It is hardly 
nonderivatively better for me-now. So, is it (then) derivatively better 
for me-now? Maybe it is not better for me-now at all?10 
10So, how should we conceive of d erivative value and time? Well, here are two 
possibilities: (i) We can reject the idea that all derivative-goodness-for-P is 
derivative-goodness-for-P-at-t, or (ii) we can keep the idea, and claim that X-at-t 7 
is derivatively-good-for-P-aMj if and only if it makes Y-at-f2 possible (etc.), where 
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(ii) If th e claim is (instead) interpreted in the second way, we get the 
idea that it is nonderivatively better for a person to be in the midst of a 
longer pleasure than it is to be in the midst of a shorter pleasure. Is this 
a more intelligible and/or plausible idea? I think not. It is of no interest 
whatsoever (to me-now) whether the pleasure I experience right now 
lasts for four hours or whether it lasts for two hours. What matters is 
how long that is left of i t, it is only the future that is of in terest to me-
now. Or in other terms, it is better for a person to have one hour left of 
a two hour pleasure than to have half an hour left of a four hour plea­
sure. In this context, it is (somehow) nonsensical to talk about the value-
for of an experience as a whole, especially if we have nonderivative 
value-for in mind. If a person is in the midst of a n experience, then his 
experience-as-a-whole is partly "in the past", partly present, and partly 
"in the future", and this is why it doesn't make sense to talk about the 
value of such a strange entity for the present person. 
In short, it seems that it does not really make sense to say that it is 
nonderivatively better for a person to have a pleasure of longer dura­
tion than it is to have a pleasure of shorter duration. It might make 
sense to say that P is in a better position if he has a longer pleasure 
before him than if h e has a shorter pleasure before him, but the better-
ness referred to here is (most definitely) not nonderivative betterness-
for. And it is both sensible and plausible to say that it is, at every objec­
tive point in time t, nonderivatively better for P-at-f to feel pleasure at t 
than not to feel pleasure at t, but from this we cannot conclude that it is 
better for P the longer his pleasure lasts. 
If this is correct, it seems that we can ignore the issue of duration 
altogether. That is, we can think of hedonism as a theory about what 
has nonderivative value for people-at-certain-points-in-time. If we do 
this, we can safely ignore (H5') (the idea that the value of an experience 
for the person who has it is a function of how pleasant or unpleasant it 
is, and how long it lasts). Instead, we can remained satisfied with the 
original (H5), which can now be understood as follows: 
(H5) The value that it has for a person-at-a-time to have a certain 
experience at that time (or rather: to be in a certain concrete 
conscious mental state at that time) is a function of one thing only, 
Y-aM2 is nonderivatively-good-for-P-at-f2, and P-at-f J and P-at-f2 are the same 
person. On my view, (ii) is a much more attractive idea. 
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viz. how pleasant or unpleasant this state is. The more pleasant P's 
state-at-f is, the nonderivatively better it is for P-at-i to be in that 
state. 
451 
Appendix F 
What conception of desire is most plausible? 
The rudimentary conception of desire which was formulated is (as the 
name suggests) far from complete. So how should it be completed? 
What must a complete conception of desire be like if it is to satisfy con­
ditions (i)-(iv) on pp 169-172? 
Conceptions of desire are normally divided into two main types, viz. 
phenomenological conceptions and functional conceptions (and as far as 
I can see, this is an exhaustive classification). So, let us first ask whether 
the conception of desire we are looking for can be a phenomenological 
conception. 
Phenomenological conceptions of desire 
To accept a phenomenological conception of desire is to accept the idea 
that desires are (essentially) "phenomenologically salient" states, or as 
Smith (1994) puts it, that "desires have phenomenological content essen­
tially". On this view, a desire is (essentially) something of which we are 
directly aware, something that is (or can be) felt, something that has a 
felt intensity. According to Smith, there are two versions of this phe­
nomenological view, viz. a strong one and a weak one. The strong 
phenomenological conception of desire is "the view that desires are, like 
sensations, simply and essentially states that have a certain phenomeno­
logical content" (p 105), and the weaker phenomenological conception is the 
idea that "desires are like sensations in that they have phenome­
nological content essentially, but differ from sensations in that they 
have propositional content as well" (ibid., p 108). So, should the desire 
theorist accept any of these two views? No, he should not, and for the 
following reasons: 
The reason why we should regard the strong phenomenological con­
ception of desires as irrelevant is simple: This view is either hard or im­
possible to combine with the idea that desires have propositional con­
tent (as Smith points out, it cannot provide a plausible epistemology of 
propositional content of desire). In fact, the strong phenomenological 
conception is most plausibly regarded as a conception of desire for rather 
than as a conception of desire that. 
The reason why we should regard the weak phenomenological con-
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ception as irrelevant, or alternatively, why we should regard any phe-
nomenological conception of desire (weak or strong) as irrelevant, is 
twofold: First, the phenomenological notion of desire is too narrow, i.e. 
it does not satisfy (iii) on pp 170-171. On the use of "desire" that has 
"rational and moral significance", we are not always directly aware of 
our desires, and a desire theorist does not have any reason whatsoever 
to restrict his attention to those desires (in the broad sense, that is) that 
have felt intensities, or to accept the idea that it is not good for a 
person to have a desire fulfilled unless this desire is "phenomeno-
logically salient". Second, the phenomenological conception of d esire is 
inconsistent with the "explanatory" or "theoretical" use of terms like 
"desire", "aversion", and "preference". We are reluctant to eliminate 
this explanatory use of the terms, however, and this explains why we 
tend to regard the phenomenological conception as false. For example, 
the phenomenological view strongly suggests that we are never fallible 
about the desires we have, and that there are actions that are not 
manifestations of desires, and these claims are (it seems) simply false. 
In short, we should reject all phenomenological conceptions of desire. 
Functional conceptions of desire 
According to Smith (1994), the alternative to the phenomenological con­
ception of desire is the dispositional conception of desire, the view that 
desires are dispositional states. Or more specifically, to desire that 
something is or will be the case is (on this view) to have a certain set of 
dispositions, primarily dispositions to do certain things in certain con­
ditions, but also dispositions to feel certain things in certain conditions. 
So, is this really the only alternative to the phenomenological con­
ception? I think not. On my view, Smith's dispositional conception of 
desire is only one of several possible versions of a broader and more 
general view, a view which we can call the functional conception of desire. 
This is (roughly) the idea that desires are essentially states that have a 
certain functional role, or more specifically, that desires are (essentially) 
motivational states, states that are related to action in a certain way 
(which does not prevent them from being essentially related to other 
things as well, however). An example of another version of this func­
tional conception is Brandt's (1979) view, according to which a desire is 
something that is (by definition) causally related to action-tendencies 
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(but also to certain other things) in a certain way1. 
Now, to regard our desires and aversions as motivational states2 is 
(roughly) to regard them as something that (in some sense of the term) 
"motivate" us to act or to refrain from acting, or as "psychological and 
physiological promptings3 to act and refrain from acting" (Kekes (1988), 
p 18). Or as Griffin (1986) puts it, "[i]n the present technical sense /.../, 
desiring something is, in the right circumstances, going for it, or not 
avoiding or being indifferent to getting it" (p 14). That is, the most 
central feature of desiring is (on this view) regarded as relational; the 
"essence" of desiring is to be found in how it is related to action4. 
How, then, is desire, qua motivational state, related to action? Well, as 
a first rough approximation, we can say that on the functional concep­
tion, every action is a manifestation of s ome desire, but every desire is 
not manifested in action. The idea that every action is a manifestation of 
some desire is basically an idea about how our actions are to be explai­
ned: To give a psychological explanation of a particular action consists, 
in part, in attributing a certain particular desire to the agent5. But even 
though every particular action is a manifestation of some particular 
desire, there are many particular desires that are not manifested in 
action. First, our desires may manifest themselves in other ways, e.g., in 
our thoughts and emotions, and second, it might even be possible that 
some of our desires are not manifested at all (neither in action nor in 
thought). 
All functional conceptions of desire are (of course) consonant with 
'The reason why I do not think of Brandt's view as dispositional is that he does 
not regard our desires themselves as behavioural dispositions (or action-
tendencies), but as lawfully related to such dispositions (cf. below). 
2For the time being, I will disregard the idea that desires might be more than just 
motivational states, i.e. that their functional role may (so to speak) be broader 
than this, that they may not just be essentially related to action, but also to other 
psychological states, e.g., to emotion. 
3But can the latter really be regarded as desires that, i.e. as propositional attitudes? 
I think not. 
4This suggests that if value-internalism is true, then our positive evaluations must 
be regarded as desires, and our negative evaluations as aversions. 
5This idea should be carefully distinguished from two related ideas, viz. (i) the idea 
that to view a piece of behaviour (or "passivity") as an action is, in part, to regard it 
as motivated by some desire or other, and (ii) the idea that to identify (view or 
describe) a piece of behaviour as an action of a c ertain type sometimes involves 
attributing a certain desire to the agent ("hunting" or "committing a murder" are 
examples of actions which are conceptually related to certain desires). 
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both (iii) and (iv), and it does not seem impossible to construct a func­
tional conception of desire which is consistent with (i) and (ii) as well6. 
This suggests that the desire theorist should accept some functional con­
ception of desire, especially if the functional conception is the only alter­
native to the phenomenological conception. 
Now, this is not the place to give a detailed functional account of 
desire which is consistent with the rudimentary conception above, but I 
think it is of some importance to say something about what questions 
such a functional account has to answer, and (also) how these questions 
might be answered. 
The questions that need to be answered if the functional conception is 
to be given a precise enough formulation can be divided into two 
groups: 
(1) If ev ery particular action is seen as a manifestation of s ome parti­
cular desire, how should the connection between a particular action and 
the desire which, in part, explains it be characterized? For example, is 
the relation between the two conceptual or causal, and is it internal or 
external? 
(2) How do we reconcile the fact that desire is paradigmatically mani­
fested in action with the fact that most of our particular desires are not 
manifested in action? If a particular desire is not manifested in action or 
behaviour, does this imply that it is not related to action at all? Or is it 
possible that it is indirectly (rather than directly) related to action? If 
there is such an indirect relation between unmanifested desire and 
action, how should it be characterized? 
Let us now look at how these questions might be answered. 
Action as Manifestation of Desire: Desire as a theoretical and 
explanatory notion 
In everyday life, we normally try to make sense of our deliberate 
actions by giving "common-sense psychological explanations" of them. 
Now, to give such an explanation of an action is always to explain it in 
terms of desire, on the one hand, and "belief" (or some other cognitive 
state or event, like thought), on the other, or more specifically, we 
explain an agent's actions psychologically by attributing certain desires 
Conditions (i)-(iv), i.e. my rudimentary conception of desire, can be found in 
section 4.1, on pp 169-172. 
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and beliefs to this agent (where the desire and the belief must be app­
ropriately related to one another and to the action they jointly explain). 
Some philosophers talk about this in terms of theory: They regard 
desires and beliefs as theoretical constructs which are parts of a 
common-sense psychological theory, or "folk theory", of deliberate 
action. Stich (1983) is one good example of such a philosopher, and 
Brandt (1979) is another: On Brandt's view, "desire" (the term he uses 
in this context is "valence", the genus of which desires and aversions are 
species) "/.../ is not an observation term, but a theoretical construct in 
a psychological theory, and its meaning is conferred on it by the laws in 
which appears /.../" (p 26)7. 
On a very common philosophical view (shared by philosophers as dif­
ferent as Aristotle, Hume and Ryle), this is the way in which action must 
be explained, i.e. every psychological explanation (common-sense or not) 
of a ction must include a reference to some desire and some belief. Why 
is this so? Wollheim (1991) is probably right when he claims that 
desire/belief psychology "is not so much a psychological theory as a 
pro forma for psychological explanations" (p xxviii). This suggests that 
desire and belief are internally related to action, i.e. that an action is, by 
definition, something which can be explained in terms of desire and 
belief8. Or alternatively put, to use the desire/belief schema to explain a 
piece of behaviour is to establish it as an action, since to see a piece of be­
haviour (or passivity) as an action (i.e. to view it from a psychological 
perspective) is to see it as "explainable" in terms of beliefs and desires9. 
So, it seems that the central issue here is really the following one: For 
an action to be (successfully) explained by reference to a desire and a 
belief, (a) how must the desire and the belief be related to one another, 
7This would not just "explain" why actions are explainable in terms of desires and 
beliefs; it would also explain why we can gain knowledge about what people want 
(and how much they want it) from observing and interpreting their actions (what 
they do and do not do). (But notice that we cannot infer what people want (etc.) 
from action and "inaction" only. For preference to be reflected in choice, certain 
conditions must be satisfied). 
8The suggestion is not, at this point, that every particular action is internally 
related to the particular desires and beliefs which explain it. Cf. the first idea in 
note 5 above. 
9As Wollheim points out (ibid., p xxix ff.), some of Freud's discoveries can be 
understood in this perspective. For instance, by introducing new explanatory 
factors (e.g., unconscious desires and beliefs), he "deepened", as Wollheim says, 
the desire/belief schema. And a part of the "meaning" of this deepening was that 
the number of behaviours we must regard as actions was "greatly enlarged". 
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and (b) how must they be related to the action they (jointly) explain? 
Suffice it to say that as far as (a) is concerned, most philosophers seem 
to have adopted the idea that a belief is (in this context) appropriately 
related to a desire if it is instrumental vis-à-vis this desire, if it specifies 
the best way that is, in the circumstances, open to the agent of satis­
fying the desire10. And as far as (b) is concerned, most philosophers 
have agreed on the following view: For a belief and a desire to be app­
ropriately related to an action (for the purpose of explanation), it is 
necessary that they make the action rational for the agent to do11. And 
since it is (on this view) rational for an agent to perform a certain action 
only if the agent believes that this very action is the optimal way of 
satisfying some desire of his, we can see that this idea is almost identical 
with what was said under (a)12. 
Let us now turn to (2) the question of h ow the above account of the 
relation between desire and action can be combined with the fact that 
most of our desires are not "fully functional". To see how this can 
(perhaps) be done, let us (for the purpose of i llustration) take a closer 
look at Brandt's (1979) theory of d esire. 
Desires and Action-tendencies: Brandt's theory 
To explain why our desires do not always manifest themselves in action, 
they must be viewed as connected primarily to action-tendencies or 
10
"The best way open to the agent...". That is, the best way open from the agent's 
point of view, rather than the (objectively speaking) best possible way. 
nBut on my view, this does not imply (as e.g., Wollheim, Elster, and Davidson 
seem to think) that the belief and the desire constitute the agent's reason to 
perform the action. The desire and the belief could also be regarded as giving him, 
in some way, a reason (as providing him with a reason, or contributing to his 
reason). 
12This is where the agreement ends, however. Some philosophers (e.g., Wollheim, 
Aristotle/Nussbaum, Elster, Maclntyre and Davidson) think that the answer that 
was just given to (b) is rather insufficient, and they want to add the idea that a 
desire and a belief cannot explain a certain action unless they jointly cause the 
action. To adopt this view is to conceive of psychological explanation as a kind of 
causal explanation; to be, in von Wright's (1971) terms, a causalist on this issue. 
Other philosophers (e.g., von Wright, Ryle, and Kenny) have (instead) adopted an 
intentionalist view, on which the connection between an action, on the one hand, 
and the desire and the belief which explain it, on the other, is conceptual rather 
than causal, and on which psychological explanations are not causal but sui 
generis. In this context, there is really no need to determine who is right, however; 
the important thing here is to see what the two positions have in common, viz. 
that they both conceive of desire as an explanatory notion, i.e. as something 
which plays a central role in the psychological explanation of an action. 
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behavioural dispositions, rather than to actual actions and actual beha­
viour. On this view, to desire something is to have a tendency to act in 
a certain way, or "to be disposed to" act in a certain way. 
So, how is the tendency to perform a certain action related to the 
actual performance of this action? On Brandt's view, the connection can 
be characterized as follows: An agent will actually perform action A if 
and only if " the tendency to perform A is stronger than the tendency 
to perform any other action B" (p 26). Brandt himself seems to regard 
the relation between action-tendency and action as a causal relation, but 
this is (I think) not necessary13. 
All this leaves room for different conceptions of the relation between 
desires, on the one hand, and action-tendencies or dispositions, on the 
other: For example, should our desires themselves be regarded as action-
tendencies or behavioural dispositions (as Smith seems to suggest), or 
should they (rather) be regarded as causally or conceptually related to 
(but not identical with) such action-tendencies and dispositions? This is 
how Brandt conceives of the relation between desires and action-
tendencies: To valence (want or be aversive to) a certain situation at a 
given time t is to be in a certain "central motive state". P wants (desires) 
X (that some situation obtains) at t if this central motive state "is such 
that if it were then to occur to him that a certain act of h is then would 
tend to bring /... / [X] about14, his tendency to perform that act would 
be increased" (ibid., p 26)15. 
13The same thing holds for the relation between P's disposition to X (e.g., to act in 
a certain way) in circumstances C and the "episodes" it disposes P to (i.e. X-ing): It 
too need not be regarded as a causal relation. As Smith (1994) points out, "it is a 
substantial philosophical thesis to claim that dispositions are causes" (p 114). 
14If it occurs to me that "if I do A, this is likely to bring X about"; is the occurrence 
of this idea independent of my desire that X? Probably not, at least not in most 
cases. As Brandt himself points out: "When some kind of event is valenced there is 
a disposition to think of such an event, or to notice ways of bringing it about" 
(ibid., p 27). 
15The "valence" which Brandt has in mind here is "occurrent valence", but there are 
also (on Brandt's view) two other fundamental kinds of valence, viz. effective 
valence and normal valence. This is how Brandt distinguishes between the three 
kinds of valences: A person P occurrently wants (at f) a situation X if all that is 
required at t, in order for a relevant change in an action-tendency to occur, is that 
he have a thought at t, to the effect that this action would tend to produce X (cf. 
ibid., p 28). If such an occurently valenced situation is in fact "before P's mind" at f, 
then this situation is effectively valenced. (This suggests that occurrent valences may 
be viewed as dispositions for effective valences: To have an occurrent desire that 
X is (roughly) to be disposed to have an effective desire that X in certain 
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Brandt seems to think that the connection between wants (occurrent 
as well as effective) and action-tendencies are (so to speak) both causal 
and conceptual. On the one hand, he explicitly claims that the two are 
lawfully related to each other, and on a normal interpretation of " law", 
this suggests that he conceives of the relation as causal. But on the 
other hand, he tells us (on p 26) that "valence" is a theoretical construct 
whose meaning is, in part, "conferred on it by the laws /.../ relating it 
to action-tendencies" (my italics), and (again on p 26) that action-
tendencies are indicative of valence, a nd "partially define its meaning" 
(my italics again). And this suggests that the relation is of a conceptual 
kind. This should probably be understood as follows: Particular desires 
and particular action-tendencies are causally related to each other, while 
the type desire (a theoretical construct) is (instead) conceptually related 
to the type action-tendency. 
It should be noted that Brandt's conception of desire (or "theory of 
valence") includes more than a specification of the relation between 
valences and action-tendencies. On his view, there are other tendencies 
(besides action-tendencies) "which are lawfully related to valence, indi­
cative of it, and partially define its meaning" (ibid., p 26). These 
"tendencies" are of four different kinds, viz.: 
(1) Tendencies to be disappointed in certain kinds of circumstances. 
Disappointment is regarded as evidence of positive valence, i.e. if it 
makes me disappointed that X does not obtain, then this suggests that I 
must have had a desire that X. 
(2) Tendencies to feel elation and to display "elation behaviour". 
(3) Tendencies to think certain kinds of thoughts: "When some kind 
of event is valenced there is a disposition to think of such an event, or 
to notice ways of bringing it about" (ibid., p 27). In my opinion, this is 
the feature of desire which is needed to explain why many of our 
desires are (like many of the virtues), in Oksenberg Rorty's (1988) 
terms, tropic dispositions, dispositions which lead its "carrier" to 
conditions, viz. when X (or a part of X) is before P's mind). A person has a normal 
valence for something if h e normally (under normal conditions) has an occurrent 
valence for it. But is it really reasonable to conceive of "normal valences" as 
"proper desires and aversions"? I think not. What Brandt calls normal valence is 
better regarded as some kind of second-order dispositions, or "traits (or states) of 
character". In any case, it doesn't take much reflection to see that "normal 
valences" are of no interest whatsoever to a desire theorist. Their relevance seems 
to be mainly of an explanatory kind. 
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gravitate to certain sorts of si tuations (cf. p 316). If I d esire something I 
tend to think of it often, and to notice ways in which I can realize it, 
and this gives in turn (because of the same desire) rise to certain action-
tendencies. The occurrence of the cognitions (thoughts, perceptions, 
etc.) which (when the desire is there) activate the relevant action-
tendencies are not always random occurrences. There are (of course) 
many cases where something presented to me "from the outside" 
activates ("awakens") my desire, but there are also cases where desires 
are, so to speak, activated "all by themselves", from the inside. 
(4) And at last, desires are also lawfully related to how easy it is to 
choose: The more "strength" a valence for a certain outcome has com­
pared to valences for other outcomes, the quicker (and the easier) I can 
(in situations of choice) make a decision16. 
The relation between desire and experience 
Before we end this appendix, let us just point out another problem that 
a functional conception of d esire has to deal with. Let us first note that 
this conception is not really compatible with the common sense idea that 
we are sometimes directly aware of our desires, or alternatively put, 
that at least some desires have "felt intensities", or "phenomenological 
content essentially". (The reason for this is simple: Dispositions are not 
things of which we can be directly aware)17. This means that the func­
tional theorist has to deal with the following question: "If our desires 
never have experiential content, and if they are never directly experien­
ced, how should the connection between those of our desires that are 
"seemingly felt" (e.g., bodily appetites like hunger, thirst, or sexual cra­
ving) and the relevant conscious experiences (our "feelings of want") be 
characterized?" Or alternatively put (if we assume that the functional 
theorist regards the relevant "feelings of want" as representations of 
desires): "What is it for a (particular) desire to be represented in con­
scious experience? If a particular desire is represented in a certain parti­
cular (introspectible) experience, how should the relation between the 
16One might ask what notion of s trength Brandt has in mind here: is it perhaps 
motivational force? 
17However, this does not mean that a functional theorist would deny that "on 
occasion, when I have a desire, I have certain psychological feelings, analogous of 
bodily sensations" (Smith (1994), p 105). He does not regard these "feelings of 
want" as content of the desire, however, but as something with which the desire is 
linked or correlated, or as something which accompanies the desire. 
460 
two be characterized?" (I will not discuss any possible answers to this 
question, however; I just wanted to present the problem). 
This completes the characterization of the functional conception of 
desire. To repeat, it is likely that the conception of desire which makes 
the desire theory most relevant is some kind of f unctional conception, 
but this is not anything we should take for granted. After all, the 
important thing is that the desire theorist accepts the rudimentary con­
ception of desire that was presented on pp 169-172 above. 
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Summary 
The main purpose of t his thesis is to find the most plausible answers to 
the following three substantive questions of prudential value (or well-
being): (I) What does a person's well-being consist in: what has final 
value for a person? (II) How do we determine just how valuable a cer­
tain situation (or fact) is for a certain person? And (III) how do we 
determine how well off a person is on the whole (at a certain time)? In 
section 1.1,1 formulate these questions as clearly and precisely as I can. 
The way in which I try to achieve the purpose of the thesis is by con­
ducting a critical examination of three common types of a nswers which 
have been given to the central questions, viz. hedonistic theories, desire 
theories, and "objective list theories". (A survey of t hese traditional an­
swers is offered in section 1.2). For each of these "theories of pruden­
tial value" (or "conceptions of well-being"), I first give a formulation of 
the theory which is as precise as possible (and which makes the theory 
as plausible as possible). I then try to find out whether the theory in 
question is a plausible theory, by looking at a number of arguments that 
can be given for and against the theory. This critical discussion of a 
number of traditional theories constitutes the major part of the book, 
and in the course of this discussion, my own theory will slowly take 
shape. 
The first theory I look at is the hedonistic theory. The pure version of 
this theory can be characterized as follows: (HI) The Experience 
Requirement: The only facts that can have nonderivative value for a 
person at a certain time are facts about his or her own experience at 
that time. (H2) More specifically, the only thing that is nonderivatively 
good for a person is to have pleasant experiences, and the only thing 
that is nonderivatively bad for a person is to have unpleasant experi­
ences. (H3) The Thesis of Unrestrictedness: All pleasant experiences are 
nonderivatively good for the experiencing subject, and all unpleasant 
experiences are nonderivatively bad, regardless of what other proper­
ties these experiences have. (H4) Every good experience is good in vir­
tue of its pleasantness only, and every bad experience is bad in virtue 
of its unpleasantness only. (H5) The "intensity-orientation" and the idea 
of p roportionality: The value of an experience for the person who has it 
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is a function of one thing only, viz. how pleasant or unpleasant it is, and 
this value is (moreover) proportional to how pleasant or unpleasant the 
experience is. (H6) The final value that a certain life (at a certain time) 
has for the person who is living it is a function of how much pleasure 
and how much suffering this life contains. The more pleasure it contains, 
the better, and the more suffering it contains, the worse. 
In chapter 2,1 try to formulate these claims in a more precise way. In 
particular, I discuss how the terms "pleasantness" and "unpleasantness" 
should be interpreted in this context. What conceptions of the pleasant 
and the unpleasant do different hedonists have in mind, and (above all) 
what conception of pleasantness and unpleasantness makes (if com­
bined with the hedonistic theory) the theory most plausible? 
In connection with this, I argue that preference-hedonism is more 
plausible than the quality hedonisms, or alternatively, that the pure 
version of the hedonistic theory is most plausible if it incorporates the 
relational theory of pleasantness. On this view, the pleasantness and 
unpleasantness of a person's experiences are somehow constituted by 
certain kinds of desires and aversions (likes and dislikes) that the 
person has. Or more specifically, an experience is pleasant if and only if 
(and because) the following conditions are met: (i) The experiencing 
subject has some kind of pro-attitude towards the experience: he 
desires it, likes it, approves of it, or the like, (ii) The experience is 
desired (etc.) by the experiencing subject when it occurs, (iii) The expe­
rience is desired in a certain way, viz. "in and for itself", i.e. intrinsically, 
or "as a goal", i.e. "finally". An alternative to (iii) is 
(iv) the reason why the experiencing subject desires to have the expe­
rience is (at least in part) that it has certain felt qualities. 
The main purpose of chapter 3 is to find out, first, whether any version 
of the hedonistic theory is a plausible theory of prudential value, and 
second, which version of the theory is most well-founded, pure hedo­
nism or some kind of modified hedonism. After having examined a 
number of a rguments that have (or can) be given for and against diffe­
rent versions of the theory, I reach the following conclusions: 
There are a number of strong arguments against pure hedonism, and 
this theory should therefore be rejected. First, pleasure is not all that 
matters; there are other things besides pleasure (and experience) which 
matter to us. How well off a person is (on the whole) is not just depen-
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dent ori how pleasant his total mental state is, but also on other things, 
e.g., how much desire-fulfilment there is in his life. Moreover, it seems 
that certain situations have nonderivative value for a person even 
though they do not have any pleasant experiential content at all. And 
second, there are certain pleasures which are not good for us to have, 
e.g., pleasant emotions the intentional objects of which are "objectively 
unpleasant". 
On the positive side, there is (obviously) some truth in the hedonistic 
theory. It is not just that it is almost always nonderivatively good for us 
to feel pleasure; pleasure is also an important good. Moreover, it seems 
plausible to assume that a person's well-being can not be directly 
affected (at least not for the better) by things he doesn't know 
anything about. 
I also suggest that the most plausible version of the hedonistic theory 
is a modified version of the theory, a theory which includes (among 
other things) the following elements: (R2) If the object of a pleasant 
emotion is an "objectively unpleasant" situation (e.g., being humiliated), 
it is not nonderivatively good for the subject to have the emotion. 
(RW2) It is ceteris paribus better to have pleasant emotions that are 
based on true beliefs than to have pleasant emotions that are based on 
false beliefs. The strongest arguments against pure hedonism do not hit 
this type of modified hedonism, and we should therefore be reluctant 
to reject it. 
I then turn my attention to the satisfaction interpretation of t he actual 
desire theory. The unrestricted version of this theory can be characte­
rized as follows: (Dl) Nothing but (actual) desire-fulfilment can be non­
derivatively good for a person, and nothing but aversion-fulfilment can 
be nonderivatively bad for a person. (UD2) The thesis of 
Unrestrictedness: There are no intrinsic desires that it is not nonderi­
vatively good for a person to have fulfilled, and there are no intrinsic 
aversions that it is not nonderivatively bad to have fulfilled. (UD3) The 
positive (or negative) value that a certain desire-fulfilment (or aversion-
fulfilment) has for a certain desiring subject is proportional to how 
strong the desire (or aversion) is. (UD4) The value that a certain life has 
for the person who is living it is a function of h ow much desire-fulfil­
ment and how much aversion-fulfilment this life "contains". The more 
desire-fulfilment and the less aversion-fulfilment a life contains, the 
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better this life is for the person who lives it. 
In chapter 4,1 try to give more precise formulations of these claims, 
viz. by discussing the following four topics: 
(1) What is it for someone to desire something? How should the key 
terms "desire" and "aversion" be understood in this context? What 
possible conception of desire makes (if combined with the desire 
theory) the theory most plausible? In answer to this question, I propose 
that we accept the following rudimentary conception of desire: (i) 
Desires and aversions are prepositional attitudes: the objects of desire 
are situations (or situations-under-descriptions), and to desire some­
thing is to desire that some situation obtains, i.e. that something is the 
case, or that some proposition is true, (ii) Desires are pro-attitudes, 
while aversions are con-attitudes, no matter how the contents (objects) 
of these attitudes are specified, (iii) Moreover, we should understand 
the term "desire" in a very broad sense. On the relevant use of 
"desire", the class of desire includes things as different as volitions and 
intentions, appetites and longings, projects and purposes, requirements 
and demands, wishes and regrets, i.e. the class of desire is, in many 
respects, a very heterogeneous class, (iv) It is also desirable that a con­
ception of desire does not deviate too much from the ordinary uses of 
the term "desire", especially not from its "explanatory" or "theoretical" 
use. 
(2) What is it for a desire to be stronger than another desire? What 
notion of strength makes an "intensity-oriented" desire theory most 
plausible. Here, I suggest that we should understand the term 
"strength" as rank in a preference ordering (where preference is not 
understood in terms of felt intensity or motivational force). On this 
view, a person's desire that X is stronger than his desire that Y if and 
only if he prefers X to Y. 
(3) What it is to have a desire fulfilled (or satisfied)? The terms 
"fulfilled" and "fulfilment" are normally understood in the following 
way: A person's desire that a situation X obtains is fulfilled if and only if 
he desires that X and X holds, and a person's aversion to a situation Y 
is fulfilled if a nd only if he has an aversion to Y and Y obtains. But does 
this "traditional" notion of fulfilment really make the desire theory 
plausible? Is it really plausible to allow for the possibility that a person's 
well-being can be directly affected by things he does not know 
anything about, or that it can be nonderivatively good for us to have 
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our prospective (and retrospective) desires fulfilled? I think not. On my 
view, we should replace the broad (traditional) notion of fulfilment with 
the idea that P's desire that X is fulfilled (in the relevant sense) if and 
only if P desires that X, X hol ds, and the desire and its object are simul­
taneous (the time of the desire coincides with the time of the occurrence 
of X). Furthermore, I suggest (in chapter 5) that on the notion of fu lfil­
ment which has most "moral and rational significance", a desire is not 
fulfilled unless the subject is aware of the occurrence of the object. 
(4) What is it for a desire to be intrinsic? What notion of intrinsicality 
makes (if adopted) the "intrinsicality condition" most plausible? Here, I 
suggest that we should reject both (i) the idea that a situation is desired 
intrinsically if and only it is desired for its intrinsic properties, or in iso­
lation, rather than for its relational properties, and (ii) the idea that a 
desire is intrinsic if and only it is underived rather than derived. 
Instead, we should accept (iii) the idea that a situation is desired intrin­
sically if and only it is desired "finally", i.e. as an end, rather than 
instrumentally, i.e. as a means. 
The central questions in chapter 5 are questions of plausibility. By loo­
king at a number of arguments that can be given for and against diffe­
rent versions of the actual desire theory, I try to find out first, what 
possible version of the theory that is the most plausible theory of pru­
dential value, and second, whether this (most plausible) version of the 
theory a plausible theory of prudential value, i.e. whether any version 
of the theory is plausible. 
This is my answer to the first question: First, the most plausible ver­
sion of the desire theory is a restricted theory: it claims that only some 
kinds of i ntrinsic now-for-now desires should be regarded as relevant. 
More specifically, if a person P has an intrinsic now-for-now desire that 
X, the theory claims that it is nonderivatively good for P to have the 
desire fulfilled (in the traditional sense) if and only if the following con­
ditions are satisfied: (i) X is a part of P's life, (ii) If th e desire is derived: 
It is derivable from the whole truth about its object (and more funda­
mental intrinsic desires), (iii) If the desire is underived: It is not causally 
dependent on (maintained by) certain kinds of false beliefs or 
"ignorances", viz. on beliefs (etc.) whose propositional contents stand in 
a close enough conceptual relation to the propositional content of the 
desire, (iv) X is not a situation that is "worth avoiding" (in the pruden-
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tial sense), (v) P is aware of the fact that X is (in fact) desired by him. 
(vi) P is aware of the fact that X obtains. (But with the following pro­
viso: It may sometimes be bad for a person to have an aversion fulfilled, 
even if he is unaware of the occurrence of i ts object, viz. if the object 
has negative prudential desirability-value). Next, the theory also makes 
certain claims about how we should determine which of two relevant 
desires that is better for the desiring subject to have fulfilled. The fun­
damental idea is of course that relevance is a function of s trength, but 
there is one possible exception to this rule, viz. (vii) that desires for situ­
ations that are worth desiring (in the prudential sense) are more rele­
vant than desires whose objects are not (in this sense) worth desiring. 
(It is worth noting that this most plausible version of t he desire theory 
contains certain "objectivist elements", viz. (iv) and (vii)). 
So, is this theory a plausible theory of prudential value? Well, its posi­
tive claims seem correct: if a person has a desire that is (on the theory) 
relevant, then it is also good for this person to have the desire fulfilled 
(in the relevant sense). However, desire-fulfilment is not the only thing 
that is good for us; it is also good for us to feel pleasure. 
The third type of traditional theory is "non-internalist pluralism" (or 
"the objective list theory". Theories of this type make the following cen­
tral claims: (1) There are several (universal) prudential values: the facts 
that have nonderivative value for us are of s everal types. (2) It is not 
the case that all the facts that have nonderivative value for a person are 
internal to this person. (This implies that at least some of the facts that 
have nonderivative value for a person P are not of the type "P feels 
pleasure"). (3) At least some of the "non-internal" facts that have non-
derivative value for P are not of the type "P has a desire fulfilled". 
None of these claims are substantive evaluative claims, however. 
Non-internalist pluralism is not a substantive evaluative theory, but a 
type of substantive theory, and the different versions of the "theory" 
need not ("substantively speaking") have anything in common. This 
means that no "objective list theory" can really be assessed as such: it is 
concrete versions of the theory (specific substantive claims about what 
has prudential value), and nothing else, that can be assessed. So, in 
order to find out whether the most plausible theory of p rudential value 
is of this type (whether there are any prudential values that fit the 
description in (l)-(3) above), we need to look at what types of relatio-
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nal or external facts non-internalist pluralists have actually regarded as 
valuable. We can then ask, for each suggested type of fact, whether it is 
really plausible to attribute prudential value to facts of this type. 
In chapter 6, we look at some of the substantive evaluative claims 
which have been made by various pluralists. The purpose of the chapter 
is merely to generate a list of possible non-internal facts which have 
nonderivative value for all human beings. The positive items that seems 
(to me) most important are classified into seven groups, viz. (1) activities 
and other "agent-goods", (2) social and relational goods, (3) experi­
ences and other mental states, (4) to be (qua experiencing and thinking 
subject) in contact with reality, (5) to be a certain kind of person 
and/or to live one's life in a certain way (to function in a certain way), 
(6) personal development, and (7) freedom. 
In chapter 7, we ask whether any of the claims made by non-internalist 
pluralists are plausible. A central question here is of course what kinds 
of a rguments that can be given for such claims. Can any universal sub­
stantive claims of the form "All non-intrinsic facts of type X ar e non-
derivatively good for all human beings" be justified, and if so, how? In 
particular, what would an acceptable subject-oriented justification of 
such a claim look like: what is it about us (about our nature, or 
"constitution") that makes it nonderivatively good for all of us to have 
friends, or to be engaged in creative activity? 
My conclusion is that we have little or no reason to accept any of t he 
relevant non-internalist claims: In particular, it seems highly unlikely that 
there is any human nature account that can provide an objectivist 
subject-oriented justification of th e relevant non-internalist claims. And 
since the other attempts to justify the relevant claims are no good 
either, and since the counter-arguments against the non-internalist 
pluralist theories are (on my view) strong enough to place the burden 
of proof on the pluralists, we should reject all such theories. 
Or more specifically, we should reject the idea that there are objective 
prudential values such that it is good for all of us to "possess" these 
things, regardless of whether we regard these "objective goods" 
favourably or unfavourably. That is, we should reject the "tough-
minded" (literal, or strong) interpretation of the idea that there are 
objective and universal prudential values; and we should reject the cor­
responding strong (pure) version of "the objective list theory". 
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However, there are "objective prudential values" such that their pre­
sence make certain wholes more prudentially valuable than they would 
otherwise have been. There are "objective prudential values" such that 
it is ceteris paribus nonderivatively better for a person to take pleasure 
in these things than to take pleasure in other things, and such that it is 
ceteris paribus nonderivatively better for a person to have his desires 
for these things fulfilled than to have his desires for other things ful­
filled. 
In chapter 8, I present my own mixed theory, a theory which is con­
structed in such a way so as to be able to stand up to all the objections 
which have been directed against the other theories. This theory gives 
the following answers to the central questions (I)-(III): 
(I) There are two kinds of situations that are nonderivatively good 
for a person, viz. (a) to have certain kinds of p leasant experiences, and 
(b) to have his relevant intrinsic now-for-now desires fulfilled, but only 
on the assumption that he is aware of t he objects of these desires. This 
answer to (I) is in part hedonistic and in part desire theoretical. "The 
objective list theory" enters the picture as follows: First, it is not good 
for a person to take pleasure in something that is on the negative objec­
tive list, and second, it is not good for a person to have a desire fulfilled 
if its object is on the same negative list. 
(II) How do we determine just how (nonderivatively) valuable a cer­
tain (good) situation is for a certain person? (a) In the case of v aluable 
pleasures, the value that it has for a person to have such an experience 
is normally a function of how pleasant the experience is. But sometimes, 
the prudential value of a p leasant experience is also dependent on other 
things, e.g., on whether it is based on true or false beliefs, or on 
whether its object is on the positive objective list, (b) In the case of 
valuable desire-fulfilments, the value that it has for a person to have a 
relevant desire fulfilled is normally a function of how strong the desire 
is. But sometimes, the value that it has for a person to have a relevant 
desire fulfilled does not just depend on how strong it is, but also on 
other things, viz. on whether or not the object of the desire is worth 
desiring (in the prudential sense). This part of the answer to (II) is in 
part hedonistic, in part desire theoretical, in part a combination between 
hedonism and "the objective list theory", and in part a combination 
between the desire theory and "the objective list theory". However, 
470 
there are also a number of w ays in which the hedonistic theory and the 
desire theory can be combined. 
(Ill) This is how our mixed theory suggest that we determine how 
well off a certain person is (on the whole, and at a certain time): A 
person's well-being is (roughly) a function of how much valuable plea­
sure and how much valuable desire-fulfilment there is in his life. If w e 
formulate the idea in terms of happiness, we get: A person's level of 
well-being is (roughly) a function of how happy (satisfied) he is with his 
existence, but only on the assumption that the affective component is 
based on true beliefs on what his existence is like. But we should also 
include the idea that there are certain "objective prudential values", viz. 
in the following way: The happiness (satisfaction) which determines 
how well off a person is on the whole must (so to speak) "include" how 
satisfied he is in a number of "ob jectively pre-determined" areas, and a 
person's level of sa tisfaction in the relevant areas must (roughly spea­
king) be "in line with" the different objective values. In short, to be well 
off is to be happy for the right reason. 
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